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Preface 
My work on retirement wealth and retirement adequacy was originally 
stimulated by two articles by Martin Feldstein (1974, 1976), which introduced 
the concept of Social Security wealth and developed its methodology, and 
considered the effects of Social Security wealth on the overall distribution 
of wealth. The latter paper was based on the 1962 Survey of Financial 
Characteristics of Consumers. My work up until that point focused on the 
inequality of household wealth, beginning with a 1980 paper using the so-
called Measurement of Economic and Social Performance (MESP) database, 
a 1969 synthetic database on household wealth constructed from a statistical 
match of the 1970 Decennial Census Public Use Microdata Sample and the 
1969 Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income tax ﬁle. 
Feldstein (1976) found that the inclusion of Social Security wealth had a 
major effect on lowering the inequality of total household wealth (including 
Social Security wealth). The Gini coefﬁcient—a measure of inequality that 
ranges from zero (complete equality) to one (total inequality)—for the sum of 
net worth and Social Security wealth among families in the age class 35–64 
was 0.51, compared to a Gini coefﬁcient of 0.72 for net worth. 
My ﬁrst article in this area, Wolff (1987b), followed up Feldstein (1976) 
by examining the distributional implications of both Social Security and 
deﬁ ned beneﬁt private pension wealth. I was particularly interested in whether 
Feldstein’s results on the equalizing effects of Social Security wealth persisted 
when private pension wealth was also included. Did retirement wealth as a 
whole lower measured wealth inequality to the same degree that Feldstein 
found for just Social Security wealth? 
Wolff (1987b) used the 1969 MESP database. His was perhaps the ﬁrst 
paper to add estimates of private pension wealth to standard household net 
worth and examine its effects on the overall distribution of wealth. The 
paper, like that of Feldstein (1976), showed that Social Security wealth had a 
pronounced equalizing effect on the distribution of augmented wealth (the sum 
of marketable wealth and retirement wealth). However, pension wealth had 
a disequalizing effect on augmented wealth. In particular, while the addition 
of Social Security wealth to net worth reduced the overall Gini coefﬁcient 
from 0.73 to 0.48, the addition of pension wealth to the sum of net worth and 
Social Security wealth raised the Gini coefﬁcient back to 0.66. The sum of 
Social Security and pension wealth had, on net, an equalizing effect on the 
distribution of augmented wealth but substantially less than did Social Security 
wealth alone. I also followed up this work with Wolff (1992), which provided 
xiii 
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a discussion of some of the methodological issues involved in estimating both 
Social Security and pension wealth. 
In the early 1990s, I turned my attention to the redistributional effects of 
the Social Security system. Wolff (1993a,b), using the 1962 Survey of Finan-
cial Characteristics of Consumers and the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, 
examined the intra-cohort distributional effects of Social Security beneﬁts 
relative to contributions into the Social Security system. The papers consid-
ered which groups were net gainers and which were net losers from the Social 
Security system as a whole. 
I ﬁrst divided Social Security beneﬁts into two components: 1) an annuity 
component, which is the beneﬁt level that would be strictly determined by the 
person’s contributions into the Social Security system, and 2) the remainder, 
the transfer component. The transfer component, as its name indicates, is the 
additional beneﬁt paid to retirees over and above the amount strictly justiﬁed 
as an annuity payment. The results indicated that the Social Security system is 
highly redistributive, paying out higher beneﬁts relative to accumulated con-
tributions for lower- than for upper-income families. Moreover, the paper also 
found that the transfer component of Social Security beneﬁts fell over time, 
from an overall ratio of 0.85 in 1969 to 0.73 in 1973, and to 0.66 in 1983. 
After an almost decade-long hiatus, I returned to the issue of retirement 
wealth. In my presidential address to the Eastern Economics Association at its 
2003 annual conference, held in New York, I called attention to the remarkable 
transformation of the American pension system. In particular, I reported on the 
rapid decline in pension coverage from traditional deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans and 
the equally stunning rise in coverage from newer deﬁned contribution plans. 
My main focus was again on the effects of pension wealth on overall wealth 
inequality. Using data from the 1983, 1989, and 1998 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, I charted changes in the share of households in the age group 47–64 
with each type of pension coverage from 1983 to 1998, and reported that the 
share with a deﬁned contribution pension plan climbed from 12 to 60 percent 
while the share with a deﬁ ned beneﬁt plan fell from 69 to 46 percent. I also 
found that deﬁned contribution wealth was distributed much more unequally 
than deﬁ ned beneﬁt pension wealth. As a result, the switchover in pension 
systems raised the inequality of pension wealth overall, and the inequality of 
total wealth, including pension wealth, advanced from 1983 to 1998 at a pace 
greater than that of standard net worth alone. This work was later updated to 
the year 2001 in Wolff (2007c). 
In two books for the Economic Policy Institute, Wolff (2002b) and Weller 
and Wolff (2005), I focused on time trends in pension wealth, retirement 
wealth, and total or augmented wealth, which is the sum of standard net worth 
and retirement wealth. I also investigated the issue of retirement income ad-
xiv 
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equacy—that is, whether future retirees will have enough ﬁnancial resources to 
provide an adequate standard of living. The results indicated strong growth in 
pension wealth, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth from 1983 to 2001, 
and an improvement in retirement adequacy as measured by expected retire-
ment income. However, there were still some important gaps in this picture, 
particularly for minorities and single females, who had much lower augmented 
wealth and expected retirement income than their counterparts. 
 On a somewhat different topic, in Wolff (2007a) I compared the well-
being of the baby boom generation (ages 40–55) in 2001 with the same age 
group in 1983 to see how their fortunes had changed over time. The paper found 
little evidence that their relative position had deteriorated over the period. By 
some indicators, this generation actually saw an improvement. In terms of 
income, the 40 –55 age group was at about the same relative position in 2001 
as in 1983, though in terms of conventional wealth, there was some slippage 
over the period. In terms of mean augmented wealth (net worth plus pension 
and Social Security wealth), their relative position improved somewhat, but 
in terms of median augmented wealth there was again some relative decline. 
The present volume both updates and expands my earlier work on these 
issues. I once again look at time trends in pension coverage, the value of 
pension plans, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth, as well as changes in 
wealth inequality and retirement adequacy over time. I also look at differences 
between demographic groups as deﬁned by age, race, marital status, and 
education. My particular focus here is on the period from 2001 to 2009. As 
we shall see, there was a marked reversal in the fortunes of most Americans 
in regard to these factors in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century as 
compared to the “booming” 1980s and 1990s. 
xv 
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1 
Introduction 
The last three decades have witnessed the radical transformation of 
the American pension system. In Wolff (2003), I call attention to this 
change which had been occurring since the early 1980s. I report that 
the share of households in the age group 47–64 with a deﬁ ned contribu-
tion (DC) pension plan soared from 12 percent in 1983 to 60 percent in 
1998, while the share with a deﬁ ned beneﬁt (DB) plan plummeted from 
69 to 46 percent. Subsequently, in Wolff (2007c), I calculate that the 
share with a DC plan rose to 62 percent in 2001, while the share with a 
DB plan fell to 45 percent. I sometimes refer to this changeover as the 
“great transformation.” 
This volume focuses primarily on changes in the U.S. pension sys-
tem from 1983 to 2009. However, attention is paid to the entire retire-
ment system, including the role of Social Security. In earlier papers, 
estimates were provided for the years 1983 to 2001 on the basis of the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (see 
Weller and Wolff 2005; Wolff 2002b, 2003, 2007a,b,c). With the avail-
ability of the 2004 and 2007 SCF, estimates of retirement wealth and 
retirement adequacy are updated here to 2007. 
The primary question of interest is who gained from and who was 
hurt by the “great transformation.” Five major developments will be 
addressed: First, how has the transformation affected the pension hold-
ings of workers? Second, how has it impacted both the pension wealth 
and the total retirement wealth (the sum of pension and social security 
wealth) of the average median household? Third, which demographic 
and income groups in particular gained in terms of pension and total 
retirement wealth, and which lost out? Fourth, has the transformation of 
the pension system led to greater overall inequality in pension wealth, 
in total retirement wealth, and in augmented wealth (the sum of net 
worth and retirement wealth)? Fifth, what implications does the trans-
formation have for the adequacy of retirement income, as measured by 
the absolute level of expected retirement income, its replacement rate of 
preretirement income, and the expected poverty rate of future retirees? 
1 
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2 Wolff 
Though the empirical analysis contained in the book concerns 
exclusively the consequences of the transformation of the pension sys-
tem on the wealth and retirement adequacy of U.S. households, it might 
be useful to speculate on some of the causes behind this rapid transfor-
mation. There are three reasons why employers might prefer DC plans 
to DB plans: 1) DC plans allow ﬁrms to shift the risk to workers, 2) 
ﬁrms no longer have long-term pension liabilities, and 3) employers 
generally make lower contributions to DC plans than DB plans.1 
There were some pulls and pushes as well. With regard to the “pull,” 
the main reason was the availability of DC plans. Individual Retirement 
Accounts were ﬁrst established in 1974. This was followed by 401(k) 
plans in 1978 for proﬁt-making companies (403[b] plans for nonproﬁts 
are much older). Another reason was the option to convert DB pen-
sion plans to so-called cash balance plans (effectively, DC accounts). In 
1999, a lawsuit was initiated by older IBM employees when IBM tried 
to convert its DB pension plan to a cash balance plan. Though the court 
initially ruled in favor of the employees, this decision was overturned 
on appeal, and regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
made such conversions legal. This probably helped to further expedite 
the elimination of DB plans.2 
With regard to the “push,” the ﬁrst reason for it was likely the pas-
sage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 
1974, which increased regulatory burdens on DB plans and made DB 
plans more costly. ERISA put restrictions on how companies could 
manage and administer their pension assets: it mandated that companies 
must put money into pension funds to meet future liabilities and must 
pay out beneﬁts. ERISA also required companies to pay premiums to 
the Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation, which was created in 1974 
to insure their pension plans. A second was the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1987, which established even tighter funding limits on 
DB plans. A third push came from the decline of unions in the United 
States. According to Current Population Survey data, the unionization 
rate fell from 20 percent in 1983 to 13 percent in 2001. Unions had been 
one of the bulwarks supporting the traditional DB pension system.3 
Wolff.indb 3  11/21/2011 9:16:47 AM   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 3 
A PRÉCIS OF THE BOOK 
This section provides a brief synopsis of the book’s principal ﬁnd-
ings in order to help the reader navigate through the rather dense set 
of empirical research presented in the ensuing chapters. There are six 
major questions in the book: 
1) With the “great transformation,” did pension coverage expand 
or contract over time? 
2) Did the value of pension wealth increase or decline? 
3) Did overall wealth inequality rise or fall? 
4) Did the retirement prospects of middle-aged Americans 
improve or worsen? 
5) How did the “great transformation” affect different demo-
graphic groups? 
6) How did these effects vary between the 1980s, the 1990s, and 
particularly the 2000s? 
The results are very sensitive to time periods and particularly to 
movements in the stock market. The stock market boomed during the 
1980s and especially the 1990s but softened during the 2000s. The 
elimination of DB plans in the 1980s hurt workers in terms of pen-
sion coverage, particularly among the elderly, but because of the rapid 
growth of DC plans in the 1990s, overall pension coverage expanded. 
In contrast, during the 2000s, pension coverage suffered a mild contrac-
tion. However, at least among current workers, the pension coverage 
rate for females increased from 1989 to 2007, while the rate for men 
declined. 
The value of DC pension plans is especially sensitive to stock mar-
ket developments, and the deﬁned contribution pension system works 
very well when the stock market booms. DC pension wealth gained in 
the 1980s and then grew enormously in the 1990s as coverage expanded 
and the stock market roared. However, as coverage slackened in the 
2000s and the stock market weakened, gains in DC pension wealth 
slowed down. When the stock market tanked from 2007 to 2009, DC 
pension wealth actually plummeted. The period 2001–2009 was indeed 
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a “lost decade” in terms of DC pension wealth, with absolutely no net 
gains over the decade. 
Despite the elimination of many DB plans, overall pension wealth 
(the sum of DB and DC pension wealth) continued to grow in the 1980s, 
1990s, and even during the years 2001–2007, though gains during the 
early and mid-2000s were much smaller than those in the preceding 
decades. However, overall pension wealth during the entire decade of 
the 2000s showed a sizable decline. One group that did well over that 
decade was the elderly, mainly because many of them remained “lega-
cies” of the traditional DB pension system, in which by law their pen-
sion beneﬁts could not be reduced. 
The story is not complete without considering the ancillary role of 
the Social Security system. Social Security ﬁlls many holes in the rather 
porous private pension system. Social Security wealth, like (private) 
pension wealth, grew strongly in the 1990s. However, during the 2000s, 
its gain slowed markedly. Retirement wealth, the sum of pension and 
Social Security wealth, showed marked improvement in the 1990s but, 
again, much slower advances in the 2000s. 
When standard net worth is added to retirement wealth to produce 
augmented wealth, this addition creates the most comprehensive mea-
sure of retirement resources. The results show that mean augmented 
wealth grew very strongly in the 1990s but that gains were much 
weaker in the 2000s. Indeed, median augmented wealth showed almost 
no change among middle-aged and elderly households and actually 
declined in absolute terms among younger households. Indeed, younger 
households were found to be particularly vulnerable as a group, and 
their retirement prospects appear to have faded over time. 
In the case of inequality trends, there is not much differentiation 
between the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. One notable ﬁnding is that DC 
pension wealth is distributed much more unequally than traditional DB 
pension wealth. As a result, the transition from the DB system to the 
DC system resulted in higher levels of inequality of pension wealth, 
retirement wealth, and augmented wealth. In particular, there was an 
increase in the overall inequality of augmented wealth between 1989 
and 2007. This result contrasts with almost no change in the inequality 
of net worth over these years. 
In 2007, there were large gaps in pension wealth, retirement wealth, 
and augmented wealth between minority households and the white 
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majority, between single females and married couples, and between col-
lege graduates and other educational groups. However, minority house-
holds generally showed strong progress in terms of pension, retirement, 
and augmented wealth relative to white households. Likewise, single 
female households generally showed gains relative to married couples 
in these three dimensions. In contrast, less educated households gener-
ally lost out relative to college graduates in terms of pension, retire-
ment, and augmented wealth. 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 provides an update of wealth trends on the basis of the 
standard deﬁnition of net worth: marketable assets less debts. This sets 
the stage for the remainder of the book. The chapter ﬁrst discusses the 
sources and methods for the data used in this study. The data sources 
used for this study are the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF conducted 
by the Federal Reserve Board. Each survey consists of a core repre-
sentative sample combined with a high-income supplement. The SCF 
provides considerable detail on both pension plans and Social Security 
contributions. The SCF also gives detailed information on expected 
pension and Social Security beneﬁts for both spouses. 
Chapter 2 then analyzes trends in median and mean wealth, the 
inequality of wealth, wealth composition, stock ownership, and wealth 
by race, ethnicity, and age group. An update of household wealth to 
mid-2009 is also provided on the basis of movements in stock and hous-
ing prices. The chapter will thus serve as a backdrop to the analysis of 
retirement wealth and enable us to see what differences in wealth trends 
are engendered by the introduction of both pension wealth and Social 
Security wealth to the deﬁnition of household wealth. 
As will be seen, there was very strong growth in both mean and 
median net worth during the 2000s (2001–2007), as there was during 
the 1990s (1989–2001). There was a dramatic shift in the household 
portfolio away from liquid assets like savings accounts and money mar-
ket funds and into DC plans instead. The early and mid-2000s also wit-
nessed sharply rising family indebtedness, as the debt-to-income ratio 
by 2007 reached its highest level in almost 25 years, particularly among 
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the middle class. In contrast, wealth inequality remained ﬂat during the 
1990s as well as from 2001 to 2007. An update to mid-2009 indicates a 
very sharp drop in mean net worth and, particularly, median net worth, 
as well as a sharp rise in wealth inequality. 
Chapter 3 reviews some of the relevant literature on pensions and 
Social Security, which is important in order to provide a context for my 
later empirical ﬁndings. It focuses on the evolution of pension cover-
age rates, pension and Social Security wealth, and replacement rates 
for each. The chapter also discusses how pensions and Social Secu-
rity wealth affect inequality, both overall and between different demo-
graphic groups. 
The chapter is divided into six parts. The ﬁrst part reviews studies 
that have documented changes in pension coverage in the United States, 
particularly the decline in DB and the corresponding rise in DC pension 
coverage among workers since the early 1980s. It asks, did the great 
transformation raise or lower the level of pension wealth and retirement 
wealth in general? The second part surveys work on trends in both the 
level of retirement wealth as well as its degree of inequality. 
One ongoing controversy is whether DC plans such as 401(k) 
plans have, on net, added to total household savings, or whether they 
have simply substituted for other forms of savings. These studies are 
reviewed in the third part. Have workers saved enough (or will they 
save enough) to meet their needs during retirement? The fourth section 
delves into the literature on measuring retirement adequacy. In more 
general terms, how have the elderly fared over time? The next section 
reviews some of the studies that have attempted to measure the eco-
nomic status of the elderly. How did families fare during the “great 
recession” of 2007–2009? The ﬁnal part of Chapter 3 reviews studies 
that have tried to measure the effects of the 2007–2009 recession on the 
pension wealth holdings of households and their anticipated retirement 
behavior. 
In Chapter 4 I turn to the empirical analysis of pension and Social 
Security wealth. How did the great transformation affect pension cov-
erage in general? I ﬁrst analyze how pension coverage developed over 
the period 1989–2007 among individual workers and then investi-
gate trends in pension coverage on the household level over the more 
extended time interval, 1983–2007. If we now add pension wealth 
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to standard net worth to obtain what I call “private accumulations,” 
how has the level of private accumulations and its degree of inequality 
changed over time? 
In Chapter 5, I extend the empirical results reported in Chapter 4 by 
considering Social Security wealth, retirement wealth in general, and 
augmented wealth. Did Social Security wealth grow over time? What 
happened to total retirement wealth, the sum of pension and Social 
Security wealth? These are the ﬁrst two topics considered in the chapter. 
I next introduce the concept of total (augmented) household wealth, 
the sum of net worth, pension wealth, and Social Security wealth. 
While net worth is a limited measure of resource availability, aug-
mented wealth provides the most comprehensive measure of the full 
set of resources available to families for retirement. When I later con-
sider retirement adequacy, I shall once again rely on the concept of 
augmented wealth. How then did augmented wealth and its degree of 
inequality change from 1983 to 2007? This is the next set of topics to 
occupy us in the chapter. Finally, what happened to pension wealth and 
augmented wealth during the great recession? The last section of Chap-
ter 5 provides an update on these estimates to mid-2009 on the basis of 
changes in stock and housing prices. 
The results of Chapters 4 and 5 show a huge increase in pension 
wealth during the 1990s despite the collapse of the DB pension system, 
mainly because of the enormous take-up rate in DC pension plans (as 
discussed above) and extremely robust gains in the stock market (as we 
see in Chapter 2). However, in the 2000s, there was a marked slowdown 
in advances in pension wealth, as both the share of households with 
pensions declined a bit and stock prices advanced more slowly. Pri-
vate accumulations, which also showed substantial gains in the 1990s, 
showed smaller increases in the 2000s. Social Security wealth, like-
wise, jumped in the 1990s but was largely unchanged in the 2000s. As 
a result, both total retirement wealth and augmented wealth climbed 
sharply in the 1990s but showed only very modest gains in the 2000s. 
Finally, while the inequality of net worth remained largely unchanged 
from 1989 to 2007, the inequality of augmented wealth rose over the 
period, as more unequal DC wealth replaced more equal DB wealth. 
How did different demographic groups fare with regard to relative 
gains in pensions, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth? Chapter 
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6 investigates these issues for the period 1989–2007. For purposes of 
analysis, three divisions of the population are made: 1) race/ethnicity, 
2) marital status, and 3) educational attainment. As will be seen in this 
chapter, there was a remarkable turnaround in the relative fortunes of 
minorities, though signiﬁcant gaps between them and the white major-
ity still remained in 2007. Differentials in retirement wealth and aug-
mented wealth also generally narrowed between single females and 
married couples, though once again very large gaps remained in 2007. 
In contrast, differences in retirement and augmented wealth by educa-
tional group splayed out over the years, with college graduates in par-
ticular increasing their lead over the other educational groups. 
What was the level of retirement adequacy among households close 
to retirement in 2007, and how did this change over time from 1989 
to 2007? These are the subjects of Chapter 7. Retirement adequacy is 
measured in three different ways: 1) by calculating the stream of retire-
ment income that today’s older workers can expect at retirement from 
their accumulated wealth at the time of retirement, 2) by comparing 
their expected retirement income to the poverty line in order to measure 
the expected poverty rate at retirement, and 3) by the so-called replace-
ment rate, which calculates the ratio of expected retirement income to 
preretirement income. All three measures of retirement adequacy are 
computed for individual age groups and by race/ethnicity, marital sta-
tus, and educational attainment. 
The results of Chapter 7 show strong gains in expected retirement 
income for the age group 47–64 during the 1990s but a marked slow-
down in its growth from 2001 to 2007, even before the ﬁnancial melt-
down of 2007–2009. These ﬁndings are consistent with the pronounced 
decline in the rate of advance of augmented wealth between the 1990s 
and the 2000s (see Chapter 5). Households in this age group also saw a 
large reduction in their expected poverty rate at retirement from 1989 to 
2001. However, there was no further reduction in the expected poverty 
rate from 2001 to 2007. In contrast, the percentage of households with 
at least a 75 percent replacement rate rose somewhat more in the 2000s 
than it had in the 1990s, though the gains were quite modest in both 
periods. 
The last chapter, Chapter 8, presents a summary of the principal 
ﬁndings of this study, considers the policy implications of the study, 
and offers pertinent policy recommendations. I argue in favor of uni-
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versal pension coverage. For current workers, I propose guaranteed 
employer pension coverage for all workers in the company. For non-
workers below the age of retirement, I advocate a mixture of Individual 
Retirement Accounts and Individual Development Accounts supported 
by the federal government. I also make the case that the current Social 
Security system should be left largely intact. 
Notes 
1. Ghilarducci, Sun, and Nyce (2004) estimate that DC plans, on average, cost the 
employer less than traditional DB pension plans. They investigate the pension 
choices of over 800 ﬁrms between 1988 and 1996 using data on pension plan 
ﬁnances from the Internal Revenue Service Form 5500 and on ﬁrm ﬁ nances from 
Compustat. They calculate that a 10 percent increase in the use of 401(k) plans 
reduced pension costs per worker by 1.8 to 2.0 percent. However, it is not clear 
whether this reduction in pension costs could be reﬂected in higher wages paid to 
workers. See also Wolman and Colamosca (2002) for more discussion of these 
points. 
2. However, Gustman and Steinmeier (1992), examining the 1977–1985 period, con-
clude that regulatory changes could account for no more than half of the shift from 
DB to DC plans, at least over this period. 
3. Another factor that has been mentioned is greater worker mobility in the 1990s 
than in the 1980s. The argument is that because DB pensions are not portable 
between employers, workers who switch jobs may prefer DC to DB plans. Such 
an argument is made by Friedberg and Owyang (2004) using a contract-theoretic 
matching model with moral hazard. In their work, they show that a decline in the 
value of existing jobs relative to new jobs reduces the expected match duration 
and therefore the desirability of DB pensions. They ﬁnd that this explanation is 
consistent with observed trends in DB pension coverage. However, according to 
Farber (2001), there was virtually no change, on average, in the degree of job ten-
ure between the 1980s and the 1990s, casting some doubt on the increased worker 
mobility argument. 
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Recent Trends in 
Household Wealth, 1983–2009 
Robust Growth Followed by Collapse
It is useful to begin the empirical part of the book with a presenta-
tion of wealth trends based on the standard deﬁnition of wealth. This 
will serve as a backdrop for the rest of the book. In particular, we will 
see how our basic ﬁndings on wealth trends change when we include 
retirement wealth in the deﬁnition of household wealth. Moreover, we 
will be able to see some of the reasons for the plunge in wealth during 
the “great recession” of 2007–2009. 
The 1990s witnessed some remarkable events: the stock market 
boomed, stock ownership spread, and real wages, after stagnating for 
many years, ﬁnally grew. The prices of stocks listed on Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index surged 171 percent between 1989 and 2001, 
and by 2001 over half of U.S. households owned stock either directly or 
indirectly. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) ﬁ gures, real 
mean hourly earnings gained 8.3 percent between 1995 and 2001 (Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers 2009a).1 
However, 2001 saw a recession, albeit a short one. Moreover, the 
stock market, which had peaked in 2000, dropped steeply from 2000 to 
2003 but recovered in 2004, so that between 2001 and 2004 the S&P
500 was down by “only” 12 percent in real terms (Council of Economic 
Advisers 2009b).2 Real wages rose very slowly from 2001 to 2004: the 
BLS real mean hourly earnings rose by only 1.5 percent, while median 
household income dropped in real terms by 1.5 percent (Council of 
Economic Advisers 2009c). On the other hand, housing prices rose 
steeply. The median sales price of existing one-family homes rose by 
18 percent in real terms nationwide (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). The 
other big story was household debt, particularly that of the middle class, 
which skyrocketed during these years, as we shall see below. 
11 
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From 2004 to 2007, the stock market rebounded. The S&P 500 rose 
19 percent in real terms. Over the period 2001–2007, the S&P 500 was 
up 24 percent (6 percent in real terms). Real wages remained stagnant, 
as the BLS real mean hourly earnings rose by only 1.0 percent. Median 
household income in real terms showed some growth over this period, 
rising by 3.2 percent. From 2001 to 2007 it gained 1.6 percent. From 
2004 to 2007, housing prices slowed, as the median sales price of exist-
ing one-family nationwide advanced only 1.7 percent over these years 
in real terms. Over the years 2001 to 2007, real housing prices gained 
19 percent. 
Updating previous studies (Wolff 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002a, 
2007d), I ﬁnd that median net worth, the wealth of the average house-
hold, demonstrated robust growth over the years 1983–2007. In fact, the 
growth rate of median wealth accelerated from the 1980s to the 1990s 
and into the 2001–2007 period. However, the gains of that period were 
based largely on rising home prices ﬁnanced by increasing mortgage 
debt. This growth came to an abrupt end in 2007 with the collapse in 
home prices, and median wealth plummeted from 2007 through 2009. 
Household wealth inequality increased sharply between 1983 and 
1989. However, in a surprising development, this increase was followed 
by a period of almost no change in household wealth inequality from 
1989 to 2007. This trend during those years was unexpected because 
the two factors normally associated with wealth inequality, income 
inequality and the ratio of stock prices to home prices, both showed a 
marked rise over the same years. 
Between 1983 and 2007, and particularly from 1989 to 2001, there 
was a striking shift in the portfolio composition of household wealth: 
out of liquid assets like savings accounts and money market funds and 
into DC pension accounts. There was also a noticeable expansion of 
stock ownership from 1989 to 2001, followed by a mild contraction 
between 2001 and 2007. Furthermore, DC pension accounts became 
more heavily invested in equities, making them vulnerable to the stock 
market downturn in 2007–2009. 
Moreover, despite the buoyant economy over the 1980s and 1990s, 
overall indebtedness continued to rise among American families and 
then skyrocketed in the early and mid 2000s. Among the middle class, 
the debt-income ratio reached its highest level in 24 years. The high 
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level of indebtedness made the middle class particularly vulnerable to 
the collapse of the housing market. 
The ratio of mean wealth between African American and white 
families was very low in 1983, at 0.19, and barely budged over the 
years from 1983 to 2007. However, Hispanics did show some relative 
gains over the 2001–2007 period. Young households (those with a head 
of household under the age of 45), after some relative gains from 1983 
to 1989, saw their relative wealth position deteriorate between 1989 and 
2007. This development made young households particularly exposed 
to the joint collapse of the stock and housing markets. 
These results on traditional net worth will set the stage for later 
analysis of trends in what I call augmented wealth, the sum of net 
worth, DB pension wealth, and Social Security wealth. How did aver-
age pension wealth and augmented wealth grow over the period from 
1983 to 2007 (Chapters 4 and 5)? What happened to the inequality of 
augmented wealth over this period? Is the racial divide smaller or larger 
once retirement wealth (the sum of pension and Social Security wealth) 
is included in household wealth (Chapter 6)? How did different age 
groups fare with regard to augmented wealth? Did young households, 
in particular, see their relative wealth position deteriorate once retire-
ment wealth was added to net worth (Chapter 5)? What were the rela-
tive developments in augmented wealth by income class and wealth 
class (Chapter 6)? Moreover, I will also look at trends in net worth, 
retirement wealth, and augmented wealth by marital status, particularly 
between female-headed households and married couples, and by level 
of educational attainment (Chapter 6). 
I begin the next section with a discussion of the measurement of 
household wealth and a description of the data sources used for this 
study. After that I present results on time trends in median and aver-
age wealth holdings, changes in the concentration of household wealth, 
and the composition of household wealth. I then investigate changes in 
wealth holdings by race and ethnicity, and report on changes in the age-
wealth proﬁ le. The last three sections of the chapter provide details on 
stock ownership, a partial update of household wealth trends to 2009, 
and a summary of results. 
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DATA SOURCES AND METHODS 
The data sources used for this study are the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 
2007 SCF conducted by the Federal Reserve Board.3 Each survey con-
sists of a core representative sample combined with a high-income 
supplement. In 1983, for example, the supplement was drawn from the 
Internal Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income data ﬁle. For the 1983 
SCF, an income cutoff of $100,000 of adjusted gross income was used 
as the criterion for inclusion in the supplemental sample. Individuals 
were randomly selected for the sample within predesignated income 
strata. In later years, the high-income supplement was selected as a list 
sample from statistical records (the Individual Tax File) derived from 
tax data by the Statistics of Income Division of the IRS (SOI). This sec-
ond sample was designed to disproportionately select families that were 
likely to be relatively wealthy (see, for example, Kennickell [2001] for 
a more extended discussion of the design of the list sample in the 2001 
SCF). The advantage of the high-income supplement is that it provides 
a much richer sample of high-income (and therefore potentially very 
wealthy) families. However, the presence of a high-income supplement 
creates some complications, because weights must be constructed to 
meld the high-income supplement with the core sample.4 
The principal wealth concept used here is marketable wealth (or 
net worth), which is deﬁned as the current value of all marketable or 
fungible assets less the current value of debts. Net worth is thus the dif-
ference in value between total assets and total liabilities or debt. Total 
assets are deﬁned as the sum of 
• the gross value of owner-occupied housing; 
• other real estate owned by the household; 
• cash and demand deposits; 
• time and savings deposits, certiﬁcates of deposit, and money 
market accounts; 
• government bonds, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and other 
ﬁ nancial securities; 
• the cash surrender value of life insurance plans; 
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• the cash surrender value of pension plans, including IRAs, 
Keogh, and 401(k) plans; 
• corporate stock and mutual funds; 
• net equity in unincorporated businesses; and 
• equity in trust funds. 
Total liabilities are the sum of 
• mortgage debt; 
• consumer debt, including auto loans; and 
• other debt. 
This measure reﬂects wealth as a store of value and therefore a 
source of potential consumption. I believe that this is the concept that 
best reﬂects the level of well-being associated with a family’s hold-
ings. Thus, only assets that can be readily converted to cash (that is, 
those that are fungible) are included. As a result, consumer durables 
such as automobiles, televisions, furniture, household appliances, and 
the like are excluded here, since these items are not easily marketed, 
with the possible exception of vehicles, or their resale value typically 
far understates the value of their consumption services to the house-
hold. Another justiﬁcation for their exclusion is that this treatment is 
consistent with the national accounts, where purchase of vehicles is 
counted as expenditures, not savings. Also excluded here is the value of 
future Social Security beneﬁts the family may receive upon retirement 
(usually referred to as Social Security wealth), as well as the value of 
DB pension beneﬁts from private pension plans (DB pension wealth). 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we shall add these two components to standard 
wealth to create a concept I call augmented wealth. 
Another concept that we will make use of later on is housing wealth. 
This is deﬁned as net home equity, the difference between the (gross) 
market value of a home and its outstanding mortgage debt. 
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MEDIAN WEALTH ROSE BRISKLY DURING THE 2000s 
Table 2.1 documents a robust growth in wealth during the 1990s 
(also see Figure 2.1). After rising 7 percent between 1983 and 1989, 
median wealth (the wealth of a household in the middle of the distribu-
tion) was 16 percent greater in 2001 than in 1989. As a result, median 
wealth grew slightly faster between 1989 and 2001, 1.3 percent per 
year, than between 1983 and 1989, at 1.1 percent per year. However, 
between 2001 and 2007, median wealth grew even faster, by 19 percent 
overall or 2.9 percent per year. Most of the increase (63 percent) in 
median net worth emanated from the pronounced rise in home prices. 
Mean net worth also showed a sharp increase of 15 percent from 
1983 to 1989 and then, buoyed largely by rising stock prices, surged 
44 percent by 2001. There was an additional rise of 20 percent in 2007. 
Overall, its 2007 value was almost double its value in 1983 and about 
three quarters larger than in 1989. Mean wealth grew quite a bit faster 
between 1989 and 2001 (3.0 percent per year) than between 1983 and 
1989 (2.3 percent per year). There was then a slight increase in wealth 
growth from 2001 to 2007 (3.1 percent per year). This modest accelera-
tion was largely due to rapid increase in housing prices of 19 percent 
Table 2.1  Mean and Median Household Wealth and Income, 1983–2007 
(in thousands, 2007$) 
Percentage change 
1983– 1989– 2001– 1983– 
Wealth concept 1983 1989 2001 2007 1989 2001 2007 2007 
Net worth 
Median 69.5 74.3 86.1 102.5 7.0 15.8 19.1 47.5 
Mean 270.4 309.8 445.1 536.1 14.6 43.7 20.4 98.2 
Incomea 
Median 43.5 48.3 49.4 50.2 11.2 2.3 1.6 15.5 
Mean 52.9 61.1 68.1 67.6 15.5 11.6 −0.8 27.9 
a Source for household income data: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys. 
Available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/ 
index.html (accessed April 2011). 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. Wealth 
ﬁgures are deﬂated using the Consumer Price Index. See Appendix A for sources and 
methods. 
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Figure 2.1  Mean and Median Household Wealth, 1983–2007 
(in thousands, 2007$) 
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
in real terms over the six years, counterbalanced by a reduced growth 
in stock prices between 2001–2007 and 1989–2001, and to the fact that 
housing comprised 28 percent and (total) stocks made up 25 percent 
of total assets in 2001. Another point of note is that mean wealth grew 
about twice as fast as the median between 1983 and 2007, indicating 
widening inequality of wealth over these years. 
Median household income (based on Current Population Survey 
[CPS] data), after gaining 11 percent between 1983 and 1989, grew 
by only 2.3 percent (total) in 1989–2001 and by another 1.6 percent in 
2001–2007, for a net change of 16 percent in 1983–2007. In contrast, 
mean income rose by 16 percent from 1983 to 1989, by another 12 per-
cent from 1989 to 2001, and then fell by 0.8 percent from 2001 to 2007, 
for a total change of 28 percent from 1983 to 2007. Between 1983 and 
2007, mean income grew about twice as fast as median income. 
In sum, while household income virtually stagnated for the average 
American household over the 1990s and 2000s, median net worth grew 
strongly over this period. In the 2000s in particular, mean and median 
income changed very little, while mean and median net worth grew 
strongly.  
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WEALTH INEQUALITY SHOWS LITTLE CHANGE OVER 
THE EARLY AND MID-2000s 
The ﬁgures in Table 2.2 also show that wealth inequality, after 
rising steeply between 1983 and 1989, remained virtually unchanged 
from 1989 to 2007. The share of wealth held by the top 1 percent rose 
by 3.6 percentage points from 1983 to 1989, and the Gini coefﬁcient 
increased from 0.80 to 0.83. Between 1989 and 2007, the share of the 
top percentile actually declined sharply, from 37.4 to 34.6 percent, 
though an increase in the share of the next four percentiles more than 
compensated for the drop. As a result, the share of the top 5 percent 
increased from 59.0 percent in 1989 to 61.9 percent in 2007, and the 
share of the top quintile rose from 83.5 to 85.0 percent. The share of the 
fourth and middle quintiles each declined by about a percentage point 
from 1989 to 2007, while that of the bottom 40 percent increased by 
almost one percentage point. Overall, the Gini coefﬁcient was virtually 
unchanged—0.832 in 1989 and 0.834 in 2007. 
The top 1 percent of families (as ranked by income on the basis of the 
SCF data) earned 21 percent of total household income in 2006, and the 
top 20 percent accounted for 61 percent—large ﬁgures but lower than 
the corresponding wealth shares.5 The time trend for income inequal-
ity also contrasts with that of net worth. Income inequality increased 
sharply between 1982 and 1988, with the Gini coefﬁcient rising from 
0.48 to 0.52 and the share of the top one percent from 12.8 to 16.6 
percent. There was again a pronounced increase in income inequality 
between 1988 and 2000, with the share of the top 1 percent rising from 
16.6 to 20.0 percent, that of the top quintile from 55.6 to 58.6 percent, 
and the Gini coefﬁcient from 0.52 to 0.56.6 
The years between 2000 and 2006 saw a slight abatement in the rise 
of income inequality. Over these years, the Gini coefﬁ cient for income 
rose from 0.56 to 0.57, the share of the top 1 percent from 20.0 to 21.3 
percent, and that of the top quintile from 15.2 to 15.9 percent. All in 
all, the 2000s witnessed a moderate increase in income inequality and a 
very slight rise in wealth inequality.7 
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Table 2.2  The Size Distribution of Wealth and Income, 1983–2007 
Percentage share of wealth or income held by: 
Gini Top Next Next Next Top 4th 3rd Bottom 
Year coefﬁcient 1.0% 4.0% 5.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% All 
Net worth 
1983 0.799 33.8 22.3 12.1 13.1 81.3 12.6 5.2 0.9 100.0 
1989 0.832 37.4 21.6 11.6 13.0 83.5 12.3 4.8 −0.7 100.0 
2001 0.826 33.4 25.8 12.3 12.9 84.4 11.3 3.9 0.3 100.0 
2007 0.834 34.6 27.3 11.2 12.0 85.0 10.9 4.0 0.2 100.0 
Income 
1982 0.480 12.8 13.3 10.3 15.5 51.9 21.6 14.2 12.3 100.0 
1988 0.521 16.6 13.3 10.4 15.2 55.6 20.6 13.2 10.7 100.0 
2000 0.562 20.0 15.2 10.0 13.5 58.6 19.0 12.3 10.1 100.0 
2006 0.574 21.3 15.9 9.9 14.3 61.4 17.8 11.1 9.6 100.0 
NOTE: For the computation of percentile shares of net worth, households are ranked according to their net worth; and for percentile shares 
of income, households are ranked according to their income. Totals may not sum to 100.0 because of rounding. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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HOUSEHOLD PORTFOLIOS SHOW A PRONOUNCED SHIFT
INTO DC PENSION ACCOUNTS 
The portfolio composition of household wealth shows the forms in 
which households save. This aspect is important when we try to under-
stand how wealth changes over time and the exposure of household 
wealth to asset price changes. 
In 2007, owner-occupied housing was the most important house-
hold asset in the breakdown shown in Table 2.3, accounting for 33 per-
cent of total assets. However, net home equity—the value of the house 
minus any outstanding mortgage—amounted to only 21 percent of total 
assets. Real estate, other than owner-occupied housing, comprised 11
percent, and business equity another 20 percent. 
Demand deposits, time deposits, money market funds, CDs, and the 
cash surrender value of life insurance made up 7 percent and pension 
accounts 12 percent. Bonds and other ﬁnancial securities amounted to 
2 percent; corporate stock, including mutual funds, to 12 percent; and 
trust equity to 2 percent. Debt as a proportion of gross assets was 15 
percent, and the debt-equity ratio (the ratio of total household debt to 
net worth) was 18 percent. 
There have been some notable changes in the composition of 
household wealth over the period 1983–2007. From the point of view 
of this work, the most important is the pronounced growth of DC pen-
sion accounts, which rose moderately from 1.5 percent of total assets 
in 1983 to 2.9 percent in 1989 and then shot up to 12 percent in 2001, 
where they remained in 2007. This increase largely offset the decline 
in the share of liquid assets in total assets, from 17 percent in 1983 to 7 
percent in 2007, so it is reasonable to conclude that households have to 
a large extent substituted tax-deferred DC pension accounts for taxable 
savings deposits. 
A second notable change is that the share of (gross) housing wealth 
in total assets, after ﬂuctuating between 28 and 30 percent from 1983 
to 2001, jumped to 33 percent in 2007. There were two factors behind 
this. The ﬁrst was the rise in the homeownership rate, which, according 
to the SCF data, climbed from 63 percent in 1983 to 69 percent in 2007. 
The second was the sharp rise in housing prices, noted above. Between 
2001 and 2004, the median house price for existing one-family homes 
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Table 2.3  Composition of Total Household Wealth, 1983–2007 
(percentage of gross assets) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
Wealth component 
Principal residence (gross value) 30.1 30.2 28.2 32.8 
Other real estate (gross value)a 14.9 14.0 9.8 11.3 
Unincorporated business equityb 18.8 17.2 17.2 20.1 
Liquid assetsc 17.4 17.5 8.8 6.6 
Pension accountsd 1.5 2.9 12.3 12.1 
Financial securitiese 4.2 3.4 2.3 1.5 
Corporate stock and mutual funds 9.0 6.9 14.8 11.8 
Net equity in personal trusts 2.6 3.1 4.8 2.3 
Miscellaneous assetsf 1.3 4.9 1.8 1.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Debt 
Debt on principal residence 6.3 8.6 9.4 11.4 
All other debtg 6.8 6.4 3.1 3.9 
Total debt 13.1 15.0 12.5 15.3 
Selected ratios in percent 
Debt/equity ratio 15.1 17.6 14.3 18.1 
Debt/income ratio 68.4 87.6 81.1 118.7 
Net home equity/total assetsh 23.8 21.6 18.8 21.4 
Principal residence debt/house value 20.9 28.6 33.4 34.9 
Stocks, directly or indirectly owned/ 11.3 10.2 24.5 16.8 
total assetsi 
NOTE: Totals may not sum to 100.0 because of rounding. 
a In 2001 and 2007 this equals the gross value of other residential real estate plus the net 
equity in nonresidential real estate. 
b Net equity in unincorporated farm and nonfarm businesses and closely held corporations. 
c Checking accounts, savings accounts, time deposits, money market funds, certiﬁ cates of 
deposit, and the cash surrender value of life insurance. 
d IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, the accumulated value of deﬁned contribution pension 
plans, and other retirement accounts. 
e Corporate bonds, government bonds (including savings bonds), open-market paper, and 
notes. 
f Gold and other precious metals, royalties, jewelry, antiques, furs, loans to friends and 
relatives, future contracts, and miscellaneous assets. 
g Mortgage debt on all real property except principal residence; credit card, installment, 
and other consumer debt. 
h Ratio of gross value of principal residence less mortgage debt on principal residence to 
total assets. 
i Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds, 
trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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rose by 19 percent in real terms. The rise in housing prices by itself 
would have caused the share of housing in total assets to rise by 5.3 
percentage points, compared to the actual increase of 4.6 percentage 
points. 
A third and related trend is that net equity in owner-occupied hous-
ing (the difference between the market value and outstanding mort-
gages on the property), after falling from 24 percent in 1983 to 19 per-
cent in 2001, picked up to 21 percent in 2007. The difference between 
the two series (gross versus net housing values as a share of total assets) 
is attributable to the changing magnitude of mortgage debt on home-
owners’ property, which increased from 21 percent in 1983 to 35 per-
cent in 2007. Moreover, mortgage debt on a principal residence climbed 
from 9.4 to 11.4 percent of total assets between 2001 and 2007. The 
fact that net home equity as a proportion of assets increased during that 
period reﬂected the strong gains in real estate values over these years. 
Fourth, the debt-equity ratio fell slightly, from 15 percent in 1983 
to 14 percent in 2001; however, it then jumped to 18 percent in 2007. 
In contrast, the ratio of debt to total income increased from 68 percent 
in 1983 to 81 percent in 2001 and then skyrocketed to 119 percent in 
2007, its high for this period. If mortgage debt on principal residence 
is excluded, then the ratio of other debt to total assets fell off from 6.8 
percent in 1983 to 3.9 percent in 2007. One implication is that over 
the 1990s and 2000s, families used tax-sheltered mortgages and home 
equity loans rather than consumer loans and other forms of consumer 
debt to ﬁ nance consumption. 
Fifth, the share of corporate stock and mutual funds in total assets 
rose rather briskly, from 9 percent in 1983 to 15 percent in 2001, before 
plummeting to 12 percent in 2007. If we include the value of stocks 
indirectly owned through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, 401(k) plans, and 
other retirement accounts, then the value of total stocks owned as a 
share of total assets more than doubled, from 11 percent in 1983 to 25 
percent in 2001, and then tumbled to 17 percent in 2007. The rise dur-
ing the 1990s reﬂected the bull market in corporate equities as well as 
increased stock ownership, while the decline in the 2000s was a result 
of the relatively small rise in the stock market over this period (par-
ticularly relative to housing prices), as well as a drop in stock owner-
ship (see Table 2.10a). The change in stock prices by itself would have 
caused the share of stocks in total assets to rise by 1.4 percentage points 
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between 2001 and 2007, compared to the actual decline of 7.6 percent-
age points. The decline in the share of stocks in total assets was due to 
sales of stocks and withdrawals from stock funds. 
PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION BY WEALTH CLASS 
Table 2.3 provides a picture of the average holdings of all families 
in the economy, but there are marked class differences in how middle-
class families and the rich invest their wealth. These differences in 
portfolio composition are important because they affect how wealth 
changes over time for different parts of the wealth distribution and thus 
how overall wealth inequality develops. 
As shown in Table 2.4, the richest 1 percent of households (as ranked 
by wealth) invested over three-quarters of their savings in investment 
real estate, businesses, corporate stock, and ﬁnancial securities in 2007. 
Corporate stocks, either directly owned by the households or indi-
rectly owned through mutual funds, trust accounts, or various pension 
accounts, comprised 21 percent by themselves. Housing accounted for 
only 10 percent of their wealth (and net equity in housing only 9 per-
cent), liquid assets another 5 percent, and pension accounts another 6 
percent. Their ratio of debt to net worth was only 3 percent, their ratio 
of debt to income was 39 percent, and the ratio of mortgage debt to 
house value was 15 percent. 
Among the next richest 19 percent of U.S. households, housing 
comprised 32 percent of their total assets (and net home equity 24 per-
cent), liquid assets another 7 percent, and pension assets 16 percent. 
Forty-four percent of their assets took the form of investment assets— 
real estate, business equity, stocks, and bonds—and 19 percent was in 
the form of stocks directly or indirectly owned. Debt amounted to 12 
percent of their net worth and 110 percent of their income, and the ratio 
of mortgage debt to house value was 26 percent. 
In contrast, almost two-thirds of the wealth of the middle three 
wealth quintiles of households was invested in their own home in 2007. 
However, home equity amounted to only 35 percent of total assets, 
a reﬂection of their large mortgage debt. Another 21 percent went 
into monetary savings of one form or another and pension accounts. 
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Tab le 2.4  Composition of Household Wealth by Wealth Class,  2007 
(percent of gross assets) 
All Middle 
households Top 1% Next 19% 3 quintiles 
Asset 
Principal residence 32.8 10.2 31.8 65.1 
Liquid assets (bank deposits, 6.6 4.5 7.3 7.8 
money market funds, and 
cash surrender value of 
life insurance) 
Pension accounts 12.1 5.8 15.9 12.9 
Corporate stock, ﬁnancial 15.5 25.2 15.0 3.6 
securities, mutual funds, 
and personal trusts 
Unincorporated business 31.3 52.3 28.5 9.3 
equity, other real estate 
Miscellaneous assets 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.3 
Total assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Selected ratios (%) 
Debt/equity ratio 18.1 2.8 12.1 61.1 
Debt/income ratio 118.7 39.4 109.8 156.7 
Net home equity/total assetsa 21.4 8.7 23.6 34.8 
Principal residence debt/ 34.9 15.2 25.6 46.6 
house value 
All stocks/total assetsb 16.8 21.4 18.6 7.0 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into wealth class according to their net worth. Brackets 
for 2007 are as follows: 
• Top 1%: Net worth of $8,232,000 or more.  
• Next 19%: Net worth between $473,000 and $8,232,000. 
• Quintiles 2–4: Net worth between $200 and $473,000. 
a Ratio of gross value of principal residence less mortgage debt on principal residence to 
total assets. 
b Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds, 
trusts, and IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF. 
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Together, housing, liquid assets, and pension assets accounted for 86 
percent of the total assets of the middle class. The remainder was about 
evenly split among nonhome real estate, business equity, and various 
ﬁnancial securities and corporate stock. Stocks directly or indirectly 
owned amounted to only 7 percent of their total assets. The ratio of debt 
to net worth was 61 percent, substantially higher than for the richest 20 
percent, and their ratio of debt to income was 157 percent, also much 
higher than for the top quintile. Finally, their mortgage debt amounted 
to almost half the value of their principal residences. 
The rather staggering debt level of the middle class in 2007 raises 
the question of whether this accumulation of debt is a recent phenom-
enon or whether it has been going on for some time. The overall debt-
equity ratio in 2007 was only slightly above its level in 1989, while the 
overall debt-income ratio has generally trended upward since 1983 and 
actually took a big jump from 2001 to 2007. 
Table 2.5 compares the wealth composition of the three wealth 
classes in 1983 and 2007. There is remarkable stability in the composi-
tion of wealth by wealth class between 1983 and 2007. The most notable 
exception is a substitution of pension assets for liquid assets—a transi-
tion that occurred for all three wealth classes but that was particularly 
marked for percentiles 81–99 and for the middle three quintiles. The 
debt-equity ratio actually fell for the top 1 percent from 1983 and 2007, 
as did the debt-income ratio. The debt-income ratio increased slightly 
for the next 19 percent, while the debt-income ratio rose sharply, from 
73 to 110 percent. 
Among the middle three wealth quintiles, pension accounts rose 
as a share of total assets by almost 12 percentage points (and the pro-
portion of households with a pension account surged by 41 percentage 
points) from 1983 to 2007, while liquid assets declined as a share by 14 
percentage points. This set of changes paralleled that of all households. 
The share of all stocks in total assets mushroomed from 2.4 percent in 
1983 to 13 percent in 2001, and then fell off to 7 percent in 2007 as 
stock prices stagnated. 
Changes in debt, however, were much more dramatic. There was a 
sharp rise in the debt-equity ratio of the middle class, from 37 percent 
in 1983 to 61 percent in 2007. The rise was much steeper than at the 
aggregate level. The debt-income ratio skyrocketed over this period, 
more than doubling. Here, too, much of the increase happened between 
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Tabl e 2.5  Composition of Household Wealth by Wealth Class, 1983 and 
2007 (percent of gross assets) 
Middle 3 
Top 1% Next 19% quintiles 
Component 1983 2007 1983 2007 1983 2007 
Principal residence 8.1 10.2 29.1 31.8 61.6 65.1 
Liquid assets (bank deposits, 8.5 4.5 21.4 7.3 21.4 7.8 
money market funds, and 
cash surrender value of 
life insurance) 
Pension accounts 0.9 5.8 2.0 15.9 1.2 12.9 
Corporate stock, ﬁnancial 29.5 25.2 13.0 15.0 3.1 3.6 
securities, mutual funds, 
and personal trusts 
Unincorporated business 52.0 52.3 32.8 28.5 11.4 9.3 
equity, other real estate 
Miscellaneous assets 1.0 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 
Total assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Debt/equity ratio 5.9 2.8 10.9 12.1 37.4 61.1 
Debt/income ratio 86.8 39.4 72.8 109.8 66.9 156.7 
NOTE: Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983 and 2007 SCF. 
2001 and 2007. Moreover, the increase was much steeper than in the 
aggregate. In fact, in 1983, the debt-income ratio was about the same 
for middle-class as for all households, but by 2007 the ratio was much 
larger. As for all households, net home equity as a percentage of total 
assets fell for the middle class from 1983 to 2007, and mortgage debt as 
a proportion of house value rose. Middle-class households were using 
their homes as a virtual ATM, withdrawing equity to sustain their nor-
mal consumption. 
The rising indebtedness of the middle class, particularly in the form 
of mortgage debt, made it very vulnerable to the home price collapse 
of 2007–2009. As we shall see below, there was a large reduction in 
median wealth over this period, as well as a substantial increase in the 
share of homeowners whose mortgage debt was greater than their home 
values (so-called underwater mortgages). Though the rich were more 
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heavily invested in stocks than the middle class, stocks did not con-
stitute nearly as high a percentage of their wealth as homes did for the 
middle class, and the stock market meltdown of 2007–2009 did not hurt 
the rich as much as the home price collapse hurt the middle class. 
THE RACIAL DIVIDE REMAINS LARGELY UNCHANGED 
OVER TIME 
Striking differences are found in the wealth holdings of different 
racial and ethnic groups. In Tables 2.6 and 2.7, households are divided 
into three groups: 1) non-Hispanic whites, 2) non-Hispanic African 
Americans, and 3) Hispanics.8 In 2007, while the ratio of mean incomes 
between (non-Hispanic) white and (non-Hispanic) black households 
was an already-low 0.48 and the ratio of median incomes was 0.60, the 
ratios of mean and median wealth holdings were even lower, at 0.19 and 
0.06, respectively.9 The homeownership rate for black households was 
49 percent in 2007, a little less than two-thirds the rate among whites, 
and the percentage of black households with zero or negative net worth 
stood at 33.4, more than double the corresponding percentage among 
whites. 
Between 1982 and 2006, while the average real income of non-
Hispanic white households increased by 42 percent and the median by 
10 percent, the former rose by only 28 percent for non-Hispanic black 
households but the latter by 18 percent. As a result, the ratio of mean 
income slipped from 0.54 in 1982 to 0.48 in 2006, while the ratio of 
median income rose from 0.56 to 0.60. 
Between 1983 and 2001, average net worth (in 2001 dollars) rose 
by a whopping 73 percent for whites but only by 31 percent for black 
households, so that the net worth ratio fell from 0.19 to 0.14. Most of 
the slippage occurred between 1989 and 2001, when white net worth 
surged by a spectacular 46 percent and black net worth advanced by 
only a respectable 24 percent. Indeed, mean net worth growth among 
black households was actually much higher in the 1989–2001 years 
than in the years from 1983 to 1989 (only a 5 percent gain). The dif-
ference in the 1989–2001 period was the huge increase in household 
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Table 2.6 Household Income and Wealth by Race, 1983–2007 
(in thousands, 2007$) 
Means Medians 
Non- Non-
Non- Hispanic Non- Hispanic 
Hispanic African Hispanic African 
Year whites Americans Ratio whites Americans Ratio 
Income 
1982 64.8 34.9 0.54 45.6 25.4 0.56 
1988 71.0 31.6 0.45 47.3 17.9 0.38 
2000 88.9 43.0 0.48 51.5 29.3 0.57 
2006 92.3 44.6 0.48 50.0 30.0 0.60 
Net worth 
1983 316.0 59.5 0.19 91.0 6.1 0.07 
1989 373.9 62.7 0.17 108.1 2.8 0.03 
2001 545.3 77.7 0.14 124.6 12.5 0.10 
2007 652.1 122.7 0.19 143.6 9.3 0.06 
Homeowner-
ship rate (%) 
1983 68.1 44.3 0.65 
1989 69.3 41.7 0.60 
2001 74.1 47.4 0.64 
2007 74.8 48.6 0.65 
NOTE: Households are divided into four racial/ethnic groups: 1) non-Hispanic whites, 
2) non-Hispanic blacks, 3) Hispanics, and 4) American Indians, Asians, and others. 
For 1995, 1998, and 2001, the classiﬁcation scheme does not explicitly indicate non-
Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks for the ﬁrst two categories, so some Hispan-
ics may have classiﬁed themselves as either whites or blacks. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
wealth among white households. However, between 2001 and 2007, 
mean net worth among black households gained an astounding 58 per-
cent while white wealth advanced only 29 percent, so that by 2007 the 
net worth ratio was back to 0.19, the same level as in 1983. 
It is not clear how much of the sharp increase in the racial wealth 
gap between 1989 and 2001 and the turnaround between 2001 and 2007 
is due to actual wealth changes in the African American community and 
how much is due to sampling variability (since the sample sizes of non-
Hispanic African Americans are relatively small in all years). However, 
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Table  2.7 Family Income and Wealth for Non-Hispanic Whites and 
Hispanics, 1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Means Medians 
Non- Non-
Hispanic Hispanic 
Year whites Hispanics Ratio whites Hispanics Ratio 
Income 
1982 64.8 39.2 0.60 45.6 30.2 0.66 
1988 71.0 32.4 0.46 47.3 22.7 0.48 
2000 88.9 44.0 0.50 51.5 28.1 0.55 
2006 92.3 46.4 0.50 50.0 35.0 0.70 
Net worth 
1983 316.0 51.4 0.16 91.0 3.5 0.04 
1989 373.9 61.5 0.16 108.1 2.3 0.02 
2001 545.3 93.8 0.17 124.6 3.5 0.03 
2007 652.1 170.4 0.26 143.6 9.1 0.06 
Homeowner-
ship rate (%) 
1983 68.1 32.6 0.48 
1989 69.3 39.8 0.57 
2001 74.1 44.3 0.60 
2007 74.8 49.2 0.66 
NOTE: Households are divided into four racial/ethnic groups: 1) non-Hispanic whites, 
2) non-Hispanic blacks, 3) Hispanics, and 4) American Indians, Asians, and others. 
For 1995, 1998, and 2001, the classiﬁcation scheme does not explicitly indicate non-
Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks for the ﬁrst two categories, so some Hispan-
ics may have classiﬁed themselves as either whites or blacks. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
one salient difference between the two groups is the much higher share 
that stocks constituted in the white portfolio and the much higher share 
that homes constituted in the portfolio of black households. In 2001, the 
gross value of principal residences formed 46 percent of the gross assets 
of black households and only 27 percent that of white households, while 
(total) stocks were 25 percent of the total assets of whites and only 15 
percent that of black households.10 Moreover, while the debt-to-asset 
ratio was higher for black than white households in 2001 (0.32 ver-
sus 0.12), the ratio among black households rose to 0.36 in 2007. For 
whites the debt-to-asset ratio increased slightly, to 0.13, in 2007. 
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In the case of median wealth, the black-white ratio ﬁ rst increased 
from 7 to 10 percent between 1983 and 2001 but then slipped to 6 per-
cent in 2007. In this case, median wealth for white households grew by 
15 percent between 2001 and 2004 but median wealth dropped by 26 
percent among black households, reﬂecting in part the rising share of 
black households with zero or negative net worth. 
The homeownership rate of black households grew from 44 to 47 
percent between 1983 and 2001, but, relative to white households, the 
homeownership rate fell off a bit, from a ratio of 0.65 in 1983 to 0.64 
in 2001. The change over these years primarily reﬂected a big jump—6 
percentage points—in the white homeownership rate. However, from 
2001 to 2007, the black homeownership rate gained 1.2 percentage 
points and the white homeownership rate 0.7 percentage points, so by 
2007 the homeownership rate ratio had recovered a bit, to 0.65. 
The picture is somewhat different for Hispanics (see Table 2.7). 
The ratio of mean income between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites 
in 2007 was 0.50, almost the same as that between African American 
and white households. However, the ratio of median income was 0.70, 
much higher than the 0.60 ratio between black and white households. 
The ratio of mean net worth was 0.26, compared to a ratio of 0.19 
between blacks and whites. However, the ratio of medians was 0.06, 
almost identical to the ratio between blacks and whites. The Hispanic 
homeownership rate was 49 percent, almost identical to that of non-
Hispanic black households. 
Developments among Hispanic households over the period from 
1983 to 2007 were generally a positive story. Mean household income 
for Hispanics grew by 18 percent and median household income by 16 
percent, so that while the ratio of mean income between Hispanics and 
non-Hispanic whites slid from 60 to 50 percent, that of median income 
advanced from 66 to 70 percent. In fact, from 2001 to 2007 median 
income for Hispanics grew by an astonishing 25 percent while that for 
non-Hispanic whites declined by 3 percent. 
Between 1983 and 2001, mean wealth almost doubled for Hispanic 
households, and the ratio of mean net worth between Hispanics and 
non-Hispanic whites improved slightly, from 16 percent in 1983 to 17 
percent in 2001. However, from 2001 to 2007, mean net worth among 
Hispanics climbed by another 82 percent, while that of whites gained 
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20 percent, so the corresponding wealth ratio advanced to 26 percent, 
quite a bit higher than that between black and white households. 
On the other hand, from 1983 to 2007, median wealth among His-
panics remained extremely low and largely unchanged, so the ratio of 
median wealth between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites stayed vir-
tually the same. The homeownership rate among Hispanic households 
climbed from 33 to 44 percent between 1983 and 2001, and the ratio 
of homeownership rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites 
likewise rose from 0.48 to 0.60. Between 2001 and 2007, the Hispanic 
homeownership rate rose once again, to 49 percent, about the same as 
for black households, and the homeownership ratio surged to 0.66. 
Despite some progress from 2001 to 2007, the respective wealth 
gaps between blacks and whites and between Hispanics and non-
Hispanic whites were still much greater than the corresponding income 
gaps in 2007. While mean income ratios were on the order of 50 per-
cent, mean wealth ratios were on the order of 20 to 25 percent. While 
blacks and Hispanics were left out of the wealth surge of the years 1989 
to 2001 because of relatively low stock ownership (see the subsequent 
section on stock ownership), they actually beneﬁted from this (and the 
relatively high share of houses in their portfolio) in the 2001–2007 
period.11 
WEALTH SHIFTS FROM THE YOUNG TO THE OLD 
As shown in Table 2.8, the cross-sectional age-wealth proﬁ les of 
1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 generally follow the predicted hump-shaped 
pattern of the life-cycle model (see, for example, Modigliani [1954]). 
Mean wealth increases with age up through age 65 or so and then falls 
off (see Figure 2.2). Homeownership rates also have a similar proﬁle, 
though the falloff after the peak age is much more attenuated than for 
the wealth numbers. In 2007, the wealth of elderly households (age 65 
and over) averaged 75 percent higher than that of the nonelderly, and 
their homeownership rate was 21 percentage points higher. 
Despite the apparent similarity in the proﬁles, there have been nota-
ble shifts in the relative wealth holdings of age groups between 1983 
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Table 2 .8  Age-Wealth Proﬁles and Homeownership Rates by Age, 
1983–2007 
Age 1983 1989 2001 2007 
Mean net worth (ratio to overall mean) 
Overall 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Under 35 0.21 0.29 0.19 0.17 
35–44 0.71 0.72 0.64 0.58 
45–54 1.53 1.50 1.25 1.19 
55–64 1.67 1.58 1.86 1.69 
65–74 1.93 1.61 1.72 1.86 
75+ 1.05 1.26 1.20 1.16 
Homeownership rate (%) 
Overall 63.4 62.8 67.7 68.6 
Under 35 38.7 36.3 40.2 40.8 
35–44 68.4 64.1 67.6 66.1 
45–54 78.2 75.1 76.1 77.3 
55–64 77.0 79.2 83.2 80.9 
65–74 78.3 78.1 82.5 85.5 
75+ 69.4 70.2 76.2 77.0 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed according to the age of the householder. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
and 2007. The relative wealth of the youngest age group, under 35, 
expanded from 21 percent of the overall mean in 1983 to 29 percent 
in 1989 but then collapsed to only 17 percent in 2007. In 2007, the 
mean wealth of the youngest age group was $91,200, which was only 
slightly more than the mean wealth of this age group in 1989 ($88,500). 
The mean net worth of the next-youngest age group, 35–44, relative 
to the overall mean showed a slight increase from 1983 to 1989 and 
then tumbled from 0.72 in 1989 to 0.58 in 2007. The relative wealth 
of the third-youngest age group, 45–54, also declined rather steadily 
over time, from 1.53 in 1983 to 1.19 in 2007. The relative wealth of 
age group 55–64, after falling between 1983 and 1989, advanced from 
1.58 in 1989 to 1.69 in 2007. The relative net worth of age group 65–74 
plummeted from 1.93 in 1983 to 1.61 in 1989 but then regained most 
of the lost ground, reaching 1.86 in 2007. The wealth of the oldest age 
group, aged 75 and over, advanced from a ratio of 1.05 in 1983 to 1.16 
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Figure 2.2  Age-Wealth Proﬁles, 2007 (ratio to overall mean wealth by 
age group) 
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in 2007. At least over the period from 1989 to 2007, there was a clear 
shift in relative wealth holdings away from younger households (under 
age 55) and toward those in age group 55–64. 
Changes in homeownership rates tend to mirror these trends. While 
the overall ownership rate increased by 5.2 percentage points, from 63.4 
to 68.6 percent, between 1983 and 2007, the share of households in the 
youngest age group owning their own home increased by only 2.1 per-
centage points. The homeownership rate of households between ages 
35 and 44 actually fell by 2.3 percentage points, and that of age group 
45–54 declined by 0.9 percentage points. Big gains in homeownership 
were recorded by the older age groups: 3.9 percentage points for age 
group 55–64, 7.1 percentage points for age group 65–74, and 7.6 per-
centage points for the oldest age group. By 2007, homeownership rates 
rose monotonically with age up to age group 65–74 and then dropped 
for the oldest age group. The statistics point to a relative shifting of 
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homeownership away from younger toward older households between 
1983 and 2007. 
Changes in the relative wealth position of different age groups 
depend in large measure on differences in asset composition and rela-
tive asset price movements. The latter are highlighted in Table 2.9 for 
the year 2007. The gross value of the principal residence comprised 
over half the value of total assets for age group 35 and under, and its 
share of total assets fell off with age to about a quarter for age group 
55–64 and then rose to 30 percent for age group 75 and over. Liquid 
assets as a share of total assets remained relatively ﬂat with age group 
at around 6 percent except for the oldest group, for whom it was 11 per-
cent, perhaps reﬂecting the relative ﬁnancial conservativeness of older 
people. Pension accounts as a share of total assets rose from 4 percent 
for the youngest group to 16 percent for age group 55–64 and then fell 
off to 5 percent for the oldest age group. This pattern likely reﬂ ects the 
buildup of retirement assets until retirement age and then a decline as 
these retirement assets are liquidated.12 Corporate stock and ﬁnancial 
securities showed a steady rise with age, from a 4 percent share for the 
youngest group to a 26 percent share for the oldest. A similar pattern 
was evident for total stocks as a percentage of all assets. Unincorpo-
rated business equity and nonhome real estate was relatively ﬂat as a 
share of total assets with age, at about 30 percent. 
There was a pronounced falloff of debt with age. The debt-to-equity 
ratio declined from 93 percent for the youngest group to 2 percent for 
the oldest, the debt-income ratio from 168 percent to 30 percent, and 
principal residence debt as a share of house value from 65 to 5 percent. 
As a result of the latter, net home equity as a proportion of total assets 
rose from 19 to 29 percent from the youngest to the oldest age group. 
Younger households were thus more heavily invested in homes and 
more heavily in debt, whereas the portfolio of older households was 
more heavily skewed to ﬁnancial assets, particularly corporate stock. 
As a result, younger households beneﬁt relatively when housing prices 
rise and inﬂation is strong, while older households beneﬁt relatively 
from rising stock prices. Conversely, younger households were much 
more exposed to the home price collapse of 2007–2008 than older ones, 
while older households were more vulnerable to the stock market crisis 
of 2007–2009 than younger ones. Changes in the relative net worth 
position of age groups over the 1983–2007 period were thus largely due 
to these relative asset price movements. 
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Table 2. 9  Composition of Household Wealth by Age Class, 2007 (percentage of gross assets) 
All Under 35 35–44 45–54 55–64 65–74 75+ 
Asset 
Principal residence 32.8 54.3 43.7 33.8 25.6 28.2 30.2 
Liquid assets (bank deposits, money market 6.6 5.7 5.4 6.4 6.3 6.1 10.5 
funds, and cash surrender value of life 
insurance) 
Pension accounts 12.1 6.0 10.7 13.0 15.8 12.9 5.0 
Corporate stock, ﬁnancial securities, mutual 15.5 4.2 8.6 13.1 16.4 20.5 25.6 
funds, and personal trusts 
Unincorporated business equity, other real 31.3 28.7 30.1 32.0 34.4 30.2 27.1 
estate 
Miscellaneous assets 1.7 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.5 2.1 1.6 
Total assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Selected ratios (%) 
Debt/equity ratio 18.1 92.7 41.3 20.2 11.9 7.1 2.1 
Debt/income ratio 118.7 167.5 156.5 118.2 100.0 79.7 29.9 
Net home equity/total assetsa 21.4 18.8 21.3 20.9 18.1 23.4 28.7 
Principal residence debt/house value 34.9 65.4 51.4 38.3 29.2 16.9 4.9 
All stocks/total assetsb 16.8 5.9 11.2 15.1 19.4 21.5 20.0 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age class according to the age of the household head. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 
a Ratio of gross value of principal residence less mortgage debt on principal residence to total assets. 
b Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and 
other retirement accounts. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF. 
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STOCK OWNERSHIP FIRST RISES AND THEN FALLS 
Table 2.10a reports on overall stock ownership trends from 1989 to 
2007.13 The years 1989–2001 saw a substantial increase in stock owner-
ship. The share of households with direct ownership of stock climbed 
from 13 percent in 1989 to 21 percent in 2001, while the share with 
some stock owned either outright or indirectly through mutual funds, 
trusts, or various pension accounts surged from 32 to 52 percent. Much 
of the increase was fueled by the growth in pension accounts like 
IRAs, Keogh plans, and 401(k) plans (see Chapter 4 for more details 
on this). Between 1989 and 2001, the share of households owning 
stock through a pension account more than doubled, accounting for the 
bulk of the overall increase in stock ownership. Indirect ownership of 
stocks through mutual funds also greatly expanded over the 1989–2001 
period, from 6 to 17 percent, as did indirect ownership through trust 
funds, from 1.6 to 5.1 percent. All told, the share of households with 
indirect ownership of stocks doubled, from 24 percent in 1989 to 48 
percent in 2001. 
In contrast, the next six years, 2001–2007, saw a retrenchment in 
stock ownership. This trend probably reﬂected the sharp drop in the 
stock market from 2000 to 2001, its rather anemic recovery through 
2004, and its modest rebound from 2004 to 2007. Direct stock ownership 
plummeted from 21 percent in 2001 to 18 percent. Indirect stock own-
ership fell by 3.3 percentage points from 2001 to 2007. This decrease 
was largely due to a sharp decline in stock ownership through mutual 
funds (down by 6 percentage points). Stock ownership through pension 
accounts was down by 1.2 percentage points from 2001 to 2007. 
By 2007 the share of households who owned stock directly or indi-
rectly dipped below half, down to 49 percent from its peak of 52 percent 
in 2001. Moreover, many of these families had only a minor stake in the 
stock market in 2007: only 35 percent owned total stock holdings worth 
$5,000 (in 1995 dollars) or more, down from 40 percent in 2001; only 
30 percent owned $10,000 or more of stock, down from 35 percent in 
2001; and only 22 percent owned $25,000 or more of stock, down from 
27 percent six years earlier. 
Direct plus indirect ownership of stocks as a percentage of total 
household assets more than doubled, increasing from 10 in 1989 to 25 
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Table 2.1 0a  Stock Ownership, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (percentage of 
households holding stocks) 
Stock type 1989 2001 2007 
Direct stock holdings only 13.1 21.3 17.9 
Indirect stock holdings only 23.5 47.7 44.4 
Through mutual funds 5.9 16.7 10.6 
Through pension accounts 19.5 41.4 40.2 
Through trust funds 1.6 5.1 4.1 
All stock holdingsa 
Any holdings 31.7 51.9 49.1 
Stock worth $5,000 or moreb 22.6 40.1 34.6 
Stock worth $10,000 or moreb 18.5 35.1 29.6 
Stock worth $25,000 or moreb 10.5 27.1 22.1 
Direct plus indirect stocks as a 10.2 24.5 16.8 
percentage of total assets 
a Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual 
funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts. 
b 1995 dollars. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
in 2001. This increase may reﬂect in large measure the 171 percent 
surge in stock prices over these years. However, between 2001 and 
2007, the share plummeted to 17 percent. This change is a result not 
only of the relative stagnation of the stock market over these years but 
also of the withdrawal of many families from the stock market. 
Table 2.10b shows the distribution of total stocks owned, by vehi-
cle of ownership. Here there are very marked time trends. Direct stock 
holdings as a share of total stock holdings fell almost continuously over 
time, from 54 percent in 1989 to 37 percent in 2007. In contrast, stock 
held in mutual funds as a share of total stock rose almost continuously 
over time, from 9 percent in 1983 to 21 percent in 2007, while that held 
in trust funds declined by 6 percentage points. 
The most interesting pattern is with regard to stock held in DC pen-
sion accounts (including IRAs). Its share of total stocks ﬁ rst increased 
from 24 percent in 1989 to 34 percent in 2001 but then fell off to 31 per-
cent in 2007. The trend from 2001 to 2007 seems to reﬂect a substitution 
of stock holdings in mutual funds for those in pension plans as investors 
looked for safer retirement accounts (see below). Likewise, the share of 
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Table 2.10b  Distribution of Stock Ownership by Asset Type, 1989–2007 
(percentage of total stock held in each asset type) 
1989– 
Stock type 1989 2001 2007 2007 
Direct stock holdings 54.0 38.5 37.1 −16.9 
Indirect stock holdings only 46.0 61.5 62.9 16.9 
Through mutual funds 8.5 16.0 21.3 12.8 
Through pension accounts 24.4 33.5 31.4 7.0 
Through trust funds 13.2 12.0 7.2 −6.0 
Stocks held in pension accounts/ 32.6 66.3 43.6 11.1 
total value of pension accounts 
a Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual 
funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, and other retirement accounts. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
the total value of pension plans held as stock doubled between 1989 and 
2001, from 33 to 66 percent, and then plummeted to 44 percent in 2007. 
The sharp tail-off in stock ownership in pension plans after 2001 likely 
reﬂects both the lethargic performance of the stock market over this 
period and the search for more secure investments among plan holders. 
Stock ownership is also highly skewed by wealth and income class. 
As shown in Table 2.11a, 93 percent of the very rich (the top 1 percent) 
reported owning stock either directly or indirectly in 2007, compared 
to 48 percent of the middle quintile and 16 percent of the poorest 20 
percent. While 88 percent of the very rich also reported stocks worth 
$10,000 or more, only 22 percent of the middle quintile and 2 percent 
of the bottom quintile did so. The top 1 percent of households owned 38 
percent of all stocks, the top 5 percent 69 percent, the top 10 percent 81 
percent, and the top quintile over 90 percent. 
Stock ownership also tails off by income class (see Table 2.11b). 
Whereas 94 percent of households in the top 3.6 percent of income 
recipients (those who earned $250,000 or more) owned stock in 2007, 
39 percent of the middle class (incomes between $25,000 and $50,000), 
23 percent of the lower middle class (incomes between $15,000 and 
$25,000), and only 11 percent of poor households (income under 
$15,000) reported stock ownership. The comparable ownership ﬁgures 
for stock holdings of $10,000 or more are 91 percent for the top income 
class, 19 percent for the middle class, 12 percent for the lower middle 
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class, and 4 percent for the poor. Moreover, 84 percent of all stocks were 
owned by households earning $75,000 or more (the top 30 percent) and 
92 percent by those earning $50,000 or more in terms of income. 
Another notable development in the 2000s was an increase in the 
concentration of stock ownership, as shown in the last column of Tables 
2.11a–b. The share of total stock owned by the richest 1 percent in terms 
of wealth increased from 34 percent in 2001 to 38 percent in 2007, and 
that of the richest 5 percent from 62 to 69 percent. In terms of income, 
the share of total stock owned by the top income class jumped from 41 
to 54 percent (though it should be noted the top income class’s share 
of total households also rose, from 2.7 to 3.6 percent) and that of the 
top two income classes from 69 to 75 percent. One result of the stock 
market bust of the early 2000s was a withdrawal from the market by 
middle-class families. 
Thus, in terms of wealth or income, substantial stock holdings have 
still not penetrated much beyond the reach of the rich and the upper 
middle class. The big winners from the stock market boom of the late 
1990s (as well as the big losers in the early 2000s) were these groups, 
while the middle class and the poor did not see sizable beneﬁts from 
the bull market (or losses when the stock market tanked in 2000–2002). 
It is also apparent which groups were most exposed to the 2007–2009 
stock market crash. 
AN UPDATE TO 2009 
A complete update of the wealth ﬁgures to 2009 is beyond the scope 
of the present study. However, it is possible to provide a partial update 
of the wealth ﬁgures to July 1, 2009, based on two notable develop-
ments. The ﬁrst is that house prices fell by 24 percent in real terms, and 
the second is that the S&P 500 index was down by 41 percent in real 
terms.14 A somewhat rough update, based on the change in housing and 
stock prices, shows a marked deterioration in middle-class wealth.15 
According to my estimates, while mean wealth (in 2007 dollars) fell 
by 17.3 percent between 2007 and 2009 to $443,600, median wealth 
plunged by an astounding 36.1 percent to $65,400 (about the same level 
as in 1992!). 
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Table 2.11 a  Concentration of Stock Ownership by Wealth Class, 2007 (in 2007$) 
Percentage of households 
owning stock worth more than Percentage of stock owned 
Wealth class Zero $4,999 $9,999 Shares Cumulative Cumulative—2001 
Top 1% 92.6 89.1 88.4 38.3 38.3 33.5 
Next 4% 92.2 90.7 89.5 30.8 69.1 62.3 
Next 5% 86.8 85.0 81.4 12.1 81.2 76.9 
Next 10% 82.1 77.1 71.2 9.9 91.1 89.3 
Second quintile 65.4 54.3 47.1 6.4 97.5 97.1 
Third quintile 47.7 28.9 22.1 1.9 99.4 99.3 
Fourth quintile 30.3 12.3 8.7 0.5 99.9 99.8 
Bottom quintile 16.3 3.5 2.0 0.1 100.0 100.0 
All 49.1 36.3 31.6 100.0 
NOTE: Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, 
and other retirement accounts. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF. 
W
olff.indb
41
W
olff.indb  41
11/21/2011
9:17:11
A
M
11/21/2011  9:17:11 A
M
 
 
 
  
   
   
 
   41 
Table 2.11b  Concentration of Stock Ownership by Income Class, 2007 (in 2007$) 
Percentage of households 
Share of owning stock worth more than Percentage of stock owned 
Income level ($) households Zero $4,999 $9,999 Shares Cumulative Cumulative—2001 
250,000 or more 3.6 95.4 93.4 91.3 53.7 53.7 40.6 
100,000–249,999 15.5 84.5 71.0 63.7 21.5 75.2 68.6 
75,000–99,999 10.4 71.1 55.6 49.6 9.0 84.3 77.4 
50,000–74,999 17.5 58.1 40.7 34.9 7.7 92.0 89.3 
25,000–49,999 27.1 39.3 23.6 19.0 5.7 97.7 97.6 
15,000–24,999 12.7 23.1 15.7 11.9 1.1 98.8 98.9 
Under $15,000 13.3 11.2 5.0 4.3 1.2 100.0 100.0 
All 100.0 49.1 36.3 31.8 100.0 
NOTE: Includes direct ownership of stock shares and indirect ownership through mutual funds, trusts, IRAs, Keogh plans, 401(k) plans, 
and other retirement accounts. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF. 
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Trends in inequality are also important. According to previous 
research (Wolff 2002a), wealth inequality is very sensitive and posi-
tively related to the ratio of stock prices to housing prices, since the 
former is heavily concentrated among the rich and the latter is the chief 
asset of the middle class (see the following section). The fact that stock 
prices fell more than housing prices, at least from 2007 to mid-2009, 
should lead to a decline in wealth inequality over these two years. How-
ever, instead, the results show a fairly steep rise in wealth inequality, 
with the Gini coefﬁcient climbing from 0.834 to 0.865. The share of 
wealth for the top 1 percent advanced from 34.6 to 37.1 percent, that of 
the top 5 percent from 61.8 to 65.0 percent, and that of the top quintile 
from 85.0 to 87.7 percent, while that of the second quintile fell from 
10.9 to 10.0 percent, that of the middle quintile from 4.0 to 3.1 percent, 
and that of the bottom two quintiles from 0.2 to −0.8 percent. There was 
also a large expansion in the share of households with zero or negative 
net worth, from 19 to 24 percent. 
On the surface, these results appear somewhat surprising in light 
of the earlier regression results. However, while stock prices fell more 
than house prices, houses were a much larger share of the gross assets 
of the middle class than stocks were of the rich. As shown in Table 2.5, 
homes comprised 65 percent of the gross assets of the three middle 
wealth quintiles in 2007, whereas stocks made up 21 percent of the 
gross assets of the top 1 percent and 19 percent of the gross assets of 
the next richest 19 percent of households. As a result, the middle class 
took a bigger relative hit from the decline in home prices on their net 
worth than the top 20 percent did from the stock market decline. This is 
also reﬂected in the fact that median wealth dropped much more in per-
centage terms than mean wealth. Moreover, the rapid decline in house 
prices over these two years left 17 percent of homeowners “underwa-
ter,” with greater mortgage debt than the value of their homes. 
A WEALTH INEQUALITY PUZZLE 
A puzzle about wealth inequality trends was encountered in my 
earlier work (Wolff 2002a). In particular, the share of total household 
wealth held by the richest 1 percent of households increased only a bit 
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between 1989 and 1998, and the Gini coefﬁcient for total household 
wealth actually declined slightly. I expected both the share of the top 1 
percent and the Gini coefﬁcient to have shown a considerable increase. 
I expected wealth inequality to increase because in this work I iden-
tify two factors that seem to underlie much of the change in the share of 
wealth held by the top 1 percent. The ﬁrst is the change in basic income 
inequality, and the second is the change in the ratio of stock prices to 
housing prices (see Figure 2.3). In a simple regression of the share of 
the top 1 percent on these two factors, both variables proved positive 
and statistically signiﬁcant, and the goodness of the ﬁt of the equa-
tion was quite high.16 Over the period 1989–1998, income inequality, as 
measured by the share of the top 5 percent, increased by 2.8 percentage 
points, and the ratio of share prices to housing prices surged by a factor 
of 2.5. Extrapolating on the basis of the regression estimates, I would 
have expected a 9.9 percentage point increase in the share of the top 
1 percent between 1989 and 1998, compared to its actual gain of 0.7 
percentage points (see Figure 2.4).17 
Figure 2.3  Wealth Inequality, Income Inequality, and the Ratio of Stock 
Prices to House Prices, 1922–1998 
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SOURCE: Wolff (2002a). 
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Figure 2.4  Predicted versus Actual Wealth Inequality, 1922–1998 
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We shall see in Chapter 5 that this puzzle is largely resolved once we 
extend the concept of household wealth to include DB pension wealth. 
Once we include DB pension wealth in our measure, we ﬁnd that the 
inequality of this extended measure does, in fact, show an increase 
between 1989 and 1998 (and indeed through 2007). The reason, as we 
shall see later, is that DB pension wealth is more equally distributed 
than conventional household wealth, and its shrinkage over time led to 
a rise in wealth inequality. This is discussed more in Chapter 5. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Median net worth showed robust gains over the period 1983–2007. 
In fact, the growth rate of median wealth accelerated from the 1980s 
to the 1990s and into the 2001–2007 period. However, the gains of the 
2001–2007 period were based largely on rising home prices ﬁ nanced by 
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increasing mortgage debt. This growth came to an abrupt end in 2007 
with the collapse in home prices, and median wealth plummeted from 
2007 through 2009. 
Household wealth inequality showed a sharp increase from 1983 to 
1989. However, from 1989 to 2007 there was almost no change in the 
degree of wealth inequality. This trend was surprising because the two 
factors normally positively associated with wealth inequality, income 
inequality and the ratio of stock prices to home prices, both showed a 
marked rise over the same years, 1989 to 2007. However, according to 
my projections, there was a fairly steep rise in wealth inequality from 
2007 to 2009, as the collapse in housing prices hurt the middle class 
more than the decline in stock prices affected the rich. 
A striking shift occurred in the portfolio composition of household 
wealth out of liquid assets and into DC pension accounts over the years 
1989–2001, though pension accounts as a share of total assets also fell 
off a bit from 2001 to 2007. There was also a noticeable expansion of 
stock ownership from 1989 to 2001, but this was followed by a mild 
contraction between 2001 and 2007. Deﬁned contribution pension 
accounts, moreover, became more heavily invested in equities, mak-
ing them vulnerable to the stock market downturn of 2007 to 2009. We
shall see more about this in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Moreover, despite the buoyant economy over the 1980s and 1990s, 
overall indebtedness continued to rise among American families and 
then shot up in the 2000s. Among the middle class in particular, the 
debt-income ratio reached its highest level in 24 years. Mortgage debt 
on middle-class homeowners’ property exploded from 29 percent in 
1983 to 47 percent in 2007 (and among all homeowners from 21 to 
35 percent). The high level of mortgage indebtedness made the middle 
class particularly vulnerable to the collapse of the housing market at 
the end of the decade of the 2000s. In fact, I estimate that 17 percent of 
homeowners were “underwater” by 2009. 
The mean wealth of African Americans was only 19 percent that of 
white families in 1983, and that ratio barely budged during 1983–2007. 
The black homeownership rate did climb from 44 percent in 1983 to 
49 percent in 2007, but relative to white households it was the same in 
2007 (a ratio of 0.65) as in 1983. The mean wealth of Hispanic house-
holds was also very low compared to non-Hispanic whites in 1983, a 
ratio of 0.16, but Hispanics did show some gains in mean wealth rela-
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tive to non-Hispanic whites, particularly in 2001–2007, and the ratio 
advanced to 0.26. The homeownership rate among Hispanic households 
also ascended, from a meager 33 percent in 1983 to 49 percent in 2007, 
the same level as African Americans, and the ratio of homeownership 
rates between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites advanced from 48 
percent in 1983 to 66 percent in 2007. 
Young households (under the age of 45), after some relative gains 
from 1983 to 1989, saw their relative wealth position deteriorate 
between 1989 and 2007. This development made young households 
particularly exposed to the joint collapse of the stock and housing mar-
kets at the end of the decade of the 2000s. 
These results on traditional net worth will set the stage for the later 
analysis of wealth trends once we include DB pension wealth and Social 
Security wealth in the deﬁnition of (augmented) wealth. In Chapters 4 
and 5, we will see how pension wealth and augmented wealth grew 
over the years 1983–2007 and how the inequality of augmented wealth 
changed over this period. In Chapter 6, we will also reexamine the racial 
divide and age class differences once retirement wealth is included in 
household wealth. In the same chapter we will also look at relative 
developments in augmented wealth by income class and wealth class. 
Notes
 1. These ﬁ gures are based on the BLS hourly wage series. The BLS wage ﬁgures are
converted to constant dollars on the basis of the CPI-U. 
2. The Census Bureau uses the newer CPI-U-RS series to convert to constant dollars. 
However, for this period, there is virtually no difference between the CPI-U and 
the CPI-U-RS. 
3. I choose these years to be consistent with the later chapters on pension and Social
Security wealth. However, the SCF was also conducted in the years 1992, 1995, and
2004. 
4. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in developing these weights, see, for
example, Kennickell and Woodburn (1999) for the 1989 SCF, or Kennickell (2001)
for the 2001 SCF. 
5. It should be noted that the income in each survey year (for instance, 2007) is for 
the preceding year (2006 in this case). 
6. The SCF data show a much higher level of income inequality than the CPS data. 
In the year 2000, for example, the CPS data show the share of the top 5 percent as 
being 22.1 percent and the Gini coefﬁcient as being 0.462. The difference is pri-
marily due to three factors. First, the SCF oversamples the rich (as noted above), 
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while the CPS is a representative sample. Second, the CPS data are top-coded (that 
is, there is an open-ended interval at the top, typically at $75,000 or $100,000), 
whereas the SCF data are not. Third, the income concepts differ between the two 
samples. In particular, the SCF income deﬁnition includes realized capital gains 
whereas the CPS deﬁnition does not. However, the CPS data also show a large 
increase in inequality between 1989 and 2000, with the share of the top 5 percent 
rising from 18.9 to 22.1 percent and the Gini coefﬁcient from 0.431 to 0.462. 
Further analysis of the difference in income ﬁgures between the two surveys is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
7. The slight rise in wealth inequality between 2001 and 2007 appears to be due 
to two offsetting effects. As shown in my previous work (Wolff 2002a), wealth 
inequality is positively related to both income inequality and the ratio of stock 
prices to house prices (also see the section titled “A Wealth Inequality Puzzle”). 
Between 2001 and 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient for household income, as noted 
above, rose modestly, from 0.562 to 0.574, while the ratio of the S&P 500 stock 
index to the median sales price of existing one-family homes fell from 8.1 to 7.1. 
These two effects generally offset each other, resulting in a small rise in wealth 
inequality. 
8. The residual group, American Indians and Asians, is excluded here because of its
small sample size. 
9. It should be stressed that the unit of observation is the household, which includes
families (two or more related individuals living together) as well as single adults. As
is widely known, the share of female-headed households among African Americans
is much higher than that among whites. This difference partly accounts for the rela-
tively lower income and wealth among African American households. 
10. Also, see Gittleman and Wolff (2004) for additional evidence from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
11.  One important reason for the wealth gap is differences in inheritances. According 
to my calculations from the SCF data, 24.1 percent of white households in 1998 
reported receiving an inheritance over their life time, compared to 11.0 percent of 
black households, and the average bequest among white inheritors was $115,000 
(present value in 1998) and only $32,000 among black inheritors. Thus, inheri-
tances appear to play a vital role in explaining the large wealth gap, particularly 
in light of the fact that black families appear to save more than white families at 
similar income levels (see, for example, Blau and Graham [1990]; Oliver and 
Shapiro [1997]; and Gittleman and Wolff [2004]). 
12. This pattern may also be partly a cohort effect, since 401(k) plans and other DC 
plans were not widely introduced into the workplace until after 1989. 
13. The 1983 data do not permit an estimation of indirect stock ownership, so I 
exclude 1983 from the table. 
14. This ﬁgure is based on the National Association of Realtors Median Sales Price 
of Existing Single-Family Homes for Metropolitan Areas. In Chapter 5 we will 
examine the implications of the recent stock market crash on pension wealth 
holdings. 
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15. I assume that there are no additional savings (or dissavings) and no portfolio 
adjustments (except those caused by price changes of homes and stock). 
16. A regression of a wealth inequality index, measured by the share of marketable 
wealth held by the top 1 percent of households (WLTH), on income inequality, 
measured by the share of income received by the top 5 percent of families (INC), 
and the ratio of stock prices (the S&P index) to housing prices (RATIO), with 21 
data readings between 1922 and 1998, yields 
WLTH = 5.10 + 1.27 INC + 0.26 RATIO,  R2 = 0.64, N = 21 ,
 (0.9) (4.2) (2.5) 
with t-ratios shown in parentheses. Both variables are statistically signiﬁ cant (INC 
at the 1 percent level and RATIO at the 5 percent level) and carry the expected 
(positive) sign. Also, the ﬁt is quite good, even for this simple model. 
Sources are as follows: 
• Share of income of the top 5 percent: The basic data source is the Current 
Population Report series on shares of income held by families that runs from 
1947 to 1998. The data are available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/ 
histinc. The earlier data, from 1922 to 1949, are from Kuznets’s (1953) series 
on the percentage share of total income received by the top percentiles of tax 
units. This series is benchmarked against the census ﬁgure for 1949. 
• S&P 500 Composite Stock Index: From 1922 to 1969: U.S. Census Bureau 
(1975a, p. 1004). From 1970 to 1998: Council of Economic Advisers (2001, 
Table B-93, p. 406). 
• Median house prices: From 1922 to 1969: U.S. Census Bureau (1975b, Series 
N 259 and 261, p. 647). From 1970 to 1998: U.S. Census Bureau (1999, Table 
No. 1203, p. 725). 
17. Kopczuk and Saez (2004), using U.S. estate tax data from 1916 to 2000, also 
ﬁnd very little change in the shares of wealth held by the top wealth groups in the 
1990s. Indeed, they ﬁnd very little change in the 1980s as well. The share of the 
top 1 percent was 21.1 percent in 1983 and 20.8 percent in 2000, according to their 
data. 
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Review of the Literature 
on Retirement Wealth 
and Retirement Adequacy 
We now turn our attention to the main topic of the book: retirement 
wealth and retirement adequacy. Before showing my own results on 
the subject, it is helpful to see what previous research has found. This 
review of the previous literature on these topics will provide a context 
for my later empirical ﬁndings. 
I divide the survey into six parts. My own work will cover much 
of the same ground. The survey begins with a focus on trends in pen-
sion coverage. As will be seen, several previous studies have reported 
on the “great transformation” of the pension system away from DB 
plans and toward DC plans, which is a focus of the present volume. Has 
the pension transformation improved or worsened the level of pension 
wealth in the U.S. and its degree of inequality? The next section will 
present a review of studies on the level of retirement wealth as well as 
its distribution. Have pensions, particularly DC pension plans, added 
to household savings and wealth and, if so, by how much? After that I 
will survey the studies that have considered the effects of pensions on 
household savings. 
Retirement adequacy is a key subject in this ﬁeld. Has the great 
transformation improved or worsened the adequacy of savings for 
retirement? How have replacement rates (the ratio of retirement income 
to prior income) been affected? This part of the chapter examines previ-
ous estimates of retirement adequacy and replacement rates. How have 
elderly households in general fared recently and in the past? The last 
two sections review the literature on the economic status of the elderly 
and consider the impact of the recent recession on pension holdings. 
49 
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DID PENSION COVERAGE RISE? 
How has the great transformation affected actual pension coverage? 
This is a topic that will occupy a large portion of Chapter 4. Has the 
replacement of DB plans with DC plans improved or worsened pension 
coverage among U.S. workers? 
Several previous studies have documented changes in pension cov-
erage in the United States, particularly the decline in DB pension cover-
age and the corresponding rise of DC coverage among workers since the 
early 1980s. Before this, Laurence Kotlikoff and Daniel Smith (1983) 
provide one of the most comprehensive treatments of pension coverage 
and show that the proportion of U.S. private-wage and salary workers 
covered by (traditional DB) pensions more than doubled between 1950 
and 1979. However, David Bloom and Richard Freeman (1992), using 
the CPS for 1979 and 1988, were among the ﬁrst to call attention to the 
decline in DB pension coverage. They report that the percentage of all 
workers aged 25–64 covered by these plans fell from 63 to 57 percent 
over this period. Among male workers in this age group, the share cov-
ered dropped from 70 to 61 percent, while among females the share 
remained almost constant, at 53 percent. 
Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier (1992) were among the ﬁrst 
to document the changeover from DB plans to DC plans between 1977 
and 1985 on the basis of IRS 5500 ﬁlings. They decompose the switch 
from DB to DC plans into two effects: the ﬁrst from the decline in DB 
coverage associated with (that is, conditional on) industry, size, and 
union status, and the second from shifts in the employment mix away 
from ﬁrms with industry, size, and union status historically associated 
with high DB coverage rates and toward those with low DB coverage. 
They estimate that each effect contributed about half to the replacement 
of DB plans by DC plans. Other studies include those by William Even 
and David Macpherson (1994a,b,c,d). The 1994c study in particular 
shows a pronounced drop in DB pension coverage among workers with 
low levels of education, and Even and Macpherson (1994d) show a 
convergence in pension coverage rates among female and male workers 
between 1979 and 1998. 
A U.S. Department of Labor (2000) report ﬁnds that a large propor-
tion of workers, especially low-wage, part-time, and minority workers, 
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were not covered by private pensions. The coverage rate of all private 
sector wage and salary workers was 44 percent in 1997. Coverage of 
part-time, temporary, and low-wage workers was especially low. This 
appears to be ascribable to the proliferation of 401(k) plans and the 
frequent requirement of employee contributions to such plans. It also 
ﬁnds important ethnic differences: 47 percent of white workers partici-
pated, but only 27 percent of Hispanics. Another important ﬁ nding is 
that 70 percent of unionized workers were covered by a pension plan, 
compared to only 41 percent of nonunionized workers. Pension par-
ticipation was found to be highly correlated with wages: while only 6 
percent of workers earning less than $200 per week had a pension plan, 
76 percent of workers earning $1,000 per week participated. 
Using CPS data, Munnell and Perun (2006) report a sharp drop-
off in pension coverage between 1980 and 2004. In fact, participation 
dropped between 1979 and 1988, rebounded from 1988 to 1999, and 
then fell off again between 1999 and 2004. In 1979, 51 percent of non-
agricultural wage and salary workers in the private sector aged 25–64 
participated in a pension plan. By 2004, that ﬁgure was down to 46 per-
cent. The authors also ﬁnd that the decline in pension coverage occurred 
for all ﬁve earnings quintiles, though it was particularly pronounced for 
the middle quintile.1 
In general, these studies report an overall increase in pension cov-
erage during the 1980s and 1990s despite the collapse of DB plans 
because of an offsetting rise in DC plans. However, they also indicate a 
drop-off in pension coverage during the 2000s. I look at this issue again 
in Chapter 4 and ﬁnd a rise in overall pension coverage among house-
holds from 1989 to 2001, but this was followed by a modest decline 
from 2001 to 2007. 
DID PENSION AND RETIREMENT WEALTH INCREASE? 
Did the transformation of the pension system out of DB plans and 
into DC plans improve or worsen the level of pension wealth and retire-
ment wealth in general? Was the great transformation beneﬁcial or hurt-
ful in terms of actual dollar amounts? This topic will be a major focus 
of Chapters 4 and 5. 
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In one of the most important studies on this topic, Poterba et al. 
(2007) consider whether the switchover from DB to DC plans helped or 
hurt workers in terms of expected retirement wealth. As they note, the 
American private pension system was once dominated by DB plans and 
is now currently divided between DC and DB plans. Wealth accumula-
tion in DC plans depends on participants’ contribution behavior and 
on ﬁnancial market returns, while accumulation in DB plans is depen-
dent on participants’ labor market experiences and on plan parameters. 
Using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Poterba et 
al. simulate the distribution of retirement wealth under representative 
DB and DC plans. In particular, they investigate how asset returns, 
earnings histories, and retirement plan characteristics contribute to the 
variation in retirement wealth outcomes. For DC plans they randomly 
assign individuals a share of wages that they and their employers con-
tribute to the plan. Asset returns are drawn from the historical return 
distribution. The DB plan simulations draw earnings histories from the 
HRS and randomly assign each individual a pension plan drawn from 
a sample of large private and public DB plans. The simulations yield 
distributions of both DC and DB wealth at retirement. They ﬁ nd that 
average retirement wealth accruals under current DC plans exceeded 
those under private sector DB plans, although DC plans were also more 
likely to generate very low retirement wealth outcomes. The compari-
son of current DC plans with public sector DB plans was less deﬁnitive, 
because public sector DB plans were more generous on average than 
their private sector DB counterparts. 
What is the effect of pension and retirement wealth in general on 
the inequality of wealth? The seminal paper on this subject is one by 
Feldstein (1974), whose main interest was in the Social Security sys-
tem rather than the private pension system. In it, Feldstein introduces 
the concept of Social Security wealth and develops its methodology. 
His main interest in this paper is in the aggregate level of Social Secu-
rity wealth and its effect on aggregate savings and retirement patterns. 
However, in a follow-up paper, Feldstein (1976) considers the effects 
of Social Security wealth on the overall distribution of wealth. He uses 
the 1962 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (SFCC), a 
survey performed by the Federal Reserve Board of Washington and a 
precursor of the SCF. The paper ﬁnds that the inclusion of Social Secu-
rity wealth had a major effect on lowering the inequality of total house-
Wolff.indb 53  11/21/2011 9:17:21 AM   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Review of the Literature 53 
hold wealth (including Social Security wealth). The Gini coefﬁ cient for 
the sum of net worth and Social Security wealth among families aged 
35–64 was 0.51, compared to a Gini coefﬁcient of 0.72 for net worth. 
I followed up this study by examining the distributional implications 
of both Social Security and private pension wealth. Wolff (1987b)  uses 
the 1969 Measurement of Economic and Social Performance (MESP) 
database, and is the ﬁrst to add estimates of private pension wealth to 
Social Security wealth and to examine their joint effects on the over-
all distribution of wealth. The paper shows that while Social Security 
wealth had a pronounced equalizing effect on the distribution of aug-
mented wealth (the sum of marketable wealth and retirement wealth), 
as Feldstein (1976) ﬁnds, pension wealth had a disequalizing effect on 
augmented wealth. In particular, the addition of Social Security wealth 
to net worth reduced the overall Gini coefﬁcient from 0.73 to 0.48 in 
1969, but the addition of pension wealth to the sum of net worth and 
Social Security wealth raised the Gini coefﬁcient back to 0.66. The sum 
of Social Security and pension wealth had, on net, an equalizing effect 
on the distribution of augmented wealth but substantially less than that 
of Social Security wealth alone.2 
Relatively similar effects are reported in later papers. McGarry and 
Davenport (1997) use the 1992 wave of the HRS to estimate private 
pension wealth. They ﬁnd that pension wealth is only slightly more 
equally distributed than net worth, and that adding pension wealth to 
net worth had a modest effect on reducing inequality (the wealth share 
of the top decile declined from 53 to 45 percent with the addition of 
pension wealth). Kennickell and Sundén (1999) use the 1989 and 1992 
SCF to analyze the effects of Social Security and pension wealth on 
the overall distribution of wealth. They also ﬁnd a large net equaliz-
ing effect from the inclusion of these two forms of retirement wealth. 
In particular, the inclusion of pension and net Social Security wealth 
reduced the share of total wealth held by the top 1 percent of nonelderly 
households in 1992 from 31 percent to 16 percent.3 
Brown, Coronado, and Fullerton (2009) examine the redistributional 
effects of Social Security using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) data for the period 1968–1993. They focus on whether the poor 
beneﬁted from Social Security beneﬁts relative to the middle class and 
rich. Their main ﬁnding is that the degree of redistribution of Social 
Security fell as the measure of resources used for a basis of compari-
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son became more expansive. In particular, as they expand the deﬁnition 
from current annual income, the measure used in most studies, to life-
time income, the measured effect of the Social Security system became 
less progressive. In fact, when they use potential labor earnings at the 
household level as the basis of comparison rather than actual earnings 
at the individual level, they ﬁnd that Social Security had virtually no 
effect on overall inequality. 
Brown, Coronado, and Fullerton (2009) also ﬁnd that even though 
there were some small positive net transfers to those at the bottom of the 
lifetime income distribution, this result was driven largely by the lack 
of redistribution across the middle and upper part of the income dis-
tribution. Moreover, in situations where redistribution did occur, they 
ﬁnd that many high-income households received positive net transfers, 
while many low-income households paid net taxes. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I elaborate on how pension wealth and Social 
Security wealth affect measured wealth inequality. Moreover, I will also 
consider how the redistributional effects of these two forms of retire-
ment wealth have changed over time, from 1983 to 2007.4 I also ﬁ nd, as 
do many of these studies, that Social Security wealth is distributed much 
more equally than conventional net worth, and its addition to household 
wealth substantially lowers measured wealth inequality. Private pen-
sion wealth, on the other hand, is distributed less equally than Social 
Security wealth but more equally than net worth, and its addition to net 
worth leads to only a modest reduction in measured wealth inequality. 
Moreover, the “equalizing” effect of pension wealth dissipated between 
1983 and 2007 as the more equally distributed DB pension wealth was 
replaced by the less equally distributed DC pension wealth. 
A related topic is the makeup or composition of total (augmented) 
household wealth; in particular, how much of it is composed of pension 
wealth, Social Security wealth, and standard net worth? Gustman et al. 
(1997), for example, using the 1992 HRS, estimate that, collectively, 
pensions, Social Security, and health insurance accounted for about half 
of the wealth held by all households aged 51–61. However, the propor-
tion varied by wealth level. They ﬁnd that these three components made 
up 60 percent of total wealth of wealth percentiles 45–55, but only 48 
percent of wealth percentiles 90–95. They conclude that pension wealth 
and Social Security wealth (as well as health insurance) were more 
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important for middle-class households than the rich. I shall report very 
similar results in Chapter 6. 
In a follow-up study, Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), using the 
HRS again, focus on the role of pensions in forming retirement wealth. 
They ﬁnd that pension coverage was widespread, covering two-thirds 
of households and accounting for one-quarter of accumulated wealth on 
average. Social Security beneﬁts accounted for another quarter of total 
wealth. The remainder consisted of traditional net worth. Here, again, 
my ﬁndings in Chapter 6 are quite similar. 
DO PENSIONS REDUCE OTHER FORMS OF SAVINGS? 
One ongoing controversy is whether DC pension plans like 401(k) 
plans have, on net, added to total household savings or whether they 
have simply substituted for other forms of savings. Some circumstantial 
evidence on this score was presented in Chapter 2, where we saw a clear 
displacement of liquid assets by DC pension accounts (see Table 2.3, 
for example). 
On one side of the issue is a series of papers by Poterba, Venti, and 
Wise. In their 1992, 1993, and 1995 papers, using SIPP data for 1984 
and 1991; in their 1998 paper, using HRS data for 1993; and in their 
2001 paper, using both macro national accounting data and micro HRS 
data, Poterba, Venti, and Wise conclude that the growth of IRAs and 
401(k) plans did not substitute for other forms of household wealth, and 
in fact raised household net worth relative to what it would have been 
without these plans. They ﬁnd no substitution of DC wealth for either 
DB wealth or other components of household wealth. 
On the other side of the issue is the work of Gale, who, in a series 
of papers both by himself and with colleagues, ﬁnds very little net sav-
ings emanating from DC plans. Gale (1995) concludes that when biases 
in estimation procedures in the previous literature on the subject are 
corrected, the offset of pension wealth on other forms of wealth can be 
very high. Gale and Scholz (1994) use the 1983 and the 1986 SCF, the 
latter of which contains a reinterview of 2,822 households out of the 
4,262 households that were ﬁrst interviewed in the 1983 SCF. Their 
main ﬁnding is that raising the annual IRA contribution limit between 
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1983 and 1986 would have resulted in little, if any, increase in national 
savings. These results, they maintain, are consistent with new evidence 
they present, indicating considerable potential among IRA holders to 
shift substitutable forms of savings into IRAs. 
Using data from the 1984, 1987, and 1991 SIPP, Engen and Gale 
(1997) estimate that, at best, only a small proportion of 401(k) contri-
butions represented net increments to household savings. In later work, 
Engen and Gale (2000) reﬁne their analysis to look at the substitution 
effect by earnings groups. Using data from the 1987 and 1991 SIPP, 
they ﬁnd that 401(k)s held by low earners are more likely to represent 
additions to net worth than 401(k)s held by high earners, who hold the 
bulk of this asset. Overall, only between 0 and 30 percent of the value 
of 401(k)s represented net additions to private savings. 
Kennickell and Sundén (1999) also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative effect 
of both DB plan coverage and Social Security wealth on nonpension 
net worth but conclude that the effects of DC plans, such as 401(k) 
plans, on other forms of wealth were statistically insigniﬁcant. In con-
trast, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2004), using data from the 1990 
SIPP, ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of 401(k) plan 
participation on net ﬁnancial assets over the entire range of the asset 
distribution. Moreover, the increase in the lower tail of the distribution 
of 401(k) wealth translated almost completely into an increase in net 
wealth. Thus, the authors conclude that 401(k) accumulations added 
to the net worth of households in general and particularly those in the 
lower wealth groups. However, there was signiﬁcant evidence of sub-
stitution of 401(k) accumulations for other asset types in the upper tail 
of the distribution. 
In later work, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007b) document the tran-
sition from the DB to the DC system that occurred in the United States 
from the early 1980s on. They report, ﬁrst, that the total value of assets 
in retirement accounts has increased substantially since 1980. As a 
percentage of National Income and Product Accounts wage and sal-
ary earnings, it rose from 71 percent in 1980 to 261 percent in 2006. 
Second, the share of employees covered by at least one pension plan 
remained about constant from 1980 to 2005, but the share covered by 
more than one plan rose substantially. Third, Poterba, Venti, and Wise 
project that 401(k) assets will increase “enormously” over time and that 
by 2040, assets of retirees will be at least twice as large in real dollars 
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as in 2000. Moreover, the increase in retirement assets will occur along 
the whole distribution of Social Security wealth. 
Engelhardt and Kumar (2007) use data from the 1991 wave of 
the HRS. They are particularly interested in how employer matching 
of employee 401(k) contributions affects retirement savings. Using 
detailed administrative contribution, earnings, and pension-plan data 
from the HRS, they estimate that an increase in the match rate (that is, 
the percentage of employee contributions to these plans that were met 
by a similar contribution from the employer) by 25 cents per dollar 
of employee contribution raised 401(k) participation by ﬁve percent-
age points. They also estimate that an increase in the match rate by 25 
cents per dollar of employee contribution raised 401(k) savings by $365 
(in 1991 dollars). Overall, they conclude that employer matching did 
increase 401(k) savings, but the effect was not very large. 
Overall, previous studies that consider whether accumulations in 
DC pension plans add to net household wealth or merely substitute for 
other forms of household savings have been inconclusive. Reported 
results on this issue have been quite mixed, with some ﬁnding a strong 
displacement effect and others little or none. Though this is an impor-
tant issue to address, it is beyond the scope of the present work. 
HAS RETIREMENT ADEQUACY IMPROVED OVER TIME? 
Retirement adequacy is a very important issue. It addresses the 
question of whether working individuals have saved enough (or will 
save enough) to meet their needs during retirement. Pension accumula-
tions, Social Security wealth, and savings in nonretirement assets all 
play a role in determining whether accumulated wealth at retirement is 
(or will be) sufﬁcient to meet retirement needs. 
Measuring retirement adequacy is usually done by comparing pre-
dicted income at time of retirement with previous income (the so-called 
replacement rate). It should be noted that estimates of the replacement 
rate are quite sensitive to the choice of denominator. Some studies use 
family income at the time of the survey, others use a measure of perma-
nent income, and still others use actual (or predicted) income as of the 
age just before retirement. 
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Measurement of adequacy also depends on the standard used for 
adequacy. Calculations of retirement income adequacy typically relate 
retirement consumption to preretirement consumption in three possible 
ways. First, a household may be considered adequately prepared for 
retirement if it can maintain a similar real level of consumption as dur-
ing its working years. Usually, 80 percent of preretirement income is 
thus considered adequate since the income needs of retirees are likely 
to be lower than those of workers (Aon Consulting 2001). Households 
no longer need to save for retirement, taxes are lower, work-related 
expenses disappear, the family size of retirees is smaller than that of 
workers, and households eventually pay off their debt (McGill et al. 
1996). Second, retirement income adequacy may be deﬁned as a con-
stant nominal level of consumption during retirement as during work-
ing years. This means that consumption needs are expected to decline 
during retirement over time, but in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. Third, 
real consumption may decline if the marginal utility of consumption 
is held constant and uncertainty about income and life expectancy is 
introduced (Engen, Gale, and Uccello 1999). As households must con-
sider an uncertain future, their marginal utility of certain consumption 
today is higher than the marginal utility of uncertain consumption in 
the future. 
Several studies have documented that household consumption gen-
erally falls after retirement compared to the time when the household 
is working. Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) use data from the Brit-
ish Family Expenditure Survey covering the years 1968–1992. They 
ﬁrst document a signiﬁcant decline in consumption among British 
households right after retirement. Moreover, they also ﬁnd that this 
drop in consumption could not be fully explained by a forward-looking 
consumption-smoothing model, such as the life-cycle model, that takes 
into account expected demographic changes and mortality risk. Fisher 
et al. (2005) use data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey cov-
ering the years 1984–2003. They ﬁrst show that as the deﬁ nition of 
consumption is expanded from food expenditures only to more compre-
hensive deﬁnitions, the recorded decline of consumption at retirement 
decreases by more than half. However, even with the most compre-
hensive deﬁ nition, they ﬁnd that consumption expenditures fall by 2.5 
percent when individuals retire and continue to decline at about a rate 
of 1 percent per year after that. 
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The decline in spending after retirement for the average household 
is sometimes called the “retirement consumption puzzle.” The reason is 
that in a standard life cycle model of savings, it is typically shown that 
household welfare is maximized when consumption remains constant 
over the person’s lifetime (see Modigliani [1954] for the classic work 
on this topic). Thus, the drop in consumption just after retirement is 
viewed as a puzzle. 
Hurst (2008), after summarizing the recent literature on consump-
tion behavior during retirement, argues that collectively there is no 
puzzle with respect to the spending patterns of most households as they 
transition into retirement. In particular, the literature shows that there 
is substantial heterogeneity in spending changes at retirement across 
consumption categories. The declines in spending after retirement for 
the average household were limited to the categories of food and work-
related expenses. Spending in nearly all other categories of nondurable 
expenditure remained constant or even rose. Moreover, even though 
expenditures on food went down after retirement, actual food intake 
(including food prepared in the home) tended to remain more or less 
constant. The literature also shows that there was substantial heteroge-
neity across households in the change in expenditure associated with 
retirement. However, much of the research on this subject shows that 
this heterogeneity can be fairly well explained by households involun-
tarily retiring due to deteriorating health. Overall, the literature shows 
that the standard life-cycle model of consumption augmented with 
home production and uncertain health shocks has done an adequate job 
in explaining the consumption patterns of the average household after 
retirement. 
Scholz and Seshadri (2009) argue that the choice of replacement 
rates should be theory-based—not the common advice of ﬁnancial 
planners, who typically call for a 70 percent replacement rate of aver-
age preretirement income. They use an augmented life-cycle model of 
household behavior to examine optimal replacement rates for a repre-
sentative set of retired U.S. households and related optimal replacement 
rates for observable household characteristics. They ﬁrst note that target 
replacement rates are usually thought to be less than 100 percent for 
three main reasons. First, upon retirement, households typically face 
lower taxes than they face during their working years, if for no other 
reason than Social Security is more lightly taxed than wages and sala-
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ries. Second, households typically save less in retirement than they do 
during their working years, so saving is a smaller claim on available 
income. Third, work-related expenses generally fall in retirement. 
Scholz and Seshadri (2009) also note that low-income households 
are thought to need higher replacement rates than high-income house-
holds. Prior to retirement, tax rates are lower for low-income house-
holds than they are for high-income households. As a result, low-income 
households’ reduction in taxes in retirement is smaller than the reduc-
tion experienced by high-income households. Moreover, low-income 
households save less than high-income households, so the reduction 
in saving in retirement will be smaller for low-income households. 
The fact that taxes and saving fall less in retirement for low-income 
households than for high-income households suggests that their target 
replacement rate should be higher. 
Scholz and Seshadri (2009) suggest that there are different choices 
of the preretirement income that can be used to compute replacement 
rates. The usual choice is average income over preretirement years, but 
replacement rates are sometimes deﬁned using average income over the 
last ﬁve (or fewer) years of the preretirement period, with the idea that 
living standards may ratchet upward as people age. The authors argue 
that a natural alternative to replacement rates can be drawn from the 
life-cycle model, augmented to account for fundamental factors affect-
ing most households, such as demographic changes and uncertainty 
about future earnings, medical expenses, and longevity. 
Using HRS data, Scholz and Seshadri (2009) compute an average 
optimal replacement rate of 0.68 for the population as a whole on the 
basis of income averaged over the lifetime as the point of comparison 
and 0.57 on the basis of income averaged over the top ﬁve earnings 
years. Optimal replacement rates exhibited a U-shaped relation with 
respect to the lifetime income decile—highest at the top and the bottom 
and lowest in the middle. They also compute that optimal replacement 
rates were highest for those who graduated college and lowest for those 
with less than a high school degree. 
As in the literature on the effects of DC accumulations on other 
forms of household savings, which I review in the last section of this 
chapter, the studies on retirement savings adequacy have produced dif-
fering results. Using the HRS, Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) ﬁ nd that 
the average household could replace 60 percent of preretirement income 
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in real terms and 86 percent of preretirement income in nominal terms. 
The ﬁnding for the nominal replacement ratio led the authors to con-
clude that households on average were adequately prepared for retire-
ment. Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999), using the SIPP and the SCF, 
estimate that about half of households fell short of what they needed 
for adequate retirement income but the other half could be expected to 
meet the target retirement savings. Despite this, they calculate an aver-
age replacement ratio for the median income household of 72 percent, 
a result that led the authors to conclude that households were close to 
being adequately prepared for retirement. 
In a later study, Engen, Gale, and Uccello (2005) ﬁnd that the 
upswing in stock prices from 1995 to 1998 did not substantially alter 
their earlier ﬁ ndings on retirement income. This suggests that much of 
the increase in retirement wealth was concentrated among households 
that were already adequately prepared for retirement. Further, Haveman 
et al. (2003), using Social Security’s New Beneﬁciary Data System, 
ﬁnd that retired beneﬁciaries had a median replacement ratio of about 
80 percent, and that only 30 percent of households had a replacement 
ratio of less than 70 percent in 1982. These four studies all appear to 
indicate that households in the main had saved enough to be adequately 
prepared for retirement. 
In contrast, several studies conclude that households were inade-
quately prepared for retirement. Moore and Mitchell (2000) ﬁ nd, using 
the 1992 HRS, that the median wealth household would have to save 
an additional 16 percent annually of earnings if it were to retire at age 
62, and an additional 7 percent annually for retirement at age 65, to 
ﬁ nance an adequate real replacement ratio. Their estimate of a savings 
rate of 7.3 percent for households wishing to retire at age 65 was three 
times as much as what households actually saved (Mitchell and Moore 
1998). This meant that households had on average between 75 and 88 
percent—depending on marital status—of what they needed when retir-
ing at age 65 in 1992. 
Similarly, Bernheim (1997) calculates that on average baby boomer 
households were saving only at 34 percent of what their target savings 
rate should be. In addition, Gustman and Steinmeier’s (1998) ﬁgures 
show that, based on real replacement ratios, the average household had 
28 percent less than what it needed for adequate retirement savings. 
Last, Wolff (2002b) concludes that 61 percent of households could not 
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replace 75 percent of their preretirement income in retirement, based 
on data from the 1998 SCF, and this ﬁgure was up from 56 percent of 
households in 1989. 
One issue to consider, though, is what a shortfall relative to adequate 
savings means. In some cases, a shortfall will still allow households to 
ﬁnance most of their expected consumption. Engen, Gale, and Uccello 
(1999) point out that the households used in Mitchell and Moore (1998) 
could still ﬁnance more than 90 percent of the consumption prescribed 
by their model with no additional savings. Similarly, Haveman et al.’s 
(2003) study shows that about 20 percent of households had a replace-
ment ratio of between 70 and 80 percent. In other words, one-ﬁ fth of 
households had more than 90 percent, but less than 100 percent, of 
what is generally assumed to be necessary for retirement income ade-
quacy—80 percent of preretirement earnings. 
As wealth is unequally distributed, there may be a large share of 
households for which the shortfalls are larger. Engen, Gale, and Uccello
(1999) calculate that households in the 75th percentile—the closest 
income percentile for average (not median) income—had 121 to 172 
percent of what they needed for retirement. For the median household, 
the same ratios ranged from 47 to 124 percent. Thus, the median house-
hold reached only 62 percent of the preparedness of the average house-
hold in 1992. Moreover, Wolff (2002b) documents that the gap between 
average wealth and median wealth to income ratios increased further 
by 1998. Because of the unequal distribution of wealth, a large share of 
households was likely to experience retirement consumption shortfalls. 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) ﬁnd that households in the bottom 
quartile had nominal replacement ratios of 50 percent and real replace-
ment rates of 33 percent, compared to nominal replacements of 121 
percent and real replacement rates of 81 percent for the top quartile. 
Also, Wolff (2002b) ﬁnds that 16 percent of households could replace 
less than 25 percent of their preretirement income and that 43 percent 
of households could replace less than half of their preretirement income 
during retirement in 1998. 
Shortfalls in retirement savings vary with household demographics. 
Mitchell, Moore, and Phillips (2000) and Engen and Uccello (1999) 
ﬁnd that black and Hispanic married households experienced a larger 
shortfall in retirement income adequacy than whites, and that less edu-
cated households had lower retirement income adequacy. Mitchell and 
Wolff.indb 63  11/21/2011 9:17:27 AM   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Review of the Literature 63 
Moore (1998) also ﬁnd that single households were less adequately pre-
pared than married ones. Haveman et al. (2003) ﬁnd that single men 
were more likely be inadequately prepared than single women, who 
were in turn less likely than married couples to be adequately prepared 
for retirement. 
In comparing these ﬁ gures with ﬁndings of other studies, it needs to 
be kept in mind that, for instance, Haveman et al. (2003) consider only 
Social Security earnings for their replacement ratio calculations, thus 
understating the level of household income. Also, Wolff (2002b) con-
siders the wealth of households nearing retirement, whereas Haveman 
et al. consider wealth for those who were already retired. Obviously 
households can increase their savings before entering retirement and 
occasionally while in retirement. 
To make ends meet in retirement, when facing an income shortfall, 
households will have to curtail their retirement consumption. In fact, 
one of the distinguishing features between studies that conclude that 
households are adequately prepared for retirement and those that do 
not is the hypothesized consumption pattern in retirement. For instance, 
Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) 
conclude that households were adequately prepared for retirement on 
the basis of the assumption that real retirement consumption declines 
with age. Similarly, Haveman et al. (2003) base their conclusions on the 
assumption of declining consumption in retirement, albeit at a slower 
pace than Gustman and Steinmeier. 
A number of studies have also looked at the changes in retire-
ment income adequacy over time. Wolff (2002b) ﬁnds that the share of 
households between the ages of 47 and 64 that could replace less than 
75 percent of their current income in retirement rose from 56 percent in 
1989 to 61 percent in 1998. In comparison, Engen, Gale, and Uccello 
(2005) ﬁnd that retirement income adequacy changed little from 1995 
to 1998. James Smith (2003), using data from the PSID and the CPS, 
ﬁnds that median after-tax income replacement ratios in retirement have 
been increasing, particularly since the early 1990s. Sorokina, Webb, 
and Muldoon (2008), using data from the HRS for age group 51–56, 
calculate that both pension wealth and replacement rates fell between 
1992 and 2004. 
An alternative approach to measuring retirement adequacy comes 
from Munnell, Webb, and Delorme (2006) of the Center for Retirement 
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Research, who developed what they call a new national retirement risk 
index (NRRI). The construction of this new NRRI involves two steps. 
The ﬁrst is to project replacement rates for each household and to deter-
mine a target replacement rate. The second step is to compare the pro-
jected replacement rates to the targets to determine the NRRI results. 
The index covers all working-age U.S. households. The original study 
used the 2004 SCF. Projected retirement income was based on income 
from ﬁnancial assets, including those in DC plans, net of nonmortgage 
ﬁnancial debt, housing net of mortgage debt, DB pension plans, and 
Social Security. The index did not include earnings from work. 
Because elderly households generally consume less than working-
age households, as Munnell, Webb, and Delorme (2006) indicate, a 
replacement rate of less than 100 percent is used in the calculation of the 
target replacement rate. However, the report argues that the projected 
replacement rate should be higher for low-income than high-income 
households because low-income households save very little before 
retirement and enjoy less in the way of tax savings (see Scholz and 
Seshadri [2009] for a similar argument). Munnell, Webb, and Delorme 
follow this approach. For example, they use a target replacement rate 
of 81 percent for couples in the bottom third of the income distribution, 
72 percent for couples in the middle third, and 67 percent for couples 
in the top third. By their calculations, 43 percent of households were 
at risk in 2004 of having inadequate retirement income. In later work, 
Munnell et al. (2007) ﬁnd a sizable increase in the share of households 
at risk according to the NRRI from 1983 to 2004. Among the bottom 
third of the income distribution, the share at risk increased from 47 to 
53 percent, while among the top two-thirds the proportion rose from 24 
to 38 percent.5 
As in the literature on the effects of DC accumulations on other 
forms of household savings, the studies on retirement savings adequacy 
have been relatively inconclusive. Several conclude that retirement sav-
ings were adequate and expected replacement rates were generally high, 
whereas others ﬁnd that expected replacement rates were relatively low 
and a large number of households near retirement age were at risk of 
inadequate income at retirement. I shall return to the subject of retire-
ment adequacy among working-age households in Chapter 7. I will 
look at their indicators of retirement adequacy—projected retirement 
income, projected replacement rates, and the projected share of retirees 
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above the poverty line. My results show a very large projected gain in 
retirement income from 1989 to 2001 but much smaller advances from 
2001 to 2007. Expected replacement rates showed improvement from 
1989 to 2001 and again from 2001 to 2007, though over the later period 
at least, gains were due more to a reduction in preretirement income 
than to advances in projected income at retirement. The share of near 
retirees at risk of falling below the poverty line at retirement declined 
from 1989 to 2001 but remained unchanged from 2001 to 2007. 
ARE THERE ALSO IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC 
STATUS OF THE ELDERLY? 
Though retirement adequacy by itself is extremely important, its 
focus is typically on the share of preretirement income replaced at 
retirement. Equally important is how the elderly have fared in absolute 
terms and how these indicators have changed over time. The literature 
on the overall economic status of the elderly deals with these issues.
 In one of the earlier studies on this topic, Hurd (1994) shows that 
the mean income of households aged 65 and over increased sharply 
between 1970 and 1975 but only moderately from 1975 to 1987. As a 
fraction of the overall mean household income, average elderly income 
rose from 54 percent in 1970 to 61 percent in 1975 and then to only 
63 percent by 1987. Smith (1997), using 1994 HRS data, ﬁnds that 
median ﬁnancial wealth among white households aged 70 and over was 
only $15,600; for white households aged 51–61 it was $23,400, and for 
black and Hispanic households in the two age groups it was zero. Venti 
and Wise (1998), using HRS data for 1992, estimated a high degree of 
wealth dispersion among persons aged 51–61, even after controlling for 
lifetime earnings. 
Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) also report a large varia-
tion in household wealth at retirement on the basis of data from the 
PSID and the Consumer Expenditure Survey. In this study, they seek 
to determine whether the standard life-cycle model could explain this 
large dispersion. In particular, they test whether differences in time 
preference rates, risk tolerance, exposure to uncertainty, relative tastes 
for work and leisure at older ages, and income replacement rates might 
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be responsible for the large inequality observed in the data. In each 
case, the authors reject these factors as possible explanatory factors. 
Purcell (2009c) presents some recent estimates of the income of 
elderly Americans on the basis of CPS data. In almost all cases, the 
results show major gains made by the elderly from 1968 to 2008. The 
mean annual income in 2008 dollars of persons aged 65 and older rose 
by 84 percent from 1968 to 2000 and by another 9.2 percent from 2000 
to 2008. The median annual income in real terms of individuals aged 
65 and above showed a similar pattern, rising by 89 percent from 1968 
to 2000 and then by 7.3 percent from 2000 to 2008. On the household 
level, the real median annual income of elderly households (deﬁned as 
husband or wife aged 65 or older) gained 91 percent from 1968 to 2000 
and an additional 4.5 percent from 2000 to 2008. Moreover, the ratio of 
the median income of elderly households to nonelderly ones progressed 
from a ratio of 0.38 in 1968 to 0.49 in 2000 and then to 0.54 in 2008. 
The gains during the 2000s were primarily due to the sharp fall in the 
median income of the nonelderly, by 6.7 percent. In fact, on the basis of 
“scaled” or “equivalent” income, the ratio of elderly to nonelderly mean 
household income advanced from 0.47 in 1968 to 0.57 in 2000 and then 
to 0.63 in 2008.6 The poverty rate of people aged 65 and older fell from 
25 percent in 1968 to 9.9 percent in 2000 and then declined a bit more 
to 9.7 percent in 2008. 
In a related study, Purcell (2009b) provides a breakdown of the 
sources of income of households aged 65 and older. For the bottom 
quartile, Social Security was by far the major source of income, account-
ing for 84 percent of the total income of households in that quartile. 
Pensions were a very small portion, only 5 percent of their income, as 
was income from assets, 3 percent. For households in the second quar-
tile, Social Security was also the overwhelming source of their income, 
comprising 67 percent. Pensions were larger, at 14 percent, as was asset 
income, at 6 percent. Among the third quartile, Social Security dropped 
to 42 percent as a share of total income, pensions were up to 23 per-
cent, and asset income was up to 8 percent. For the top quartile, Social 
Security plummeted to 17 percent of income, pensions fell a bit to 16 
percent, and asset income was up to 16 percent. Their major source of 
income was labor earnings, which made up 49 percent of their total 
income. I shall report somewhat similar ﬁndings on the composition of 
augmented wealth by wealth group in Chapter 6. 
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Wolff and Zacharias (2009) ﬁnd that the relative well-being of the 
elderly was even greater than that measured by gross money income. 
They examine the economic well-being of the elderly using the Levy 
Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being (LIMEW), which is is a 
comprehensive measure that incorporates broader deﬁnitions of income 
from wealth, government expenditures, and taxes than standard income, 
and also includes the value of household production. Wolff and Zacha-
rias ﬁnd that, according to LIMEW, the elderly were much better off 
relative to the nonelderly. The main reason is that income from wealth 
and net government expenditures for the elderly was much higher than 
for the nonelderly. Both mean and median LIMEW also grew much 
faster for the elderly than the nonelderly over the 1989–2001 period. 
In contrast, growth rates of money income were actually greater for the 
nonelderly than the elderly over this period. Wolff and Zacharias also 
ﬁnd that the degree of inequality in LIMEW was substantially higher 
among the elderly than among the nonelderly. In contrast, inequality in 
money income was virtually identical between the two groups. Inequal-
ity in the LIMEW grew for both the elderly and the nonelderly, while 
the inequality in standard money income grew only for the latter group. 
Butrica, Murphy, and Zedlewski (2008) also use an expanded mea-
sure of well-being, as well as alternative deﬁnitions of resource avail-
ability and poverty thresholds, to measure poverty among the elderly. 
They use the 2004 wave of the HRS. Their main ﬁnding is that alterna-
tive poverty measures that account for spending on health produced 
higher poverty rates than the ofﬁcial poverty measure, even when the 
value of housing and ﬁnancial assets were included in the measure of 
resource availability. They also ﬁnd that poverty remained concentrated 
among single women, blacks, Hispanics, and adults aged 85 and older 
regardless of how poverty was measured, because these populations 
have relatively little in the way of housing equity or ﬁ nancial assets. 
Several studies have also considered whether households have 
accumulated an adequate amount of wealth for retirement. Gustman 
and Steinmeier (2000), using the 1992 wave of the HRS, estimate that 
by 1992, pensions and retiree health insurance represented one-quarter 
of the wealth of families on the verge of retirement. Their simulations 
suggested that between 1969 and 1992, after controlling for the effects 
of changes in wages and years of covered work on pension beneﬁt 
amounts, changes in pension coverage and changes in pension plan 
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provisions would have raised the total wealth of each household in the 
HRS by $67,000 in 1992 dollars. This would have increased the wealth 
from employer-provided pension beneﬁts per household by 150 percent 
in real terms. Changes in retiree health beneﬁts, which were only about 
7 percent of the value of pensions, experienced similar real growth, 
increasing in value by $3,700 in 1992 dollars. Most of the increase 
in pension values and in the value of retiree health insurance was due 
to improvements in real beneﬁts among covered workers. All classes 
of wealth holders enjoyed increased wealth from employer-provided 
retirement plans, but those in the top half of the wealth distribution 
enjoyed increases that were much larger in absolute terms and were also 
larger in relation to their total wealth than were the gains received by 
those in the bottom half of the wealth distribution. 
Using data from the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2001 SCF, 
Engen, Gale, and Uccello (2005) examine the relation between ﬂuc-
tuations in the aggregate value of equities (stocks) and the adequacy 
of households’ saving for retirement. They ﬁnd that many and perhaps 
most households appeared to be saving adequate amounts for retire-
ment, and that there was almost no link between stock values and the 
adequacy of retirement saving. Historical variation in equity values and 
ownership had little correlation with the historical variation in the ade-
quacy of saving. Even a simulated 40 percent decline in stock values 
had little effect on the adequacy of saving. These results are explained 
by the fact that equities are highly concentrated among households with 
signiﬁcant amounts of other wealth (as was shown in Tables 2.11a and 
2.11b in Chapter 2). Middle-class and poorer households, on the other 
hand, did not accumulate enough stocks in their portfolios to be very 
exposed to downturns in the stock market. As a result, stock market 
downturns do not appear to be a cause of an inadequate level of retire-
ment savings for the vast majority of households. 
In two related working papers, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2007a, 
2008) argue that over the past two and a half decades there was a funda-
mental change in retirement saving, with a rapid shift from employer-
managed DB pensions to DC saving plans that are largely controlled by 
employees. To understand how this change will affect the well-being of 
future retirees, they project the future growth of 401(k) assets at age 65 
for cohorts attaining age 65 between years 2000 and 2040. Using data 
from the HRS and the SIPP, they estimate that cohorts that attain age 
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65 in future decades will have accumulated much greater retirement 
savings (in real dollars) than the retirement savings of current retirees. 
They also consider how the change in the pension system will affect the 
wealth of future retirees. The personal retirement account system is not 
yet mature. A person who retired in 2000, for example, could have con-
tributed to a 401(k) for at most 18 years, and the typical 401(k) partici-
pant had only contributed for a little over 7 years. Nonetheless, current 
401(k) assets are quite large. Poterba, Venti, and Wise consider in this 
paper the implications of rising 401(k) savings through the year 2040. 
In particular, they focus on the growth of the sum of Social Security 
wealth and 401(k) assets for families in each decile of the Social Secu-
rity wealth distribution. Their projections show a substantial increase 
between 2000 and 2040 in the sum of these retirement assets in each 
wealth decile. 
Love, Smith, and McNair (2008), using data from the 1998–2006 
waves of the HRS, construct two measures of the current wealth ade-
quacy of older (aged 51–61 in 1992) American households. The ﬁ rst is 
the ratio of what they call comprehensive wealth—deﬁned as net worth 
plus expected future income streams—that would be needed to generate 
expected poverty-line income in future years. According to this index, 
they estimate that the median older American household was reason-
ably well situated, with a poverty ratio of about 3.9 in 2006. However, 
they also ﬁnd that about 18 percent of households had less wealth than 
would be needed to generate 150 percent of poverty-line income over 
their expected future lifetime. 
Love, Smith, and McNair’s (2008) second measure was the ratio 
of the annuitized value of comprehensive resources to preretirement 
earnings. On the basis of this index, they estimate a median replace-
ment rate of about 105 percent, with about 13 percent of households 
experiencing replacement rates of less than 50 percent. Comparing the 
leading edge of the baby boomers in 2006 to households of the same 
age in 1998, they also ﬁnd that the baby boomers showed slightly less 
wealth in real terms than the corresponding age group in 1998, and 
single boomers showed a bit higher incidence of inadequacy than did 
their elders. Nonetheless, the median single boomer appeared to have 
adequate resources. Finally, they found a rising age proﬁle of annu-
alized wealth within households over time even after controlling for 
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other factors, suggesting that older households were not spending their 
wealth as quickly as their survival probabilities were falling. 
Smith, Soto, and Penner (2009) use the 1998–2006 waves of the 
HRS to investigate how U.S. households changed their asset holdings at 
older ages. They ﬁnd a sizable increase in the net worth of older house-
holds between 1998 and 2006, with most of the growth due to increases 
in the value of housing. They also ﬁnd that, at least through 2006, older 
households did not consume the total amount of their capital gains. This 
asset accumulation provided older households with a ﬁ nancial cush-
ion for the turbulence experienced after 2007. The wealth distribution 
was also highly skewed, and the age patterns of asset accumulation and 
deaccumulation varied considerably by income group. High-income 
elderly households increased their assets at older ages. Middle-income 
elderly households reduced their assets in retirement, but at a rate that 
for most seniors will not deplete assets within their expected life. Many 
low-income elderly households accumulated fewer assets and spent 
their ﬁnancial assets at a rate that will mostly deplete them at older ages, 
leaving low-income seniors with only Social Security and DB pension 
income at older ages. 
Although there is some variance in reported results on this topic as 
well, the general upshot is that the economic status of elderly house-
holds improved over the last few decades. This ﬁnding held in terms 
of income, wealth, and the poverty status of these households. We have 
already seen some evidence of this in Chapter 2 in terms of the wealth 
holdings of elderly households. In Chapter 4 and particularly in Chapter 
5, we shall see further evidence of this in the improvement of senior 
households in terms of augmented wealth (standard net worth plus 
retirement wealth) over the years 1983–2007. 
WHAT WERE THE EFFECTS OF THE 2007–2009 RECESSION 
ON PENSION WEALTH? 
In Chapter 2 we saw evidence that the collapse of the housing and 
stock prices in 2007–2009 lowered both average and median household 
wealth. However, different groups of households had different degrees 
of vulnerability to these price shocks, depending on their asset holdings. 
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The sharp decline in the stock market in 2007–2009 put many 
Americans nearing retirement in a difﬁcult ﬁ nancial situation. Although 
the market had almost fully rebounded as of November 2010 after hit-
ting a low point in March 2009, important losses did occur. The Urban 
Institute and the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College 
were both involved in trying to predict the effects of the stock market 
crash on the retirement readiness of older Americans. As we shall see, 
the elderly were particularly hard hit by the stock market downturn. 
Butrica and Issa (2010) of the Urban Institute analyze the impact of 
the recession on DC retirement accounts and IRAs. They use data from 
the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds to do the updating. From 
the third quarter of 2007 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, retirement accounts 
declined from a peak of $8.6 trillion to $5.9 trillion, for a loss of $2.8 
trillion, or 31 percent of their value in nominal terms. In real terms, 
the loss was even greater, at 34 percent. However, the value of these 
accounts did come back, and by the fourth quarter of 2009, their value 
was $7.6 trillion, though still 15 percent below their peak value (and at 
the same level as the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 in real terms). 
According to a study done by Sass, Monk, and Haverstick (2010) at 
the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, the stock market 
crash of 2008 signiﬁcantly dimmed the retirement prospects of many 
workers who were approaching retirement. These workers are, in gen-
eral, heavily dependent on 401(k) plans (as opposed to traditional DB 
pensions) as a source of retirement income. During the economic down-
turn, these plans lost about one-third of their value. Even before the 
crash, many older workers lacked the assets needed to enjoy a comfort-
able retirement. The rational response to a sharp decline in retirement 
wealth is to “spread the pain” by saving more, working longer, and con-
suming less in retirement. The extent to which workers are absorbing 
a portion of the loss by saving more and working longer is thus critical 
for assessing their economic prospects at retirement. 
To address these questions, the Center for Retirement Research 
in the summer of 2009 surveyed a nationally representative sample 
of 1,317 workers approaching retirement, aged 45–59, on changes in 
retirement saving and expected retirement age. The survey also col-
lected data on the ﬁnancial and employment characteristics, emotional 
reactions to the downturn, and enhanced ﬁnancial literacy. The major 
ﬁndings were that two-thirds of working people in this age group said 
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that they now had less retirement savings than they did before the reces-
sion, 40 percent expected to retire later than they had planned (by an 
average of 4 additional years), and many reported experiencing a level 
of distress equal to or even greater than that caused by the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001. 
However, two-thirds of the workers in the sample reported that 
they had not changed their saving behavior for their 401(k)s, IRAs, 
and other retirement accounts. In contrast, 60 percent of the workers 
reported having changed their spending levels. The main conclusion of 
the Center for Retirement Research study was that there was a signiﬁ-
cant increase in expected retirement ages but not much change in retire-
ment saving. The study found no differences in behavior by race or sex. 
The study also provided some evidence that if credible ﬁ nancial advice 
were more widely available, we might have seen more alterations in 
savings behavior to offset the effects of the Great Recession. 
Two surveys conducted by Bank of America (2010) in 2008 ﬁnd 
similar results regarding unchanged savings behavior. The ﬁ rst survey 
was conducted in March and the second survey in November by Braun 
Research via telephone using a random digit dial methodology between 
the dates of November 5 and 12, 2008. Braun surveyed 750 nationally 
representative Americans, plus 250 individuals with investable assets of 
between $100,000 and $3 million. The sample size was about 1,000 in 
each of the two months. 
The survey ﬁnds that a growing number of Americans were con-
cerned that the current economic crisis was threatening to leave them 
further behind on their retirement plans. As a result, 6 in 10 Americans 
were spending less than they were three months prior. However, even 
with this decreased spending, 51 percent of the general public and 40 
percent of afﬂuent Americans were also saving less than they had been 
three months earlier, and approximately one in ﬁve said that they were 
saving “much less.” 
The ﬁndings underscore how deeply troubled Americans were 
about their retirement savings and ﬁnancial well-being, with 23 percent 
of respondents indicating that the impact of economic turbulence on 
their retirement savings was the ﬁnancial issue that concerned them 
most. Based on this survey, it appears that many Americans were not 
fully able to save what was needed to retire as they had planned, and 
some were tapping into their ﬁnancial savings to meet more immediate 
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ﬁnancial needs. Although the majority of respondents (68 percent) with 
at least one retirement account said that they had not had to withdraw 
assets from their accounts prematurely, recent economic conditions had 
caused 18 percent to withdraw assets prematurely. The main reasons 
for these early withdrawals were near-term ﬁnancial obligations, such 
as credit card debt (26 percent) and mortgage payments (22 percent), 
with an additional 22 percent citing recent job loss. The article argues 
that if the economy should continue to worsen, these numbers may 
increase signiﬁcantly. The possibility of many more Americans dipping 
into their retirement savings could have profound implications for the 
country’s future economic well-being. 
In light of the recent economic turbulence, many Americans (43 
percent) believe they now face more years in the workforce than they 
expected a couple of years ago. This will clearly affect baby boomers 
the most, or those approaching retirement who may not have time to 
recover the ﬁnancial losses incurred during the ﬁnancial crisis. For this 
reason, it is not surprising that 36 percent of afﬂuent respondents said 
current economic conditions had pushed back their expected retirement 
age. 
According to responses to the Bank of America Retirement survey 
(2010) conducted in March, 53 percent of the general public and 36 
percent of afﬂuent Americans were either behind schedule or had not 
started their retirement planning efforts. Comparatively, according to 
ﬁndings from the later survey conducted in November, 62 percent of 
the general public and closer to half (44 percent) of afﬂ uent Americans 
were either behind schedule or had not started their retirement planning 
efforts. Despite the recent market turmoil, 68 percent of respondents 
had not changed the way they save, invest, or manage their retirement 
assets in the prior three months. The article notes that this lack of change 
could be a sign that Americans do not exactly know what to do besides 
reducing spending and continuing to watch as their retirement assets 
diminish. This later survey further conﬁrmed that Americans need better 
guidance and education regarding how best to plan for retirement and 
manage their retirement assets. In fact, 59 percent of the general pub-
lic and 52 percent of afﬂ uent Americans did not know how much they 
would need to save in order to maintain their current standard of living 
in retirement, according to this survey. Nearly half of retired Americans 
indicated that they do not believe or are unsure whether their retirement 
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assets would cover their ﬁnancial needs throughout their remaining life-
time. According to this survey, 25 percent of the general public and 33 
percent of afﬂuent Americans still had at least one 401(k) or 403(b) 
plan with a former employer. Of those who had a plan with a former 
employer, close to half (48 percent for the general public, and 46 per-
cent for the afﬂuent) intended to keep their assets in the existing plan. 
The upshot of this survey is that Americans probably do not know how 
to meet the impending retirement crisis other than to cut their spending. 
Rich Morin (2009) of the Pew Research Center reaches similar con-
clusions based on a national survey by the center’s Social and Demo-
graphic Trends Project. During the recession of 2007–2009, which took 
a heavy toll on household wealth, just over half of all working adults 
aged 50–64 said that they might delay their retirement, and another 
16 percent said that they never expect to stop working. The survey’s 
ﬁndings are based on a telephone survey of a nationally representative 
sample of 2,969 adults conducted from February 23 through March 23, 
2009. Overall, 37 percent of full-time employed adults of all ages said 
that they had thought in the past year about postponing their eventual 
retirement. This proportion increased to 52 percent among full-time 
workers aged 50–64 (the so-called threshold generation). They were 
twice as likely as younger workers to say they never planned to retire 
(16 percent vs. 8 percent). Moreover, those in the threshold generation 
who did plan to retire someday said that they planned to keep working, 
on average, until they were 66 years old, which would make them four 
years older than the average age at which current retirees 65 or older 
reported that they had stopped working. 
Investment losses appeared to play more of a role in the decision 
of when to retire. Among the threshold generation as well as among 
other age groups, higher-income earners were only slightly less likely 
than lower-income adults to have considered postponing retirement. 
But regardless of income or age, those who lost 40 percent or more 
of their retirement account were roughly twice as likely as those who 
had not lost money in the market meltdown to say that they thought 
about delaying their eventual retirement from the workforce. The rising 
inclination to delay retirement was driven in part by the recession of 
2007–2009, but it was also in conformity with longer-term labor market 
trends. Morin reported that the labor force participation rate of those 
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aged 65 and older had already increased from 13 percent in 2000 to 17 
percent in 2008. 
There were also gender and racial differences in the decision of 
when to retire. Among all age groups, 46 percent of full-time employed 
women said that they thought about delaying retirement in the past 
year, compared with 31 percent of all working men. Also, 40 percent of 
whites thought about extending their working lives, compared with 32 
percent of blacks and 34 percent of Hispanics. Income differences mat-
tered less in the retirement decision. Among those with family incomes 
of less than $30,000, 44 percent thought about postponing their retire-
ment, compared with 37 percent of those earning $100,000 or more. 
Similarly, 36 percent of those making $30,000–$50,000 and 38 percent 
in the $50,000–$100,000 income bracket considered working longer as 
the recession developed from 2007 to 2009. 
Moreover, among adults aged 50–64 who were employed full time, 
61 percent of women working full time in this age group said they had 
reconsidered when they would retire, compared with 45 percent of men. 
This gender gap is consistent with other research showing that older 
women approaching retirement have fewer economic resources to draw 
on than do men. But among this age group, there was little difference in 
plans to delay retirement by income. Working adults who were closer 
to age 65 (the traditional retirement age) were even more likely than 
younger members of the threshold generation (50–64) to have consid-
ered delaying their retirement. Over two-thirds of those aged 57–64 
said they had thought about delaying retirement, compared with 44 per-
cent of those aged 50–56. 
Working members of the threshold generation were the least con-
ﬁdent of any age group that they would have enough money to last 
through their retirement years. Only 21 percent of those aged 50–64 
said that they were “very conﬁdent” that they had enough income and 
assets to tide them over, compared with 37 percent of full-time workers 
younger than age 30 and 40 percent of those aged 65 and older. Most 
Americans, young or old, said that the recession made it harder to take 
care of their ﬁ nancial needs in retirement. However, working adults in 
the threshold generation were more inclined than any other age group to 
feel this way. Among those aged 50–64 with full-time jobs, 78 percent 
said that the recession made it more difﬁcult to take care of their ﬁnan-
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cial needs in retirement, compared with 66 percent of those younger 
than 50. Income differences played little role in fueling the recession-
driven ﬁnancial worries of the threshold generation. Similarly, there 
was little difference by gender, by level of education, or by race. 
It is also the case that among all adults, the threshold generation saw 
the value of their investments shrink the most, with 76 percent saying 
that they had lost money in mutual funds, individual stocks, or retire-
ment accounts, compared with 54 percent of those younger than age 50. 
Working members of this generation who lost money on investments 
were also more likely than those who did not suffer losses to say that 
they had considered delaying retirement (54 vs. 45 percent), and they 
were more likely to have considered taking this step than were adults 
below the age of 50 who had lost money in the market (54 vs. 34 per-
cent). Investment losses also affected ﬁnancial conﬁdence, as 82 per-
cent of working members of the threshold generation who lost money 
in the past year said that the recession would make it harder for them 
to meet their ﬁnancial needs in retirement, compared with 66 percent 
of those aged 18–49. The degree of loss also mattered in this regard: 
among all adults employed full time, those who had lost 40 percent or 
more on their investments were twice as likely as those who had lost 
nothing to say that they thought about delaying their retirement. 
Butrica, Smith, and Toder (2009a,b) from the Urban Institute show 
that delaying retirement even by a year might greatly help offset the 
effects of the recession. The beneﬁts of delaying retirement would be 
greatest for the late boomers, less for middle boomers, and least for 
preboomers, although it would be beneﬁcial to all. Moreover, while 
people with lower incomes had less to lose in the stock market crash, 
they would be the ones to beneﬁt the most from an additional year of 
working life. 
Butrica, Smith, and Toder (2009a,b) also show possibilities for 
the future after the stock market crash. They ﬁrst note that the sharp 
decline in the stock market in 2008 placed the retirement security of 
many Americans at risk (although the market rebounded sharply after 
its trough in March 2009). They simulate and compare various fast and 
slow recovery scenarios to a “no-crash” scenario that shows what the 
long-term trend in retirement assets would have been if the stock mar-
ket had not collapsed in 2008 but instead had continued to increase at 
its historical rate from the 2007 level. The three scenarios they consider 
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are 1) a “no recovery” scenario in which the stock market does not 
rebound but instead resumes its long-term historical rate after 2008; 2) a 
“repeat 70s” scenario in which real stock prices continue to decline for 
a number of years after the 2008 crash, as they did between 1974 and 
1982; and 3) a “full recovery” scenario in which the stock market fully 
rebounds after 10 years to the projected no-crash level in 2017. 
According to calculations by Butrica, Smith, and Toder (2009a,b), 
if stocks remain depressed, as after the 1974 crash, 20 percent of pre-
boomers born in 1941–1945 and 22 percent of late boomers born in 
1961–1965 would see their retirement incomes drop 10 percent or 
more. Working another year would reduce the share of these big losses 
to 14 percent for late boomers. Because most preboomers were already 
retired, their share of big losses would decline slightly to 19 percent. 
Delaying retirement would disproportionately beneﬁt low-income peo-
ple because their additional earnings exceed their stock market losses. 
Another ﬁnding indicates that the effect of the market crash on 
retirement incomes varied by age, income level, and assumptions about 
future market performance. About 63 percent of boomers were esti-
mated to have owned stocks in 2008, but those in the higher income 
quintiles were affected much more than others because they were more 
likely to have retirement accounts and other ﬁnancial assets, and to hold 
larger shares of their ﬁnancial wealth in stocks. Those farthest from 
retirement age fared better than older people because they had less 
wealth when the market crashed because of fewer years of accruals 
(even though they were more likely to have retirement accounts and 
invest in equities), and because they had more time to restore their lost 
wealth through new stock acquisitions and future appreciation before 
retirement. 
Preboomers lost in all scenarios, and all cohorts lost under the no-
recovery scenario. Middle boomers and late boomers experienced net 
income losses under the no-recovery scenario but retirement income 
gains under the full-recovery scenario. For example, the highest income 
quintile of middle boomers experienced on average a 14 percent loss in 
income at age 67 if the market failed to recover, but a 4 percent gain 
on average if the market fully recovered to its previous path by 2017. 
Gains and losses also varied depending on the individual’s portfolio 
allocations and the market performance of their investments. 
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In contrast, Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2009) offer a 
much more sanguine view of the effects of the stock market crash on 
retirement preparedness. Their ﬁndings indicate that although the con-
sequences of the decline in the stock market were serious for those 
approaching retirement, the average person approaching retirement age 
was not likely to suffer a life-changing ﬁnancial loss from the recession 
of 2007–2009. Likewise, the probable effects of the stock market down-
turn on retirement resources have been greatly exaggerated. If there is 
any postponement of retirement due to stock market losses, on average 
it will be a matter of a few months rather than years. Counting layoffs, 
retirements may be accelerated rather than reduced. 
Using HRS data, Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2009) calcu-
late trends in pensions among three cohorts: those aged 51–56 in 1992, 
called the HRS cohort; those 51–56 in 1998, called the war baby cohort; 
and those 51–56 in 2004, called the early boomer cohort. They ﬁ nd that 
pension coverage was much more extensive than was usually recog-
nized. Over three-quarters of the households with a person aged 51–56 
in 2004 were either currently covered by a pension or had had pension 
coverage in the past. Pension wealth accounted for 23 percent of the 
total wealth (including Social Security wealth) of those on the verge of 
retirement. For those nearing retirement age, DC plans remained small. 
As a result, 63 percent of pension wealth held by those aged 51–56 
in 2004 was in the form of a DB plan.7 The ﬁgures were even higher 
for the older cohorts. Three-quarters of the pension wealth of the HRS 
cohort was from DB plans, as was 65 percent of the pension wealth of 
the war baby cohort. The fact that such a higher share of pension wealth 
was in the form of DB pension wealth should cushion the drop in over-
all pension wealth from the stock market crash. 
In general, these papers (with the exception of Gustman, Steinmeier, 
and Tabatabai [2009]) indicate that the 2007–2009 recession wreaked 
ﬁnancial havoc on workers close to retirement age. On the basis of 
direct survey questions, it appears that many of these workers suffered 
large declines in DC plan pension wealth and on their net worth overall. 
As a consequence, a large number of them plan to postpone retirement 
and/or to decrease their future consumption spending. In Chapter 5, I 
shall also investigate the effects of the crisis of 2007–2009 on the pen-
sion wealth holdings of those on the verge of retirement. I also ﬁnd a 
large plunge in pension wealth from 2007 to 2009 and, indeed, report 
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that DC pension wealth had remained virtually unchanged from 2001 
to 2009. However, I will not investigate the effects of the recession on 
either retirement behavior or spending plans. 
Notes 
1. A related topic of interest is whether DC pension plans have substituted for DB-
type plans. Popke (1999), using employer data (IRS 5500 ﬁlings) for 1992, ﬁnds 
that, indeed, 401(k) and other DC plans substituted for terminated DB plans, and 
that offering a DC plan raised the chance of a termination in DB coverage. 
2. See Wolff (1992) for a discussion of some of the methodological issues involved 
in estimating both Social Security and pension wealth. 
3. Net Social Security wealth is deﬁned as the discounted present value of future 
Social Security beneﬁts less future taxes paid into the Social Security (OASI) 
system. Estimates were not provided separately for pension wealth and Social 
Security wealth. 
4. There are a host of studies that examine the intra-cohort redistributional effects of 
Social Security beneﬁts relative to contributions into the Social Security system. 
They consider which groups are net gainers and which net losers from the Social 
Security system as a whole. These authors include Wolff (1993a,b), who uses the 
1962 SFCC and the 1983 SCF; Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (2000), who derive 
their estimates from the PSID; Smith, Toder, and Iams (2001), who base their 
work on the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data matched 
with Social Security administrative data and the microsimulation MINT model; 
Liebman (2002), who matches Social Security Administration earnings and ben-
eﬁt records to the 1990 and 1991 panels of the SIPP; and Leimer (2003, 2004), 
who bases his analyses on Social Security administrative data. 
5. Also see Jonathan Skinner (2007) for a review of the literature on savings 
adequacy. 
6. Equivalent or scaled income adjusts household income for household size. The 
formula used in this study for equivalent income is household income / (number 
of adults + number of children under 18)0.5. The higher ratios of equivalent income 
in comparison to normal household income are due to the fact that average house-
hold size is smaller among elderly households than the nonelderly. 
7. These proportions seem a lot larger than the ones I compute from the SCF. For 
example, DB wealth as a share of total pension wealth among the age group 47–64 
was 47 percent in 2001 and only 41 percent in 2007. 
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The Slowdown in Pension 
Wealth Growth in the 2000s 
As I discuss in Chapter 1, one of the most dramatic changes in 
the retirement income system over the last three decades has been the 
replacement of many traditional DB pension plans with DC pensions. 
Has this transformation been beneﬁcial to most American households? 
This is the principal focus of the chapter. Poterba, Venti, and Wise 
(1998) ﬁnd that the transition from DB to DC type plans increased 
mean pension wealth dramatically in the 1990s, at least. I ﬁnd that the 
transformation was largely beneﬁcial to American families during the 
1980s and 1990s, particularly the latter decade, when the stock mar-
ket boomed. However, during the period 2001–2007 (and before the 
meltdown in the ﬁnancial markets), pension wealth growth slowed sub-
stantially. Moreover, overall pension coverage itself, after rising rapidly 
from 1989 to 2001, fell in 2007. 
A secondary interest is the effect of pension wealth on overall 
wealth inequality. Feldstein (1976), in a seminal paper on this subject, 
ﬁnds that adding Social Security wealth to marketable net worth led to 
a sharp reduction in measured wealth inequality (see Chapter 3). Is this 
also true for pension wealth? Does retirement wealth in total (the sum 
of Social Security and pension wealth) help to equalize the distribution 
of household wealth? This chapter will show that the addition of pen-
sion wealth to marketable net worth does reduce overall wealth inequal-
ity, but the equalizing effect is much smaller than that of Social Security 
wealth (discussed in Chapter 5). Moreover, the evidence of both this 
chapter and Chapter 5 will show that the equalizing effect of retirement 
wealth dissipated over time, particularly after 2001. 
The results of this and the next chapter will also clear up the “puzzle” 
discussed in Chapter 2—that (marketable) wealth inequality remained 
largely unchanged from 1989 to 2007, while both income inequality 
and the ratio of stock prices to housing prices increased. In contrast, I 
do ﬁnd an increase in the inequality of augmented wealth (the sum of 
81 
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net worth, pension and Social Security wealth) from 1989 to 2007 (see 
Chapter 5). 
The next section of the chapter develops the accounting framework 
used in the analysis. How has the change in the pension system affected 
pension coverage for individual workers? In this regard, the section 
after that presents results on pension coverage for workers both overall 
and by demographic characteristic for the period 1989–2007. 
The chapter then moves on to discuss the change in the pension 
system and the effects it had on pension coverage and pension values 
on the household level, and to investigate changes in pension coverage, 
pension wealth, and private accumulations—i.e., the sum of net worth 
and (private) pension wealth—on the household level over the more 
extended time interval, 1983–2007. The ﬁnal section contains a provi-
sional summary of the results. 
A full treatment of the retirement system would not be complete 
without consideration of the Social Security system. Chapter 5 intro-
duces Social Security wealth and presents results on its movement on 
the household level from 1983 to 2007. It presents summary measures 
on total (augmented) household wealth, the sum of net worth, pension 
wealth, and Social Security wealth. The chapter will show alternative 
pension wealth calculations and present an update of the pension wealth 
estimates to 2009 (July 1, 2009, to be exact) on the basis of changes in 
stock prices. 
ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK 
The standard wealth concept is marketable wealth (or net worth), 
which was deﬁned in Chapter 2. It should be noted that the standard 
deﬁnition of net worth includes the market value of DC pension plans. 
Deﬁned contribution plans include a variety of ﬁnancial instru-
ments. There are two types: individually provided plans and employer-
provided plans. Individually provided plans are IRAs and Keogh plans.1 
Standard employer-provided DC plans are 401(k), 403(b), SRA (supple-
mental retirement account), and 457 plans. Firms also provide a variety 
of other plans, such as proﬁt-sharing, tax-deferred annuities, portable 
cash option plans, IRA-SEP (simpliﬁed employee pension) or IRA-
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SIMPLE (simpliﬁed incentive match plan for employers), SARSEP
(salary reduction simpliﬁed employee pension), TIAA-CREF (Teach-
ers Insurance and Annuity Association/College Retirement Equity 
Fund), money purchase plans, deferred compensation plans, cash bal-
ance plans, stock purchase/ESOP (employee stock option plan), thrift/ 
savings plans, and the like. I have combined all of these as DC plans. 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁt plans include (but are not limited to) state, local, 
and federal government plans, PERS (public employees retirement 
system), employer-provided annuity plans, and traditional DB plans. 
Some employer-provided plans are a mixture of the two. Following the 
SCF protocol, I have divided DC plans from DB plans on the basis of 
whether they are “account-type” plans, with a balance or cash value, or 
whether they are “formula-type” plans, with no cash balance and the 
beneﬁt determined by such variables as years of service and earnings 
history. 
My principal data source, as indicated in Chapter 2, is the Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF). While the SCF provides considerable detail 
on marketable assets and liabilities held by the household, it does not 
provide estimates of pension or Social Security wealth. These variables 
have to be estimated by the user.2 
Before proceeding to the actual empirical results, it is necessary 
to make imputations of both DB pension wealth and Social Security 
wealth. The reason for the imputations is that, with the exception of 
the 1983 SCF, estimates of these two variables are not provided in the 
SCF data because their estimation requires making assumptions about 
several parameters, as indicated below.3 Since researchers may differ in 
what they believe are the best assumptions to make, the Federal Reserve 
Board believes it would be inappropriate for them to arbitrarily make 
speciﬁ c assumptions. 
The imputation of DB pension wealth and Social Security wealth 
involves a large number of steps, which are summarized below. Greater 
details are shown in Appendix B. 
DB Pension Wealth 
For retirees (r) the procedure is straightforward. Let PB be the pen-
sion beneﬁt currently being received by the retiree. The SCF question-
naire indicates how many pension plans each spouse is involved in and 
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what the expected (or current) pension beneﬁt is. The SCF question-
naire also indicates whether the pension beneﬁ ts remain ﬁxed in nomi-
nal terms over time for a particular beneﬁciary or are indexed for inﬂa-
tion. In the case of the former, DB pension wealth is given by 
109 − A 
(4.1a) DB  = ∫ 0 PB(1 − mt)e
−δtdt ,r 
and in the latter case, 
109 − A
(4.1b) DBr = ∫ 0 PB(1 − mt)e
−δ*tdt , 
where A is the current age of the retiree; mt is the mortality rate at time t
conditional on age, gender, and race; δ* is the real annual discount rate, 
set to 2 percent; γ is the inﬂation rate and is assumed to be 3 percent per 
year; δ = δ* + γ is the nominal annual discount rate, equal to 5 percent; 
and the integration runs from zero to the number of years when the 
retiree reaches age 109.4 
Estimates of DC pension wealth (as well as Social Security wealth) 
are quite sensitive to the choice of inﬂation rate and discount rate. 
I choose a 3 percent inﬂation rate since it is very close to the actual 
annual change of the CPI-U index from 1983 to 2007 (see Table D.1). 
Moreover, I choose a 5 percent nominal discount rate because it like-
wise is close to the actual average annual rate of return on liquid assets 
over the same period (see Appendix Table D.1). These two choices lead 
to a 2 percent real discount rate (the difference between the two rates). 
A higher real discount rate will lead to lower estimates of DB pen-
sion wealth (and likewise Social Security wealth), and conversely, a 
lower discount rate will lead to higher estimates of these two variables. 
I also use a 3 percent real discount rate to estimate both DB pension and 
Social Security wealth. The general results in this book are not materi-
ally altered by the use of this higher discount rate.5 
Among current workers (w) the procedure is more complex. The 
SCF provides detailed information on pension coverage among current 
workers, including the type of plan; the expected beneﬁt at retirement 
or the formula used to determine the beneﬁt amount (for example, a 
ﬁxed percentage of the average of the last ﬁve years’ earnings); the 
expected retirement age when the beneﬁts are effective; the likely 
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retirement age of the worker; and vesting requirements. Information is 
provided not only for the current job (or jobs) of each spouse but for up 
to ﬁve previous jobs as well. On the basis of the information provided in 
the SCF and on projected future earnings (see Appendix B for details), 
future expected pension beneﬁ ts (EPBw) are then projected to the year 
of retirement or the ﬁrst year of eligibility for the pension. Then the 
present value of pension wealth for current workers (w) is given by 
109 − A 
(4.2) DBw = ∫ LR EPB(1 − mt)e
−δtdt , 
where RA is the expected age of retirement and LR = A − RA is the 
number of years to retirement. The integration runs from the number of 
years to retirement, LR, to the number of years when the retiree reaches 
age 109.6 
It should be noted that the calculations of DB pension wealth for 
current workers are based on employee response, including his or her 
stated expected age of retirement (see Appendix B), not on employer-
provided pension plans.7 
Social Security Wealth 
For current Social Security beneﬁ ciaries (r), the procedure is again 
straightforward. Let SSB be the Social Security beneﬁt currently being 
received by the retiree. Again, the SCF provides information for both 
husband and wife. Since Social Security beneﬁts are indexed for inﬂa-
tion, Social Security wealth is given as 
109 − A 
(4.3) SSW  = ∫ 0 SSB(1 − mt)e
−δ*tdt,r 
where it is assumed that the current Social Security rules remain in 
effect indeﬁ nitely.8 
The imputation of Social Security wealth among current workers is 
based on the worker’s actual and projected earnings history estimated by 
regression equation (see Appendix B). The steps are brieﬂy as follows. 
First, coverage is assigned based on whether the individual expects 
to receive Social Security beneﬁts and on whether the individual was 
salaried or self-employed. Second, on the basis of the person’s earn-
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ings history, the person’s average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) 
is computed. Third, on the basis of the rules current at the time of the 
survey year, the person’s primary insurance amount (PIA) is derived 
from AIME. Then, 
109 − A 
(4.4) SSWw = ∫ LR PIA(1 − mt)e−δ*tdt. 
As with pension wealth, the integration runs from the number of years 
to retirement, LR, to the number of years when the retiree reaches age 
109.9 
Here, too, it should be noted that estimates of Social Security wealth 
are based on reported earnings at a single point in time. These estimates 
are likely to be inferior to those based on longitudinal work histories of 
individual workers (see, for example, Smith, Toder, and Iams [2001]), 
whose estimates are based on actual Social Security work histories. In 
fact, actual work histories do show much more variance in earnings 
over time than one based on a human capital earnings function projec-
tion. Moreover, they also show many periods of work disruption that 
I cannot completely capture here. In contrast, I do have retrospective
information on work history provided by the respondent (see “Ques-
tions on Work History” in Appendix B for details). In particular, each 
individual is asked to provide data on the total number of years worked 
full time since age 18, the number of years worked part time since age 
18, and the expected age of retirement (both from full- and part-time 
work). On the basis of this information, it is possible to approximate the 
total number of full- and part-time years worked over the individual’s 
lifetime and use these ﬁgures in the estimate of the individual’s AIME.10 
I can now deﬁne the different accounting measures to be used. Let
NWX be marketable household wealth excluding DC wealth and non-
pension wealth. Then 
(4.5) NW = NWX + DC. 
Total pension wealth, PW, is given by 
(4.6) PW = DC + DB. 
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Private accumulations, PA, is then deﬁned as the sum of NWX and total 
pension wealth: 
(4.7) PA = NWX + PW. 
The term private accumulations is used to distinguish contributions to 
wealth from private savings and employment contracts with both pri-
vate and government employers from those of social insurance pro-
vided by the state, notably, Social Security. 
Retirement wealth, RW, is then given as the sum of pension and 
Social Security wealth: 
(4.8) RW = PW + SSW. 
Finally, augmented household wealth, AW, is given by 
(4.9) AW = NWX + RW. 
Employer Contributions to DC Pension Plans 
To complete the accounting framework, I consider the contributions 
employers make to DC pension plans. So far I have treated DC and DB 
pension wealth (as well as Social Security wealth) on a comparable 
footing, but there is an important difference between them in their deﬁ-
nitions. In particular, I deﬁne DB wealth as the discounted future stream 
of DB pension beneﬁts on the assumption that the employee remains at 
his or her ﬁrm of employment until the person’s expected retirement 
date. The computation of Social Security wealth is also based on the 
assumption that the worker remains at work until the person’s expected 
retirement date. On the other hand, the valuation of DC pension wealth 
is based solely on the current market value of DC plans. There is no 
added value in the calculation of DC wealth from the employee remain-
ing at work (until the expected date of retirement). 
What if we put DC wealth on an equal footing with DB wealth? To
do this, we could add into DC wealth a projection of the future stream 
of employer contributions to DC accounts like 401(k) plans until the 
expected year of retirement. Luckily, the SCF does provide informa-
tion on employer contribution to DC plans (see Appendix B). If we 
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assume, as in the case of DB pensions, that workers remain at their 
company until retirement and that the terms of their DC contract with 
their employer stay the same, then it is possible to do this. In most 
cases, the employer contribution is a ﬁxed percentage of the employee’s 
salary. On the basis of the estimated human capital earnings functions 
for each worker and the “ongoing concern” assumption, it is possible to 
calculate the annual stream of future employer contributions to the DC 
plan until retirement, which I call DCEMP.11 Adding DCEMP to DC 
would then put DC wealth on the same footing as DB wealth, since both 
would reﬂect the available retirement wealth at time of retirement due 
to employer contributions to retirement plans.12 
The SCF questionnaire indicates how many DC pension plans each 
spouse has (up to three per spouse).13 Information on the employer 
contribution to DC pension plans is recorded in two ways. First, in 
some cases, the contribution is given as a ﬂat dollar amount. Though 
it is not indicated in the survey data whether the dollar contribution is 
indexed to inﬂation over time, I assume that it is indexed to the CPI, 
which seems the more likely arrangement.14 Let EMPAMT be the dol-
lar amount of the employer contribution to the DC plan. Then, in the 
case where employer contributions are recorded as a dollar amount, the 
present value of the stream of future employer contributions, DCEMPa , 
is given by 
LR
(4.10) DCEMPa = ∫ 0 EMPAMT (1 − mt)e
−δ*tdt , 
where mt is the mortality rate at time t conditional on age, gender, and 
race; and δ* is the real annual discount rate, set to 2 percent.15 The 
integration runs from the current year to LR, where RA is the expected 
age of retirement and LR = A – RA is the number of years to retirement. 
Second, in most cases the employer contribution is given as a per-
centage of earnings. If we assume that the proportion, EMPPER, is 
ﬁxed over time, then in the case where the respondent records employer 
contributions as a percentage of earnings, DCEMPb, is given by 
LR
(4.11)   DCEMPb = ∫ 0 EMPPER × E*t (1 − mt)e
−δ*tdt, 
where E* t is the predicted earnings of the worker at time t in constant 
dollars (see Appendix B for details). 
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The basic accounting framework can then be modiﬁed as follows: 
DCEMP= DCEMPa + DCEMPb 
DC* = DC + DCEMP 
PW* = DB + DC* 
PA* = NWX + PW* 
RW* = PW* + SSW 
AW* = NWX + RW* . 
I shall return to a consideration of DCEMP in Chapter 5. 
PENSION COVERAGE ON THE EMPLOYEE LEVEL
Here I address the question of whether the transformation of the 
pension system increased or lowered pension coverage among individ-
ual workers. Though most of the analysis in the book will be conducted 
on the household level, I ﬁrst look at pension coverage at the level of 
the individual worker. In the SCF, almost all of the wealth variables are 
provided only on the household level. However, one exception is infor-
mation on pension plans, which is provided for both husband and wife. 
Both husband and wife list their DC plans separately. Moreover, each 
is asked about coverage from DB plans. Work history data and earnings 
are also provided separately for each spouse, so that we can construct 
estimates of DB pension wealth for each. 
The story that will unfold is that DB pension coverage plummeted 
over time. DC coverage increased sharply and picked up some of the 
slack from the collapse of DB plans. However, this was true for only 
certain occupations and industries. For other groups, overall pension 
coverage diminished. 
Table 4.1 begins the statistical portrait by showing pension cover-
age by type of pension plan for currently employed male and female 
workers in 1989, 2001, and 2007.16 I ﬁnd that while male pension cov-
erage fell over these years, female coverage increased, so that by 2007 
virtual parity had been reached between the two genders. In 2007, 62 
percent of male workers under the age of 65 had some type of pen-
sion coverage.17 Deﬁned contribution coverage was more prevalent: 28 
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Table 4.1  Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Type of 
Pension and Gender, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989 2001 2007 
Age group Male Female Male Female Male Female 
All workers (under age 65) 
IRA or Keogh accounts 28.2 22.4 29.7 25.6 27.8 25.8 
Employer-provided DC 31.3 25.6 44.1 36.0 42.6 38.9 
accounts 
All DC accounts 46.5 40.8 59.6 50.6 56.4 53.9 
Current job DB plans 33.5 26.9 19.2 15.4 13.0 13.0 
Past job DB plans 4.5 2.5 6.3 3.1 6.8 3.4 
Current and past job DB 36.3 28.9 24.7 18.2 18.5 15.9 
plans 
DC and/or DB plans 65.0 54.8 68.1 58.7 61.7 60.4 
All workers aged 46 and under 
IRA or Keogh accounts 21.3 17.6 23.2 19.9 21.1 19.5 
Employer-provided DC 29.1 26.0 44.6 34.9 38.7 35.6 
accounts 
All DC accounts 40.9 37.2 56.0 45.4 49.5 47.2 
Current job DB plans 31.4 23.7 15.5 13.6 10.4 10.4 
Past job DB plans 3.3 1.9 2.5 1.0 3.1 1.5 
Current and past job DB 33.6 25.2 17.3 14.5 12.8 11.8 
plans 
DC and/or DB plans 59.7 49.8 62.2 52.6 53.1 53.0 
All workers aged 47–64 
IRA or Keogh accounts 46.0 34.2 42.2 37.4 38.4 36.0 
Employer-provided DC 37.2 24.5 43.0 38.2 48.8 44.2 
accounts 
All DC accounts 61.0 49.8 66.6 61.2 67.3 64.5 
Current job DB plans 38.9 34.8 26.5 19.1 17.0 17.3 
Past job DB plans 7.4 4.0 13.7 7.3 12.5 6.6 
Current and past job DB 43.4 38.2 39.1 25.7 27.5 22.4 
plans 
DC and/or DB plans 78.5 67.1 79.7 71.2 75.2 72.3 
NOTE: The table includes only current workers aged 64 and under. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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percent of these workers had an IRA or Keogh account, 43 percent had 
an employer-provided DC account, and together, 56 percent had some 
type of DC account. However, only 13 percent were covered by a DB 
plan from their current job and only 7 percent still had DB entitlements 
(a “legacy” DB plan) from a past job.18 Altogether, 19 percent of male 
workers in 2007 had some form of DB entitlement. Corresponding ﬁg-
ures for female workers were only slightly lower than those for men. 
Not surprisingly, pension coverage was lower for younger work-
ers than for older ones. Among male workers under the age of 47, 53 
percent had some pension coverage, mainly DC plans, while 75 percent 
of male workers between the ages of 46 and 64 had coverage, again 
primarily DC plans. Here again, ﬁgures for female workers were very 
similar to those for men. 
There were some substantial changes in coverage from 1989 to 
2007. From 1989 to 2001, overall coverage rose moderately, by 3.2 per-
centage points for male workers and 3.9 percentage points for females. 
However, trends were very different for DC coverage and DB cover-
age. DC coverage expanded by 13 percentage points for men and 10 
percentage points for women, while DB coverage dwindled by 12 and 
11 percentage points, respectively. Almost all of the losses in the DB 
coverage were in current job plans. These were almost exactly offset by 
increased coverage in employer-provided DC plans. Here, the substitu-
tion between DC and DB plans is very evident. 
While changes in coverage were very similar for men and women 
during the 1990s, they were quite different during the 2000s. Male pen-
sion coverage dropped substantially from 2001 to 2007, by 6.4 percent-
age points. There was again a marked decrease in DB coverage, by 6.2 
percentage points, but even a loss in DC coverage, by 3.2 percentage 
points. Losses in coverage were much greater for younger male work-
ers, 9.1 percentage points, than among the older age group, 4.5 percent-
age points. Younger male workers, in particular, saw a sharp drop in 
employer-provided DC plans of 6.5 percentage points, as well as in 
current job DB plans of 5.1 percentage points. (This trend for younger 
households will reemerge in the next section of the chapter.) Older male 
workers also saw current job DB plan coverage plummet by 9.5 per-
centage points but DC plan coverage rise slightly. 
In contrast, female workers saw a modest increase in pension cover-
age from 2001 to 2007, of 1.7 percentage points. This occurred among 
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both younger and older female workers. The main reason was increased 
access to employer-provided DC plans. As a result, whereas in 1989 
and 2001 there was about a 10 percentage point gap in pension cover-
age between male and female workers, by 2007 almost complete con-
vergence had been achieved.19 
Pension Coverage by Race and Ethnicity 
Table 4.2 shows coverage by race and ethnicity, as well as by edu-
cational attainment.20 The results will show sizable gaps in pension cov-
erage between whites, blacks, and Hispanics. In 2007, 61 percent of 
white male workers reported some kind of DC account, in contrast to 46 
percent of African American workers and only 32 percent of Hispanic 
workers. Differences in the share with DB entitlements were much 
smaller between black and white male workers in 2007—virtually 
zero—while there was a 13 percentage point gap between white male 
and Hispanic male workers in favor of the former. Altogether, 66 per-
cent of white male workers had some form of pension wealth in 2007, 
compared to 54 percent of black male workers and only 36 percent of 
Hispanic male workers. Differences in pension coverage by race and 
ethnicity were very similar among female workers. 
The share of male workers with a DC account advanced more for 
blacks than whites from 1989 to 2001 but then fell more for the former 
than the latter from 2001 to 2007. Declines in DB coverage were simi-
lar for the two racial groups. As a result, the gap in pension coverage 
between white and African American male workers declined notice-
ably between 1989 and 2001, from 11 to 7 percentage points, and then 
spiked upward between 2001 and 2007 to 12 percentage points, higher 
than in 1989. 
The time trends were different for female workers. In 1989, DB 
pension coverage was much greater among black female workers than 
among white female workers, 41 versus 28 percent. However, DB cov-
erage declined much more among black females than among white 
females from 1989 to 2007, so that by 2007 the DB coverage rate was 
greater for white than black females. The share reporting a DC account 
rose about the same for white females and black females from 1989 to 
2007. As a result, the share of white female workers with pension cov-
erage advanced from 57 percent in 1989 to 65 percent in 2007, while 
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Table 4.2  Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Race, 
Education, and Gender, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
By racea 
Non-Hispanic whites 
All DC accounts 51.3 45.3 63.4 54.2 61.0 58.9 
All DB plans 38.2 27.9 26.0 19.3 20.6 17.1 
DC and/or DB plans 69.5 57.2 71.6 62.3 66.3 65.3 
(Non-Hispanic) African 
Americans 
All DC accounts 34.9 28.6 49.9 47.1 45.6 41.8 
All DB plans 36.9 40.6 25.9 16.8 20.5 14.0 
DC and/or DB plans 58.8 53.3 65.0 55.6 54.2 48.5 
Hispanics 
All DC accounts 20.0 18.8 32.9 27.3 32.3 29.9 
All DB plans 24.5 25.9 14.7 14.2 7.8 9.3 
DC and/or DB plans 37.8 38.7 38.6 36.3 36.2 36.3 
By educational attainment 
No high school diploma 
(or GED) 
All DC accounts 26.6 24.2 25.5 20.4 19.8 22.3 
All DB plans 27.0 23.6 17.3 6.4 3.2 2.9 
DC and/or DB plans 46.0 42.6 37.5 26.8 22.4 24.2 
High school diploma 
(or GED) 
All DC accounts 40.6 33.0 51.8 40.6 43.4 42.8 
All DB plans 34.2 26.3 20.4 13.2 17.6 13.7 
DC and/or DB plans 60.9 49.0 60.4 49.0 50.6 49.7 
Some college 
All DC accounts 47.9 40.8 53.6 46.9 57.2 50.6 
All DB plans 36.7 27.6 23.4 14.2 17.9 13.3 
DC and/or DB plans 67.1 52.7 63.5 52.2 62.1 56.4 
College degree 
All DC accounts 59.3 57.3 76.2 66.5 74.5 67.2 
All DB plans 41.9 35.2 30.3 26.5 23.2 20.4 
DC and/or DB plans 75.6 68.2 83.2 76.1 79.2 74.7 
NOTE: The table includes all current workers aged 64 and under. 
a Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of their small sample size. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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the coverage rate for black females fell from 53 to 49 percent, and the 
racial gap in coverage grew from 4 to 17 percentage points. 
The gap in pension coverage remained very high between non-
Hispanic white and Hispanic white male workers from 1989 to 2007—a 
little over 30 percentage points. Among female workers, the difference 
widened from 19 percentage points in 1989 to 29 percentage points 
in 2007, mainly due to the greater reduction in the DB coverage rate 
among Hispanic female workers. In fact, the pension coverage rate 
among Hispanic females actually fell by 2.4 percentage points from 
1989 to 2007.21 
Pension Coverage by Educational Attainment 
The principal ﬁnding here is that the gap in pension coverage 
between college graduates and the other educational groups expanded 
substantially over the period 1989–2007 (see Table 4.2). The main 
reason is not that pension coverage advanced dramatically among col-
lege graduates but rather that it dwindled among the other educational 
groups. 
In 2007, a mere 22 percent of male workers without a high school 
degree had some form of pension coverage, compared to 51 percent 
of those with a high school degree (or GED), 62 percent of those with 
some college, and 79 percent of those who were college graduates.22 
As a result, there were considerable gaps in pension coverage between 
college graduates and the other groups. These differences were largely 
a reﬂection of the gap in the proportion with a DC account, though there 
was also a considerable difference in DB coverage between those with-
out a high school degree and college graduates. The pattern of results is 
very similar for female workers. 
Pension coverage showed an absolute decline among the three less-
educated groups of workers. For male workers without a high school 
degree (or GED), DC coverage declined from 27 percent in 1989 to 
20 percent in 2007, DB coverage plummeted from 27 to 3 percent, and 
overall pension coverage from 46 to 22 percent. For male high school 
graduates, DC coverage rose slightly, from 41 to 43 percent, DB cover-
age contracted from 34 to 18 percent, and overall coverage fell from 61 
to 51 percent. Among those with some college, DC coverage grew by 9 
percentage points, DB coverage fell, and overall coverage dipped from 
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67 to 62 percent. Among college graduates, the overall coverage rate 
rose moderately, from 76 to 79 percent. 
As a result, the gaps in pension coverage considerably widened 
over time. The difference in the overall pension coverage rate between 
the lowest educational group and college graduates mushroomed from 
30 to 57 percentage points, the difference between high school and col-
lege graduates expanded from 15 to 29 percentage points, and the dif-
ference in overall pension coverage between those with some college 
and college graduates climbed from 8 to 17 percent. Here, too, results 
are similar among female workers. 
Pension Coverage by Industry, Occupation, and 
Employment Status 
There are also marked differences in pension coverage by indus-
try, occupation, and employment status (see Table 4.3). Of particu-
lar note are the sizable losses in pension coverage among male blue-
collar workers. In 2007, the highest pension coverage among male 
workers was found in public administration, 87 percent, followed by 
nongovernmental services, 69 percent, wholesale and retail trade, 55 
percent, and goods-producing industries, 50 percent.23 Among female 
workers, the highest pension coverage was also found in public admin-
istration, 89 percent, also followed by nongovernmental services, 63 
percent, but then followed by goods-producing industries, 61 percent, 
and ﬁnally wholesale and retail trade, 44 percent. The share of workers 
reporting a DC account was roughly similar to the proportion with any 
pension coverage, and the rank order was almost identical. By far, the 
highest proportion of workers with DB coverage was found in public 
administration—57 percent for men and 55 percent for women. Deﬁned 
beneﬁt coverage was quite low in goods-producing industries, 13 and 7 
percent, respectively—surprising since this sector includes such heav-
ily unionized industries as autos. 
There were also some notable gender differences in coverage. In the 
goods-producing sector, overall pension coverage was 61 percent for 
women and only 50 percent for men. These differentials reﬂect the rela-
tively large concentration of white-collar jobs among the women and 
of blue-collar jobs among the men employed in this sector. In contrast, 
overall pension coverage was higher for men than for women in trade 
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Table 4.3  Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Industry, 
Occupation, and Employment Status, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
By industry of employmenta 
Goods-producing industries 
All DC accounts 45.5 39.8 55.2 53.5 45.8 58.2 
All DB plans 33.6 24.7 23.3 15.1 12.7 7.4 
DC and/or DB plans 62.1 52.7 64.7 57.9 50.3 60.5 
Wholesale and retail trade 
All DC accounts 39.8 28.5 49.8 39.1 53.1 38.6 
All DB plans 15.4 14.8 12.6 7.4 9.4 6.4 
DC and/or DB plans 49.0 37.6 54.1 42.5 55.0 41.1 
Nongovernmental services 
All DC accounts 49.9 44.2 64.9 52.1 63.4 56.1 
All DB plans 42.7 31.0 26.1 19.9 19.5 16.7 
DC and/or DB plans 70.4 58.4 72.7 61.5 68.8 63.1 
Public administration 
All DC accounts 49.7 47.0 75.5 58.6 72.6 66.1 
All DB plans 73.9 62.0 59.0 41.9 56.8 54.5 
DC and/or DB plans 96.3 74.9 95.9 75.8 87.4 88.8 
By occupation of employment 
Professional and managerial 
All DC accounts 63.3 57.9 72.8 61.8 73.0 61.5 
All DB plans 45.1 35.6 26.9 24.4 21.9 20.0 
DC and/or DB plans 80.1 70.0 79.2 71.4 77.6 69.3 
Technical and clerical 
All DC accounts 46.5 41.3 63.5 50.4 59.1 56.7 
All DB plans 24.1 29.4 20.0 14.9 15.3 12.9 
DC and/or DB plans 59.7 56.4 68.3 56.9 62.7 61.9 
Service workers 
All DC accounts 30.2 19.4 41.3 26.8 43.6 26.4 
All DB plans 44.3 20.3 33.5 11.3 31.4 11.5 
DC and/or DB plans 63.2 33.6 57.7 34.3 55.4 32.4 
Craft, operative, and 
agricultural 
All DC accounts 36.2 26.0 48.6 41.5 42.0 41.9 
All DB plans 33.6 22.4 22.8 13.4 12.8 8.8 
DC and/or DB plans 56.0 39.4 59.2 49.6 46.9 47.0 
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Table 4.3  (continued) 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
By employment statusb 
Part-time, full-year 
All DC accounts 30.7 26.1 36.3 37.1 47.1 39.4 
All DB plans 24.6 13.2 20.2 11.2 9.3 8.9 
DC and/or DB plans 46.6 34.7 45.6 42.9 48.8 42.8 
Full-time, part-year 
All DC accounts 46.0 46.9 55.9 51.7 41.7 58.1 
All DB plans 30.2 52.5 22.9 38.5 16.8 25.7 
DC and/or DB plans 59.6 73.6 64.2 73.2 47.5 70.4 
Part-time, part-year 
All DC accounts 34.0 41.0 47.7 42.5 51.8 43.4 
All DB plans 11.7 11.5 26.7 12.5 21.0 13.0 
DC and/or DB plans 37.8 47.3 54.1 47.5 59.7 47.6 
Full-time, full-year 
All DC accounts 47.7 44.5 61.8 54.4 58.3 57.7 
All DB plans 38.1 33.4 25.1 17.8 19.1 16.6 
DC and/or DB plans 67.1 59.7 70.3 61.6 63.6 64.6 
Self-employed workers 
All DC accounts 41.5 49.0 52.3 48.0 43.2 42.9 
All DB plans 10.8 20.5 13.7 16.8 6.4 16.4 
DC and/or DB plans 45.4 57.1 57.4 56.2 45.5 46.6 
NOTE: The table includes all current workers aged 64 and under. 
a Industries are grouped into four classiﬁcations: 1) Agriculture, mining, and manu-
facturing; 2) wholesale and retail trade; 3) communications, information services, 
ﬁnance, insurance, real estate, repair services, transportation, utilities, professional 
services, and personal services; and 4) public administration. 
b Part-time is less than 35 hours per week; part-year is less than 50 weeks per year. Self-
employment may be part-time or full-time. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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and in nongovernmental services. The overall coverage rate was about 
the same for men and women in public administration. 
Over time, pension coverage fell off sharply for male workers in 
goods-producing industries, from 62 percent in 1989 to 50 percent in 
2007. This change is traceable to a huge drop in DB coverage, from 
34 to 13 percent. On the other hand, overall pension coverage climbed 
for women, from 53 to 61 percent, as DC coverage expanded. In the 
trade sector, pension coverage rose from both men and women, because 
of a rise in coverage from DC plans. There was a precipitous drop in 
DB coverage in nongovernmental services over this period, from 43 to 
20 percent among male employees and from 31 to 17 percent among 
female employees. Despite this, overall pension coverage remained 
largely unchanged for men and increased moderately for women 
over the period because of the sharp rise in DC coverage. In 1989, an 
astounding 74 percent of male employees in public administration had 
a DB plan, as did 62 percent of female employees. Overall coverage 
rates were (an equally astounding) 96 percent for men and 75 percent 
for women. Deﬁ ned beneﬁt coverage fell off for both, but DC coverage 
rose so that while overall pension coverage declined from 96 to 87 per-
cent for male employees, it increased from 75 to 89 percent for female 
employees, resulting in women having a slightly higher percentage of 
coverage than did men. 
By occupation of employment, pension coverage in 2007 was high-
est among professional and managerial workers, 78 percent for males 
and 69 percent for females, and second highest among technical and 
clerical workers, 63 and 62 percent, respectively. Among male workers, 
service workers ranked third at 55 percent, while blue-collar jobs (craft, 
operative, and agricultural) ranked last, at 47 percent. Among women, 
the rank order was reversed, with a 47 percent coverage rate among 
blue-collar workers and a 32 percent rate among service workers. As 
with industry of employment, DC coverage rates were almost as high 
as overall pension coverage rates, and the rank order was identical to 
that of the overall coverage rate. Deﬁ ned beneﬁt coverage rates were 
relatively small among technical and clerical workers and, surprisingly, 
among blue-collar workers as well. However, the DB coverage rate was 
31 percent among male service workers and 22 and 20 percent among 
male and female professional and managerial workers, respectively. 
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The latter result reﬂects the large proportion of workers in this occupa-
tional group who are employed by the government sector. 
Pension coverage rates were almost identical for male and female 
workers in technical and clerical jobs, as well as in blue-collar work. 
They were slightly higher for men than for women in professional 
and managerial jobs because of the higher share of men with a DC 
plan. Among service workers, 55 percent of male employees reported 
pension coverage compared to only 32 percent of female employees 
because of the higher rate of both DC and DB plan coverage. 
There was little change in the overall pension coverage rate among 
professional and managerial workers between 1989 and 2007. Deﬁned 
beneﬁt coverage declined and DC coverage increased to offset the 
decline in DB coverage. Over the period, overall pension coverage fell 
from 80 to 78 percent for male employees but stayed the same for female 
employees at about 70 percent. Among technical and clerical workers, 
there was a slight increase in overall coverage for both men and women 
because of the rise in DC coverage rates. In contrast, among service 
workers, the overall pension coverage rate for male employees tailed 
off from 63 to 55 percent, mainly because of the decline of DB cover-
age, while it remained largely unchanged for female employees. Like-
wise, overall pension coverage slid from 56 to 47 percent among male 
workers because of the shrinkage of DB coverage, while it increased 
among female workers from 39 to 47 percent because of the expansion 
of DC coverage. 
The third panel of Table 4.3 shows pension coverage by employ-
ment status. I have divided workers into four groups based on hours 
and weeks worked in the preceding year: part-time, full-year; full-time, 
part-year; part-time, part-year; and full-time, full-year.24 I have also 
separated out self-employed workers. The results do not show dramatic 
differences by work status. In 2007, the pension coverage rate among 
male workers was highest among full-time, full-year employees, 64 
percent; surprisingly, it was second highest among part-time, part-
year employees, 60 percent;25 next highest among part-time, full-year 
employees, 49 percent; and lowest among full-time, part-year workers, 
48 percent. Among female workers, the rank order was ﬁrst for full-
time, part-year workers; second among full-time, full-year employees; 
third among part-time, part-year employees; and last among part-time, 
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full-year employees. Self-employed workers ranked lower than any of 
these groups for male workers and second lowest for female workers. 
Despite a drop in DB coverage, part-time, full-year workers saw a 
modest increase in their overall pension coverage rate between 1989 and 
2007 because of an increasing share with a DC account. Full-time, part-
year workers saw a modest drop in overall pension coverage because of 
a sharp decline in DB coverage. Pension coverage climbed among part-
time, part-year male workers because of a large jump in DC plan cover-
age but remained the same among female workers. Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plan 
coverage plummeted among both male and female full-time, full-year 
workers from 1989 to 2007. However, the proportion with a DC plan 
expanded, and as a result overall pension coverage fell modestly among 
men but increased modestly among women so that women, though with 
a lower coverage rate than men in 1989, had a slightly higher coverage 
rate in 2007 than men. The pension coverage rate remained about the 
same for self-employed men in 2007 as in 1989, but fell among self-
employed women because of a decline in the share with DC accounts. 
Pension Coverage by Earnings Quintile 
I next divide workers (excluding the self-employed) into earnings 
quintiles on the basis of their annual earnings to see how pension cover-
age varies by earnings level (see Table 4.4).26 As expected, the pension 
coverage rate was much higher for higher-income workers. I also ﬁnd 
that the gap in coverage spread out over time, particularly among male 
workers, as pension coverage slipped sharply among lower-earning 
workers. 
In 2007, among men, the pension coverage rate varied directly by 
earnings quintile, from a high of 94 percent for the top quintile to a low 
of 39 percent for the bottom quintile. Among female workers, there was 
very little variation in pension coverage among the top three earnings 
quintiles: it was somewhat lower for the second quintile, and, again, 
quite a bit lower for the bottom quintile. Pension coverage rates were 
higher for female employees than for male employees among the bot-
tom three quintiles, particularly the middle one, but were lower for the 
top two quintiles. 
Over time, from 1989 to 2007, pension coverage fell off markedly 
among the bottom three quintiles for male workers and declined slightly 
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Tab le 4.4  Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Earnings 
Quintile, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Bottom earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 37.6 38.1 43.4 41.6 34.2 40.1 
All DB plans 30.9 26.8 16.2 14.1 9.9 10.5 
DC and/or DB plans 56.7 52.3 51.6 49.2 38.9 46.0 
Second earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 74.9 74.8 67.9 71.7 62.1 67.4 
All DB plans 52.1 65.7 28.1 28.1 21.8 24.7 
DC and/or DB plans 92.7 89.2 77.4 81.5 69.3 78.1 
Third earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 73.8 98.1 76.6 80.8 73.1 85.6 
All DB plans 62.7 46.6 40.7 35.4 25.0 24.6 
DC and/or DB plans 92.5 99.8 89.6 90.1 79.0 90.5 
Fourth earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 91.5 100.0 89.8 95.0 84.9 83.6 
All DB plans 41.3 13.3 34.0 15.2 31.9 26.7 
DC and/or DB plans 91.5 100.0 90.8 95.0 89.4 86.5 
Top earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 72.7 99.5 90.9 58.2 94.0 86.0 
All DB plans 66.1 96.5 27.1 28.8 20.3 8.3 
DC and/or DB plans 97.0 100.0 92.8 78.4 94.3 86.0 
NOTE: The table includes all current workers aged 64 and under. Self-employed are 
excluded from this table. Earnings quintiles are based on the combined distribution of 
annual earnings for men and women. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
for the top two quintiles. Among female employees, there was a falloff 
of pension coverage in each earnings quintile. In the bottom earnings 
quintile, the overall pension coverage rate diminished by 18 percentage 
points for men and 6 percentage points for women. In the second earn-
ings quintile, the DB coverage rate collapsed for both male and female 
workers and the DC coverage rate also fell, but more modestly. Overall, 
the pension coverage rate lessened by 23 percentage points for men and 
by 11 percentage points for women. 
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In the middle quintile, DB coverage again plummeted for male and 
female workers, the share with DC plans remained almost unchanged 
for men but slipped for women, and, as a result, the overall pension 
coverage rate slid by 14 percentage points for men and by 9 percentage 
points for women. Among the top two earnings quintiles, overall pen-
sion coverage rate slipped a bit for men and went down by about 14 
percentage points for women.27 
Among male employees, there was a growing cleavage in pension 
coverage between the top of the earnings distribution and the bottom 
three earnings quintiles. This was, in turn, mainly due to a growing gap 
in the proportion with DC plans. Among female workers, the differen-
tials in pension coverage between the top quintile and the bottom three 
actually lessened over the period 1989–2007.28 
Pension Wealth on the Household Level 
We now turn our attention to household level wealth. Table 4.5 
highlights trends in pension coverage over the 1983–2007 period. In 
this and the subsequent tables, it should be noted that the unit of obser-
vation is the household, not the individual worker. Moreover, I have 
divided households into three age groups: under 47, 47–64, and 65 and 
older. The valuation of DB pension rights among younger workers has 
to be interpreted cautiously. In fact, data for the youngest group are the 
most problematic, since estimates of DB pension wealth are based on 
projected beneﬁts in 20–40 years and depend on projecting future work 
life and future job tenure with the same employer. In the case of the 
1983 SCF, the data needed to calculate DB pension wealth are available 
only for individuals 40 years and older, so I cannot make corresponding 
estimates of DB wealth for the 46 and under group. Data for retirees 
are the most secure, since both pension and Social Security beneﬁ t lev-
els are already determined. Estimates of both DB and Social Security 
wealth for the middle-aged group lie in between in terms of reliability. 
Individuals close to retirement have a fairly good idea of their expected 
pension beneﬁts and their expected age of retirement and have a high 
likelihood of remaining with their current employer (see Farber [2001] 
for some evidence). 
The picture that unfolds is a precipitous drop in DB coverage largely 
compensated for by a sizable increase in DC coverage. Moreover, while 
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Tabl e 4.5  Percentage of Households with Pension Wealth, 1983–2007 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
DC accounts 11.1 24.0 52.2 52.6 
DB plans — 45.6 34.4 34.0 
Pension wealth — 56.0 65.6 64.1 
Aged 46 and under 
DC accounts 13.7 31.2 53.8 49.9 
DB plans — 37.9 22.8 22.6 
Pension wealth — 52.2 60.7 54.7 
Aged 47–64 
DC accounts 12.3 28.3 62.0 63.8 
DB plans 68.5 56.8 45.3 38.8 
Pension wealth 70.3 67.5 75.9 74.1 
Aged 65 and over 
DC accounts 2.0 1.3 35.0 40.8 
DB plans 67.0 51.3 46.5 50.6 
Pension wealth 67.8 51.8 62.6 68.5 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Pension wealth = DB + DC. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
mean pension wealth gained rapidly in the 1990s, its growth slowed 
down considerably in the 2000s. Among young households in particu-
lar, pension coverage dropped sharply in the 2000s and mean pension 
wealth stagnated. 
The share of all households with DC pension accounts skyrocketed 
during the 1983–2001 period, from 11 to 52 percent, or by 41 percent-
age points. The story is very similar for the three different age groups 
shown in Table 4.5, even among the elderly. The proportion holding 
pension accounts advanced by 40 percentage points in age group 46 and 
under, by 50 percentage points among households in age group 47–64, 
and by 33 percentage points among elderly households. In 2001, 62 
percent of households in the age range of 47–64 held some form of DC 
account, compared to 35 percent of elderly households and 54 percent 
of younger households. Most of the gains occurred after 1989. 
The picture changes during the 2000s. Among all households, there 
is virtually no change in the DC coverage rate. For the younger age 
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group, the share actually dropped by 4 percentage points. For the mid-
dle age group, there was a slight increase of 2 percentage points, and 
among elderly households an increase of 6 percentage points. 
Trends are also different for DB pension wealth. The share of 
all households with DB pension wealth fell by 11 percentage points 
between 1989 and 2001. Among households in age group 47–64, the 
decline was about the same, 12 percentage points from 1989 to 2001. 
However, the fall was even more precipitous—by 24 percentage 
points—from 1983 to 2001. Among elderly households the proportion 
fell by 5 percentage points from 1989 to 2001 and by 20 percentage 
points from 1983 to 2001, while among young households the share 
was down by 15 percentage points from 1989 to 2001. In 2001, while 
47 percent of elderly households held some form of DB pension wealth, 
45 percent of households in age group 47–64 and only 23 percent of 
young households recorded DB entitlements. Most of the loss in cover-
age again occurred after 1989. 
The trend moderated after 2001. Among households under age 47, 
the share with DB coverage remained unchanged. For middle-aged 
households, the share was down another 6.5 percentage points in 2007. 
Elderly households bucked the trend, as the share with DB coverage 
rose by 4.1 percentage points. 
The percentage of all households covered by either a DC or a DB 
plan increased from 56 to 66 percent between 1989 and 2001. Among 
the 47–64 age group, the proportion rose by 8 percentage points, and 
among the elderly, the share increased by 11 percentage points. How-
ever, comparing 2001 to 1983 shows a smaller rise in pension coverage 
among the 47–64 age group (6 percentage points) and an actual decline 
among elderly households (5 percentage points). Among younger 
households the proportion rose by 10 percentage points from 1989 to 
2001. The share of households covered by some form of pension in 
2001 was 76 percent among the middle-aged, compared to 63 percent 
among the elderly and 61 percent among the youngest age group. 
The story once again changes from 2001 to 2007. The share of 
households with some form of pension coverage actually declined by 
1.4 percentage points. The decline was particularly precipitous among 
younger households, whose coverage rate fell by 6.1 percentage points. 
Among the middle-aged, the fall was 1.8 percentage points, whereas 
Wolff.indb 105  11/21/2011 9:17:53 AM   
 
 
  
The Slowdown in Pension Wealth Growth in the 2000s  105 
among the elderly pension coverage rose by 5.9 percentage points. As 
shown in Table 4.6, there were huge increases in the average holdings 
of DC pension accounts. Among all households, the average value of 
these accounts increased almost fourteenfold between 1983 and 2001, 
to $52,800 (all dollar ﬁgures are in 2007 dollars, unless otherwise 
noted). Among age group 46 and under the increase was by a factor of 
11, and among age group 47–64 the gain was by a factor of 12. Among 
elderly households, the rise was by a factor of 31. In 2001, mean DC 
pension wealth was greatest among age group 47–64, at $113,000, sec-
ond highest among elderly households, at $63,000, and lowest among 
the youngest age group, at $33,000. 
The rise in DC wealth slowed down from 2001 to 2007. Among all 
households, mean DC wealth increased by (only) 22 percent. Middle-
aged households saw their mean DC wealth increase by 18 percent and 
Table 4.6 Mean Household Pension Wealth, 1983–2007 (in thousands, 
2007$) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
DC pension wealth 4.6 10.6 62.8 76.8 
DB pension wealth — 56.5 58.0 61.2 
Pension wealth — 67.1 120.8 138.0 
Aged 46 and under 
DC pension wealth 3.0 9.2 33.1 30.7 
DB pension wealth — 25.1 20.3 24.6 
Pension wealth — 34.3 53.4 55.3 
Aged 47–64 
DC pension wealth 9.7 20.4 113.1 133.8 
DB pension wealth 90.1 100.3 98.9 91.4 
Pension wealth 99.7 120.7 211.9 225.3 
Aged 65 and over 
DC pension wealth 2.1 2.3 62.7 84.5 
DB pension wealth 73.6 82.4 89.2 91.2 
Pension wealth 75.7 84.7 151.9 175.8 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Pension wealth = DB + DC. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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elderly households by 35 percent. On the other hand, younger house-
holds actually experienced a decline in DC wealth, by 7 percent, to 
$31,000 in 2007. 
Opposite trends are again evident for DB pension wealth. Among 
all households, the mean value rose by only 3 percent between 1989 
and 2001. Losses occurred for younger households, down by 19 per-
cent, and for age group 47–64, down by 1.4 percent. However, the aver-
age value of DB plans among the elderly rose by 8 percent over the 
period—a reﬂection of their legacy status with respect to DB plans. 
The years 2001–2007 saw continued slow growth in DB pension 
wealth; among all households, it rose by 5.5 percent. A 21 percent gain 
was recorded among young households, though the actual level was still 
quite low, but among middle-aged households mean DB fell by 7.5 per-
cent. Elderly households saw a moderate gain of 2.3 percent. By 2007, 
mean DB wealth was about the same among elderly and middle-aged 
households ($91,000), but only $24,600 among younger households. 
I can now consider one of the issues raised in the beginning of this 
chapter: Has the spread of DC-type pension plans adequately compen-
sated for the decline in traditional DB pension coverage? The answer 
is a resounding “yes” for the period from 1989 to 2001 (and 1983 to 
2001), but a “perhaps” for the period 2001 –2007. Average pension 
wealth (the sum of DC and DB pensions) increased for all age groups 
between 1989 and 2001. Among all households, the mean value of total 
pension wealth climbed by 80 percent. Among those in age groups 46 
and under and 47–64, the mean value increased by 56 and 76 percent, 
respectively, while among elderly households the mean value jumped 
by 79 percent. 
However, the growth in pension wealth slowed down markedly 
from 2001 to 2007. Mean pension wealth among all households rose by 
14 percent, compared to an 80 percent gain during the 1980s. It inched 
up by only 4 percent among young households and by 6 percent among 
middle-aged ones, though it did gain 16 percent among the elderly. By 
2007 mean pension wealth was $225,300 among age group 47–64, 
$175,800 among the elderly, and only $55,300 for young households. 
With the transition in the pension system, has the inequality of pen-
sion wealth increased or declined? We will see that pension inequality 
among DC plan holders is considerably greater than that among DB 
plan holders. As a result, the transition to DC plans raised overall pen-
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sion inequality. This was true despite a decline in inequality in both DC 
wealth and DB wealth by themselves. 
Table 4.7 records the inequality of pension wealth among pen-
sion holders only within age group. The inequality of holdings of DC 
accounts generally declined over the years from 1989 (or 1983) and 
2007. This was true among all DC pension holders, young households 
who held DC plans, and middle-aged ones as well. The drop in the 
Gini coefﬁcient from 1989 to 2007 was 0.022 among all households, 
0.038 among those under age 47, and 0.045 among middle-aged ones. 
In contrast, the inequality of DC holdings spiked upward among elderly 
households, with the Gini coefﬁcient rising by 0.101 points from 1989 
to 2007. This change reﬂected the entry into the ranks of the elderly of 
newer and newer cohorts of elderly households with large holdings of 
DC wealth. 
Table  4.7 Inequality of Pension Wealth among Pension Holders, 1983– 
2007 (Gini coefﬁcients) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All pension holders 
DC accounts — 0.750 0.741 0.728 
DB plans — 0.606 0.582 0.549 
Pension wealth — 0.641 0.676 0.661 
Pension holders: aged 46 and under 
DC accounts — 0.731 0.719 0.693 
DB plans — 0.576 0.552 0.511 
Pension wealth — 0.635 0.672 0.653 
Pension holders: aged 47–64 
DC accounts 0.732 0.726 0.714 0.681 
DB plans 0.507 0.537 0.571 0.519 
Pension wealth 0.524 0.577 0.637 0.617 
Pension holders: aged 65+ 
DC accounts 0.687 0.635 0.703 0.736 
DB plans 0.458 0.605 0.541 0.556 
Pension wealth 0.466 0.607 0.607 0.642 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Pension wealth = DB + DC. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Despite the reduction of inequality in DC wealth, the level of 
inequality in DC pension wealth was still very high in 2007. The Gini 
coefﬁcient among all DC pension account holders was 0.728 in 2007. 
This compares to a Gini coefﬁcient for net worth of 0.834. Inequality 
among DC account holders within age group was almost as great as 
among all DC account holders.29 
The inequality of DB wealth also fell over these years. The Gini 
coefﬁcient for DB wealth among all households who held DB plans fell 
by 0.058 points from 1989 to 2007. It declined by 0.065 points among 
young households, 0.018 among middle-aged ones, and by 0.048 points 
among elderly ones. 
However, when we consider total pension wealth, we ﬁnd just the 
opposite story, despite the declines in both DC and DB wealth inequal-
ity. Pension wealth inequality overall increased by 0.020 Gini points 
among all pension holders from 1989 to 2007, by 0.018 Gini points 
among young households, by 0.039 Gini points among middle-aged 
ones, and by 0.036 Gini points among elderly ones. On the surface, 
these results may appear rather paradoxical. However, the explanation 
emanates from the fact that DC wealth inequality is considerably higher 
than DB wealth inequality. In 2007, for example, the Gini coefﬁcient 
for DC wealth among all households with DC plans was 0.728, com-
pared to only 0.549 for DB plan holders. Similar differences exist for 
the individual age groups. 
Not surprisingly, the switchover from DB pension plans to DC pen-
sion plans resulted in a rise in overall pension wealth inequality. The 
reason is that the Gini coefﬁcient for the sum of DB and DC wealth 
is equal to a weighted sum of the Gini coefﬁcients for DC and DC 
individually (plus an interaction term), where the weight is equal to the 
share of each component in total pension wealth. The rising share of DC 
wealth in total pension wealth over time, from 1989 to 2007, thus led to 
a rise in the Gini coefﬁcient in overall pension wealth, despite the fact 
that the Gini coefﬁcient for both DC wealth and DB wealth declined 
over time individually.30 
Figure 4.1a gives dramatic evidence of how differently DC and DB 
wealth are distributed and about how much more unequal DC wealth 
is than DB wealth. In this case, I divide pension wealth into its DB and 
DC components and show the distribution of each among account hold-
ers only by their corresponding percentile level in 2007. Here it is clear 
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that DB dominates DC values at least up to the 95th percentile, and 
then at the very upper reaches of the respective distributions the reverse 
is true. This pattern reﬂects the small accumulations of DC plans like 
IRAs and some 401(k) plans and the more substantial values of most 
DB plans. For example, at the 25th percentile the value of DC plans was 
$11,000 versus $44,000 for DB plans. However, at the 95th percentile 
the value of the former was $1.5 million while that of the latter was $1.0 
million. The contrasting distributions also illustrate why DC inequality 
is higher than DB inequality, since there is a larger share of DC holders 
with both small and large amounts of pension wealth than DB holders. 
The percentage difference declined with percentile level, from 88 
percent at the 5th percentile to 15 percent at the 90th. At the 99th per-
centile, DC exceeded DB by 43 percent, a reﬂection of the fact that the 
DC system has particularly beneﬁted the high end of the pension (and 
wealth) distribution. A similar pattern is evident for age group 47–64 
(see Figure 4.1b). However, here the crossover point was between 
the 90th and 95th percentiles. At the 95th percentile and above, DC 
exceeded DB. Indeed, at the 99th percentile, DC exceeded DB by a 
sizable 54 percent. 
Figures 4.2a and 4.2b provide a slightly different perspective on the 
distribution of pension wealth by considering its distribution among all 
households (not just pension holders). The story that emerges is differ-
ent from when we consider only pension holders. In fact, the inequal-
ity of pension wealth among all households remained fairly unchanged 
over the years 1989–2007. The reason is that the disequalizing effect 
of rising pension wealth inequality among pension holders alone was 
offset by the equalizing effect of a rising share of households holding 
pension wealth. 
As shown in Figure 4.2a, there were large gains in pension wealth 
over the 1989–2001 period at all percentiles, reﬂecting the increase in 
the share of households with a pension plan and the rising value of pen-
sion wealth. However, the overall pattern is U-shaped. The percentage 
gain declined from 214 percent at the 50th percentile to 72 percent at 
the 75th percentile, and then increased to 86 percent at the 99th percen-
tile. These results illustrate that the largest growth of pension wealth 
occurred at both the bottom and the top of the pension wealth distri-
bution. As a result, overall pension wealth inequality remained almost 
unchanged over these years. 
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Figure 4.1a  Percentage Difference between DC and DB Pension Wealth 
among Account Holders by Pension Percentile, All 
Households, 2007 
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Figure 4.1b  Percentage Difference between DC and DB Pension Wealth 
among Account Holders by Pension Percentile, Aged 47–64, 
2007 
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Figure 4.2a  Percentage Change in Pension Wealth by Percentile, All 
Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989–2001 
2001–2007 
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
ha
ng
e 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
Percentile 
Figure 4.2b  Percentage Change in Pension Wealth by Percentile, Aged 
47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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From 2001 to 2007, pension wealth showed much more modest 
gains at all percentiles. Moreover, the largest gains were in the mid-
dle part of the pension wealth distribution (averaging about 20 percent 
from the 60th to the 90th percentile) and much smaller at the bottom 
and top. This result too is in accordance with the ﬁnding that the Gini 
coefﬁcient for pension wealth changed very little over this period, since 
the largest increase in pension wealth occurred in the middle of the pen-
sion wealth distribution. 
Results were quite similar among middle-aged households (see 
Figure 4.2b). Relative gains in pension wealth had a U-shaped pattern 
between 1989 and 2001, declining from 139 percent at the 40th percen-
tile to 49 percent at the 70th percentile in the ﬁrst period and then rising 
to 139 percent at the 99th percentile. As among all households, overall 
pension wealth inequality changed very little over these years. Over 
the later period, percentage advances were fairly uniform and small 
(around 10 percent) across percentiles, and inequality again remained 
relatively unchanged.31 
TRENDS IN PRIVATE ACCUMULATIONS  
How has the radical makeover of the retirement system affected 
trends in both the level and the inequality of private accumulations? 
Recall that private accumulations are deﬁned as the sum of net worth 
and DB. It thus represents the resources available to households for 
retirement from private sources—their own wealth accumulations and 
private (as opposed to public) pension funds. The results indicate that 
with the dismantling of the DB pension system, private accumulations 
generally grew slower than household net worth. Moreover, inequality 
in the distribution of private accumulations increased more than that of 
net worth. 
As noted in Chapter 2, there was very strong growth in net worth 
during the 1990s and 2000s. Mean net worth rose 73 percent from 1983 
to 2007, while the median rose 38 percent (see Table 4.8).32 When DB 
wealth is added to net worth to obtain private accumulations, I ﬁ nd that 
its mean value was up by 63 percent between 1989 and 2007, lower 
than that of net worth, while its median value increased by 25 percent, 
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Table 4 .8  Mean and Median Net Worth and Private Accumulations, 
1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Mean net worth 270.4 309.8 445.1 536.1 
Mean private accumulations — 366.1 503.2 597.5 
Median net worth 69.5 74.3 86.1 102.5 
Median private accumulations — 114.0 118.3 142.8 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean net worth 126.6 171.2 205.0 209.9 
Mean private accumulations — 196.3 225.3 234.5 
Median net worth 30.4 27.8 24.2 21.8 
Median private accumulations — 40.5 38.5 35.0 
Aged 47–64 
Mean net worth 437.5 477.0 700.5 803.2 
Mean private accumulations 526.3 577.3 799.4 894.7 
Median net worth 126.8 156.0 161.1 206.5 
Median private accumulations 215.3 226.9 249.4 283.8 
Aged 65+ 
Mean net worth 434.2 454.1 652.8 809.1 
Mean private accumulations 505.9 536.5 742.0 900.4 
Median net worth 122.5 128.1 176.5 211.1 
Median private accumulations 191.9 187.7 258.5 277.1 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
again slower than that of net worth. The differences reﬂect the much 
slower growth (and for households under age 65, the absolute decline) 
in the value of DB plans over these years. 
The pattern is repeated among middle-aged and elderly households. 
Mean private accumulations among the former rose by 55 percent from 
1989 to 2007, compared to a 68 percent increase in net worth, whereas 
median private accumulations were up by 25 percent, compared to a 32 
percent gain in median net worth. Among elderly households, mean pri-
vate accumulations advanced 68 percent, less than the 78 percent gain 
in new worth, and median private accumulations grew by 48 percent, 
again less than the 72 percent increase in median net worth. Among 
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households under age 47, the story is somewhat different: Mean private 
accumulations were up by 19 percent, compared to a 23 percent growth 
in net worth. This result is similar to the other age groups. However, 
median private accumulations actually dropped by 14 percent in abso-
lute terms, compared to a 22 percent decline in median net worth. This 
ﬁnding that the fortunes of young households deteriorated during the 
1990s and 2000s will be a recurrent theme in this book. 
Generally speaking, households fared worse in terms of private 
accumulations than in terms of conventional net worth between 1989 
and 2007 (except for young households, for whom median private accu-
mulations declined in absolute terms less than did median net worth). 
This ﬁnding indicates that the explosive growth of DC plans after 1989 
did not fully compensate for the collapse of DB plans, at least in terms 
of the growth of household wealth. 
I also ﬁnd that the attrition of DB plans led to a rise in wealth 
inequality (see Table 4.9). The reason is that DB wealth is fairly equal-
izing, as discussed earlier, and its disappearance helped fuel a rise in 
wealth inequality. In 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth among all 
households was 0.834, while that for private accumulations was 0.805. 
The higher level of inequality in the distribution of net worth than in 
private accumulations reﬂects the fact that DB pension wealth is dis-
tributed much more equally than net worth. 
It was also the case that the equalizing effect of DB pension wealth 
lessened with the passage of time. Whereas the Gini coefﬁcient for net 
worth among all households increased by a very modest 0.002 points 
over the years from 1989 to 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient for private accu-
mulations advanced even more, by 0.012 points. Alternatively, adding 
DB wealth to net worth resulted in a 0.039 decline in the Gini coefﬁ-
cient in 1989 but only a 0.029 decrease in 2007. 
The results are even stronger for middle-aged households and over 
the longer time span, 1983 –2007. For this group, the Gini coefﬁ cient for 
net worth increased by 0.033 points between 1983 and 2007, while the 
Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations ballooned by 0.070 points. 
Here we see even stronger evidence that the equalizing effect of DB 
pension wealth wore off over time. Adding DB wealth to net worth 
caused the Gini coefﬁcient to decline by 0.073 in 1983, 0.053 in 1989, 
0.043 in 2001, and 0.036 in 2007. These results help solve the puzzle 
discussed in Chapter 2 of why traditional wealth inequality remained 
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Table 4. 9  Inequality of Net Worth and Private Accumulations, 1983– 
2007 (Gini coefﬁcients) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Net worth 0.799 0.832 0.826 0.834 
Private accumulations — 0.793 0.796 0.805 
Aged 46 and under 
Net worth 0.797 0.887 0.859 0.880 
Private accumulations — 0.851 0.830 0.850 
Aged 47–64 
Net worth 0.761 0.775 0.798 0.795 
Private accumulations 0.688 0.721 0.756 0.758 
Aged 65+ 
Net worth 0.778 0.778 0.762 0.784 
Private accumulations 0.708 0.738 0.724 0.748 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
relatively static from 1989 to 2007, while both income inequality and 
the ratio of stock prices to housing prices rose. The reason is that tra-
ditional wealth fails to include DB wealth. Once this is included, the 
results show a much sharper increase in wealth inequality from 1989 to 
2007. In Chapter 5 we will see whether this pattern of results holds up 
when Social Security wealth is also included in total household wealth. 
Results are similar for elderly households. Among the elderly, pri-
vate accumulations inequality increased by 0.040 points from 1983 
to 2007, whereas net worth inequality remained virtually unchanged. 
However, the pattern is different for younger households. Among them, 
the Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations changed by −0.001 from 
1989 to 2007, slightly more than the −0.007 change in the Gini coef-
ﬁcient for net worth.33 
Figure 4.3a provides an alternative picture of the change in the size 
distribution of private accumulations, among all households between 
1989–2001 and 2001–2007. Over the earlier period, the major gains 
were made by households at the high end of the private accumulations 
distribution, while households at the bottom of the distribution experi-
enced an absolute decline. Between these two extremes, relative gains 
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Figure 4.3a  Percentage Change in Private Accumulations by Percentile, 
All Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 4.3b  Percentage Change in Private Accumulations by Percentile, 
Aged 46 and Under, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 4.3c  Percentage Change in Private Accumulations by Percentile, 
Aged 47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 4.3d  Percentage Change in Private Accumulations by Percentile, 
Aged 65 and Over, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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showed no discernible pattern, which is consistent with the ﬁ nding of 
a slight increase in the Gini coefﬁcient over these years. From 2001 
to 2007, the highest growth in private accumulations occurred roughly 
in the middle of the private accumulations distribution, with sharp 
declines at the bottom end. This pattern also seems consistent with the 
modest increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations over 
these years. 
Among young households (Figure 4.3b), percentage changes in pri-
vate accumulations were negative up to the 75th percentile and then 
positive above this during the earlier period. The pattern was very simi-
lar during the later period. The results for the later period are consistent 
with an increase in the Gini coefﬁcient over these years, but those for 
the earlier period seem inconsistent with a decline in the Gini coef-
ﬁcient. However, further investigation shows that the reason for the 
decline in inequality in the earlier period is that private accumulations 
for households in the bottom 20 percent of the private accumulations 
distribution became more negative over the period (this also happened 
from 2001 to 2007). 
Among middle-aged households, the percentage change in private 
accumulations was negative up at the 45th percentile and then posi-
tive after that over the earlier period (see Figure 4.3c). Over the second 
period, the percentage growth in private accumulations was positive at 
all percentiles but with no discernible pattern. These results are consis-
tent with the ﬁnding of a rising Gini coefﬁcient over the earlier period 
and little change over the second. In contrast, among elderly house-
holds (Figure 4.3d), private accumulations showed positive growth at 
all percentile levels in the earlier period, though percentage gains were 
greater at the bottom than the top, and as a result there was a mod-
est decline in private accumulations inequality. During the later period, 
changes in private accumulations were negative up to the 20th percen-
tile and generally positive above that, leading to a rise in the inequality 
of private accumulations. 
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DC EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS (DCEMP) TO DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PENSION PLANS 
To complete the picture of pension wealth, I look at trends in 
DCEMP. Recall that DCEMP is deﬁned as the present discounted value 
of future employer contributions to DC plans. I will reserve a discus-
sion of the effects of DCEMP on private accumulations (and augmented 
wealth) until the next chapter. 
The share of all households reporting an employer contribution rose 
swiftly in the 1980s and 1990s, from 5 percent in 1983 to 28 percent 
in 2001, and then stayed at this level in 2007 (see Table 4.10). In con-
trast, the share of DC plan holders reporting an employer contribution 
climbed from 45 percent in 1983 to 63 percent in 1989, and then in 2001 
fell to 54 percent, where it remained in 2007. The results indicate that 
employer matching contributions to DC pension plans (the employer 
“take-up rate”) fell off over the last 20 years or so. This retrenchment 
likely reﬂects general cutbacks in employee compensation. 
Likewise, the mean value of DCEMP, the present discounted value 
of future employer contributions to DC plans, among all households rose 
from virtually zero in 1983 to $34,300 (in 2007$) in 2001 but then fell 
off by 13 percent to $29,900 in 2007. Among those reporting employer 
contributions, the median value of DCEMP climbed from $18,900 in 
1983 to $68,900 in 2001 but then fell by 16 percent to $57,900 in 2007. 
By all four measures, employer contributions to DC plans peaked in the 
early 2000s and then retreated in the mid- and late 2000s. 
Younger workers were hit particularly hard during the 2000s. The 
share of all households in this age group reporting employer contri-
butions grew rapidly, from 9 percent in 1983 to 24 percent in 1989 
and then 38 percent in 2001. However, employers pulled back in the 
2000s and their share fell to 34 percent. Likewise, the mean value of 
DCEMP mushroomed from $3,100 in 1983 to $47,900 in 2001 before 
slipping 22 percent to $37,400 in 2007. The share of DC plan hold-
ers who reported an employer contribution climbed from 63 percent in 
1983 to 77 percent in 1989 and then fell off to 70 percent in 2001 and 
67 percent in 2007. In a slightly different pattern, the median value of 
DCEMP among recipients only rose rather steadily, from $20,400 in 
1983 to $78,000 in 2001, and then plunged by 14 percent to $66,800. 
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Table 4.1 0  Employer Contributions to DC Plans (DCEMP), 1983–2007 
(in thousands, 2007$) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Percent of households with DCEMP 4.9 15.0 28.4 28.4 
Percent of DC plan holders with DCEMP 45.0 62.7 54.3 53.9 
Mean DCEMP 1.9 14.3 34.3 29.9 
Median DCEMP (recipients only) 18.9 41.1 68.9 57.9 
Aged 46 and under 
Percent of households with DCEMP 8.6 24.1 37.8 33.6 
Percent of DC plan holders with DCEMP 62.9 77.1 70.3 67.4 
Mean DCEMP 3.1 22.2 47.9 37.4 
Median DCEMP (recipients only) 20.4 41.7 78.0 66.8 
Aged 47–64 
Percent of households with DCEMP 1.4 9.1 32.3 36.0 
Percent of DC plan holders with DCEMP 11.4 32.0 52.1 56.5 
Mean DCEMP 0.5 10.2 36.0 37.7 
Median DCEMP (recipients only) 13.2 37.8 53.0 51.8 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
Middle-aged households fared better during the 2000s. The share 
of all households in this age group reporting an employer contribution 
rose steadily, from virtually zero in 1983 to 36 percent in 2007. The 
percent of DC plan holders with DCEMP also increased more or less 
steadily, from 11 percent in 1983 to 57 percent in 2007. Mean DCEMP
surged upward from virtually zero in 1983 to $36,000 in 2001 and then 
inched up by 4.7 percent to $37,700 in 2007. Median DCEMP among 
plan holders also gained rapidly from 1983 to 2001, from $13,200 to 
$53,000, but then slipped to $51,800 in 2007. All in all, there appeared 
to be much smaller gains in employer contributions to DC plans among 
middle-aged households after 2001. 
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the unraveling of the traditional DB 
pension system in favor of DC pension coverage. Have U.S. households 
in general gained from this transformation? Have particular groups 
been hurt? Has the devolution of the DB system lowered or raised over-
all inequality? In general, there was a marked turnaround in the fortunes
of U.S. households in the 2000s as compared to the 1980s and 1990s. 
The analysis in this book began with pension coverage rates among 
workers currently employed. So far I have looked at both changes over 
time and differences in coverage rates by gender, age group, race, edu-
cational attainment, and employment status. In 2007, 56 percent of male 
workers under the age of 65 had some type of DC account, 19 percent 
had some form of DB entitlement, and altogether, 62 percent had some 
type of pension coverage. Not surprisingly, pension coverage was lower 
for younger workers (under age 47) than older ones (aged 47–64): 53 
versus 75 percent. 
Over time, DB coverage dropped considerably while DC coverage 
expanded. This systemic change beneﬁted female workers but hurt male 
workers. From 1989 to 2001, expanded DC coverage more than com-
pensated for dwindling DB coverage, and overall coverage rose by 3 
percentage points for male workers and 4 percentage points for female 
workers. However, from 2001 to 2007, male pension coverage actu-
ally dropped substantially, by 6 percentage points, and there was even 
a decrease in DC coverage. In contrast, female workers saw a modest 
increase of 2 percentage points in pension coverage from 2001 to 2007. 
As a result, the male coverage rate declined from 65 percent in 1989 to 
62 percent in 2007, while the female coverage rate advanced from 55 
to 60 percent. Moreover, whereas in 1989 and 2001 there was about a 
10 percentage point gap in pension coverage between male and female 
workers, by 2007 almost complete convergence had been achieved. 
The pension transformation also harmed younger male workers 
more than older ones. The coverage rate for younger male workers fell 
by 7 percentage points from 1989 to 2007, while that for older ones 
declined by only 3 percentage points. 
Black workers were more adversely affected by the pension make-
over than white workers. In 2007, there was a large gap in pension 
Wolff.indb 122  11/21/2011 9:18:09 AM     
122 Wolff 
coverage (12 percentage points) between black male workers and (non-
Hispanic) white male workers, and a huge gap (30 percentage points) 
between Hispanic male workers and non-Hispanic white male workers. 
Between 1989 and 2007, the pension coverage rate fell more for black 
male workers (4.6 percentage points) than for white male workers (3.2 
percentage points). The decline for Hispanic male workers was less (1.6 
percentage points) but was much lower than for whites or blacks. Black 
female workers saw their pension coverage rates plummet by 4.8 per-
centage points, while that for white female workers climbed by 8.1 per-
centage points (there was also a small decline among Hispanic female 
workers), and the gap in pension coverage between white females and 
black females advanced from 4 to 17 percentage points. 
Pension coverage among the college-educated was helped by the 
pension transformation, but that among less-educated male work-
ers was damaged. In 2007, only 22 percent of male workers without 
a high school degree had some form of pension coverage, compared 
to 51 percent of those with a high school degree, 62 percent of those 
with some college, and 79 percent of college graduates. Pension cover-
age showed an absolute decline among the three less-educated groups 
of male workers between 1989 and 2007, while among male college 
graduates the overall coverage rate rose moderately. As a result, the 
gap in pension coverage between college graduates and the other three 
educational groups expanded substantially over the 1989–2007 period. 
Male blue-collar workers were also adversely affected by the 
changeover in the pension system. The pension coverage rate among 
male workers plummeted 12 percentage points in goods-producing 
industries in 1989–2007, while it fell considerably less in nongovern-
mental services and public administration and even expanded some-
what in the trade sector. Likewise, pension coverage fell 9 percentage 
points among craft, operative, and agricultural male workers, and 8 
percentage points among male service workers. It contracted much less 
among male professional and managerial workers, and even gained a 
bit among technical and clerical male workers. 
Similarly, lower-paid workers were hurt more by the pension make-
over than higher-paid ones. In 2007, pension coverage among male 
workers was highest for the top quintile, 94 percent; second highest 
for the fourth quintile, 89 percent; third for the middle quintile, 79 per-
cent; fourth for the second quintile, 69 percent; and markedly lower 
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for the bottom quintile, 39 percent. Over time, pension coverage fell 
off markedly among the bottom three quintiles for male workers while 
declining only slightly among the top two quintiles between 1989 and 
2007. Indeed, among male employees in 1989, overall pension cover-
age rates were over 90 percent among the top four earnings quintiles. 
This, in turn, was due to the concentration of DB plans in the middle 
of the earnings distribution. During the 1980s, the DB pension system 
helped shore up the middle class. However, with the unraveling of DB 
pensions, the overall pension coverage rate plunged among the bottom 
three earnings quintiles. 
What did the pension transformation mean for pension coverage 
and pension wealth at the household level? I ﬁnd that after phenomenal 
growth in the share of all households covered by DC plans from 1983 to 
2001, the coverage rate leveled off from 2001 to 2007. In contrast, the 
DB coverage rate plummeted from 1989 to 2001, and though it leveled 
off during the new century, the overall pension coverage rate slipped by 
1.4 percentage points from 2001 to 2007. 
Mean DB pension wealth remained steady from 1989 to 2007. 
Buoyed by the stock market boom and rising DC coverage, average 
DC pension wealth skyrocketed from 1989 to 2001. It continued to rise 
from 2001 to 2007 but at a much slower pace. As a result, mean pen-
sion wealth climbed by 80 percent from 1989 to 2001 but then rose by 
only 14 percent from 2001 to 2007. Gains were particularly low among 
nonelderly households during the 2000s. 
Younger households experienced smaller gains in both pension 
coverage and pension wealth as a result of the transition from the DB 
to the DC system. Many middle-aged people were still protected under 
the older DB system. Moreover, the elderly were by and large fully 
protected from the transition of the pension system since those with DB 
pensions were almost fully protected because of “grandfather” provi-
sions. As a result, among households aged 46 and under, overall pen-
sion coverage advanced by only 2 percentage points from 1989 to 2007, 
compared to a 7 percentage point gain for middle-aged households and 
a 17 percentage point gain for elderly ones. Average pension wealth 
grew by 61 percent over this period, compared to an 87 percent gain for 
middle-aged ones and a 108 percent gain for the elderly. 
In general, as was discussed in Chapter 2, U.S. households saw 
marked improvements in both mean and median marketable net worth 
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over the period 1989–2007. However, mean private accumulations 
among all households grew slower than mean net worth, as did median 
private accumulations in comparison to median net worth. This pat-
tern also held for middle-aged and elderly households. Among young 
households, mean private accumulations also grew slower than mean 
net worth. However, both median net worth and median private accu-
mulations actually declined in absolute terms over these years. 
How did the transformation of the pension system affect overall 
wealth inequality? Even though inequality in the distribution of both 
DC wealth and DB wealth fell among households that held that form of 
pension wealth, overall pension wealth inequality among pension hold-
ers actually rose from 1989 to 2007. The switchover from DB to DC 
plans was the main reason behind the rise in pension wealth inequality. 
Despite the decline in both DC and DB wealth inequality, the higher 
level of DC pension inequality coupled with its rising share in total 
pension wealth was the main factor accounting for the rise in pension 
wealth inequality. 
Correspondingly, the pension transformation led to the increased 
inequality of private accumulations. First, it is of note that the Gini 
coefﬁcient for private accumulations is lower than that for net worth (a 
0.030-point difference among all households in 2001, for example). This 
difference is due to the smaller level of inequality in DB pensions than in 
net worth. Moreover, while the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth among all 
households increased by 0.002 from 1989 to 2007, that for private accu-
mulations increased more, by 0.012. In other words, the “inequality-
reducing” effect of DB pensions declined from 0.039 in 1989 to 0.029 
in 2007, largely because of the declining share of DB wealth in total 
private accumulations. This effect is most notable among middle-aged 
households, the group that was most subject to the transition of the pen-
sion system. Among them, the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth rose by 
0.033 from 1983 to 2007, while that for private accumulations surged 
by 0.070. Correspondingly, the difference in Gini coefﬁcients between 
net worth and private accumulations tumbled from 0.073 in 1983 to 
0.036 in 2007. Thus, the inequality of private accumulations rose much 
more than that of traditional net worth. 
These results also help unravel the “puzzle” noted at the end of 
Chapter 2 and at the beginning of this chapter, namely that while 
income inequality surged in the 1990s and 2000s, (traditional) net worth 
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inequality remained largely unchanged. We can see that if we expand 
the deﬁnition of net worth to include DB pension wealth, then there is a 
rise in wealth inequality during the 1990s and the 2000s. 
Notes 
1. This group also includes Roth IRAs and rollovers from pension accounts. 
2. An alternative data source often used in these studies is the Health and Retire-
ment Survey (HRS). This data source has an advantage over the SCF in that it has 
relatively complete data on earnings histories and has employer-provided infor-
mation on individual DB pension plans of each employee covered by these plans. 
However, the SCF has three advantages over the HRS. First, the SCF provides 
much better data on the assets and liabilities that constitute marketable net worth. 
Second, the SCF data date from 1983, whereas the HRS data start in 1992. Since 
the transformation of the pension system dates from the late 1980s, the SCF data 
allow us to better track this change over the transition period. Third, the age cover-
age of the HRS is limited, whereas the SCF covers the whole population. This is 
important since young households were particularly hurt by the pension transfor-
mation, and these households are not covered in the HRS. 
3. As I discuss in Appendix B, even though estimates of both DB pension and Social 
Security wealth are provided in the 1983 SCF, I reestimate the values of both to be 
consistent with later years. 
4. I use age 109 somewhat arbitrarily as the last possible year of living. Moreover, 
the difference between the two formulas is that in the ﬁrst the nominal discount 
rate δ is used whereas in the latter the real discount rate δ* is used. 
5. The results using the 3 percent real discount rate are not shown in this volume 
because reporting these results would vastly increase the number of tables in the 
book. Another crucial choice is the selection of which mortality rates to use in the 
calculation of DB and Social Security wealth. I have used here the standard ones 
from the Statistical Abstract of the United States based on age, gender, and race. 
However, there are also available unofﬁcial life expectancy estimates for individu-
als by age, gender, and income class (and even by educational attainment). As is 
well known, higher-income (and more-educated) individuals live longer on aver-
age than lower-income (or less-educated) ones. The use of mortality rates condi-
tional on income (or education) will have the effect of increasing estimates of DB 
pension wealth and Social Security wealth of higher-income (and better-educated) 
individuals relative to lower-income (and less-educated) individuals. 
6. Technically speaking, the mortality rate mt associated with the year of retirement 
is the probability of surviving from the current age to the age of retirement. 
7. A couple of studies have looked at the reliability of employee-provided estimates 
of pension wealth by comparing self-reported pension beneﬁts with estimates 
based on provider data. Using data from the 1992 wave of the HRS, Gustman 
and Steinmeier (1999) and Johnson, Sambamoorthi, and Crystal (2000) ﬁ nd that 
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individual reports of pension beneﬁts tend to differ from those based on provider 
information. However, the latter also calculate that the median values of DB plans 
from the two sources were quite close (about a 6 percent difference). As a result, 
for average values of pension wealth, employee-provided estimates of expected 
pension wealth seem to be fairly reliable. 
It should also be noted that my deﬁnition of DB wealth is based on a so-
called ongoing concern treatment. It is assumed in this that employees continue 
to work at their place of employment until their expected date of retirement (this 
is also true for Social Security wealth). The alternative is to use the accrual value 
in which DB wealth (and Social Security wealth) is valued as of the current year 
on the basis of work experience up to that date only. I elect the ongoing concern 
method because it is consistent with my calculations of retirement adequacy in 
Chapter 7. The accrual method will produce lower values of both DB and Social 
Security wealth. Indeed, the accrual method and the ongoing concern treatment 
represent two extremes in the valuation of both DB and Social Security wealth. 
The latter treatment in particular relies on the assumptions that the ﬁrm or organi-
zation remains in existence over time and the employee continues working at the 
enterprise. 
8. Separate imputations are performed for husband and wife and an adjustment in the
Social Security beneﬁt is made for the surviving spouse. See Appendix B for details. 
9. As with pension wealth, the mortality rate mt associated with the year of retire-
ment is the probability of surviving from the current age to the age of retirement. 
10. Though I can approximate the number of years of full- and part-time work for a 
given worker, I cannot determine when in his or her work history periods of non-
employment occurred. 
11. As explained in Note 5, I have opted for the ongoing concern method rather than 
the accrual method. In the latter method, it is assumed that the worker stops work-
ing as of the year of the survey—say, 2007. One can then compute the expected DB 
pension entitlements as of 2007. One can also make such a calculation for Social 
Security wealth. I choose the ongoing concern method because this approach is 
consistent with my later estimates of retirement adequacy (see Chapter 7). 
12. I do not include future employee contributions to DC plans (which I will later call 
DCEMPW) here, since this represents additional savings by the employee in the 
same vein as investments in other assets like housing, stocks, and bonds. In Chap-
ter 7, however, when I treat retirement adequacy, I include the value of DCEMPW
in projections of future retirement income. Likewise, I do not provide for a full 
projection of total wealth accumulation over time. This process would require a 
household microsimulation model, such as the MINT model, which the Urban 
Institute and the Social Security Administration use (see, for example, Smith, 
Toder, and Iams [2001]). However, in Chapter 7 I do provide for a simple projec-
tion of nonpension wealth to date of retirement. 
This approach also avoids the difﬁculty of determining whether or not DC 
contributions add to net savings over time. As discussed in Chapter 3, the evidence 
is rather mixed, with Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001) concluding that the growth 
of IRAs and 401(k) plans do not substitute for other forms of household wealth, 
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and Engen and Gale (2000) ﬁnding that DC plans do not add to net savings but 
rather substitute for other forms of savings. Moreover, it is also possible that par-
ticipation in a DB plan might reduce future savings (see, for example, Munnell 
[1996] and Kennickell and Sundén [1999]). 
Although the addition of DCEMP to DC wealth makes DC wealth more com-
parable to DB wealth, some differences still remain between the two. In particular, 
there is greater risk associated with DC wealth. The beneﬁt levels in DB plans are 
already set by the terms of the plans—that is why these are called deﬁ ned beneﬁts. 
Deﬁned beneﬁt wealth depends only on future labor force participation in the 
company and future earnings. The establishment of the Pension Beneﬁt Guar-
anty Corporation in 1974 does, at least, insure the pension beneﬁts (up to a ﬁxed 
amount) in the event of the bankruptcy of a company. In comparison, DC wealth 
depends not only on future labor force participation and future earnings but also 
on future employee contributions, future employer contributions, and future rates 
of return. Indeed, the stock market experience of the 2000–2003 and 2007–2009 
periods shows how difﬁcult it would have been to project the future value of DC 
wealth even over these short periods. The beneﬁts from DB plans are more certain 
than DC beneﬁts. Indeed, the shifting of the risk from employer to employee is 
one of the reasons behind the rise of DC plans (see Wolff [2007c] for a discussion 
of this issue). 
13. The SCF records DC plans only for the main job of each respondent. No informa-
tion on DC plans is provided for secondary employment. This does not appear to be 
a signiﬁcant problem because in 2001, 99.4 percent of the total labor earnings of the 
head and 98.8 percent of that of the spouse came from the person’s primary job. 
14. This will, if anything, bias upward the estimated employer contribution to the DC 
pension plan. 
15. It should be noted that past employer contributions to DC plans are already 
included in the current market value of DC wealth. 
16. Because of differences in methodology, it is not possible to include 1983 in this 
and the next three tables. 
17. Part-time, temporary, and teenage workers are included in this tabulation. DC cov-
erage is deﬁned to include only workers with a positive balance in a DC plan and 
therefore excludes workers who are covered by a 401(k) plan but do not partici-
pate in such a plan, as well as people who have a pension account but do not con-
tribute to that account. The 62 percent ﬁgure for men might seem high compared 
to previous estimates (see Chapter 3, for example, as well as Note 19, below) but 
this seemingly high estimate is explained by the fact that my ﬁgure includes indi-
viduals with an IRA or Keogh plan and individuals with a DB plan from a past job. 
18. This means that the employee had worked long enough to become vested. By law, 
such entitlements remain in effect even after the employee leaves a company. 
19. Munnell and Quinby (2009) also ﬁnd a decline in the share of workers who partic-
ipated in pension plans. They use the CPS as their data source, and the years cov-
ered were 1979 and 2008. Their sample consisted of workers aged 25–64. They 
report that in 2008, 42 percent of male workers and 39 percent of female workers 
participated in a pension plan. These ﬁgures are quite a bit lower than my calcula-
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tions for 2007 (62 and 60 percent for male and female workers, respectively). The 
differences in results are attributable to different deﬁnitions of pension coverage. 
Munnell and Quinby include in their pension coverage estimates only workers 
who are covered in a plan by their current employers, while my ﬁ gures include 
DB pension entitlements from past jobs, as well as IRA and Keogh holdings. They 
ﬁnd that the coverage rate for male workers declined from 56 percent in 1979 to 
42 percent in 2008, while for female workers the rate actually increased from 36 
to 39 percent. These results are consistent with my ﬁndings reported here. As a 
consequence, Munnell and Quinby ﬁnd that the coverage gap between male and 
female workers fell from 20 percentage points in 1979 to only 3 percentage points 
in 2008, results also similar to mine. They note that among full-time, full-year 
workers in 2008, women actually had a slightly higher level of pension coverage 
than men. 
Also, see Sanzenbacher (2006) for an illuminating comparison of different 
estimates of pension coverage from the CPS, SCF, SIPP, and the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics. 
Purcell (2009a), also using CPS data, ﬁnds a slight decline in the overall share 
of workers who participated in employer-sponsored retirement plans between 
2007 and 2009, from 52.0 to 51.1 percent. He also reports that the share of work-
ers whose employer sponsored a retirement plan also fell slightly, from 59.9 to 
59.0 percent. Purcell found that year-round, full-time female workers had reached 
virtual parity with their male counterparts, with pension coverage rates of 51.0 and 
51.2 percent, respectively. This is very similar to my results on gender differences. 
20. I combine the two age groups since differences between younger and older work-
ers are very similar within each demographic grouping, as they are among all 
workers (see Appendix Tables B.1–B.3 for details by age group). 
A breakdown of pension wealth by demographic characteristic is also shown 
for households in Chapter 6. 
21. Several studies have examined racial differences in pension coverage. Mok and 
Siddique (2009) also report a substantial gap in pension coverage between African 
Americans and whites on the basis of data from the CPS and the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) over the period 1997–2008. On average they ﬁnd 
that 75 percent of white male workers had a pension plan compared to 68 percent 
of black male workers. However, the racial gap was reversed among females, as 
77 percent of black female workers had a pension plan compared to 75 percent of 
white female workers. 
Munnell and Sullivan (2009) also ﬁnd racial and ethnic gaps in the share of 
workers with a 401(k) plan. Using the 2001, 2004, and 2007 SCF, they calculate 
that 57 percent of white workers were eligible for a 401(k) plan on average over 
these years, compared to 55 percent of black workers and only 37 percent of His-
panic workers. The take-up rate was also higher among white workers. On aver-
age, 78 percent of white workers eligible for a 401(k) plan elected to participate, 
compared to 70 percent of black workers and 70 percent of Hispanic workers. 
However, because of differences in deﬁnitions of pension coverage, it is not pos-
sible to provide a direct comparison between these two sets of results and mine. 
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Purcell (2009a) also ﬁnds that white workers had higher coverage rates than 
minority workers. In 2008, the pension coverage rate for employer-sponsored 
retirement plans was 57 percent for non-Hispanic whites, 46 percent for non-
Hispanic blacks, and 30 percent for Hispanic workers. These results are similar to 
mine. 
22. GED refers to the General Educational Development test, given in lieu of a high 
school degree. 
23. The industries are grouped into four categories: 1) agriculture, mining, and manu-
facturing; 2) wholesale and retail trade; 3) communications, information services, 
ﬁnance, insurance, real estate, repair services, transportation, utilities, profes-
sional services, and personal services; and 4) public administration. The classiﬁ-
cation scheme is dictated by the industry groupings provided in the SCF data. 
24. The question of hours worked in the 2007 SCF is: How many hours (do you/does 
[he/she]) work on (your/her/his) main job in a normal week? 
25. This can be traced to the high share of part-time workers with an IRA or Keogh 
account. 
26. In the case of married couples, the husband’s and wife’s earnings are treated as 
separate earnings. 
27. The very high DB coverage rate for women in the top quintile in 1989 can be 
traced to the high concentration of government employees in this group. 
28. One similar analysis was conducted by Karamcheva and Sanzenbacher (2010) 
on the basis of CPS data over the period 1979–2008. They divide the earnings 
distribution into three equal tiers for private sector male workers in the age group 
25–64. They ﬁnd that on average over this period only about one-third of work-
ers in the bottom third worked for an employer that sponsored a pension plan, in 
comparison with over 70 percent of the top third. Moreover, while the pension 
participation rate of the top third was near 100 percent and constant over time, 
that of the middle third fell from 94 to 86 percent over this period and that of the 
bottom third from 85 to 69 percent. As a result, the overall share of workers in the 
top third who participated in a pension plan averaged about 70 percent over the 
period and remained fairly constant, while the overall share in the middle third 
averaged about 60 percent and fell by 22 percent over the period, and that of the 
bottom third averaged about 30 percent and fell 29 percent. Purcell (2009a) like-
wise reports on the basis of CPS data that only 28 percent of workers in the lowest 
quartile in terms of annual earnings in 2008 participated in a retirement plan at 
work, compared to 69 percent of workers in the top quartile. 
I also report large differentials in pension coverage between the bottom, 
middle, and top earnings quintile of male workers under the age of 65. More-
over, I ﬁnd that pension coverage had slipped among the bottom and middle earn-
ings quintiles from 1989 to 2007 but had remained roughly constant for the top 
quintile. However, it is not possible to directly compare actual estimates between 
my work and the two studies cited above, since the deﬁnition of pension cover-
age differs between the three studies. For example, I include past DB pension in 
my deﬁnition of coverage, whereas Karamcheva and Sanzenbacher do not. This 
makes my estimate of DB coverage rates higher than those of Karamcheva and 
Sanzenbacher. 
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29. This result is in accordance with media accounts of a large divide in the value of 
401(k) plans between executives and staff workers in large corporations (see, for 
example, Leonhardt [2002]). 
30. This relationship can perhaps be seen most clearly by a decomposition of the coef-
ﬁcient of variation. As derived in Wolff (1987b), for any variable X = X1 + X2 , 
CV 2(X) = p12CV 2(X1)+ p22CV 2(X2) + 2CC(X1,X2), 
where CV is the coefﬁcient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the 
mean), CC is the coefﬁcient of covariation, deﬁned as the ratio of the covariance 
to X 2, p1= X1/X, and p2 = X2/X. The interaction term principally reﬂects the cor-
relation coefﬁcient between DC and DB wealth. The correlation coefﬁ cient also 
rose over time (from 0.07 in 1989 to 0.24 in 2007 among all households). The 
rising interaction term as a result also made a positive contribution to the growth 
in overall pension wealth inequality. 
31. The Gini coefﬁcient for PW among all households was 0.799 in 1989 and 0.783 
in 2007, while that for PW among middle-aged households was about 0.715 in the 
two years. 
32. When I exclude DC wealth to obtain nonpension net worth, I ﬁnd that mean non-
pension wealth rose by a lesser amount from 1989 to 2007, 54 percent, while 
median nonpension net worth was up by only 6 percent. It is at once clear how 
important DC plans were to the growth of net worth. This is not to say, of course, 
that households would not have accumulated wealth in alternative instruments in 
the absence of the existence of DC plans. However, the accumulations were likely 
to have been less for two reasons. First, savings in DC plans are tax-sheltered, 
which means that they accumulate at a higher rate in DC plans, ceteris paribus, 
than in taxable investments. Second, the value of employer-provided DC plans, 
like the 401(k), also incorporates the contributions made by employers. Employer 
contributions would not likely have occurred in alternative investments. A com-
parison of trends in net worth with those in NWX suggests that households sub-
stituted savings in 401(k) and other DC plans for other forms of private savings. 
This result is more in accord with the arguments of Gale (1995) and Engen and 
Gale (2000) than Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001). (See Chapter 3 for a review of 
the pertinent literature). 
33. The use of a higher (lower) discount rate in the calculation of DB pension wealth 
would have lowered (raised) the value of DB pension wealth and consequently 
increased (decreased) the measured inequality of private accumulations. Cor-
respondingly, the use of a higher (lower) discount rate would have led to a lower 
(higher) increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for private accumulations between 1989 
(or 1983) and 2007. 
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Stagnation of Retirement 
Wealth in the 2000s 
One of the main topics to be addressed in this book is retirement 
adequacy. A full picture of retirement resources would not be complete 
without a consideration of expected Social Security beneﬁts and Social 
Security wealth (SSW). This chapter ﬁlls in that gap. 
We pick up the story from Chapter 4 by focusing on SSW, retire-
ment wealth in general, and augmented wealth. As discussed in Chapter 
1, over the last three decades traditional DB pension plans were largely 
replaced with DC pensions. We focused on two major issues in the pre-
vious chapter. First, has this transformation been beneﬁcial to most U.S. 
households? Second, has it led to a rise or a decline in inequality? 
I ﬁnd that mean augmented wealth (the sum of net worth, pension 
and SSW), after rising dramatically during the 1990s, showed much 
smaller gains in the new century. Moreover, median augmented wealth 
by age group was generally stagnant over the years 2001 to 2007. Fur-
thermore, the inequality of augmented wealth showed an increase from 
1989 to 2007, while the inequality of net worth remained unchanged. 
The next section of the chapter looks at time trends in SSW on the 
household level from 1983 to 2007. I then present summary measures 
on total (augmented) household wealth. After that, alternative pen-
sion wealth calculations are treated, followed by an update on pension 
wealth and augmented wealth to July 1, 2009, on the basis of changes 
in the stock market. The ﬁnal section provides a summary and conclud-
ing remarks. 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND TOTAL RETIREMENT WEALTH 
I ﬁrst look at how SSW compares to pension wealth. Is it greater or 
smaller than pension wealth—and, correspondingly, is it a more or less 
131 
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important source of retirement income than pension wealth? Has SSW
grown faster or slower than pension wealth? 
Social Security wealth among all households averaged $165,300 
in 2001 (see Table 5.1); this compared to an average pension wealth of 
$138,000. Thus, even as of 2007, SSW was a more important retirement 
asset than pension wealth. Median SSW in 2007 was $139,300—close 
to that of mean SSW—and eight times greater than median pension 
wealth.1 The fact that mean and median SSW were so close was due 
to a normal or nearly normal distribution of SSW. Mean SSW among 
middle-aged households was 26 percent greater than that among elderly 
households, and median SSW 39 percent larger. The greater SSW
among middle-aged relative to elderly households largely reﬂ ected the 
higher lifetime earnings of the former. Mean and median SSW among 
young households was about 40 percent lower than among age group 
47–64. This discrepancy was mainly due to the greater discount factor 
applied to future Social Security beneﬁts among young earners (from 
the larger number of years left before retirement). 
During the 1980s, SSW gained less than pension wealth. Mean 
SSW among all households rose by 46 percent between 1989 and 2001, 
in comparison to an 80 percent gain in mean pension wealth, the sum 
of DB and DC wealth. Mean SSW gained 56 percent among middle-
aged households, 38 percent among young households, and 35 percent 
among elderly households. The increase in median SSW was very close 
to that of mean SSW—a reﬂection of both the low degree of inequality 
in SSW and the relative constancy in SSW inequality over time.2 The 
rise in SSW over these years reﬂected primarily increasing real wages, 
particularly in the late 1990s, and rising longevity. This was offset, in 
part, by the increase in the age (65 to 67) at which full Social Security 
beneﬁts were received for persons born after 1938 and the rising share 
of minorities in the labor force, whose life expectancy is shorter than 
that of whites. 
In contrast to the 1990s, the years 2001–2007 witnessed almost no 
growth in SSW. Indeed, mean and median SSW fell slightly among 
young, middle-aged, and elderly households. This turnaround was 
largely attributable to the wage stagnation of this decade, as well as to 
the increasing age at which full Social Security beneﬁts were received. 
Another factor was the increasing share of minorities in the workforce. 
Additional factors were the higher unemployment rates of the 2000s 
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Table 5.1  Mean and Median Retirement Wealth, 1983–2007 (in thousands, 
2007$) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Mean pension wealth — 67.1 120.8 138.0 
Mean Social Security wealth — 111.9 163.3 165.3 
Mean retirement wealth — 179.0 284.1 303.3 
Median pension wealth — 5.6 17.6 19.0 
Median Social Security wealth — 100.5 141.3 139.1 
Median retirement wealth — 126.0 184.5 187.6 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean pension wealth — 34.3 53.4 55.3 
Mean Social Security wealth — 92.9 128.5 125.7 
Mean retirement wealth — 127.2 181.9 181.0 
Median pension wealth — 0.8 4.7 1.8 
Median Social Security wealth — 87.7 119.9 112.5 
Median retirement wealth — 100.4 136.4 130.5 
Aged 47–64 
Mean pension wealth 99.8 120.7 211.9 225.3 
Mean Social Security wealth 158.5 138.4 216.0 215.7 
Mean retirement wealth 257.8 259.1 427.9 440.9 
Median pension wealth 46.8 37.4 69.1 75.4 
Median Social Security wealth 149.1 138.1 206.4 195.8 
Median retirement wealth 205.7 189.5 298.3 301.9 
Aged 65 and over 
Mean pension wealth 75.7 84.7 151.9 175.8 
Mean Social Security wealth 140.0 127.6 171.7 169.6 
Mean retirement wealth 215.6 212.3 323.6 345.4 
Median pension wealth 43.0 5.7 35.1 47.4 
Median Social Security wealth 129.1 105.9 148.6 132.6 
Median retirement wealth 184.4 153.6 218.8 211.8 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Computations are for all households in the group. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned 
contribution + deﬁ ned beneﬁt. Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security 
wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
Wolff.indb 134  11/21/2011 9:18:16 AM   
 
 
  
  
134 Wolff 
compared to the 1990s and the drop in the median retirement age com-
pared to the 1990s. Both of these led to fewer years of employed work 
life. Moreover, though longevity increased over this period, the rate of 
increase slowed down relative to the 1990s. Pension wealth also grew 
slowly during the 2000s but faster than SSW. 
The inequality of SSW was much lower than that of pension wealth 
(or even net worth). As shown in Table 5.2, in 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient 
for SSW among all households was 0.36, compared to 0.78 for pen-
sion wealth (and 0.83 for net worth).3 The inequality of SSW among 
all households fell slightly, by 0.007 Gini points, over the 1989–2007 
period. The inequality of SSW also fell slightly among middle-aged 
households but rose modestly among young households. Among the 
elderly, there was a substantial drop in the inequality of SSW, reﬂecting 
primarily an increase in Social Security coverage over these years.4 
Table 5.2  Inequality of Retirement Wealth, 1983–2007 (Gini coefﬁcients) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Pension wealth — 0.799 0.788 0.783 
Social Security wealth — 0.370 0.344 0.363 
Retirement wealth — 0.485 0.493 0.514 
Aged 46 and under 
Pension wealth — 0.810 0.801 0.810 
Social Security wealth — 0.306 0.320 0.327 
Retirement wealth — 0.405 0.430 0.440 
Aged 47–64 
Pension wealth 0.666 0.715 0.724 0.716 
Social Security wealth 0.297 0.314 0.297 0.305 
Retirement wealth 0.378 0.454 0.464 0.470 
Aged 65+ 
Pension wealth 0.638 0.796 0.754 0.755 
Social Security wealth 0.412 0.463 0.356 0.415 
Retirement wealth 0.378 0.529 0.486 0.535 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt wealth. Retirement 
wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth. — = data not available. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Another look at the change in the distribution of SSW is provided 
in Figures 5.1a–5.1d. Among all households there was strong growth 
in SSW at all percentiles over the 1989–2001 period (see Figure 
5.1a). Moreover, in contrast to the U-shaped pattern of pension wealth 
growth, the largest gains were made by the lowest percentiles, resulting 
in a decline in the Gini coefﬁcient. The pattern was different over the 
2001–2007 period, during which percentage gains in SSW were nega-
tive at lower percentiles and positive at higher percentiles, and the Gini 
coefﬁcient rose as well. 
Among younger households, the percentage gains in SSW were 
all positive but U-shaped over the 1989–2001 period, corresponding 
to a slight rise in SSW inequality (Figure 5.1b). Over the 2001–2007 
period, there were generally small losses in SSW across the board and 
a very slight rise in inequality. The pattern among middle-aged house-
holds was very similar to that among all households (Figure 5.1c). Over 
the 1989–2001 period, percentage gains were positive at all percentiles 
but higher at the lower ones, and the Gini coefﬁcient declined. Over 
the years 2001–2007, the pattern was one of very small changes, both 
positive and negative, over the percentiles, and inequality remained 
fairly constant. In contrast, among elderly households (Figure 5.1d), 
changes in SSW were all positive but much greater at the bottom end, 
and inequality fell as well. During the second period, changes in SSW
were negative at the bottom and positive at the top, and the Gini coef-
ﬁcient for SSW rose as well. 
When we put together DC pensions, DB pension wealth, and SSW, 
how has total retirement wealth changed over time? Among all house-
holds, mean retirement wealth grew by 59 percent from 1989 to 2001 
(see Table 5.1). The percentage gain was, not surprisingly, lower than 
that of pension wealth but higher than that of SSW. Moreover, mean 
retirement wealth was up strongly among each of the three age groups 
over these years—43 percent among young households, 65 percent 
among middle-aged ones, and 52 percent among the elderly. Median 
retirement wealth also climbed sharply—46 percent among all house-
holds, 36 percent among young households, 58 percent among middle-
aged ones, and 43 percent among the elderly. 
In contrast, from 2001 to 2007 mean retirement wealth was up by 
only 7 percent among all households. This ﬁgure was once again about 
midway between the growth in pension wealth and that of SSW. By age 
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Figure 5.1a  Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, All Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 5.1b  Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 46 and under, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 5.1c  Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 5.1d  Percentage Change in Social Security Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 65 and over, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
?20 
?40 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
ha
ng
e 
Wolff.indb 138  11/21/2011 9:18:21 AM   
 
 
 
 
  
138 Wolff 
group, mean retirement wealth was down by 1 percent among young 
households, up by a very modest 3 percent among middle-aged ones, 
and up 7 percent for the elderly. Median retirement wealth was basi-
cally unchanged among all households, down 4 percent among young 
ones, unchanged among middle-aged ones, and down 3 percent among 
the elderly. 
In the last chapter we saw a very high level of pension wealth 
inequality. However, SSW exerted a moderating inﬂuence so that the 
inequality of retirement wealth was substantially lower. In fact, the 
inequality of retirement wealth, not surprisingly, lay between that of 
pension and SSW (Table 5.2). In 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient for retire-
ment wealth among all households was 0.51, compared to 0.36 for SSW
and 0.78 for pension wealth. 
The inequality of retirement wealth increased by 0.029 Gini points 
from 1989 to 2007 among all households, despite a reduction in the 
inequality of both pension wealth and SSW. There are two reasons. 
First, the share of pension wealth in total retirement wealth rose over 
the period (from 37 to 45 percent). Since pension wealth was more 
unequally distributed than SSW, this change had the effect of raising 
the inequality of retirement wealth (the sum of the two components). 
Second, the correlation between the two rose substantially over these 
years (from 0.26 to 0.38). In other words, households with large pen-
sion wealth holdings tended to have increasing levels of SSW over 
time, thus leading to greater skewness in the distribution of retirement 
wealth.5 
Among young households, the Gini coefﬁcient for retirement 
wealth rose by 0.034 Gini points, largely because of the rising inequal-
ity of SSW. Among middle-aged households, the Gini coefﬁcient was 
up by 0.017 points, despite little change in the inequality of both pen-
sion and SSW. In this case, the main reason is the rising share of pension 
wealth in total retirement wealth over the period. Among the elderly, the 
inequality of retirement wealth remained virtually unchanged, despite 
drops in the inequality of both pension wealth and SSW. The explana-
tion in this case is a sharp rise in the correlation between these two 
components. 
Figures 5.2a–5.2d give a clearer picture of changes in the distribu-
tion of retirement wealth by subperiod, covering 1989–2001 and 2001– 
2007. Among all households (Figure 5.2a), percentage gains in retire-
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ment wealth were all positive over the 1989–2001 period and formed 
a U-shaped pattern. The strong growth in retirement wealth among the 
lowest percentiles reﬂected the large increases in SSW at the bottom, 
while the sharp gains among the top percentiles were due to the sub-
stantial gains of pension wealth at the top (primarily DC wealth). The 
decline in the middle was a reﬂection of the losses in pension wealth in 
this part of the distribution. There was a modest gain in inequality over 
these years as well. However, from 2001 to 2007, changes in retire-
ment wealth were much smaller. They were also negative up to the 40th 
percentile or so and then generally positive above that. These changes 
reﬂected declines in SSW in the bottom percentiles and increases of 
pension wealth in the middle and upper percentiles. This period, not 
surprisingly, was characterized by an increase in the Gini coefﬁ cient for 
retirement wealth. 
Similar patterns are evident among the younger, middle-aged, and 
elderly age groups. Among the former (Figure 5.2b), the gains in retire-
ment wealth were all positive over the 1989–2001 period, and the pat-
tern of gains was again U-shaped, bottoming out at the 60th percentile. 
Over the later period, changes in retirement wealth were again nega-
tive at the bottom (up to the 70th percentile) and then positive. The 
pattern of percentage gains was also U-shaped among middle-aged 
households over the ﬁrst period (Figure 5.2c). Over the second period, 
retirement wealth recorded losses in the bottom percentiles (up to the 
40th) and then generally positive gains after that. Among the elderly 
(Figure 5.2d), the percentage changes in retirement wealth were once 
again all positive and formed a U-shaped pattern for the 1989–2001 
period, bottoming out at the 65th percentile. In contrast, from 2001 to 
2007, retirement wealth declined at the lower percentiles (up through 
the 55th percentile) and rose at the upper ones. Percentage gains were 
almost directly related to percentile level, rising from −17 percent at the 
10th percentile to 22 percent at the 99th percentile. This pattern almost 
directly mirrored changes in SSW among the elderly over the period. 
Another perspective is afforded by Figure 5.3, which shows changes 
in retirement wealth by nonpension net worth percentile among all 
households in 1989, 2001, and 2007. It is apparent that there is a strong 
correlation between nonpension net worth and retirement wealth. In 
2007, retirement wealth ranged from a low of $184,000 for the bot-
tom vintile (the bottom 5 percent) to $940,000 for the top vintile—a 
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Figure 5.2a  Percentage Change in Retirement Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, All Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (2007$) 
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Figure 5.2b  Percentage Change in Retirement Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 46 and Under, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 5.2c  Percentage Change in Retirement Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 5.2d  Percentage Change in Retirement Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 65 and Over, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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SOURCE: Author’s computation from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Figure 5.3  Percentage Growth of Retirement Wealth in 2007$, All 
Households, by Nonpension Wealth Vintile, 1989, 2001, 
 and 2007 
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ﬁvefold difference. It also appears that the correlation became stronger 
over time between 1989 and 2001 and then weakened from 2001 to 
2007. And, it is evident that between 1989 and 2001 retirement wealth 
displayed positive gains for all vintiles, though the pattern was a bit 
uneven. From 2001 to 2007, there was a mixture of positive and nega-
tive changes in retirement wealth by nonpension net worth vintile, and 
once again no clear pattern emerged. These results will be useful when 
we consider changes in the inequality of augmented wealth. 
AUGMENTED WEALTH 
I now turn to an appraisal of what happened to augmented wealth, 
the sum of net worth, pension wealth, and SSW. Augmented wealth is 
the most comprehensive measure of the full set of resources available 
for retirement, and so its change over time is of interest when consider-
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ing trends in retirement adequacy. I ﬁnd that whereas there was rapid 
growth in augmented wealth during the 1990s, a marked slowdown 
occurred during the 2000s. Indeed, median augmented wealth barely 
moved at all for the older age groups and actually fell in absolute terms 
among young households. 
I noted above that mean net worth among all households rose by 44 
percent between 1989 and 2001, while median net worth increased by 
16 percent (see Table 5.3 as well). If DB pension wealth is now added 
in, then the mean value of private accumulations was up by 37 percent 
and its median value by 4 percent. Finally, if SSW is now included, then 
the mean value of augmented wealth rose by 39 percent and its median 
Table 5.3  Augmented Wealth, 1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Mean net worth 270.4 309.8 445.1 536.1 
Mean augmented wealth — 478.0 666.5 762.8 
Median net worth 69.5 74.3 86.1 102.5 
Median augmented wealth — 225.0 277.5 309.2 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean net worth 128.1 171.2 205.0 209.9 
Mean augmented wealth — 289.2 353.8 360.2 
Median net worth 30.8 27.8 24.2 21.8 
Median augmented wealth — 140.5 165.3 155.8 
Aged 47–64 
Mean net worth 436.8 477.0 700.5 803.2 
Mean augmented wealth 684.3 715.7 1,015.3 1,110.3 
Median net worth 126.8 156.0 161.1 206.5 
Median augmented wealth 364.6 373.2 475.4 485.4 
Aged 65+ 
Mean net worth 436.3 454.1 652.8 809.1 
Mean augmented wealth 645.9 664.0 913.7 1,070.0 
Median net worth 119.3 128.1 176.5 211.1 
Median augmented wealth 342.3 310.7 426.5 435.5 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + pension wealth + Social Security 
wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
Wolff.indb 144  11/21/2011 9:18:27 AM   
 
 
 
  
144 Wolff 
value by 23 percent. The rapid growth of SSW over the 1990s made 
up, in part, for the slower growth of pension wealth in the middle of 
the distribution, thus explaining the more rapid increase in augmented 
wealth than in private accumulations. 
Patterns vary by age group. Among young households, mean aug-
mented wealth increased by 22 percent, compared to a 20 percent rise in 
net worth, and median augmented wealth rose by 18 percent, compared 
to a 13 percent drop in net worth. Among middle-aged households, 
mean augmented wealth grew by 42 percent, compared to a 47 percent 
increase in net worth, and median augmented wealth gained 27 percent, 
compared to a 3 percent rise in net worth. The elderly experienced a 
38 percent gain in mean augmented wealth, compared to a 44 percent 
growth in mean net worth, and median augmented wealth advanced by 
37 percent, about the same as the 38 percent gain in median net worth. 
The years 2001–2007 again look different. The growth in mean aug-
mented wealth slowed down, registering a 14 percent gain among all 
households compared to a 39 percent increase in 1989–2001. Median 
augmented wealth advanced by only 11 percent, in comparison to a 23 
percent rise in 1989–2001. Evidence of the slowdown in the growth of 
augmented wealth is evident for each of the three age groups as well. 
Mean augmented wealth remained virtually unchanged, and median 
augmented wealth declined in absolute terms for young households in 
the 2001–2007 period, whereas both rose at about 20 percent during 
the 1990s. Mean augmented wealth grew by only 9 percent for middle-
aged households in the later period, whereas it increased by 42 per-
cent in the 1989–2001 period, and median augmented wealth showed 
almost no change in the 2000s, compared to a 27 percent growth in the 
1990s. For the elderly, mean augmented wealth advanced by 17 percent 
in the 2000s, compared to 38 percent in the 1990s, and median aug-
mented wealth remained virtually unchanged in the later period, though 
it gained 37 percent in the earlier period. 
We saw in the last chapter that adding DB wealth to net worth to 
create private accumulations resulted in a modest reduction in mea-
sured inequality. Here, it will become apparent that also including SSW
results in a fairly sizable decrease in measured inequality. 
In 2007 the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth among all households 
was 0.834. Adding DB wealth to net worth to obtain private accumula-
tions resulted in a 0.030 decline of the Gini coefﬁcient to 0.805. This 
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decrease in inequality was due to the relatively small level of inequal-
ity in DB wealth. In contrast, adding SSW to nonpension net worth 
caused an even more sizable reduction in the Gini coefﬁcient of 0.141 
points, from 0.834 to 0.693. This drop in inequality reﬂected both the 
much lower level of inequality in SSW than in marketable wealth, as 
well as its relatively low (though positive) correlation with net worth. 
Finally, adding both DB wealth and SSW to net worth produced only 
a very modest further diminution of the Gini coefﬁcient, to 0.684. As a 
consequence, it is apparent that the main equalizing effect of retirement 
wealth comes from Social Security, not private pensions. Results are 
very similar for the three individual age groups. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the inequality of net worth 
among all households was essentially unchanged over the years 1989– 
2007. In contrast, the inequality of augmented wealth showed a siz-
able increase over these years, rising by 0.021 Gini points (see Table 
5.4). This is tantamount to saying that the equalizing effect of retire-
ment wealth mitigated over the 1989–2007 period. While the addi-
tion of retirement wealth to net worth reduced the Gini coefﬁ cient by 
0.169 points in 1989, the difference was only 0.150 in 2007. Thus, the 
inequality-reducing effects of adding retirement wealth to net worth fell 
over the years 1989–2007.6 
Among young households, the inequality of both net worth and 
augmented wealth declined slightly from 1989 to 2007. Among middle-
aged households the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth increased by 0.020 
from 1989 to 2007, whereas that for augmented wealth advanced by 
0.031 points. Indeed, over the full 1983–2007 period, while the Gini 
coefﬁcient of net worth was up by 0.033 points, that for augmented 
wealth gained 0.076 points. Among the elderly, the inequality of net 
worth rose by a slight 0.006 Gini points and that of augmented wealth 
increased a little more, by 0.013 Gini points. In fact, from 1983 to 2007, 
the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth was almost unchanged, while that for 
augmented wealth climbed 0.066 points. Thus, for both middle-aged 
and elderly households, the same pattern ensued as that for all house-
holds, namely, that the inequality of augmented wealth rose more than 
that of net worth. 
Why did the inequality of augmented wealth increase while that 
of net worth remained unchanged from 1989 to 2007? The main rea-
son is that the inequality of retirement wealth increased. This was the 
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Table 5.4  Inequality of Augmented Wealth, 1983–2007 (Gini coefﬁcients) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Net worth 0.799 0.832 0.826 0.834 
Private accumulations — 0.793 0.796 0.805 
Nonpension wealth + Social — 0.676 0.665 0.693 
Security wealth 
Augmented wealth — 0.663 0.661 0.684 
Aged 46 and under 
Net worth 0.797 0.887 0.859 0.880 
Private accumulations — 0.851 0.830 0.850 
Nonpension wealth + Social — 0.650 0.612 0.636 
Security wealth 
Augmented wealth — 0.642 0.616 0.636 
Aged 47–64 
Net worth 0.761 0.775 0.798 0.795 
Private accumulations 0.688 0.721 0.756 0.758 
Nonpension wealth + Social 0.607 0.644 0.655 0.673 
Security wealth 
Augmented wealth 0.574 0.619 0.637 0.650 
Aged 65+ 
Net worth 0.778 0.778 0.762 0.784 
Private accumulations 0.708 0.738 0.724 0.748 
Nonpension wealth + Social 0.638 0.670 0.637 0.678 
Security wealth 
Augmented wealth 0.599 0.652 0.626 0.665 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of house-
hold. Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. Augmented 
wealth = nonpension wealth + pension wealth + Social Security wealth. — = data not 
available. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
case for all households except elderly households. A secondary reason 
is the increased correlation between nonpension wealth and retirement 
wealth (see Figure 5.3 and the pertinent discussion above). The correla-
tion coefﬁcient between the two advanced from 0.18 to 0.25 among all 
households and from 0.16 to 0.22 among middle-aged ones.7 
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 Figures 5.4a–5.4d give a graphical depiction of changes in the 
distribution of augmented wealth in 1989, 2001, and 2007. Among all 
households (Figure 5.4a), percentage changes in augmented wealth over 
the 1989–2001 period, like those of retirement wealth, were all positive 
and formed a U-shaped pattern, bottoming out at the 50th percentile. 
The pattern seems to mirror rather closely the pattern of percentage 
gains in retirement wealth. In contrast, from 2001 to 2007, changes in 
augmented wealth were negative at the bottom of the distribution (up 
through the 30th percentile) and generally positive above this. More-
over, percentage gains are positively correlated with the initial aug-
mented wealth level. These results are consistent with the ﬁ nding of 
little change in the inequality of augmented wealth from 1989 to 2001 
and an increase in inequality from 2001 to 2007. 
Among young households (Figure 5.4b), a similar pattern unfolded. 
Over the ﬁrst period, augmented wealth rose at all percentiles and there 
was a U-shaped pattern in percentage gains. Over the later period, 
changes in augmented wealth were uniformly negative up to the 60th 
percentile and then generally positive thereafter. The pattern of percent-
age gains was largely repeated among middle-aged households (Figure 
5.4c) in the earlier period. Over the second period, changes were almost 
all positive but the pattern was quite uneven. In contrast, among the 
elderly (Figure 5.4d), the percentage gains in augmented wealth were 
all positive in the ﬁrst period but tended to decline with percentile level. 
Over the second period, changes in augmented wealth were generally 
negative at the bottom part of the distribution (up to the 15th percentile) 
and then generally positive above. These results are consistent with the 
ﬁnding that the inequality of augmented wealth fell over the 1989–2001 
period and then rose over the 2001–2007 period. 
ALTERNATIVE PENSION WEALTH CALCULATIONS 
How robust are the ﬁndings reported in Chapters 4 and 5 to alterna-
tive measures of pension wealth? I consider two modiﬁcations to the 
deﬁnition of pension wealth here. First, as discussed in Chapter 4, I 
include DCEMP, an estimate of future employer contributions to DC 
pension plans in the deﬁnition of pension wealth (the sum of DCEMP
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Figure 5.4a  Percentage Change in Augmented Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, All Households, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 5.4b  Percentage Change in Augmented Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 46 and Under, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 5.4c  Percentage Change in Augmented Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 47–64, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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Figure 5.4d  Percentage Change in Augmented Wealth in 2007$ by 
Percentile, Aged 65 and Over, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
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SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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with another variable is noted with an asterisk, e.g., DC + DCEMP is 
shown as DC*). Second, as discussed below, DC accumulations are 
tax-deferred savings, and I consider how my estimates would change if 
I use a net (after-tax) measure of deﬁned contribution wealth. 
DC Employer Contributions to Deﬁned Contribution Pension Plans
How does the inclusion of employer contributions to DC plans 
affect time trends in augmented wealth AW* and its other compo-
nents? I ﬁrst consider how the inclusion of DCEMP affects the level 
of measured wealth. Recall from Chapter 4 that DCEMP is deﬁned as 
the present discounted value of future employer contributions to DC 
plans. In 2007, the average value of DCEMP among all households 
was $29,900, or 39 percent of mean DC. This represented a substantial 
addition to the value of DC wealth and, in earlier years, such as 2001, 
put total DC wealth at a value far greater than DB wealth. The addition 
of DCEMP in 2007 increased the mean value of pension wealth by 22 
percent, mean private accumulations by 5 percent, the mean value of 
retirement wealth by 10 percent, and mean augmented wealth by 4 per-
cent (see Table 5.5). Among younger households, the net effect of add-
ing DCEMP was much larger. It raised mean DC wealth by 122 percent 
(since DC accumulations among young workers are relatively small), 
mean pension wealth by 68 percent, mean private accumulations by 16 
percent, mean retirement wealth by 21 percent, and mean augmented 
wealth by 10 percent. Among age group 47–64, the effect of adding 
DCEMP to other components of retirement wealth was smaller, since 
DC accumulations among older workers were already relatively high. 
The inclusion of DCEMP enlarged mean DC wealth by 28 percent, 
mean pension wealth by 17 percent, mean private accumulations by 
4 percent, mean retirement wealth by 9 percent, and mean augmented 
wealth by only 3 percent. 
The inclusion of DCEMP actually has a larger effect on median 
values than on mean values. In 2007, adding DCEMP increased the 
median value of private accumulations by 17 percent, the median value 
of retirement wealth by 9 percent, and the median value of augmented 
wealth by 8 percent among all households; median private accumu-
lations by 65 percent, median retirement wealth by 12 percent, and 
median augmented wealth by 17 percent among younger households; 
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Table 5.5  Augmented Wealth, Including Employer Contributions to 
Deﬁned Contribution Plans, 1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Mean values 
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth* 6.4 29.4 97.1 106.7 
Pension wealth* — 86.0 155.1 167.9 
Private accumulations* — 384.3 537.5 627.4 
Retirement wealth* — 197.8 318.4 333.2 
Augmented wealth* — 496.2 700.8 792.7 
Median values 
Pension wealth* — 12.0 39.5 38.1 
Private accumulations* — 127.3 148.8 166.4 
Retirement wealth* — 133.9 208.5 205.4 
Augmented wealth* — 237.2 311.1 335.2 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean values 
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth* 6.0 38.4 80.9 68.1 
Pension wealth* — 63.5 101.2 92.7 
Private accumulations* — 224.0 273.2 271.8 
Retirement wealth* — 156.3 229.8 218.4 
Augmented wealth* — 316.9 401.7 397.6 
Median values 
Pension wealth* — 5.0 21.1 7.0 
Private accumulations* — 63.3 68.4 57.8 
Retirement wealth* — 111.0 155.8 146.0 
Augmented wealth* — 159.3 196.5 182.0 
Aged 47–64 
Mean values 
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth* 10.2 33.9 149.1 171.6 
Pension wealth* 100.3 134.3 248.0 263.0 
Private accumulations* 526.8 590.1 835.4 932.4 
Retirement wealth* 258.7 272.5 463.9 478.7 
Augmented wealth* 684.8 728.5 1,051.3 1,148.1 
(continued) 
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Table 5.5  (continued) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
Aged 47–64 
Median values 
Pension wealth* 46.8 48.5 91.3 98.2 
Private accumulations* 215.3 231.2 274.5 310.0 
Retirement wealth* 206.1 194.0 318.4 318.8 
Augmented wealth* 365.5 374.7 500.2 510.7 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Key: Pension wealth* = deﬁ ned beneﬁt + deﬁned contribution* = deﬁ ned beneﬁ t + 
deﬁned contribution + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution plans. Private 
accumulations* = nonpension wealth + pension wealth*. Retirement wealth* = pen-
sion wealth* + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth* = nonpension wealth + 
pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. — = data not available. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
and median private accumulations by 9 percent, median retirement 
wealth by 6 percent, and median augmented wealth by 5 percent among 
age group 47–64. 
How does the inclusion of employer contributions to DC plans 
affect the measured growth in the various components of wealth? In 
Chapters 4 and 5, we saw that there was a marked slowdown in the 
growth of pension wealth, private accumulations, retirement wealth, 
and augmented wealth between the 1990s (1989 to 2001) and the 2000s 
(2001 to 2007). This was the case for both mean and median values. 
Because the ratio of DCEMP to DC jumped from 0.38 in 1983 to 
1.79 in 1989 among all households (reﬂecting the initiation of many 
ﬁ rm-level deﬁned contribution plans), the growth of DC* wealth (the 
sum of DC wealth and DCEMP) over this period was much higher than 
that of DC wealth (361 percent versus 129 percent). However, after 
1989, DCEMP fell as a share of DC wealth to 0.55 in 2001 and then to 
0.39 in 2007, so that relative gains in mean DC* were lower than that of 
mean DC after 1989. As a consequence, we still ﬁnd sharp slowdowns in 
the growth of both mean and median pension wealth, private accumula-
tions, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth between the 1990s and 
the 2000s. In fact, the slowdowns are even greater when employer con-
tributions to DC plans are included in the deﬁnition of wealth. While, 
for example, median augmented wealth (without employer contribu-
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tions) gained 11 percent from 2001 to 2007, median AW* advanced by 
only 8 percent. 
The pattern is very similar for age group 47–64, though the dif-
ferences are somewhat smaller. DCEMP as a share of DC ﬁrst surged 
from 0.05 in 1983 to 0.66 in 1989 and then fell off to 0.28 in 2007. As 
a result, mean DC* grew much faster than mean DC from 1983 to 1989 
but the opposite was true after 1989, and the slowdown in percentage 
increase of both mean and median pension wealth, private accumula-
tions, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth between the 1990s and 
the 2000s became even greater. In fact, median RW* remained virtu-
ally unchanged over the later period and median AW* grew by only 2 
percent.8 
Three ﬁndings are particularly noteworthy. First, median AW* 
among all households had much lower gains in the 2001–2007 period 
in comparison to the 1989–2001 period. This remained true with or 
without the inclusion of employer contributions to DC plans. Second, 
among younger households, both mean and median PA* and AW* 
declined in absolute terms in the later period. Third, among age group 
47–64, median PA* showed almost no change over the 2001–2007 
period. Thus, the main results derived in Chapters 4 and 5 without the 
inclusion of DCEMP remain largely unaltered. 
The story is very similar when we consider trends in inequality (see 
Table 5.6). As we saw above, the inequality of both private accumula-
tions and augmented wealth advanced from 1989 to 2007, while that of 
traditional net worth remained largely unchanged. 
It is ﬁrst of interest that adding employer contributions, DCEMP, 
reduces overall pension wealth inequality (from a Gini coefﬁ cient of 
0.783 to 0.758 among all households in 2007). Results are similar by 
individual age groups. The reason is that DCEMP was distributed more 
equally than pension wealth (PW). The equalizing effect of DCEMP
on PW* was offset to a modest extent by the fact that the correlation 
of DCEMP and standard pension wealth was positive though quite low 
(0.21 among all households in 2007).9 Thus, the addition of DCEMP
to standard pension wealth tended to even out the distribution of PW* 
among households. Likewise, the inclusion of DCEMP lowered the 
inequality of private accumulations and augmented wealth. The rea-
sons are similar—a lower level of inequality of DCEMP than either net 
worth or augmented wealth, despite a positive though low correlation 
Wolff.indb 154  11/21/2011 9:18:36 AM   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
154 Wolff 
Table 5.6  Inequality of Augmented Wealth*, Including Employer
Contributions to Deﬁned Contribution Plans, 1983–2007 (Gini 
coefﬁcients) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Pension wealth* — 0.787 0.749 0.758 
Private accumulations* — 0.776 0.773 0.789 
Retirement wealth* — 0.502 0.498 0.521 
Augmented wealth* — 0.658 0.650 0.677 
Aged 46 and under 
Pension wealth* — 0.809 0.748 0.775 
Private accumulations* — 0.818 0.782 0.813 
Retirement wealth* — 0.471 0.470 0.479 
Augmented wealth* — 0.643 0.608 0.631 
Aged 47–64 
Pension wealth* 0.666 0.716 0.709 0.706 
Private accumulations* 0.688 0.715 0.746 0.750 
Retirement wealth* 0.379 0.466 0.473 0.483 
Augmented wealth* 0.574 0.618 0.633 0.647 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Key: Pension wealth* = deﬁ ned beneﬁt + deﬁned contribution* = deﬁ ned beneﬁ t + 
deﬁned contribution + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution plans. Private 
accumulations* = nonpension wealth + pension wealth*. Retirement wealth* = pen-
sion wealth* + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth* = nonpension wealth + 
pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
of DCEMP with net worth (0.11 in 2007 among all households) and of 
DCEMP with augmented wealth (0.12 among all households in 2007). 
Nonetheless, we still ﬁnd that the inequality of both PA* and AW* 
among all households advanced over the years from 1989 (or 1983) to 
2007, while that of net worth remained essentially unchanged. Among 
middle-aged households, we likewise ﬁnd that the inequality of PA* 
and AW* increased more than that of net worth.10 
Future Tax Liability on Pension Wealth 
I have so far applied a pretax valuation to pension wealth. However, 
as many of us are painfully aware, contributions to DC plans are tax 
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sheltered or tax-deferred when they are made but subject to income tax 
on withdrawal.11 Because of this, their posttax value is lower (usually 
quite a bit) than their stated (pretax) market value. In contrast, most 
other assets in the household portfolio, such as mutual funds, are not 
subject to income taxes on withdrawal. As a result, when we include 
the market value of DC plans as a part of net worth, we are adding an 
asset with an attached tax liability to other assets that do not have this 
liability. 
Thus, in principle, the posttax value of DC plans should be used 
when computing net worth. Likewise, DB pension beneﬁts (and lump-
sum distributions) are taxable on receipt, so that, in principle, the post-
tax value of DB pension wealth should also be used instead of its pretax 
value when computing total pension wealth.12 
I make a somewhat rough adjustment to the values of DB and DC 
pension wealth for future taxes on income receipt. In principle, to make 
a proper calculation we would have to predict future income (and its 
composition), future tax deductions and exemptions, and the future tax 
schedule as well at retirement. For the sake of simplicity, I assume that 
for current workers income at retirement equals 80 percent of the pre-
retirement income.13 In the case of current beneﬁciaries, I assume that 
their (postretirement) income remains ﬁxed over their remaining life. I 
assume that marital status remains unchanged and that couples ﬁ le joint 
returns. I assume that the tax schedule remains ﬁxed over the remaining 
lifetime of the individual.14 I also treat the taxation of Social Security 
beneﬁts according to the tax code current at the time of the survey.15 
How does the use of net (after-tax) DB and DC pension wealth 
affect trends in the level of and the degree of inequality in augmented 
wealth and its various components? Do the results reported above still 
hold up? I ﬁnd that the slowdown in pension wealth and augmented 
wealth between the 1990s and the 2000s holds up when net pension 
wealth is used instead of gross pension wealth. Moreover, I ﬁ nd that 
augmented wealth becomes more unequal over the period 1989–2007 
irrespective of whether net or gross pension wealth is used. 
Results for 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 are shown in Table 5.7. For 
2007, the average tax rate on pension wealth was 11.8 percent among 
all households, and that on SSW was 9.4 percent. The mean tax rate on 
pension wealth fell from 15.5 percent in 1983 to 11.8 percent in 1989, 
rose a bit to 13.4 percent in 2001, and then fell off again to 11.8 percent 
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Table 5.7  Augmented Wealth, Net of Federal Income Taxes on Receipt, 
1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Mean values 
Net pension wealth — 53.8 93.4 108.5 
Net private accumulations — 352.9 475.8 568.0 
Net retirement wealth — 156.5 235.7 253.4 
Net augmented wealth — 455.5 618.1 712.9 
Median values 
Net pension wealth — 5.0 14.9 16.7 
Net private accumulations — 109.6 113.0 136.4 
Net retirement wealth — 116.1 164.3 168.5 
Net augmented wealth — 213.9 255.7 289.3 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean values 
Net pension wealth — 27.0 40.9 44.2 
Net private accumulations — 189.0 212.8 223.3 
Net retirement wealth — 111.7 152.2 155.0 
Net augmented wealth — 273.7 324.1 334.1 
Median values 
Net pension wealth — 0.6 3.8 1.6 
Net private accumulations — 39.7 36.0 32.3 
Net retirement wealth — 95.5 122.0 119.0 
Net augmented wealth — 133.7 152.7 147.3 
Aged 47–64 
Mean values 
Net pension wealth 74.9 96.8 161.6 175.6 
Net private accumulations 502.8 553.3 749.0 845.0 
Net retirement wealth 233.5 222.0 346.7 361.3 
Net augmented wealth 661.3 678.5 934.1 1,030.7 
Median values 
Net pension wealth 39.1 31.3 57.1 64.9 
Net private accumulations 202.6 211.6 234.0 270.9 
Net retirement wealth 196.1 170.7 261.6 260.6 
Net augmented wealth 357.6 364.0 430.1 444.4 
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Table 5.7  (continued) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
Aged 65+ 
Mean values 
Net pension wealth 60.1 69.3 121.5 139.3 
Net private accumulations 492.3 521.0 711.6 863.9 
Net retirement wealth 200.1 189.7 276.9 291.7 
Net augmented wealth 632.2 641.5 867.0 1,016.4 
Median values 
Net pension wealth 39.9 5.6 31.2 44.7 
Net private accumulations 181.9 187.0 255.2 272.5 
Net retirement wealth 175.8 145.8 202.5 202.1 
Net augmented wealth 338.1 304.0 414.0 423.5 
NOTE: Augmented wealth excludes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution 
pension plans. Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head 
of household. Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. 
Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth = 
nonpension wealth + pension wealth + Social Security wealth. — = data not available. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
in 2007. In contrast, the mean tax rate of SSW rose from zero in 1983 
to 6.0 percent in 1989 and then to 9.8 percent in 2001 before falling 
slightly to 9.4 percent in 2007. 
The projected future tax liability on pension wealth took a large 
chunk out of pension wealth. The average net value of pension wealth 
(that is, net of expected taxes on receipt and excluding DCEMP) among 
all households was 80 percent of its gross average value in 1989 and 79 
percent in 2007. Future tax liabilities took a smaller bite out of SSW. 
The average net value of retirement wealth was 87 percent of its gross 
average value in 1989 and 84 percent in 2007. Federal income taxes took 
about the same sized bite out of expected retirement beneﬁts in 2007 as 
in 1989. 
As a result, while the mean value of gross retirement wealth (exclud-
ing DCEMP) among all households grew by 70 percent between 1989 
and 2007, its net value increased by only 62 percent (the corresponding 
ﬁgures are 68 and 62 percent when including DCEMP, as shown in 
Appendix Table C.1). Likewise, while the median value of gross retire-
ment wealth among all households increased by 49 percent (53 percent 
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for RW*), the median value of net retirement wealth gained only 45 
percent (49 percent for RW*). 
Future income tax liabilities had less effect on private accumula-
tions and augmented wealth. The mean value of private accumulations 
was reduced by 4 percent in 1989 and 5 percent in 2007 and that of 
augmented wealth by 5 percent in 1989 and 7 percent in 2007 (the effect 
was about the same for PA* and AW*). As a result, the mean value of 
gross augmented wealth climbed by 60 percent (and by 60 percent for 
AW* as well) over the period, while the net value gained 57 percent 
(57 percent also for AW*). Finally, while the median value of gross 
augmented wealth advanced by 37 percent (41 percent for AW*), the 
median value of net augmented wealth grew somewhat less, by 35 per-
cent (38 percent for AW*). 
As with gross pension wealth, I ﬁnd a marked slowdown in the 
growth of pension wealth and augmented wealth over the two subpe-
riods, 1989–2001 and 2001–2007, when net pension wealth is used 
instead. Mean and median values of both gross and net pension wealth 
(with and without DCEMP) show strong positive growth during the 
earlier period but much smaller gains over the later period. Mean values 
of both gross and net private accumulations (with and without DCEMP) 
also show strong growth (of the order of 35 to 40 percent) during the 
ﬁrst period and slower growth during the second (of the order of 17 to 
19 percent). Mean and median values of both gross and net retirement 
wealth (with and without DCEMP) show strong gains in the ﬁ rst period 
but tepid growth in the second. Mean and median values of both gross 
and net augmented wealth (with and without DCEMP) indicate robust 
growth in the early period and much slower gains in the second. The 
results are quite similar for age groups 46 and under and 47–64, with 
net values showing a slightly smaller increase over time due to the mod-
erate increase in future tax liabilities on SSW and pension wealth. 
Netting out implicit income taxes on retirement wealth had an 
equalizing effect, but the effect was rather modest on pension wealth 
among all households (see Table 5.8). In 2007 the Gini coefﬁ cient for 
pension wealth among all households was reduced by 0.014 (0.016 for 
PW*). Netting out future income tax liabilities had a larger effect on 
retirement wealth inequality. The Gini coefﬁcient for retirement wealth 
was lessened by 0.035 and that for RW* by 0.036. The greater reduction 
of the Gini coefﬁcient for total retirement wealth than pension wealth 
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Table 5.8  Inequality of Augmented Wealth, Net of Federal Income 
Taxes on Receipt, Both Excluding and Including Employer
Contribution to Deﬁned Contribution Plans, 1983–2007 
(Gini coefﬁcients) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Gini coeff. excluding employer 
contributions to deﬁ ned contribution 
plans 
Net pension wealth — 0.789 0.776 0.769 
Net private accumulations — 0.790 0.798 0.807 
Net retirement wealth — 0.458 0.458 0.479 
Net augmented wealth — 0.663 0.662 0.686 
Gini coeff. including employer 
contributions to deﬁ ned contribution 
plans 
Net pension wealth* — 0.774 0.733 0.742 
Net private accumulations* — 0.779 0.776 0.792 
Net retirement wealth* — 0.472 0.460 0.485 
Net augmented wealth* — 0.657 0.650 0.677 
Aged 47–64 
Gini coeff. excluding employer 
contributions to deﬁ ned contribution 
plans 
Net pension wealth 0.641 0.701 0.708 0.698 
Net private accumulations 0.692 0.721 0.759 0.762 
Net retirement wealth 0.345 0.424 0.423 0.433 
Net augmented wealth 0.573 0.618 0.638 0.652 
Gini coeff. including employer 
contributions to deﬁ ned contribution 
plans 
Net pension wealth* 0.641 0.699 0.689 0.685 
Net private accumulations* 0.692 0.718 0.750 0.753 
Net retirement wealth* 0.345 0.433 0.431 0.443 
Net augmented wealth* 0.573 0.617 0.634 0.648 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. Key: 
Retirement wealth* = pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth* 
= nonpension wealth + pension wealth* + Social Security wealth. — = data not 
available. 
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alone reﬂected the fact that the implicit tax rates on Social Security 
beneﬁts are notably higher for high earners, and netting out taxes from 
SSW is strongly redistributive. However, netting out implicit taxes on 
pension and SSW barely affected the measured inequality of either pri-
vate accumulations or augmented wealth. As a result, inequality trends 
in both private accumulations and augmented wealth between 1989 and 
2007 remained almost unchanged after subtracting implicit taxes from 
retirement wealth. 
Among middle-aged households, netting out taxes had a somewhat 
larger effect on the inequality of both pension wealth and retirement 
wealth than that for all households. The 2007 Gini coefﬁcient for pen-
sion wealth declined by 0.018 (0.021 for PW*), and the Gini coefﬁcient 
for retirement wealth fell by 0.037 (0.040 for RW*). However, once 
again, netting out taxes did not have much effect on inequality trends 
for private accumulations and augmented wealth (as well as for PA* 
and AW*). Thus, the central ﬁndings on trends in both private accumu-
lations and augmented wealth remained largely unchanged when after-
tax values were used instead of gross values. 
UPDATE TO 2009 
Following the procedures outlined in Chapter 2, I next update both 
net worth and pension wealth to July 1, 2009, on the basis of the change 
in the stock market and housing prices. As discussed in Chapter 2, house 
prices fell by 23.5 percent in real terms and the S&P 500 index was 
down by 40.9 percent in real terms. I also report in that chapter that in 
2007, 40.2 percent of households held stocks through one or more pen-
sion accounts and 31.4 percent of the value of all stocks owned directly 
or indirectly were held in pension funds. Additionally, 43.6 percent of 
the value of DC pension plans was invested in stocks in that year. 
Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 5.9, DC wealth was decimated 
by the stock market crash of 2008–2009. The average value of DC plans 
fell by 17 percent from 2007 to the midpoint of 2009.16 Younger house-
holds (under age 47) had a smaller share of their pensions invested in 
stocks (40 percent) and consequently took a somewhat smaller hit in the 
value of their pensions (16 percent), as did middle-aged households (17 
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Table 5.9  Augmented Wealth, 2007 and Projections to 2009 (in thousands, 
2007$) 
2007 Projected 2009 
All households 
Mean values 
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth 76.8 63.5 
Pension wealth 138.0 124.7 
Net worth 536.1 443.8 
Private accumulations 597.5 505.0 
Retirement wealth 303.3 290.0 
Augmented wealth 762.8 670.3 
Median values 
Pension wealth 19.0 16.4 
Net worth 102.5 65.4 
Private accumulations 142.8 104.2 
Retirement wealth 187.6 184.1 
Augmented wealth 309.2 271.2 
Ratio of stocks held in deﬁ ned contribution 43.6 
plans to value of deﬁned contribution plans 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean values 
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth 30.7 25.6 
Pension wealth 55.3 50.3 
Net worth 209.9 162.3 
Private accumulations 234.5 186.9 
Retirement wealth 181.0 176.0 
Augmented wealth 360.2 312.7 
Median values 
Pension wealth 1.8 1.6 
Net worth 21.8 5.4 
Private accumulations 35.0 14.6 
Retirement wealth 130.5 128.8 
Augmented wealth 155.8 136.7 
Ratio of stocks held in deﬁ ned contribution 39.7 
plans to value of deﬁned contribution plans 
(continued) 
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Table 5.9  (continued) 
2007 Projected 2009 
Aged 47–64 
Mean values 
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth 133.8 111.6 
Pension wealth 225.3 203.0 
Net worth 803.2 674.5 
Private accumulations 894.7 765.9 
Retirement wealth 440.9 418.7 
Augmented wealth 1,110.3 981.6 
Median values 
Pension wealth 75.4 66.8 
Net worth 206.5 147.9 
Private accumulations 283.8 225.4 
Retirement wealth 301.9 295.6 
Augmented wealth 485.4 438.9 
Ratio of stocks held in deﬁ ned contribution 40.8 
plans to value of deﬁned contribution plans 
Aged 65+ 
Mean values 
Deﬁned contribution pension wealth 84.5 68.1 
Pension wealth 175.8 159.3 
Net worth 809.1 678.1 
Private accumulations 900.4 769.3 
Retirement wealth 345.4 328.9 
Augmented wealth 1,070.0 938.9 
Median values 
Pension wealth 47.4 47.1 
Net worth 211.1 168.4 
Private accumulations 277.1 237.2 
Retirement wealth 211.8 209.6 
Augmented wealth 435.5 392.9 
Ratio of stocks held in deﬁ ned contribution 47.6 
plans to value of deﬁned contribution plans 
NOTE: The projections to 2009 assume that housing prices declined by 23.5 percent in 
real terms and stock prices declined by 40.9 percent in real terms from 2007 to July 1, 
2009. Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. Retirement wealth 
= pension wealth + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + 
pension wealth + Social Security wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF. 
Wolff.indb 163  11/21/2011 9:18:42 AM   
 
  
Stagnation of Retirement Wealth in the 2000s  163 
percent decline). Elderly households, on the other hand, had 48 percent 
of their pensions invested in stocks and, as a result, suffered a 20 per-
cent decline. These results, by the way, show the extreme vulnerability 
of the DC pension system to stock market ﬂuctuations. 
Mean pension wealth suffered a 10 percent drop overall. Results 
were similar by age group. Mean net worth, as discussed in Chapter 
2, plunged by 17 percent among all households. Younger households 
experienced a larger decline, 23 percent, while middle-aged households 
and elderly households were down by about 16 percent. As a result, 
mean private accumulations tumbled by 16 percent overall, 20 percent 
for younger households, and about 14 percent for middle-aged and 
elderly ones; and mean augmented wealth fell by 12–13 percent across 
the board. Declines in overall median values were even more acute 
for pension wealth (14 percent), net worth (36 percent), and private 
accumulations (27 percent). Similar patterns existed for younger and 
middle-aged households, but among the elderly median pension wealth 
fell less than mean pension wealth, and median private accumulations 
declined about the same as mean private accumulations. However, 
overall and for each of the three age groups, median augmented wealth 
shrank about the same as mean augmented wealth. The reason that 
median augmented wealth declined less than net worth is that median 
retirement wealth fell only slightly between 2007 and 2009. 
However, all in all, the decade of the 2000s (2001–2009) was truly 
a “lost decade.” Mean net worth and augmented wealth were basically 
unchanged, while median net worth dwindled by 24 percent and median 
augmented wealth fell by 2.3 percent. For younger households, both 
mean and median net worth crashed, and mean and median augmented 
wealth sank by 12 and 17 percent, respectively. Among middle-aged 
households, mean net worth fell by 4.2 percent and median net worth 
by 8.2 percent, while mean augmented wealth was down by 3.3 percent 
and median augmented wealth by 7.7 percent. The elderly fared a little 
better, with mean net worth up by 3.9 percent and mean augmented 
wealth up by 2.8 percent, but median net worth declined by 4.6 percent 
and median augmented wealth slid by 7.9 percent. 
In Chapter 2, I estimate a large increase in wealth inequality from 
2007 to the middle of 2009, with the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth 
climbing from 0.834 to 0.865. In contrast, the inequality of pension 
wealth remained largely unchanged (see Table 5.10). As a result, the dis-
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Table 5.10  Inequality of Augmented Wealth, 2007, and Projections to 
2009 (Gini coefﬁcients) 
Projected 
2007 2009 
All households 
Net worth 0.834 0.865 
Pension wealth 0.783 0.781 
Private accumulations 0.805 0.827 
Retirement wealth 0.514 0.501 
Augmented wealth 0.684 0.684 
Aged 46 and under 
Net worth 0.880 0.959 
Pension wealth 0.810 0.812 
Private accumulations 0.805 0.912 
Retirement wealth 0.440 0.431 
Augmented wealth 0.684 0.638 
Aged 47–64 
Net worth 0.795 0.820 
Pension wealth 0.716 0.715 
Private accumulations 0.758 0.776 
Retirement wealth 0.470 0.457 
Augmented wealth 0.650 0.649 
Aged 65+ 
Net worth 0.784 0.795 
Pension wealth 0.755 0.746 
Private accumulations 0.748 0.753 
Retirement wealth 0.535 0.521 
Augmented wealth 0.665 0.658 
NOTE: The projections to 2009 assume that housing prices declined by 23.5 percent in 
real terms and stock prices declined by 40.9 percent in real terms from 2007 to July 
1, 2009. Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of house-
hold. Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension wealth. Retirement 
wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth = nonpension 
wealth + pension wealth + Social Security wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 2007 SCF. 
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tribution of private accumulations became more unequal because of the 
rising inequality in net worth. Retirement wealth became less unequal 
because of the declining share of pension wealth and hence the rising 
share of SSW in retirement wealth. Its Gini coefﬁcient fell by 0.013 
points. As a result, augmented wealth inequality stayed unchanged. 
There were two reasons for this. First, the declining inequality of retire-
ment wealth offset the rising inequality of net worth. Second, retirement 
wealth, especially SSW, which was more equally distributed than net 
worth, assumed a greater share in augmented wealth. As a consequence, 
retirement wealth had a greater equalizing effect on augmented wealth 
in 2009 than in 2007, with the difference between the Gini coefﬁcient 
of net worth and that of augmented wealth expanding from 0.150 to 
0.181. Thus, the contraction of pension wealth, which was itself a con-
sequence of the stock market slide, led to a reduction in the inequality 
of augmented wealth. 
Results are roughly similar for the middle-aged group as well as for 
elderly households. However, for the youngest age group, we observe 
a huge increase in net worth inequality from 2007 to 2009 (0.079 Gini 
points), little change in pension wealth inequality, a large jump in the 
inequality of private accumulations, and a decline in the inequality of 
retirement wealth. However, unlike the other age groups, the inequal-
ity of augmented wealth fell by 0.046 Gini points because of the sharp 
reduction in pension wealth. 
When we consider the whole decade of the 2000s, we ﬁnd that the 
inequality of net worth rose substantially (0.039 Gini points), that the 
inequality of retirement wealth was largely unchanged, and that the 
inequality of augmented wealth also rose, though by less than that of net 
worth (0.023 Gini points). The pattern is similar for middle-aged house-
holds, among the elderly, the inequality of augmented wealth climbed 
by about the same extent as that of net worth. In contrast, among young 
households, the Gini coefﬁcient for net worth mushroomed by a stagger-
ing 0.100 Gini points while that of augmented wealth fell by 0.022 Gini 
points. Thus, one unintended consequence of the stock market crash of 
the late 2000s and the consequent contraction of pension wealth is that 
it lessened the inequality of augmented wealth. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a marked transformation of the tra-
ditional DB pension system in favor of DC pension coverage. Have 
households gained from this change? Has inequality been affected? 
The chapter began with an analysis of SSW. While mean SSW
grew by 46 percent from 1989 to 2001 among all households, there was 
virtually no change from 2001 to 2007. As result, mean and median 
retirement wealth were up sharply over the 1989–2001 period (by 59 
and 46 percent, respectively, for all households), but mean retirement 
wealth grew very slowly from 2001 to 2007, and median retirement 
wealth actually fell slightly in absolute terms from 2001 to 2007. Both 
mean and median augmented wealth advanced strongly from 1989 to 
2001. However, the growth in both mean and median augmented wealth 
fell off in the 2001–2007 period. Indeed, median augmented wealth 
declined in absolute terms for young households and gained only 2 per-
cent among middle-aged households and the elderly. Thus, in terms of 
the broadest measure of retirement resources, the years from 2001 to 
2007 were particularly unfavorable to American households. 
Thus, in contrast to the sharp rise in both mean and median net worth 
during 2001–2007, we ﬁnd a notably smaller growth in augmented 
wealth over these years. This was particularly the case for middle-aged 
and elderly households, for whom median augmented wealth advanced 
by only 2 percent, much less than median net worth. Among young 
households, median net worth showed an absolute decline, and as a 
consequence, so did augmented wealth. Clearly, by the period 2001– 
2007, even before the ﬁnancial meltdown, the DC pension system was 
not providing the boost to household well-being that it had in the 1990s. 
I next considered the effects of adding expected employer contribu-
tions to DC plans (DCEMP) to pension wealth. It is ﬁrst of note that 
employer contributions to DC plans appear to have peaked in the early 
2000s and then retreated in the late 2000s. Younger workers were par-
ticularly hard hit during the 2000s in terms of DCEMP. All in all, there 
appeared to be quite a sizable pullback in employer contributions to DC 
plans after 2001. When DCEMP is added in to pension wealth, my basic 
ﬁndings remain unchanged. In particular, the slowdown in the growth 
of augmented wealth between the 1989–2001 and 2001–2007 periods 
was about the same as when DCEMP is not included in pension wealth. 
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I also considered what happened when expected future income 
taxes on receipt of pension beneﬁts were netted out of both pension and 
SSW. The basic ﬁndings are actually strengthened a bit, with a some-
what greater slowdown in the growth of mean and median net aug-
mented wealth between the 1989–2001 and 2001–2007 periods than 
when gross pension and SSW are used. 
Another issue considered in the chapter is whether the equalizing 
effects of retirement wealth lessened over time. Net worth inequality 
remained essentially ﬂat from 1989 to 2007 despite a rise in income 
inequality. Retirement wealth did have a marked effect on inequality. 
Adding retirement wealth to net worth substantially lowered the Gini 
coefﬁcient (from 0.834 to 0.684 in 2007, for example). Most of the 
equalizing effect came from the addition of SSW. 
Considering the period 1989–2007, I did ﬁnd that the equalizing 
effect of retirement wealth diminished. While the Gini coefﬁ cient for 
net worth remained largely unchanged over these years, the Gini coef-
ﬁcient for augmented wealth rose by 0.021. The differences are most 
marked for middle-aged households, the group most affected by trans-
formation of the pension system. Among that group, the Gini coef-
ﬁcient for net worth rose by 0.020, while that of augmented wealth 
advanced by 0.031. Indeed, from 1983 to 2007, the Gini coefﬁcient 
for augmented wealth among this age group climbed by 0.076, while 
that for net worth increased by only 0.033. In other words, the addition 
of retirement wealth to net worth reduced the overall Gini coefﬁcient 
among all households in 1989 by 0.169 but by only 0.150 in 2007. 
Among middle-aged households, adding retirement wealth to net worth 
decreased the Gini coefﬁcient by 0.187 in 1983 but by 0.145 in 2007. 
When employer contributions to DC pension plans are added in to pen-
sion wealth, and when expected future income taxes on receipt of pen-
sion beneﬁts are netted out of both pension and SSW, the same pattern 
holds. 
A somewhat rough update to the middle of 2009 shows that DC pen-
sion wealth was eviscerated by the stock market plunge of 2008–2009. 
I estimated that the average value of deﬁned contribution plans fell by 
17 percent from 2007 to the midpoint of 2009. Young households were 
particularly vulnerable. Their mean net worth plummeted by 21 percent 
and their median net worth by 78 percent; their mean pension wealth 
was down by 6 percent; and their mean augmented wealth slipped by 12 
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percent, and their median augmented wealth dipped by 17 percent. The 
contraction of pension wealth resulting from the stock market plunge 
did have the beneﬁcial effect of reducing augmented wealth inequality, 
however. 
These results also help to clear up the puzzle noted at the end of 
Chapter 2, namely that while income inequality surged in the 1990s and 
2000s, (traditional) net worth inequality remained largely unchanged. 
The results show that when the deﬁnition of net worth is expanded to 
include DB pension wealth, then we do see a rise in (augmented) wealth 
inequality during the 1990s and the 2000s. 
Notes 
1. The low value for median pension wealth in 2007, $19,000, is mainly a reﬂec-
tion of the relatively large share of households (36 percent) without any pension 
wealth. 
2. A small decline in both mean and median SSW for middle-aged and elderly house-
holds can be seen in the data for the period from 1983 to 1989. This seems to be 
due to the number of individuals reporting Social Security beneﬁts received in 
1983 as opposed to 1989. For example, among individuals 65 and over, the per-
centage of males reporting Social Security beneﬁts increased from 86.0 percent 
in 1983 to 90.7 percent in 1989, while the share of females 65 and over reporting 
such beneﬁts declined from 51.6 to 41.5 percent. Average Social Security ben-
eﬁts (in 1989 dollars) rose from $5,685 to $6,306 for elderly males but declined 
from $2,687 to $1,729 for elderly females. It is not clear whether the change for 
females is due to reporting problems in the 1989 SCF or represents a real change. 
For age group 47–64, the decrease in SSW might reﬂect the decline in average 
real wages over the period according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ real hourly 
wage series. 
3. The Gini coefﬁcients of pension wealth reported in Table 5.2 differ from those 
in Table 4.7 because the former refer to all households, whereas the latter are for 
pension holders only. 
4. The inequality of SSW ﬁrst fell very substantially from 1989 to 2001, a trend 
that reﬂected primarily increasing Social Security coverage, and then rose sharply 
from 2001 to 2007, though not enough to offset its fall during the 1990s. The 
change over the 2000s mainly reﬂected the rising spread in (annual) earnings and, 
by implication, the rise in lifetime earnings inequality among the elderly. 
5. Note that a higher correlation between two components of a variable leads to a 
higher coefﬁcient of variation of that variable. 
6. The use of a higher (lower) discount rate in the calculation of DB pension wealth 
would have lowered (raised) the value of DB pension wealth and consequently 
increased (decreased) the measured inequality of augmented wealth. Correspond-
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ingly, the use of a higher (lower) discount rate would have led to a lower (higher) 
increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for augmented wealth between 1989 (or 1983) and 
2007. A similar argument holds for the choice of the discount rate for the calcula-
tion of SSW. 
7. Among elderly households, the primary reason for the rise in augmented wealth 
inequality was the increasing share of net worth in augmented wealth, which rose 
from 68 percent in 1989 to 76 percent in 2007. Since the level of inequality of net 
worth is greater than that of retirement wealth, this shift resulted in higher inequal-
ity of augmented wealth in the later year. A secondary reason was the increase in 
the correlation between nonpension wealth and retirement wealth. 
8. The pattern is again quite similar for age group 46 and under. The ratio of DCEMP
to DC ﬁrst ballooned from 1.03 in 1983 to 3.16 in 1989 and then diminished to 
1.22 in 2007, and the slowdown in percentage gains of both mean and median 
pension wealth, private accumulations, retirement wealth, and augmented wealth 
between the 1990s and the 2000s became even larger. In fact, mean and median 
retirement wealth RW* (including employer contributions) and augmented wealth 
AW* (also including employer contributions) all showed absolute declines over 
the 2001–2007 period. 
9. Recall that a larger correlation between two components of a variable leads to a 
higher coefﬁcient of variation of that variable. 
10. The story is different among younger households. In this case, the Gini coefﬁ-
cient for PA* (including employer contributions) and AW* (including employer 
contributions) showed a small decline from 1989 to 2007, while that for private 
accumulations (without employer contributions) and augmented wealth (without 
employer contributions) both showed an increase. For this age group, the addition 
of DCEMP to pension wealth had a greater equalizing effect in 2007 than in 1989. 
11. The exception is Roth IRAs, which are not subject to income taxes on withdrawal. 
12. Two other taxes associated with wealth holdings are capital gains tax on the sale of 
an asset and estate tax liability on inheritances. Neither DC nor DB pension wealth 
are salable, so a capital gains tax would not apply to these assets. On the other 
hand, estate tax liability would apply to all asset components of net worth, includ-
ing DC wealth, though not generally to DB pension wealth. (The exception would 
be lump-sum distributions from DB plans, which is a relatively small amount— 
only 2.7 percent of total DB wealth in 2001, for example.) It is beyond the scope of 
this chapter to adjust wealth holdings for capital gains or estate taxes. See Poterba 
(2004) for further discussion of the tax treatment of retirement savings. 
13. The 80 percent ﬁgure is a typical replacement rate (see Chapter 3 for a review of 
the pertinent literature). I also use adjusted gross income as the income concept, 
which is provided in the SCF data. The use of a higher replacement rate (say, 90 
percent) would increase the marginal tax rate paid by the household and therefore 
reduce the estimated value of after-tax pension wealth, SSW, retirement wealth, 
and augmented wealth. 
14. I also assume that families take the standard deduction and that the number of 
exemptions is two for singles and four for married couples (this includes the extra 
exemption for being 65 years of age or over). Moreover, it is assumed that tax 
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exemptions and the standard deduction are ﬁxed in value over time. The latter 
assumption is plausible since both exemptions and the standard deduction are 
indexed for inﬂation. 
15. In 1989, 2001, and 2007, Social Security beneﬁts were subject to income tax only 
if AGI, excluding Social Security beneﬁts, was greater than $32,000 for a married 
couple ﬁling jointly and $25,000 for singles or couples ﬁling separately. Other-
wise, 15 percent of Social Security beneﬁts is excluded from taxable income. In 
1983, there was no tax on Social Security beneﬁts. 
16. This compares with the estimates of Butrica and Issa (2010), using the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds, of a decline of 33.7 percent in the value of retire-
ment accounts in real terms from the third quarter of 2007 to the ﬁrst quarter of 
2009, and of 14.6 percent from the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 
2009 (see Chapter 2 for more discussion). 
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Differences in Retirement 
Wealth by Demographic and 
Household Characteristics 
How have different demographic groups fared with the transition 
in the structure of the pension system? We saw an inkling of this in 
Chapter 4 when we examined changes in pension coverage for different 
groups of workers. We ﬁnd that female workers actually fared very well, 
while men saw their pension coverage rates decline. The pension make-
over also harmed younger male workers more than older ones. Black 
workers were more adversely affected by the pension transformation 
than white workers. Pension coverage among the college-educated was 
aided by the systemic change in pensions, but coverage among less-
educated male workers was damaged. The pension transition decimated 
coverage among blue-collar male workers and those in the bottom three 
quintiles of the earnings distribution. 
In this chapter, we look at the relative income, retirement wealth, 
and augmented wealth of different demographic groups over the period 
1989–2007. Because I am comparing relative gains made by different 
groups, I will focus on the 1989–2007 period exclusively. The next sec-
tion presents a summary of aggregate trends in retirement and augmented 
wealth, and then shows results on the composition of augmented wealth 
for different population segments. Following that, the chapter considers 
how different demographic groups have fared with regard to retirement 
and augmented wealth. I focus on three divisions of the population: 
1) race/ethnicity, 2) marital status, and 3) educational attainment. The 
chapter concludes with summary and concluding remarks. In Chapter 
7, I will take up the issue of retirement income adequacy for the same 
set of population groups. 
As will be seen in this chapter, there was a remarkable turnaround in 
the relative fortunes of minorities, though signiﬁcant gaps still remained 
in 2007. Likewise, single females improved their position relative to 
married couples in terms of total (augmented) wealth. In contrast, dif-
171 
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ferences in wealth by educational groups have, if anything, splayed out 
over the years, with college graduates in particular increasing their lead 
over the other educational groups. 
TRENDS AND COMPOSITION OF RETIREMENT AND 
AUGMENTED WEALTH 
There are three tiers of retirement savings to consider: Social Secu-
rity, private pensions, and other forms of savings.1 Social Security, as 
we saw in Chapter 5, has evolved into a near-universal program that 
provides a basic retirement beneﬁt. Private employer-sponsored pen-
sions would presumably supply the bulk of the additional income, and 
that additional savings would round out retirement income as “icing on 
the cake.” It will be clear from my ﬁgures that Social Security fulﬁ lls its 
role as a basic retirement beneﬁt and that its importance has even grown 
in recent years. However, large holes remain with respect to employer-
sponsored pensions. In fact, private savings outside of retirement wealth 
play more than just a supplemental role, and wealth outside of retire-
ment wealth can be a substantial addition to retirement savings. 
Prior to retirement at age 65, median SSW is the largest of the three 
forms of savings (see Table 6.1). This was true in both 1989 and 2007. 
In 2007, households between the ages of 47 and 55 had a median SSW
of $180,000 (in 2007 dollars), almost three times median private pen-
sion wealth. We observe a similar divergence for the age group 56–64, 
which had a median SSW of $216,100, more than twice as large as 
median private pension wealth. Among age group 46 and under, the 
discrepancy is even larger, with median SSW more than 100 times that 
of median pension wealth. Among elderly households, median SSW
was almost three times median pension wealth in 2007. 
Households have amassed substantial amounts of wealth outside of 
retirement savings. Median augmented wealth (the sum of net worth and 
retirement wealth) for households aged 47–55 was $424,300 in 2007, 
compared to $270,000 in retirement wealth for the same age group. 
For households aged 56–64, median retirement wealth amounted to 
$364,100 in 2007, compared to a median augmented wealth of $568,200. 
Among elderly households, median augmented wealth was $435,500 
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Table 6.1  Household Income and Wealth, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 
2007$) 
% change, 
1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean income 61.6 67.1 8.9 
Mean nonpension wealth 162.0 179.2 10.6 
Mean pension wealth 34.3 55.3 61.0 
Mean Social Security wealth 92.9 125.7 35.4 
Mean augmented wealth 289.2 360.2 24.5 
Median income 47.2 46.0 −2.4 
Median nonpension wealth 24.9 11.6 −53.5 
Median pension wealth 0.8 1.8 — 
Median Social Security wealth 87.7 112.5 28.2 
Median retirement wealth 100.4 130.5 30.0 
Median augmented wealth 140.5 155.8 10.9 
Aged 47–55 
Mean income 90.9 110.2 21.3 
Mean nonpension wealth 446.0 588.9 32.0 
Mean pension wealth 103.3 179.4 73.7 
Mean Social Security wealth 131.0 198.2 51.2 
Mean augmented wealth 680.3 966.4 42.1 
Median income 58.5 61.0 4.2 
Median nonpension wealth 153.9 114.3 −25.7 
Median pension wealth 25.7 61.0 137.3 
Median Social Security wealth 139.3 180.0 29.2 
Median retirement wealth 181.4 270.0 48.8 
Median augmented wealth 364.0 424.3 16.6 
Aged 56–64 
Mean income 67.8 111.7 64.7 
Mean nonpension wealth 467.7 780.6 66.9 
Mean pension wealth 139.3 288.6 107.2 
Mean Social Security wealth 146.3 239.9 64.0 
Mean augmented wealth 753.3 1309.1 73.8 
Median income 41.8 53.0 26.8 
Median nonpension wealth 137.6 172.4 25.2 
(continued) 
Wolff.indb 174  11/21/2011 9:18:48 AM   
 
 
  
174 Wolff 
Table 6.1  (continued) 
% change, 
1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 56–64 
Median pension wealth 56.7 104.6 84.4 
Median Social Security wealth 138.1 216.1 56.5 
Median retirement wealth 210.4 364.1 73.0 
Median augmented wealth 388.7 568.2 46.2 
Aged 65+ 
Mean income 43.8 66.9 52.6 
Mean nonpension wealth 451.8 724.6 60.4 
Mean pension wealth 84.7 175.8 107.6 
Mean Social Security wealth 127.6 169.6 32.9 
Mean augmented wealth 664.0 1070.0 61.1 
Median income 24.1 29.0 20.4 
Median nonpension wealth 128.1 191.0 49.1 
Median pension wealth 5.7 47.4 738.6 
Median Social Security wealth 105.9 132.6 25.2 
Median retirement wealth 153.6 211.8 38.0 
Median augmented wealth 310.7 435.5 40.2 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Pension 
wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned beneﬁt wealth. Retirement wealth = pension 
wealth + Social Security wealth. Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + retirement 
wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
and median retirement wealth was about half as much, $211,800. Non-
retirement wealth was thus substantial among these age groups in 2007. 
However, among younger households (46 and under), the discrepancy 
was much smaller, with a median retirement wealth of $130,500 and a 
median augmented wealth of $155,800. 
One important aspect with respect to wealth accumulation that 
deserves further attention is the distribution of wealth. Typically, all 
forms of wealth are relatively unequally distributed, with the exception 
of SSW (see Chapters 4 and 5). For instance, median private pension 
wealth of households between the ages of 47 and 55 was only 34 per-
cent of the average private pension wealth in that age group in 2007, 
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which indicates that pension wealth was heavily concentrated among 
those with substantial amounts of private pension wealth (see Chapter 
4). In contrast, the SSW of the typical household in this age group was 
91 percent of the average SSW of this age group. For households aged 
56–64, the ratios were 36 percent and 90 percent, suggesting that pri-
vate pension wealth was substantially more unequally distributed than 
SSW in this age group, too. 
How has the situation changed over time? Median SSW saw strong 
gains from 1989 to 2007 for households between the ages of 47 and 
64 (Table 6.1). Median pension wealth also saw strong increases from 
1989 to 2007. For age group 47–55, the change in median private pen-
sion wealth was substantially greater than that in SSW. The same was 
true for age group 56–64. Among the elderly, both median SSW and 
pension wealth showed robust growth over this period as well. In con-
trast, among age group 46 and under, median SSW showed a large gain 
from 1989 to 2007, but median pension wealth was virtually zero in 
both years.2 
For age group 47–55, median household income showed a mod-
est increase in real terms from 1989 to 2007 (by 4 percent) but solid 
growth for age group 56–64 (by 27 percent).3 Real median income also 
showed strong growth among elderly households (20 percent) but a 
slight decline among young households. 
One factor that may put a damper on increases in retirement 
resources is a rise in income and wealth inequality. For all ages, aver-
age incomes and average wealth increased faster than median income 
and wealth over the 1989–2007 period. The divergence was most pro-
nounced for households aged 47–55, for whom average augmented 
wealth rose more than twice as fast as median augmented wealth. These 
results generally accord with the calculations in Chapter 5, which show 
an increase in the Gini coefﬁcient for augmented wealth among age 
group 47–64 and among the elderly, but a slight decline among younger 
households (see Table 5.4). 
We next turn to how the composition of augmented wealth varies 
by age group (Table 6.2). First, for all households, we can see how 
the shares of the three major components of augmented wealth have 
changed over the period 1989–2007. Nonpension wealth fell as a share 
of augmented wealth, from 63 percent in 1989 to 60 percent in 2007. In 
contrast, the share of pension wealth rose from 14 percent in 1989 to 18 
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Table 6.2  Composition of Augmented Wealth, 1989 and 2007 (percentage 
of augmented wealth) 
1989 2007 
Aged 46 and under 
Nonpension wealth 56.0 49.7 
Pension wealth 11.9 15.4 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 3.2 8.5 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 8.7 6.8 
Social Security wealth 32.1 34.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Aged 47–64 
Nonpension wealth 63.8 60.3 
Pension wealth 16.9 20.3 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 2.9 12.1 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 14.0 8.2 
Social Security wealth 19.3 19.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Aged 65+ 
Nonpension wealth 62.1 59.6 
Pension wealth 18.5 22.0 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 0.3 7.9 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 18.1 14.1 
Social Security wealth 19.4 18.3 
Total 100.0 99.9 
All households 
Nonpension wealth 62.6 60.2 
Pension wealth 14.0 18.1 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 2.2 10.1 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 11.8 8.0 
Social Security wealth 23.4 21.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
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Table 6.2  (continued) 1989 2007 
Composition of augmented wealth*: aged 47–64 
Nonpension wealth 62.6 58.3 
Pension wealth* 18.4 22.9 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 2.8 11.7 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 13.8 8.0 
Employer contributions to deﬁ ned contribution 1.8 3.3 
pension plans 
Social Security wealth 19.0 18.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Composition of net augmented wealth*: aged 47–64 
Nonpension wealth 66.3 65.6 
Net pension wealth* 15.5 16.2 
Net Social Security wealth 18.2 18.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of household. 
Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth. Augmented 
wealth* = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth*. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due 
to rounding. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
percent in 2007. Of the two parts of pension wealth, DC wealth showed 
a very strong gain, from 2 percent of augmented wealth in 1989 to 10 
percent in 2007, while DB showed a corresponding decline, from 12 to 
8 percent. The share of SSW fell slightly, from 23 to 22 percent. The 
composition of augmented wealth was remarkably similar among age 
groups 47–64 and 65 and older. However, among young households, 
age 46 and under, the share of SSW was higher, a third or more, while 
the shares of nonpension wealth and pension wealth were correspond-
ingly lower. 
When employer contributions to DC pension plans (DCEMP) are 
added in to produce AW*, we see that the share of DCEMP in AW* 
among middle-aged households was relatively small—between 2 and 3 
percent. The inclusion of DCEMP in AW* resulted in a modest rise in 
the share of PW* in augmented wealth and a corresponding decline in 
the shares of the other two components. Looking at net (after-tax) AW*, 
we see, not surprisingly, lower shares of net PW* and net SSW in net 
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AW* and a correspondingly higher share of nonpension wealth. There 
was little change over time in the shares of these three components. The 
share of nonpension wealth in net AW* was about the same in 2007 as 
in 1989 (66 percent), as were the shares of net PW* (16 percent) and 
net SSW (18 percent). 
In sum, we can now get a good idea of what the sources of retire-
ment income are. On the basis of gross (before-tax) retirement wealth, 
the share of nonpension wealth was about three-ﬁfths, that of pension 
wealth about one-ﬁfth, and that of SSW also about one-ﬁfth among 
all households. These shares should generally correspond to the break-
down of retirement income. The composition of augmented wealth was 
very similar among middle-aged and elderly households. However, 
among younger households, the share of SSW was higher, about one-
third, that of nonpension wealth about one-half, and that of pension 
wealth about one-sixth. On a net (after-tax) basis, the importance of 
nonpension wealth was greater (about two-thirds) and that of pension 
wealth smaller (about 16 percent), as was that of SSW (about 18 per-
cent). We would also expect the make-up of augmented wealth (and 
thus the sources of retirement income) to vary both by income level and 
by demographic characteristic, as we shall see below. 
Table 6.3 considers the composition of AW* by income quin-
tile for age group 47–64. I have elected to use here AW* because it 
gives a more comprehensive measure of pension resources than stan-
dard pension wealth. It is clear that SSW is much more important for 
lower-income households than upper-income ones. In 2007, the share 
of SSW in AW* was 44 percent for the bottom income quintile, 40 
percent for the second quintile, 33 percent for the middle quintile, 29 
percent for the fourth quintile, and only 9 percent for the top quintile. 
In contrast, nonpension wealth was much more important for the top 
income quintile, comprising 71 percent of AW* in 2007, compared to 
a range of 38–48 percent for the lower quintiles. PW*, on the other 
hand, was more important in the middle income quintiles, accounting 
for 29 percent of AW* for the middle quintile and 32 percent for the 
fourth quintile, compared to 9 percent for the bottom, 21 percent for the 
second, and 21 percent for the top. These results indicate that SSW will 
be a relatively more important source of retirement income among low-
income households, nonpension wealth will be relatively more impor-
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Table 6.3  Composition of Augmented Wealth by Income Quintile, Aged 
47–64, 1989 and 2007 (percentage of augmented wealth*) 
1989 2007 
Bottom income quintile 
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth 39.5 47.8 
Pension wealth* 11.1 8.6 
Social Security wealth 49.5 43.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Second income quintile 
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth 44.7 39.5 
Pension wealth* 19.7 21.0 
Social Security wealth 35.6 39.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Third income quintile 
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth 46.0 38.2 
Pension wealth* 24.1 29.3 
Social Security wealth 29.8 32.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Fourth income quintile 
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth 47.6 38.6 
Pension wealth* 25.6 32.4 
Social Security wealth 26.8 29.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Fifth income quintile 
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth 75.7 70.6 
Pension wealth* 15.0 20.5 
Social Security wealth 9.3 8.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 
All households, aged 47–64 
Net worth minus deﬁned contribution wealth 62.6 58.3 
Pension wealth* 18.4 22.9 
Social Security wealth 19.0 18.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
NOTE: Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁ ned contribution 
pension plans. Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of the head of 
household. Income quintiles are based on income for age group 47–64 only and are 
calculated separately for each year. Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + 
retirement wealth*. Augmented wealth* = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth*.
Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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tant among upper-income households, and pension wealth relatively 
more important among middle-income households. 
Except for the bottom income quintile, pension wealth’s importance 
as a share of total retirement resources rose over time. For example, the 
third income quintile’s share of AW* grew from 24 percent in 1989 to 
29 percent in 2007. With the exception of the bottom and top quintiles, 
the importance of SSW also increased. Again, for the middle income 
quintile, the share of SSW in AW* advanced from 27 to 29 percent over 
this period. Correspondingly, except for the bottom quintile, the share 
of nonpension wealth in AW* declined over these years (from 46 to 38 
percent for the middle quintile, for example). Thus, there was generally 
a shift in retirement resources away from standard wealth holdings to 
pension and SSW. 
We next look at mean retirement wealth by wealth and income class 
to determine whether gains in retirement resources have been greater at 
the bottom or top. Not surprisingly, there is a big spread of retirement 
wealth levels by wealth class—by a factor of ﬁve or so between the 
highest and lowest (see Table 6.4). A U-shaped proﬁle is in evidence 
for gains in retirement wealth over the 1989–2007 period. This is true 
for all three age groups. The largest gains by far were made by the top 
wealth group. The retirement wealth of the wealth class with assets of
$1,000,000 and above grew by 117 percent over the period among age 
group 56–64 and by 48 percent among elderly households. The smallest 
gains were made by the middle wealth class, those who have $100,000– 
$249,999. The mean retirement wealth of the bottom wealth class, in 
contrast, showed strong gains over the period (a 93 percent increase 
among age group 56–64). Thus, while retirement wealth among the 
lowest wealth group was catching up to the middle, the retirement 
wealth of the highest wealth groups was also moving further ahead of 
the middle. These changes reﬂected large gains in SSW at the lower end 
of the wealth distribution and very big increases in DC pension wealth 
at the top (see Figure 4.1a, for example). 
The pattern is similar by income class (Table 6.5). Once again, 
gains in mean retirement wealth over the 1989–2007 period were strong 
among the top two or three income classes. There were also sizable 
gains for the bottom income class (except among the elderly). The 
three middle income classes ($25,000–$75,000) all experienced actual 
declines in their mean retirement wealth (with one exception). 
Wolff.indb 181  11/21/2011 9:18:53 AM   
 
 
 
 
  
Differences in Retirement Wealth  181 
Table 6.4  Mean Retirement Wealth by Wealth Class, 1989 and 2007 
(in thousands, 2007$) 
% change, 
1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 47–55 
Under 50,000 115.8 166.1 43.4 
50,000–99,999 196.3 234.1 19.3 
100,000–249,999 239.0 273.9 14.6 
250,000–499,999 329.6 362.3 9.9 
500,000–999,999 355.0 470.7 32.6 
1,000,000 or over 484.0 805.8 66.5 
Aged 56–64 
Under 50,000 104.2 200.6 92.5 
50,000–99,999 260.3 223.8 −14.0 
100,000–249,999 290.1 301.9 4.0 
250,000–499,999 396.0 400.4 1.1 
500,000–999,999 517.5 581.4 12.4 
1,000,000 or over 509.7 1,106.3 117.0 
Aged 65+ 
Under 50,000 105.6 159.8 51.4 
50,000–99,999 183.0 176.8 −3.4 
100,000–249,999 197.0 220.9 12.1 
250,000–499,999 256.5 253.8 −1.1 
500,000–999,999 422.4 378.3 −10.4 
1,000,000 or over 518.6 769.1 48.3 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by net worth in 2001 dollars. Key: Retirement wealth 
= pension wealth + Social Security wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
Given all other data trends discussed so far, especially the sharp 
increases in SSW, it seems reasonable to assume that the changes in 
retirement wealth among households nearing retirement were driven by 
two separate forces. Increases were due to gains in SSW as a result of a 
strong labor market, at least through 2001, and strong returns in 401(k) 
and other DC plans, also mainly up through 2001, which in turn were 
due to a strong ﬁnancial market performance. Given the distribution of 
ﬁnancial wealth, it is very likely that the latter was more of a factor for 
higher-income households. 
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Table 6.5  Mean Retirement Wealth by Income Class, 1989 and 2007 
(in thousands, 2007$) 
% change, 
1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 47–55 
Under 25,000 73.9 91.8 24.3 
25,000–34,999 140.0 138.9 −0.8 
35,000–49,999 206.0 166.4 −19.2 
50,000–74,999 247.9 234.2 −5.5 
75,000–99,999 311.9 327.0 4.8 
100,000–249,999 421.8 504.3 19.6 
250,000 or over 796.2 900.6 13.1 
Aged 56–64 
Under 25,000 102.1 130.4 27.7 
25,000–34,999 226.6 234.9 3.7 
35,000–49,999 325.8 211.2 −35.2 
50,000–74,999 414.0 373.9 −9.7 
75,000–99,999 448.0 475.1 6.1 
100,000–249,999 519.3 681.6 31.3 
250,000 or over 802.1 1,536.4 91.5 
Aged 65+ 
Under 25,000 120.2 90.1 −25.0 
25,000–34,999 279.6 180.9 −35.3 
35,000–49,999 285.3 263.9 −7.5 
50,000–74,999 414.2 339.2 −18.1 
75,000–99,999 365.5 462.1 26.4 
100,000–249,999 642.4 696.1 8.4 
250,000 or over 1,109.5 1,392.5 25.5 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by income in 2001 dollars. Key: Retirement wealth = 
pension wealth + Social Security wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
Disparate gains in wealth tend to reduce the overall effect of wealth 
gains on retirement income adequacy, especially if households that are 
likely to be already well prepared for retirement see the largest gains. 
If wealth gains are concentrated among households that already have a 
large amount of wealth or income, average retirement wealth increases 
have less of an effect on retirement income adequacy compared to a 
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situation where wealth increases are less concentrated. The results so 
far show that percentage gains in retirement wealth have been gener-
ally greater at the upper ends of the wealth and income distributions as 
well as the very bottom, but small in the middle. As a result, the gains 
in retirement income adequacy from 1989 to 2007 were likely less than 
they could have been if the gains had been more equally distributed 
across wealth and income classes. 
Importantly, this result holds only for retirement wealth outside of 
SSW. Improvements in SSW to be appear fairly equally distributed. 
Thus, it is fair to conclude that Social Security improvements had a 
more broad-based effect on retirement income adequacy than improve-
ments in private pension wealth or other private savings, regardless of 
whether the changes on average were smaller or larger. In Chapter 7, we 
shall analyze these factors more fully. 
DISPARITIES IN RETIREMENT WEALTH BY
DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP 
I next consider how different demographic groups have fared with 
regard to retirement and augmented wealth. I look at three divisions of 
the population: 1) race/ethnicity, 2) marital status, and 3) educational 
attainment. 
Race/Ethnicity 
The population is divided here into two groups: 1) non-Hispanic 
white households (“whites,” for short) and 2) African American and 
Hispanic households (“minorities,” for short).4 In 2007 over three-
quarters of white households in age groups 47–55 and 56–64 held some 
form of pension wealth (see Table 6.6). Over 70 percent of white elderly 
households and 60 percent of white younger households (age 46 and 
under) likewise owned pension wealth. In contrast, 57 percent of minor-
ity households in age group 47–55 and 59 percent in age group 56–64 
held pension wealth, as did 38 percent of younger minority households 
and a half of minority elderly ones. 
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Table 6.6  Percentage of Households with Pension Wealth by Race/ 
Ethnicity and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 
Non-Hispanic African American 
white or Hispanic 
1989 2007 1989 2007 
Aged 46 and under 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 35.9 55.8 17.8 33.8 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 42.0 25.7 26.3 15.2 
Pension wealth 58.5 60.5 34.3 38.2 
Share of deﬁned contribution owners 77.1 64.8 81.5 75.8 
who receive employer contributions 
Aged 47–55 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 35.5 70.1 21.2 47.5 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 60.3 36.3 40.4 32.5 
Pension wealth 74.1 77.7 46.6 56.8 
Share of deﬁned contribution owners 58.1 61.8 36.2 72.4 
who receive employer contributions 
Aged 56–64 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 23.7 64.6 12.0 43.8 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 65.1 46.3 39.3 33.1 
Pension wealth 71.0 78.2 46.0 59.3 
Share of deﬁned contribution owners 0.0 43.6 0.0 62.0 
who receive employer contributions 
Aged 65+ 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 1.6 45.3 0.0 9.3 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 56.1 51.0 30.1 46.2 
Pension wealth 56.8 71.1 30.1 49.9 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Asians and other 
races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. Key: Pension wealth 
= deﬁned contribution + deﬁ ned beneﬁ t wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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It is at once evident that in 2007 whites were much more likely to 
have a pension plan than minorities. Among age group 56–64, the dif-
ference in pension wealth ownership rates was 19 percentage points. 
Differences were even higher for the other age groups—22 percentage 
points among age group 46 and under, 21 percentage points among age 
group 47–55, and 21 percentage points among the elderly. The main dis-
parity was in ownership of DC accounts.5 The gap in the ownership of 
DC plans was over 20 percentage points among the three youngest age 
groups and 36 percentage points among the elderly. The racial gap in 
entitlements to DB plans was much smaller, 4 percentage points among 
age group 47–55, 13 percentage points among age group 56–64, and 11
percentage points among younger households. Among the elderly, 46 
percent of minority and 51 percent of white households held DB pen-
sion wealth, with a gap of only 5 percentage points.6 
The disparity in DC pension ownership widened considerably 
between the two groups, as the take-up rate for DC plans grew much 
faster among white workers. Among younger households, DC owner-
ship among whites expanded from 36 percent in 1989 to 56 percent in 
2007, while among minorities it grew from 18 to 34 percent; among 
age group 47–55, it increased from 36 to 70 percent among the former 
and from 21 to 48 percent among the latter; among age group 56–64, it 
rose from 24 to 65 percent and from 12 to 44 percent, respectively; and 
among the elderly, from 2 to 45 percent and from 0 to only 9 percent, 
respectively. The gap in participation in DC plans between whites and 
minorities thus rose among all age groups, though particularly among 
the elderly (by 34 percentage points). 
In contrast, the racial gap in participation in DB plans fell quite 
substantially between 1989 and 2007, as participation in these plans 
plummeted among both whites and minorities. As a result, the racial 
gap in the share of households with pension wealth (either DC or DB) 
narrowed somewhat over these years. 
Despite improvements, minority households still had a lot less 
wealth accumulated than nonminority households as they approached 
retirement in 2007. For households between the ages of 47 and 55, the 
average retirement wealth of non-Hispanic whites was about twice as 
large as for minorities (Table 6.7). For households aged 56–64, the 
ratio of average retirement wealth was 2.3, for households 65 and older 
it was 1.4, and for households aged 46 and under it was 2.0. Similar 
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Table 6.7  Retirement Wealth by Race/Ethnicity and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Non-Hispanic white African American or Hispanic 
% change, % change,
 1989 2007 1989–2007 1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 46 and under
 Mean pension wealth 41.4 67.5 63.1 14.5 27.3 88.6 
Mean Social Security wealth 106.2 144.5 36.1 50.9 79.7 56.5 
Mean retirement wealth 147.6 212.1 43.7 65.4 107.0 63.6 
Median retirement wealth 124.3 155.6 25.1 48.0 79.2 65.0 
Aged 47–55
 Mean pension wealth 114.8 204.5 78.1 70.2 93.6 33.4 
Mean Social Security wealth 145.9 213.3 46.2 73.9 138.8 87.8 
Mean retirement wealth 260.7 417.8 60.3 144.1 232.4 61.3 
Median retirement wealth 193.6 304.4 57.2 95.7 166.3 73.8 
Aged 56–64
 Mean pension wealth 166.2 329.1 98.0 56.6 111.0 96.0 
Mean Social Security wealth 167.9 261.1 55.5 71.2 147.6 107.3 
Mean retirement wealth 334.1 590.3 76.6 127.8 258.6 102.3 
Median retirement wealth 269.6 417.1 54.7 68.1 183.9 169.8 
Aged 65+
 Mean pension wealth 88.5 185.8 110.0 33.6 104.2 209.7 
Mean Social Security wealth 141.5 171.4 21.1 56.7 149.3 163.3 
Mean retirement wealth 230.0 357.2 55.3 90.4 253.5 180.5 
Median retirement wealth 184.8 219.0 18.5 44.3 158.9 258.8 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of small 
sample sizes. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁ ned beneﬁt wealth. Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security 
wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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disparities existed for median retirement wealth. Discrepancies were 
much larger for pension wealth than SSW. In 2007, the ratio of average 
pension wealth was 2.5 for the youngest age group, 2.2 for age group 
47–55, 3.0 for age group 56–64, and 1.8 among elderly households. 
These differences reﬂect to a large extent disparities in pension owner-
ship. In contrast, the ratio of average SSW was 1.8 for the youngest age 
group, 1.5 for age group 47–55, 1.8 for age group 56–64, and only 1.2 
among elderly households. 
Over time, the racial gap in retirement wealth generally narrowed. 
Among younger households, pension wealth and SSW both increased 
faster among minorities than among whites, and the ratio of mean retire-
ment wealth increased from 44 percent in 1989 to 51 percent in 2007 
and the ratio of median retirement wealth from 39 to 51 percent. Among 
age group 47–55, the story was somewhat different. In this case, mean 
SSW grew faster for minorities but mean pension wealth grew slower. 
On net, the ratio of mean retirement wealth stayed at around 55 percent 
from 1989 to 2007, while that of median retirement wealth advanced 
from 49 to 55 percent. In contrast, among age group 56–64, mean pen-
sion wealth gained about the same for both groups from 1989 to 2007, 
while percentage gains in SSW were greater for minorities. As a result, 
the ratio of both mean and median retirement wealth between minori-
ties and whites showed a sizable rise, particularly the ratio of medi-
ans. Elderly minority households also fared well in relative terms. Both 
mean pension wealth and mean SSW grew much faster for minorities 
in this age group than among whites, and the ratio of mean retirement 
wealth climbed from 39 percent in 1989 to 71 percent in 2007 and that 
of median retirement wealth from 24 to 73 percent. 
Even larger differences exist for total wealth. The ratio of average 
total (augmented) wealth of whites to the average augmented wealth of 
minorities was 2.7 for households aged 46 and under in 2007, 2.7 for 
households aged 47–55, 2.9 for households aged 56–64, and 2.5 for 
households 65 and older (see Table 6.8).7 Ratios of median augmented 
wealth were a bit lower (except for the youngest age group): 2.7 for ages 
46 and under, 2.1 for ages 47–55 and ages 56–64, and 2.0 for elderly 
households. The gap in augmented wealth was uniformly smaller than 
the gap in net worth, where the ratios ran from 3.5 for the youngest age 
group to 4.2 for the oldest, but larger than the gap in income, where the 
ratios ranged from 1.8 for the youngest to 2.6 for the oldest. The smaller 
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Table 6.8  Income and Wealth by Race/Ethnicity and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Non-Hispanic white African American or Hispanic 
% change, % change,
 1989 2007 1989–2007 1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean income 70.9 76.4 7.7 34.2 42.3 23.8 
Mean net worth 202.8 265.0 30.7 38.6 76.8 98.7 
Mean augmented wealth 338.6 439.1 29.7 101.6 170.1 67.4 
Median augmented wealth 195.8 215.0 9.8 48.5 80.3 65.7 
Mean augmented wealth* 374.2 483.4 29.2 112.1 189.3 68.9 
Mean net augmented wealth* 347.3 443.0 27.6 104.6 174.7 66.9 
Aged 47–55
 Mean income 102.8 124.1 20.7 41.2 62.1 50.8 
Mean net worth 543.7 822.2 51.2 106.8 222.3 108.2 
Mean augmented wealth 778.9 1,112.0 42.8 244.0 415.3 70.2 
Median augmented wealth 402.8 484.4 20.3 125.4 226.3 80.4 
Mean augmented wealth* 812.3 1,163.9 43.3 247.9 435.5 75.7 
Mean net augmented wealth* 761.5 1,071.8 40.7 228.5 399.7 74.9 
Aged 56–64
 Mean income 79.5 125.5 58.0 29.9 52.7 76.1 
Mean net worth 595.3 1,087.8 82.7 129.7 305.1 135.3 
Mean augmented wealth 905.9 1,481.5 63.5 252.8 516.0 104.1 
Median augmented wealth 503.7 676.8 34.4 104.7 323.4 209.0 
Mean augmented wealth* 905.9 1,513.8 67.1 252.8 528.2 108.9 
Mean net augmented wealth* 860.3 1,396.6 62.3 241.6 493.7 104.4 
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Aged 65+
 Mean income 49.3 72.1 46.4 17.9 27.8 55.2 
Mean net worth 539.0 877.2 62.7 58.9 207.2 252.1 
Mean augmented wealth 766.3 1,139.5 48.7 149.2 448.5 200.6 
Median augmented wealth 375.4 457.1 21.8 83.2 228.2 174.1 
Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample 
sizes. Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth. Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned 
contribution pension plans. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
Wolff.indb 190  11/21/2011 9:18:59 AM   
 
 
 
  
190 Wolff 
gap in augmented wealth than in net worth is attributable mainly to 
the equalizing effect of Social Security. The racial gap in augmented 
wealth thus narrowed over the years. The ratio of mean augmented 
wealth between minorities and whites rose from 0.30 in 1989 to 0.39 in 
2007 among the 46-and-under age group, from 0.31 to 0.37 among the 
47–55 age group, from 0.28 to 0.35 among the 56–64 age group, and 
from 0.20 to 0.39 among elderly households.8 Relative gains made by 
minorities were even more pronounced for median augmented wealth. 
The closure of the augmented wealth racial gap was due to the sizable 
relative gains made by minorities in net worth, which occurred for all 
age groups, and to relative gains in retirement wealth, which occurred 
for all age groups except for ages 56–64.9 The racial income gap also 
narrowed among all age groups.10 
Family Status 
I next analyze levels and trends of retirement wealth and total 
wealth for married couples, single females, and single males. I begin, 
as before, by looking at trends in pension ownership.11 As shown in 
Table 6.9, wide gaps in holdings of pension plans are evident between 
married couples and both single men and single women, particularly 
with regard to DC plans. 
In 2007, the gap in holdings of DC pension wealth between mar-
ried couples and single men was 14 percentage points for the youngest 
age group, 20–22 percentage points among the middle-aged (47–64), 
and 26 percentage points among the elderly. Married couples were also 
more apt to have matching contributions to their DC plans from their 
employers. Among the three nonelderly age groups, the gap in DC pen-
sion coverage generally remained unchanged or widened slightly. How-
ever, among the elderly, the gap mushroomed from 2 percentage points 
in 1989 to 26 percentage points in 2007. In contrast, the gap in DB 
plan entitlement generally narrowed over the period from 1989 to 2007 
as DB plans atrophied. All told, the gap in pension wealth holdings 
narrowed among nonelderly households over the 1989–2007 period, 
mainly because of the sharp contraction in DB plans, but widened 
among elderly households. 
Results are similar when single females are compared with mar-
ried couples. In 2007, the gap in ownership rates of DC plans between 
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Table 6.9  Percentage of Households with Pension Wealth by Family 
Status and Age Class, 1983–2007 
Married Single Single 
couples males females 
1989 2007 1989 2007 1989 2007 
Aged 46 and under 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 37.8 57.4 21.0 43.4 21.5 33.9 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 45.6 25.9 29.0 19.7 24.4 15.8 
Pension wealth 62.4 61.7 41.7 49.0 33.6 39.5 
Share of deﬁ ned contribution 80.6 70.5 77.2 58.9 65.8 61.1 
owners who receive 
employer contributions 
Aged 47–55 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 41.5 74.3 19.4 52.6 17.3 51.9 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 59.9 39.3 50.7 29.5 43.7 28.6 
Pension wealth 75.6 80.6 57.4 61.9 54.3 62.7 
Share of deﬁ ned contribution 48.2 65.3 43.7 58.6 82.5 59.6 
owners who receive 
employer contributions 
Aged 56–64 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 26.7 69.7 10.5 49.6 20.2 46.1 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 70.2 46.3 45.8 43.4 39.2 37.5 
Pension wealth 77.8 79.5 45.8 68.0 51.5 66.9 
Share of deﬁ ned contribution 0.0 51.4 0.0 23.5 0.0 38.0 
owners who receive 
employer contributions 
Aged 65+ 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 1.9 53.4 0.0 27.3 1.0 29.3 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 65.3 57.2 66.1 57.3 33.4 40.7 
Pension wealth 65.8 78.9 66.1 70.4 34.1 55.4 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Pension 
wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁ ned beneﬁ t wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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married couples and single women varied between 22 and 24 percent-
age points across age groups. Married couples were again more apt 
to have matching contributions to their DC plan from their employer 
than single females. Here, too, the gap in the share of DC plan holders 
generally widened over the years from 1989 to 2007 (except for age 
group 47–55). The gap in DB plan entitlement was about 10 percentage 
points among the three nonelderly age groups in 2007 and 17 percent-
age points for the oldest. These gaps in DB coverage narrowed over 
the years 1989 to 2007 among all age groups as DB plans were elimi-
nated. As a consequence, the gap in pension wealth holdings between 
married couples and single females fell by 7 percentage points among 
young households from 1989 to 2007, by 3 percentage points among 
age group 47–55, by 14 percentage points among age group 56–64, and 
by 8 percentage points among the elderly. 
The results from Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show that married couples 
had substantially more retirement wealth and total (augmented) wealth 
than single male–headed households, and they in turn had more retire-
ment and augmented wealth than single female–headed households in 
2007. However, the ﬁgures also show that single men and single women 
generally did catch up somewhat to married couples from 1989 to 2007. 
The ratio of pension wealth, SSW, and both mean and median 
retirement wealth between single men and married couples improved 
between 1989 and 2007. This was true across all age groups. However, 
even in 2007, the mean pension wealth, SSW, and retirement wealth 
of single men averaged about half that of married couples, and median 
retirement wealth averaged about 40 percent that of married couples. 
This discrepancy is, of course, partly explainable by the fact that mar-
ried couples have two adults in the household, and even if they did not 
have two earners, SSW at least is higher for a single earner in a married 
couple than a for single man living alone.12 
In contrast, in 2007, the mean pension wealth, SSW, and retire-
ment wealth, as well as the median retirement wealth, of single women 
averaged about 33–40 percent that of married couples. From 1989 to 
2007, the relative position of single women aged 47 and under and 
aged 65 and older improved across the board with respect to married 
couples. Among age group 47–55, there was a mild deterioration in the 
relative position of single females, while among age group 56–64 the 
mean retirement wealth of single females declined relative to married 
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Table 6.10  Retirement Wealth by Family Status and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Married couples Single males Single females
% change, % change, % change, 
1989 
2007 1989–2007 1989 2007 1989–2007 1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean pension wealth 45.7 70.1 53.3 23.8 43.0 80.5 12.5 23.7 89.4 
Mean Social Security wealth 122.1 160.8 31.7 47.4 69.8 47.2 49.2 69.4 41.0 
Mean retirement wealth 167.8 230.9 37.5 71.2 112.8 58.3 61.7 93.1 50.8 
Median retirement wealth 140.3 175.2 24.9 51.8 72.2 39.3 50.3 70.8 40.6 
Aged 47–55 
Mean pension wealth 131.0 229.3 75.1 56.5 125.3 121.8 44.9 78.7 75.4 
Mean Social Security wealth 161.5 251.9 56.0 65.9 111.9 69.7 71.4 108.0 51.3 
Mean retirement wealth 292.5 481.3 64.5 122.4 237.2 93.7 116.3 186.8 60.6 
Median retirement wealth 214.5 365.8 70.6 77.7 144.9 86.5 89.1 130.6 46.6 
Aged 56–64 
Mean pension wealth 186.3 385.9 107.2 71.5 198.8 178.0 69.5 114.9 65.2 
Mean Social Security wealth 195.8 311.3 59.0 75.3 134.0 78.0 72.5 128.7 77.6 
Mean retirement wealth 382.1 697.2 82.5 146.8 332.8 126.7 142.0 243.6 71.5 
Median retirement wealth 310.1 493.1 59.0 107.5 208.6 94.0 82.0 174.7 113.0 
Aged 65+ 
Mean pension wealth 138.2 265.4 92.0 59.8 124.3 107.7 34.8 81.9 135.3 
Mean Social Security wealth 206.5 248.4 20.3 87.3 110.1 26.2 55.0 91.3 66.0 
Mean retirement wealth 344.7 513.8 49.0 147.1 234.5 59.4 89.8 173.2 92.9 
Median retirement wealth 282.3 352.1 24.7 125.8 157.4 25.1 56.7 102.7 81.1 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁ ned beneﬁ t wealth. 
Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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Table 6.11  Income and Wealth by Family Status and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Married couples Single males Single females 
% change, % change, % change, 
1989 2007 1989–2007 1989 2007 1989–2007 1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 46 and under
 Mean income 77.9 85.3 9.5 46.7 44.4 −5.1 30.4 33.5 10.1 
Mean net worth 217.2 272.2 25.3 177.4 123.9 −30.1 50.3 100.2 99.0 
Mean augmented wealth 372.4 464.3 24.7 243.9 210.4 −13.8 108.6 181.6 67.1 
Median augmented wealth 222.8 241.2 8.3 73.1 83.2 13.8 56.3 68.3 21.2 
Mean augmented wealth* 412.5 511.4 24.0 255.9 238.2 −6.9 121.1 199.1 64.4 
Mean net augmented wealth* 381.9 468.4 22.7 244.4 214.7 −12.2 114.1 185.6 62.7 
Aged 47–55
 Mean income 114.9 143.6 25.0 74.4 74.1 −0.4 31.7 42.8 35.1 
Mean net worth 617.5 929.1 50.5 303.0 453.8 49.8 120.5 226.9 88.3 
Mean augmented wealth 880.5 1,268.6 44.1 411.4 611.9 48.7 233.6 375.2 60.6 
Median augmented wealth 449.7 592.7 31.8 135.0 282.4 109.1 141.4 192.7 36.3 
Mean augmented wealth* 911.7 1,324.2 45.2 421.5 646.2 53.3 251.1 396.2 57.8 
Mean net augmented wealth* 853.3 1,219.6 42.9 400.7 593.2 48.0 238.2 367.3 54.2 
Aged 56–64
 Mean income 90.1 155.7 72.8 42.5 58.5 37.6 30.9 38.3 24.0 
Mean net worth 665.1 1,335.0 100.7 242.8 541.2 122.9 215.2 281.1 30.6 
Mean augmented wealth 1,022.6 1,797.7 75.8 382.5 773.1 102.1 343.5 471.3 37.2 
Median augmented wealth 552.3 833.6 50.9 228.8 392.6 71.6 154.2 301.6 95.6 
Mean augmented wealth* 1,022.6 1,839.1 79.8 382.5 785.1 105.3 343.5 478.4 39.2 
Mean net augmented wealth* 972.7 1,695.8 74.3 364.2 723.4 98.6 324.8 449.6 38.4 
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Aged 65+
 Mean income 66.8 102.5 53.3 27.4 46.3 69.1 23.7 29.6 25.1 
Mean net worth 751.0 1,249.2 66.3 207.8 592.0 184.9 202.2 338.2 67.2 
Mean augmented wealth 1,091.3 1,627.0 49.1 354.9 769.2 116.7 291.4 481.4 65.2 
Median augmented wealth 510.2 674.4 32.2 179.2 386.9 115.9 167.1 299.5 79.2 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + retirement wealth. 
Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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couples while median retirement wealth improved substantially. In the 
case of the latter group, the widening in the mean retirement wealth 
gap between single women and married couples was attributable to a 
relative decline in private pension wealth since their relative SSW had 
improved. 
Augmented wealth also differed widely by marital status in 2007 
(see Table 6.11). Single women typically had less than single men, who 
had less than married couples. Single men had only about half the level 
of augmented wealth (both mean and median) as married couples in 
2007, while single women had about a third. Typically, single men or 
women should have about half of what married couples have in retire-
ment wealth to achieve a similar level of retirement income adequacy, 
all else being equal. My ﬁgures show that, after controlling for family 
size in this simplistic manner, single men had approximately the same 
level of wealth per person as married couples. However, single women 
had approximately two-thirds of what their married or male counter-
parts had in terms of wealth. 
However, single women generally showed an improvement relative 
to married couples with regard to augmented wealth over the period 
1989–2007. Among younger households (under age 47), the ratio of 
mean augmented wealth advanced from 0.29 to 0.39 and that of median 
augmented wealth from 0.25 to 0.28. This improvement was attribut-
able to relative gains in both net worth and retirement wealth. Among 
age group 47–55, the ratio of mean augmented wealth increased moder-
ately from 27 to 30 percent, and that of median augmented wealth from 
31 to 33 percent. These relative gains reﬂected relative improvements 
in mean net worth. 
Among age group 56–64, the ratio of mean augmented wealth actu-
ally fell from 34 to 26 percent (the only case of a decline), but that of 
median augmented wealth rose from 28 to 36 percent. These changes 
were attributable to a sharp drop in relative mean net worth and strong 
relative gains in median retirement wealth. Among the elderly, the ratio 
of mean augmented wealth showed a modest improvement, from 27 to 
30 percent, but that of median augmented wealth climbed from 33 to 44 
percent. These trends were attributable to strong relative gains in mean 
and median retirement wealth. 
The story for single men is even stronger. Their position relative 
to married couples in terms of retirement wealth, net worth, and aug-
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mented wealth improved across almost all age groups (except young 
households) over the years 1989–2007. However, single men saw their 
income relative to married couples generally decline over the period 
1989–2007 (for single women the trends were mixed). 
Educational Attainment 
Trends based on distinctions by educational attainment are very dif-
ferent from those based on race and ethnicity and also those between 
married couples and single women. Households with less educational 
attainment had substantially less retirement wealth and total wealth in 
2007 than their counterparts. In addition, they generally fell further 
behind college graduates over the years 1989–2007. Indeed, retirement 
wealth and total wealth splayed out over time, as college graduates 
pulled ahead of other educational groups. 
As shown in Table 6.12, the gap in pension ownership rates wid-
ened over time between college graduates and the less educated. Hold-
ings of DC plans increased among all educational levels and age groups 
from 1989 to 2007. Despite this, the gap in holdings of DC plans among 
young households (age 46 and under) between households with less 
than 12 years of schooling and households headed by a college gradu-
ate widened greatly, from 23 percentage points in 1983 to 57 percentage 
points in 2007. Most of the widening took place during the 1990s, as 
the take-up rate for DC plans was much higher for college graduates. 
Similar trends are evident for other age groups (among the elderly, the 
gap widened from 3 percentage points in 1989 to 50 percentage points 
in 2007!). 
Trends differed somewhat for high school graduates. The gap in 
DC pension coverage between high school and college graduates was 
already generally quite large in 1989 but declined over the ensuing years 
among young households and those aged 47–55. However, the gap in 
DC plans between high school and college graduates rose from 12 to 
30 percentage points among age group 56–64, and from 4 to 29 per-
centage points among elderly households. The gap in DC plan holdings 
between those with 13–15 years of schooling and college graduates rose 
by between 8 and 35 percentage points over the 1989–2007 period.13 
The percentage of households with entitlements to DB plans plum-
meted among all educational levels and age groups from 1989 to 2007. 
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Table 6.12  Percentage of Households with Pension Wealth by Years of Schooling and Age Class, 1983–2007 
Less than 12 years
 12 years
 13–15 years
 16 years or more 
1989 2007 1989 2007 1989 2007 1989 2007 
Aged 46 and under 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 21.1 17.5 0.0 37.8 33.0 47.7 44.4 74.4 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 26.1 5.2 78.0 50.6 44.1 21.5 45.7 34.1 
Pension wealth 35.5 19.3 78.0 67.1 57.7 54.1 67.3 79.2 
Share of deﬁ ned contribution 70.1 85.6 0.0 10.9 83.1 69.5 80.6 65.3 
owners who receive employer 
contributions 
Aged 47–55 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 20.2 36.6 32.1 57.1 43.3 70.0 59.9 80.6 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 48.2 14.9 52.4 31.2 71.8 33.7 64.1 46.3 
Pension wealth 60.2 43.5 65.0 65.3 80.1 75.9 85.9 89.3 
Share of deﬁ ned contribution 57.7 65.4 53.2 63.5 53.1 58.2 47.3 65.8 
owners who receive employer 
contributions 
Aged 56–64 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 15.4 26.7 20.8 48.2 46.2 64.5 32.7 78.4 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 47.7 12.8 61.4 40.1 73.9 50.5 81.9 51.1 
Pension wealth 55.1 37.4 66.4 68.8 91.1 80.6 86.7 86.7 
Share of deﬁ ned contribution 0.0 51.4 0.0 46.2 0.0 53.9 0.0 41.1 
owners who receive employer 
contributions 
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Aged 65+ 
Deﬁned contribution accounts 1.0 16.4 0.0 37.8 4.3 50.2 3.7 66.3 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁ t plans 43.9 36.5 78.0 50.6 58.4 52.3 65.9 65.4 
Pension wealth 44.4 46.7 78.0 67.1 59.7 75.2 67.4 90.4 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age and education of the head of household. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned 
beneﬁ t wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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As a result, the gap in DB plan entitlements between college gradu-
ates and less-educated households generally fell over time. The gap 
in the share of households owning one or the other form of pension 
between less-educated households and college graduates rose over 
time. Between those with less than 12 years of schooling and col-
lege graduates, the gap widened by 28 percentage points from 1989 to 
2007 among young households, by about 20 percentage points among 
middle-aged households, and by 21 percentage points among the elderly. 
Between high school graduates and college graduates, the gap widened 
by 23 percentage points among young households and by 34 percent-
age points among elderly ones, but it remained relatively unchanged 
among middle-aged households.14 Between those with 13–15 years of 
schooling and college graduates, the gap increased by between 4 and 17 
percentage points. 
Not surprisingly, households with less education had accumulated 
much less pension wealth than those headed by a college graduate, and 
the gap widened between 1989 and 2007 (see Table 6.13). In 2007, the 
mean pension wealth of households with less than 12 years of school-
ing averaged less than 10 percent that of college graduates, the mean 
pension wealth of high school graduates about a quarter that of college 
graduates, and the mean pension wealth of those with 13–15 years of 
schooling only about a third of college graduates. The mean pension 
wealth among households headed by someone with less than 12 years 
of schooling declined among all age groups from 1989 to 2007 (about 
55 percent for age groups 46 and under, 47–55, and 56–64 and by 4 per-
cent for those aged 65 and over), and the ratio of mean pension wealth 
between this educational group and college graduates fell by between 7 
and 17 percentage points. 
For high school graduates, mean pension wealth remained more or 
less unchanged among the youngest age group and those aged 47–55, 
but declined by 12 percent among those aged 56–64 and by 27 per-
cent among those aged 65 and over. Moreover, the ratio of mean pen-
sion wealth between high school and college graduates fell by 15–24 
percentage points from 1989 to 2007. Despite the fact that the mean 
pension wealth of households with 13–15 years of schooling generally 
increased from 1989 to 2007, the ratio of mean pension wealth between 
this educational group and college graduates also declined across all 
age groups, from 9 to 29 percentage points. 
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Less-educated households did relatively better in terms of SSW
than in terms of pension wealth. In 2007, the ratio of mean SSW among 
households with less than 12 years of schooling was about half that of 
college graduate households; the ratio between high school and col-
lege graduates varied between three-ﬁfths and two-thirds; and the ratio 
between those with 13–15 years of schooling and college graduates 
ranged from about three-ﬁfths to four-ﬁfths. Mean SSW grew among 
all educational and age groups in 1989–2007 except among the elderly, 
where it stayed unchanged or declined. The ratio of mean SSW between 
those with less than a high school degree and college graduates actually 
increased moderately between 1989 and 2007. However, the ratio in 
mean SSW between high school and college graduates fell among all 
age groups, as it did between those with 13–15 years of schooling and 
college graduates. 
Households with less than 12 years of schooling still had the least 
amount of retirement wealth in 2007, compared to households with 
more education. For instance, the typical household between the ages 
of 56 and 64 with less than 12 years of schooling had $164,000 in retire-
ment wealth, compared to $271,500 for households with 12 years of 
schooling, $359,700 for households with 13–15 years of schooling, and 
$565,100 for households with 16 and more years of schooling. These 
differences held by and large, regardless of the age group or whether 
median or mean retirement wealth is used. 
The ratio of mean and median retirement wealth ranged from 23 
to 33 percent in 2007 between the least educated group and college 
graduates, from 33 to 48 percent between high school and college 
graduates, and from 49 to 64 percent between those with some college 
and college graduates. Due mainly to the increasing spread in pension 
wealth between college graduates and the less educated, the ratio of 
both mean and median retirement wealth between the least educated 
group and college graduates fell for every age group between 1989 and 
2007 (with the single exception of median retirement wealth for age 
group 56–64). A similar pattern holds for the ratio between high school 
and college graduates. In the case of elderly households, the ratio in 
mean retirement wealth plummeted by 32 percentage points and that 
in median retirement wealth by 49 percentage points. A similar story 
ensues between those with some college and college graduates. 
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Table 6.13  Retirement Wealth by Years of Schooling and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Less than 12 years of schooling
 12 years of schooling % change % change 
Category 1989 2007 1989−2007 1989 2007 1989−2007 
Aged 46 and under
 Mean pension wealth 12.8 5.5 −57.5 31.0 31.9 3.0 
Mean Social Security wealth 56.3 81.7 45.2 102.4 107.3 4.7 
Mean retirement wealth 69.1 87.1 26.1 133.4 139.2 4.3 
Median retirement wealth 61.8 78.9 27.7 111.2 115.7 4.0 
Aged 47–55
 Mean pension wealth 54.5 24.2 −55.7 94.7 92.4 −2.3 
Mean Social Security wealth 83.9 128.6 53.3 160.9 166.1 3.3 
Mean retirement wealth 138.4 152.8 10.4 255.6 258.6 1.2 
Median retirement wealth 106.2 116.1 9.3 203.5 219.5 7.9 
Aged 56–64
 Mean pension wealth 73.3 33.3 −54.5 150.5 133.2 −11.5 
Mean Social Security wealth 105.9 162.9 53.8 190.7 203.5 6.7 
Mean retirement wealth 179.2 196.2 9.5 341.2 336.7 −1.3 
Median retirement wealth 126.9 164.0 29.2 275.2 271.5 −1.3 
Aged 65+
 Mean pension wealth 43.7 42.2 −3.5 111.8 81.9 −26.8 
Mean Social Security wealth 94.0 123.7 31.6 210.1 153.6 −26.9 
Mean retirement wealth 137.7 166.0 20.5 321.9 235.5 −26.8 
Median retirement wealth 94.6 106.8 12.8 309.5 195.0 −37.0 
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13–15 years of schooling 16 or more years of schooling 
Aged 46 and under
 Mean pension wealth 41.6 41.7 0.3 63.6 113.5 78.6 
Mean Social Security wealth 96.7 111.5 15.3 134.4 177.1 31.8 
Mean retirement wealth 138.3 153.2 10.8 197.9 290.6 46.8 
Median retirement wealth 124.5 118.0 −5.2 169.1 239.1 41.4 
Aged 47–55
 Mean pension wealth 111.5 137.5 23.3 220.8 328.1 48.5 
Mean Social Security wealth 150.3 168.3 12.0 185.0 264.8 43.2 
Mean retirement wealth 261.8 305.8 16.8 405.8 592.9 46.1 
Median retirement wealth 250.1 241.2 −3.6 315.5 480.5 52.3 
Aged 56–64
 Mean pension wealth 167.6 214.0 27.7 329.8 532.1 61.3 
Mean Social Security wealth 173.0 211.3 22.1 221.8 309.3 39.4 
Mean retirement wealth 340.6 425.2 24.8 551.7 841.4 52.5 
Median retirement wealth 297.2 359.7 21.0 513.6 565.1 10.0 
Aged 65+
 Mean pension wealth 188.3 172.8 −8.2 276.7 487.5 76.2 
Mean Social Security wealth 195.1 189.8 −2.7 224.1 232.8 3.8 
Mean retirement wealth 383.4 362.6 −5.4 500.8 720.2 43.8 
Median retirement wealth 320.9 280.7 −12.5 335.4 452.8 35.0 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age and education of the head of household. Key: Pension wealth = deﬁned contribution + deﬁned 
beneﬁt wealth. Retirement wealth = pension wealth + Social Security wealth. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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Table 6.14  Income and Wealth by Years of Schooling and Age Class, 1989 and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Less than 12 years of schooling 12 years of schooling 
% change, % change,
 1989 2007 1989–2007 1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean income 33.6 29.5 −12.2 55.6 51.1 −8.0 
Mean net worth 57.6 40.8 −29.2 87.7 117.5 34.0 
Mean augmented wealth 123.5 124.9 1.1 213.1 241.1 13.1 
Median augmented wealth 68.7 83.2 21.1 150.0 128.0 −14.6 
Mean augmented wealth* 135.4 129.7 −4.2 236.0 255.6 8.3 
Mean net augmented wealth* 128.5 125.7 −2.2 219.7 239.5 9.0 
Aged 47–55 
Mean income 41.0 38.8 −5.5 70.4 65.1 −7.5 
Mean net worth 143.4 100.4 −30.0 397.1 266.9 −32.8 
Mean augmented wealth 278.4 242.1 −13.0 638.1 478.2 −25.1 
Median augmented wealth 177.0 170.8 −3.5 389.8 332.0 −14.8 
Mean augmented wealth* 291.0 248.3 −14.7 646.7 497.9 −23.0 
Mean net augmented wealth* 277.3 238.8 −13.9 614.1 461.2 −24.9 
Aged 56–64 
Mean income 36.5 30.8 −15.8 64.5 56.9 −11.7 
Mean net worth 198.9 123.1 −38.1 438.4 374.0 −14.7 
Mean augmented wealth 369.5 298.0 −19.3 767.4 646.7 −15.7 
Median augmented wealth 241.0 224.2 −7.0 532.7 424.6 −20.3 
Mean augmented wealth* 369.5 300.7 −18.6 767.4 653.3 −14.9 
Mean net augmented wealth* 355.5 291.6 −18.0 740.1 619.5 −16.3 
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Aged 65+ 
Mean income 25.3 25.8 2.0 43.5 36.9 −15.1 
Mean net worth 200.8 241.7 20.4 505.9 375.7 −25.7 
Mean augmented wealth 338.0 393.3 16.4 827.7 586.2 −29.2 
Median augmented wealth 229.3 247.0 7.7 530.8 387.8 −26.9 
13–15 years of schooling 16+ years of schooling 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean income 65.7 56.5 −14.0 105.9 109.8 3.7 
Mean net worth 172.7 125.6 −27.3 422.3 454.5 7.6 
Mean augmented wealth 301.9 258.9 −14.2 600.9 677.1 12.7 
Median augmented wealth 184.9 136.9 −26.0 329.9 346.9 5.2 
Mean augmented wealth* 330.8 287.6 −13.1 662.0 759.7 14.8 
Mean net augmented wealth* 309.2 264.0 −14.6 611.6 687.4 12.4 
Aged 47–55 
Mean income 92.3 73.0 −20.9 232.0 193.3 −16.7 
Mean net worth 466.1 437.4 −6.1 1,306.7 1,411.8 8.0 
Mean augmented wealth 706.9 657.0 −7.0 1,639.3 1,798.3 9.7 
Median augmented wealth 522.5 340.5 −34.8 875.1 857.1 −2.1 
Mean augmented wealth* 745.2 684.0 −8.2 1,712.0 1,886.7 10.2 
Mean net augmented wealth* 694.6 632.2 −9.0 1,587.6 1,731.6 9.1 
(continued) 
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13–15 years of schooling 16+ years of schooling 
% change, % change,
 1989 2007 1989–2007 1989 2007 1989–2007 
Aged 56–64 
Mean income 85.2 79.8 −6.3 163.5 198.3 21.3 
Mean net worth 504.0 488.0 −3.2 1,482.3 1,931.5 30.3 
Mean augmented wealth 827.1 816.0 −1.3 1,971.6 2,434.8 23.5 
Median augmented wealth 557.8 566.4 1.6 890.9 1,103.7 23.9 
Mean augmented wealth* 827.1 832.2 0.6 1,971.6 2,495.3 26.6 
Mean net augmented wealth* 776.3 771.6 −0.6 1,856.9 2,287.3 23.2 
Aged 65+ 
Mean income 81.9 60.3 −26.4 149.3 169.0 13.2 
Mean net worth 1,360.8 666.4 −51.0 1,648.4 2,295.4 39.3 
Mean augmented wealth 1,734.4 956.7 −44.8 2,136.6 2,741.8 28.3 
Median augmented wealth 676.6 580.7 −14.2 971.0 1,149.3 18.4 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age and education of the head of household. Key: Augmented wealth = nonpension wealth + 
retirement wealth. Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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Likewise, similar disparities exist in net worth and augmented 
wealth between the less educated and college graduates (see Table 
6.14). In 2007, the ratio of net worth between the least educated group 
and college graduates ranged from 6 to 11 percent; that between high 
school and college graduates from 19 to 26 percent; and that between 
some college and college graduates from 25 to 31 percent. Mean net 
worth generally declined among the less-educated groups and increased 
among college graduates from 1989 to 2007, so that the ratio of mean 
net worth between the three less-educated groups and college graduates 
generally fell between 1989 and 2007. 
Ratios of both mean and median augmented wealth between the 
less educated and college graduates are generally higher than the cor-
responding net worth ratios. The ratio of mean and median augmented 
wealth between the least educated and college graduates ranged from 12 
to 24 percent in 2007; that between high school and college graduates 
from 21 to 39 percent; and that between those with some college and 
college graduates from 33 to 51 percent. Here, too, because of a relative 
decline in both retirement wealth and net worth between the less edu-
cated and college graduates, the former groups fell further behind the 
latter in terms of both mean and median augmented wealth from 1989 
to 2007. This occurred for all educational groups and age groups, with 
only two exceptions (median augmented wealth among the least edu-
cated aged 46 and under, and mean augmented wealth for high school 
graduates aged 46 and under). The mean income of the less-educated 
groups also declined relative to college graduates between 1989 and 
2007. This was true for all age groups (again with two exceptions). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The chapter began with a review of time series trends in retire-
ment wealth and augmented wealth and comparisons of the portfolio 
composition of augmented wealth by age class and income quintile. 
It is clear that SSW was more important for younger households than 
older ones. It is also particularly important among the lowest income 
quintile, accounting for almost half or more of augmented wealth in 
some years. In contrast, pension wealth was a major component of aug-
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mented wealth for the third and fourth income quintiles. For the top 
income quintile, nonpension net worth was by far the leading compo-
nent, accounting for about 70–75 percent of augmented wealth. 
When dividing households by net worth class, a U-shaped pattern 
emerged between wealth class and the growth in retirement wealth from 
1989 to 2007. Gains were by far the strongest at the top but also rela-
tively strong at the bottom. They were weakest in the middle (in many 
cases negative). Dividing households by income class, I also ﬁ nd that 
advances in retirement wealth were strongest at the top. Advances were 
once again weakest in the middle and, in most cases, negative. 
Dividing households by race and ethnicity, I ﬁnd large gaps in pen-
sion ownership, pension wealth, retirement wealth, and augmented 
wealth between minorities and (non-Hispanic) whites. However, there 
is strong evidence of relative gains made by minorities on whites in 
terms of SSW, retirement wealth, net worth, and augmented wealth 
from 1989 to 2007. Relative gains in net worth appear to be due to 
a large expansion of the home ownership rate among minorities dur-
ing the 2000s (see Chapter 2). Though a full analysis is beyond the 
scope of the present volume, it is likely that the relative gains in SSW
among minorities are due to three factors: 1) some convergence in labor 
earnings between minorities and whites, particularly during the 1990s; 
2) more continuous work histories for minority workers over time; and 
3) a reduction in the life expectancy gap between minorities and whites. 
There was also a substantial gap in retirement wealth and aug-
mented wealth between single females and married couples. Similar to 
the experience of minorities, single females progressed relative to mar-
ried couples between 1989 and 2007 along almost every dimension. A
similar pattern holds for single men. Their position relative to married 
couples improved along almost every dimension as well. 
Trends based on educational attainment are very different from 
those by race and ethnicity and by family status. Households with less 
educational attainment had substantially less retirement wealth and aug-
mented wealth in 2007 than their counterparts. In addition, they gener-
ally fell further behind college graduates between 1989 and 2007 in 
terms of pension wealth, retirement wealth, net worth, and augmented 
wealth. Indeed, retirement wealth and augmented wealth splayed out 
over time, as college graduates pulled ahead of the other educational 
groups. Much of this change reﬂects the rising returns to education 
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that have occurred since 1980 or so (see Goldin and Katz [2008], for 
example). This pattern also shows up in relative household incomes by 
schooling level, which shows increasing dispersion between 1989 and 
2007. 
With regard to pension wealth, the decline in DB plans was particu-
larly detrimental to the less educated, since DB had been a bulwark of 
retirement security among the less-educated, blue-collar workers up to 
the 1980s. We also saw a similar pattern for current workers classiﬁed 
by years of schooling (see Table 4.2). 
Notes 
1. Although they are quite distinct ﬁnancial instruments, we combine DC and DB 
plans under private pensions, as both are employer-sponsored savings initiatives 
with the explicit purpose of saving for retirement. 
2. As was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, most of the gains in both pension wealth 
and SSW occurred in the 1990s, with only modest advances from 2001 to 2007. 
3. In general, incomes are skewed toward high-income earners in the SCF compared 
to the CPS because of oversampling of the rich and the fact that income values are 
not top-coded. Thus, average income levels (and inequality) in the SCF are higher 
than the corresponding ﬁgures in the CPS. 
4. I combine these two minority groups because of the small sample of each. Also, 
Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of their small sample 
size. The race/ethnicity of the household is based on that recorded by the reference 
person in the household. 
5. Interestingly, of those with DC accounts, minority households were much more 
likely to receive employer contributions (DCEMP). 
6. Similar results are evident for (current) workers classiﬁed by race and ethnicity. 
(see Table 4.2). 
7. Ratios of mean AW* and mean net AW* are almost identical. 
8. Trends in mean AW* and mean net AW* are once again almost identical. 
9. The racial net worth ratio by age group in 2007 was 0.29 for the youngest age 
group, 0.27 for age group 47–55, 0.28 for age group 56–64, and 0.24 for the 
elderly. These ratios compare to an overall net worth ratio of 0.19 in 2007 between 
African Americans and whites and of 0.26 between Hispanics and (non-Hispanic) 
whites (see Chapter 2). The apparent inconsistency is accounted for by the fact 
that there was a much higher share of minority households (notably Hispanics) in 
the low-wealth youngest age group (59.8 versus 40.1 percent), and correspond-
ingly lower percentages in the high-wealth middle-aged group 47–64 (30.0 versus 
35.2 percent) and the elderly group (11.2 versus 24.7 percent). 
10. Minorities made considerable advances during the 1990s (the 1989–2001 period) 
as well as during the 2000s (2001 to 2007). During the 1990s, growth was strong 
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across the board for both whites and minorities but stronger among minority house-
holds. As a result, the gap in pension wealth, SSW, mean and median retirement 
wealth, income, and mean and median augmented wealth generally narrowed, 
particularly among the elderly. During the 2000s, the racial gap further narrowed. 
This was true almost across the board in terms of pension wealth, SSW, mean 
and median retirement wealth, income, and mean and median augmented wealth. 
Among households in age group 46 and under and age group 47–55, this closure 
was due to actual declines in pension wealth and SSW among white households in 
contrast to positive growth among minority households. For the older age groups, 
both whites and minorities generally saw positive growth, but it was higher among 
minorities than among whites. 
11. As indicated, households are divided into three types: 1) married couples, includ-
ing cohabitating adults; 2) male householders without a spouse (or a cohabitating 
adult) present; and 3) female householders without a spouse (or a cohabitating 
adult) present. 
12. The reason, as discussed in Chapter 4, is that Social Security beneﬁts for a single 
earner qualifying for beneﬁts in a married couple are increased by 50 percent rela-
tive to beneﬁts for a single earner living alone. 
13. Similar trends are reported in Table 4.2 for this gap as measured by the educational 
level of (current) workers. 
14. As was true among current workers, in 1989 high school graduates had a higher 
rate of pension ownership than college graduates because of a higher share of 
households with DB entitlements. 
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Retirement Prospects 
Retirement income security occupies the public debate on a regular 
basis. It refers to the ability of households to provide an adequate stream 
of income during the period of their retirement from the labor force. 
There has been, for example, periodic discussion about the possibility 
for Social Security privatization. What is largely absent from the dis-
cussion, though, is a broader perspective that puts Social Security ben-
eﬁts in the frame of retirement income security. Social Security’s value 
and thus the options to reform it can only be fully understood when it 
is put in the larger context of all retirement savings. This requires an 
understanding of the retirement savings that households have accumu-
lated, how this has changed over time, and what role Social Security has 
played in these changes. 
The ﬁrst question is whether workers have saved enough for retire-
ment. My results indicate that the retirement system in the United States 
outside of Social Security is a system with many holes, despite large tax 
incentives from the federal government for workers to save for retire-
ment. Nearly one-ﬁfth of households nearing retirement—i.e., house-
holds between the ages of 56 and 64—had no retirement savings other 
than Social Security. In contrast, almost all households can expect to 
receive some beneﬁts from Social Security. 
Even among the households that have private pensions, savings are 
very unevenly distributed. Indeed, one of the most dramatic transforma-
tions over the last three decades has been the replacement of traditional 
DB pension plans with DC plans such as 401(k)s. This changeover has 
actually been detrimental to a large share of the working population. 
Minorities, single women, and workers with a high school educa-
tion or less have substantially less retirement wealth than their coun-
terparts. Much of this inequality results from an uneven distribution 
of retirement savings outside of Social Security. In fact, as is shown in 
Chapter 5, expected Social Security beneﬁts are an equalizing force: 
when Social Security wealth is included, total retirement beneﬁts are 
more equally distributed than without. Moreover, the typical household 
211 
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in 2007 could expect more retirement income from Social Security than 
from its private DC plan retirement savings. In addition, private pen-
sions fell behind other private savings in the spectrum of retirement 
preparedness. 
How have retirement savings changed over time? Retirement sav-
ings improved from 1989 to 2007, despite the fact that large trouble 
spots remain. The share of households that could expect to have retire-
ment incomes that were less than the poverty line declined. Also, the 
share of households that could hope to replace at least three-quarters 
of their projected income at age 64 with beneﬁts from their savings in 
retirement rose from 1989 to 2007. Moreover, minorities and the bot-
tom quintile in terms of income saw larger improvements in retirement 
preparedness than their counterparts, although they generally remained 
less well prepared in 2007 than these other groups. 
Social Security played an important role in the relative improve-
ments of these two groups. Gains in Social Security beneﬁts were more 
pronounced than improvements in private retirement savings among 
the groups that saw disproportionately larger gains—that is, relative 
improvements—in their retirement income adequacy. Social Security 
was at the heart of improving retirement income security for those who 
typically have less retirement wealth than their counterparts. In some 
cases, improvements in SSW even helped to offset declines in private 
pension wealth. 
My empirical analysis involves three steps. The ﬁrst is a calculation 
of how much wealth—in its various manifestations, including market-
able wealth, pension wealth, and SSW—households held in 2007, and 
how that amount changed compared to 1983, 1989, and 2001. These 
computations of the components of augmented wealth are made in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The second step is a calculation of the stream 
of retirement income that today’s older workers can expect from their 
accumulated wealth at the time of their retirement. For this purpose, 
I convert the stock of wealth into an annuity ﬂow on the basis of the 
historical rate of return on household assets and on the basis of life 
expectancy by age, race, and gender. 
The third step is a comparison of the expected income stream gener-
ated from different wealth holdings to two standards of adequate retire-
ment income: the poverty level income and the ratio of ﬁ nal income 
replaced by retirement income. These measures allow us to assess 
Wolff.indb 213  11/21/2011 9:19:13 AM   
 
 
 
  
Retirement Prospects 213 
whether households have saved enough for retirement and how this has 
changed over time. The last two topics are the focus of the present chap-
ter, as well as an analysis of changes in retirement income security for 
households with different demographic characteristics, as deﬁ ned by 
age, gender, race or ethnicity, education, and marital status. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the methods used to mea-
sure retirement income adequacy. It then provides details on expected 
retirement income over the period 1989–2007 by demographic and 
household characteristic. I then make projections of the expected pov-
erty rate at retirement by demographic and household characteristic. 
The last two sections present estimates of expected income replacement 
rates at retirement and offer a summary of results. 
MEASURING RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY
I now turn to a consideration of how well families are prepared 
for retirement. I ﬁrst discuss the method for projecting future retire-
ment income. I then show results on three dimensions of retirement 
income adequacy: 1) projected retirement income, 2) projected poverty 
status during retirement, and 3) the projected income replacement rate 
at retirement. 
Retirement Income Projections 
Retirement income is based on four components: 1) standard 
nonpension wealth holdings, 2) DC pension holdings, 3) DB pension 
entitlements, and 4) Social Security.1 Current holdings of nonpension 
wealth are ﬁrst divided into two parts: equity in owner-occupied hous-
ing and nonhome wealth. There is some disagreement in the literature 
about whether home equity should be considered part of the resource 
base for retirement income. On the one hand, home equity provides 
consumption services directly to the household and, as a result, does 
not augment other sources of income that can be used for nonhome 
consumption. On the other hand, home equity can be used to ﬁnance 
current consumption through new mortgages, home equity loans, and 
even reverse mortgages. In this regard, home equity can also add to 
Wolff.indb 214  11/21/2011 9:19:13 AM   
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
214 Wolff 
the resource base for nonhome consumption. Because both views are 
legitimate, I will compute projected retirement income both including 
and excluding home equity and, as an intermediate position, including 
half the value of home equity. 
I then convert nonhome, nonpension wealth and owner-occupied 
housing into an annuity equivalent (ANN) based on the formula 
(7.1) ANNi = ri × Asset i / [1 − (1 + ri)−max(LERH,LERW)] , 
where ri is the rate of return on Asset i, LERH is the life expectancy of 
the husband at year of retirement, and LERW is the life expectancy of 
the wife at year of retirement. As discussed in Appendix D, each spouse 
records his or her expected date (or age) of retirement in the Survey 
of Consumer Finances (SCF). An annuity is calculated for each asset 
(and debt) based on the historical rate of return on that asset. The asset 
classes used for the calculation, as well as the corresponding estimated 
historical rate of return, are listed in Appendix Table D.1. 
The rationale for converting household wealth into an annuity to 
gauge retirement adequacy is that the annuity value indicates the sus-
tainable level of withdrawals from each asset that will last the (esti-
mated) remainder of the person’s life (or, in the case, of a couple, the 
life of the longest-living spouse) and that will totally exhaust the asset 
value at time of death.2 In a sense, this is the wealth equivalent to the 
concept of permanent income. The rates of return include both capital 
gains and asset income like dividends and interest, so that the annuity 
value replaces any projected property income. Though a family need 
not actually withdraw the annuity value of its wealth each year, the 
annuity value does indicate the level of potential consumption that 
can be maintained over time from the family’s wealth holdings. I treat 
the second component of augmented wealth, DC pension holdings, in 
exactly the same way, and convert it into an annuity. 
The third component, DB plan beneﬁts, is the sum of DB pension 
plan beneﬁts currently received by the husband and wife and pension 
beneﬁts expected in the future by the husband and wife. The former 
consists of pension beneﬁts received by current retirees as well as ben-
eﬁts currently collected from past jobs by those currently working. Up 
to six pensions from past jobs and six beneﬁts from current job beneﬁts 
can be recorded in the SCF (see Chapter 4 and Appendix B for more 
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details). The latter consists of future expected DB pension beneﬁts as 
indicated by the respondent. 
The fourth component, Social Security beneﬁts, is the sum of Social 
Security beneﬁts currently being received plus future expected Social 
Security beneﬁts. The latter is based on a computation of the Primary 
Insurance Amount, which, in turn, is based on estimated work history 
for both husband and wife (see Chapter 4 and Appendix B for more 
details). 
I then add to current nonpension wealth holdings and DC plan hold-
ings the estimated amount of additional wealth accumulations up to the 
time of retirement. And, I estimate the future accumulations of each 
asset in nonpension wealth up to time of retirement. This is based on 
the historical real rate of return of each asset type (see Appendix Table 
D.1).3 I also estimate the future gains on current holdings of DC pension 
wealth. Moreover, in the case of DC accounts, I add on DCEMP (future 
projected employer contributions to the worker’s DC plan), as well as 
a new component which I call DCEMPW).4 This is the present dis-
counted value of future employee contributions into his or her DC plan. 
This is based on data provided in the SCF, which indicates what fraction 
of an employee’s salary is currently contributed into the employee’s DC 
account. It is assumed that the worker continues to work for the same 
employer until retirement and that his or her contribution rate remains 
unchanged over time.5 I then deﬁne total DC wealth, DCTOT, as the 
sum of DC, DCEMP, and DCEMPW. 
It should be noted that I do not try to estimate future savings rates 
or wealth transfers received from gifts or inheritances. Indeed, it should 
be stressed that I am not attempting to fully model the savings behavior 
of households nearing retirement, as one can do in a microsimulation 
model. As a result, my estimates of retirement income (and replacement 
rates) should be viewed as lower bounds. However, they are useful for 
comparing retirement preparedness of an age group at different points 
in time, such as 1989, 2001, and 2007, to determine whether there is 
improvement or deterioration.6 
Retirement Adequacy 
Retirement adequacy is measured in three different ways: 1) the 
annual projected retirement income, 2) the percentage of households 
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whose projected retirement income is greater than the poverty thresh-
old, and 3) the income replacement rate, which is based on projected 
retirement income at time of retirement and projected income up to 
the year of retirement (typically age 64).7 For the latter, I use a 1.70 
percent annual growth rate of real income, an estimate based on the 
growth of real income for age group 47–64 over the period 1989–2007.8 
It should be noted that this is a stringent measure of the replacement 
rate compared to most of the literature on the subject since it compares 
(projected) retirement income against (projected) preretirement income 
at the eve of retirement (see Chapter 3 for a review of the pertinent 
literature).9 Other studies have used a measure akin to average income 
over the lifetime (or over the 10–20 years preceding retirement) or a 
measure of permanent income as the basis of comparison. However, I 
think a comparison of expected retirement income to projected income 
received in the year just before retirement is a more meaningful com-
parison than of expected retirement income to some measure of perma-
nent income, because it is the drop in income just after retirement that 
most affects family well-being. 
EXPECTED RETIREMENT INCOME  
Table 7.1 presents a summary of results on future expected mean 
retirement income both overall and by selected demographic groups. 
The mean retirement income for all households in age group 47–64 is 
projected to be $111,300 in 2007. This compares to the actual mean 
income of this group in 2007 of $110,800. There is little difference in 
projected retirement income for age groups 47–55 and 56–64. How-
ever, there is a big difference between minorities and whites, with the 
latter projected to have 2.3 times the income of the former at retirement. 
(This compares to a ratio of 2.9 in augmented wealth between the two 
groups in 2007.) 
There are also wide gaps by family type. The projected mean retire-
ment income of married couples is $147,500, 1.9 times that of single 
males and 3.5 times that of single females. Wide variation is also seen 
by educational attainment. The projected mean retirement income of 
college graduates in 2007 is $206,000, 2.7 times that of those with some 
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Table 7.1  Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth and Expected Pension and Social Security Beneﬁts 
(in thousands, 2007$) 
Percentage change
 1989 2001 2007 1989–2001 2001–2007 1989–2007 
Aged 47–64 73.2 102.8 111.3 40.4 8.2 52.0 
Aged 47–55 83.9 104.8 112.6 24.9 7.4 34.2 
Aged 56–64 61.1 99.9 109.6 63.6 9.7 79.4 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 83.5 117.8 125.5 41.0 6.5 50.2 
African American or Hispanica 31.2 41.6 53.8 33.3 29.5 72.6 
Married couples 94.1 136.7 147.5 45.3 7.9 56.8 
Single males 57.4 74.3 77.5 29.4 4.3 35.0 
Single females 32.8 40.4 41.5 23.2 2.9 26.8 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 36.2 31.3 26.3 −13.5 −16.0 −27.3 
12 years of schoolingb 76.5 53.7 56.0 −29.9 4.3 −26.9 
13–15 years of schoolingb 86.5 70.2 76.3 −18.8 8.7 −11.8 
16 or more years of schoolingb 173.9 202.6 206.0 16.5 1.7 18.4 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 12.3 22.7 24.2 84.5 6.6 96.7 
Income quintile 2 33.7 37.9 39.8 12.3 5.0 18.0 
Income quintile 3 52.5 60.5 66.8 15.2 10.4 27.2 
Income quintile 4 71.0 93.8 99.1 32.2 5.6 39.6 
Income quintile 5 200.7 310.3 335.8 54.6 8.2 67.3 
NOTE: Total retirement income includes expected future gains on all components of net worth. Households are classiﬁed by the age of 
the head of household. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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college, 3.7 times that of high school graduates, and 7.8 times that of 
those with the least schooling. There is also great variation by income 
quintile. The projected mean retirement income of the top quintile in 
2007 is (a huge) $335,800, 3.4 times that of the fourth quintile, 5.0 
times that of the middle quintile, 8.4 times that of the second quintile, 
and 13.9 that of the bottom quintile. 
Projected retirement income advanced very strongly between 1989 
and 2001. Among all households in age group 47–64, expected mean 
retirement income increased by 40 percent. However, changes in retire-
ment income were generally much lower from 2001 to 2007. For age 
group 47–64 as a whole, mean retirement grew by only 8 percent. Rela-
tively low growth is found for almost every group except minorities. 
For households with less than 12 years of schooling, a large 16 percent 
drop is projected for their mean retirement income. 
Some gaps in retirement income between groups widened over time 
whereas others narrowed. Retirement income for households nearer 
retirement (aged 56–64) grew faster, 79 percent between 1989 and 
2007, than households in age group 47–55, only 34 percent. Minorities 
saw greater gains in retirement income than whites, 73 percent versus 
50 percent. While mean retirement income of whites grew somewhat 
faster than that of minorities over the 1990s, the reverse was true for the 
2000s. Indeed, minorities were the only group with sizable gains (30 
percent) in retirement income over the period 2001–2007. As a result, 
the ratio of retirement income between minorities and whites, after fall-
ing from 0.37 in 1989 to 0.35 in 2001, advanced to 0.43 in 2007. (This 
compares to an actual income ratio among 47-to-64-year-olds between 
the two groups of 47 percent in 2007.) 
Married couples experienced greater gains in retirement income 
over the 1989–2007 period (57 percent) than single males (35 percent) 
and, especially, single females (27 percent), and the retirement income 
gaps widened among these groups. This result is consistent with the fact 
that the retirement wealth and augmented wealth of middle-aged single 
females declined relative to married couples between 1989 and 2007. 
In 2007, the mean expected retirement income of single females was 
only 28 percent that of married couples, down from 35 percent in 1989. 
The only educational group with positive growth in retirement 
income from 1989 to 2007 was college graduates, which saw a modest 
18 percent gain. The other groups experienced negative growth, rang-
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ing from −27 percent for the least educated group and for high school 
graduates to −12 percent for those with some college.10 As a result, 
the gap in retirement income between college graduates and the other 
groups widened over these years. In contrast, the bottom income quin-
tile recorded the fastest growth in retirement income at 97 percent, with 
the top income quintile second at 67 percent, whereas the middle three 
quintiles had the lowest gains over the period. 
Further details are provided in the next two tables. The ﬁrst of these, 
Table 7.2, shows the percentage composition of expected retirement 
income in 2007 (also see Appendix Table D.2 for details on 1989 and 
1998). In 2007, 37 percent of total retirement income of all households 
in age group 47–64 is projected to come from this group’s nonhome, 
nonpension wealth, including expected gains, and another 14 percent 
from home equity, also including expected capital gains, for a total of 
52 percent from total nonpension wealth.11 In addition, 18 percent is 
expected from the total value of DC plans, likewise including expected 
capital gains, and 17 percent from expected Social Security beneﬁts, 
while 13 percent will come from DB pension beneﬁts.12 
There is a big variation in the composition of expected retirement 
income among different demographic groups. These tend to mirror the 
composition of augmented wealth. Expected Social Security beneﬁts 
make up 27 percent of the expected retirement income of minorities in 
2007, compared to 16 percent for whites, whereas the expected annuity 
from nonhome, nonpension wealth constitutes 21 percent, compared to 
39 percent for whites. Likewise, expected Social Security beneﬁ ts com-
prise 23 percent of the expected retirement income of single females, 
compared to 17 percent for married couples, whereas income from non-
home, nonpension wealth makes up 23 percent, compared to 39 percent 
for married couples. The share of expected Social Security beneﬁ ts in 
expected retirement income falls from 49 percent for the least-educated 
group to 12 percent for college graduates, while the share from non-
home, nonpension wealth rises from 14 to 44 percent. The share from 
Social Security falls from 42 to 9 percent across the ﬁve income quin-
tiles, while the share from nonhome, nonpension wealth rises from 24 
to 52 percent. 
Over time, DC plans are projected to become an increasingly 
important source of retirement income, since they have risen from 8 
percent of projected retirement income in 1989 to 18 percent in 2007. 
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Table 7.2  Composition of Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and 
Social Security Beneﬁts, 2007 (%) 
Nonhome, Deﬁned Deﬁned 
nonpension Home contribution beneﬁt Social 
wealth equity plans pensions Security Total 
Aged 47–64 37.4 14.4 18.3 12.7 17.2 100.0 
Aged 47–55 35.9 15.0 19.3 12.5 17.3 100.0 
Aged 56–64 39.5 13.6 16.8 13.0 17.0 100.0 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 39.1 13.9 18.6 12.3 16.1 100.0 
African American or Hispanica 21.0 19.2 15.1 17.8 26.9 100.0 
Married couples 39.0 13.9 18.3 12.1 16.7 100.0 
Single males 38.3 13.9 19.8 12.8 15.1 100.0 
Single females 22.9 19.9 17.1 17.4 22.7 100.0 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 14.3 20.4 9.2 7.0 49.1 100.0 
12 years of schoolingb 22.5 19.3 15.2 14.2 28.7 100.0 
13–15 years of schoolingb 28.4 16.0 18.2 15.9 21.5 100.0 
16 or more years of schoolingb 43.8 12.7 19.4 11.8 12.2 100.0 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 24.4 19.9 4.4 9.0 42.3 100.0 
Income quintile 2 17.7 19.5 11.5 15.3 36.0 100.0 
Income quintile 3 15.4 17.3 19.7 19.4 28.2 100.0 
Income quintile 4 15.4 17.0 23.8 19.5 24.3 100.0 
Income quintile 5 52.0 12.0 18.2 9.3 8.5 100.0 
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Aged 47–64 
1989 41.6 13.9 8.1 19.0 17.5 100.0 
2001 39.2 11.7 17.0 13.8 18.4 100.0 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁ t) from 
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 
Key: Home equity: net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home 
equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned 
contribution pension plans + present discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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This change reﬂects the sharp rise in the share of DC pension wealth in 
the overall household portfolio and the offsetting decline in the share of 
liquid assets in total household assets (see Chapter 2). Correspondingly, 
DB plans will become less important, having declined from 19 percent 
of projected retirement income in 1989 to 13 percent in 2007. Together, 
the contribution of total pension wealth to projected retirement income 
will rise from 27 percent in 1989 to 31 percent in 2007. Correspond-
ingly, the proportion of projected retirement income from nonpension 
wealth will decline over time, from 55 percent in 1989 to 52 percent in 
2007, while that from Social Security will remain almost unchanged at 
17 percent. 
Table 7.3 shows levels of retirement income by component in 2007 
(See Appendix Table D.3 for results for 1989 and 1998 and Appendix 
Table D.4 for a similar set of results using a more detailed breakdown of 
the sources of retirement income). In 2007, the ratio of mean expected 
retirement income between minorities and whites was 43 percent. The 
ratio of the expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension wealth was 
much lower, at 23 percent, as was the ratio of the expected annuity 
from DC plans DCTOT, at 35 percent. However, the ratio of expected 
Social Security beneﬁts was much higher, 71 percent, as was the ratio of 
expected DB plan beneﬁts, 62 percent, and the expected annuity from 
home equity, 59 percent. This pattern mimics racial differences in pen-
sion wealth, Social Security wealth, and net worth (see Tables 6.7 and 
6.8). 
Similar patterns exist for other groupings. The ratio of mean 
expected retirement income between single females and married cou-
ples was 0.28 in 2007. However, the ratio of the expected annuity from 
nonhome, nonpension wealth was only 0.17 and that from DC plans 
DCTOT was 0.26, while the ratio of expected Social Security beneﬁts 
was higher, at 0.38. The expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension 
wealth relative to college graduates was a mere 0.04 for the lowest edu-
cation group, 0.14 for high school graduates, and 0.24 for those with 
some college, and the corresponding ratios of the expected annuity 
from DC plans DCTOT were 0.06, 0.21, and 0.35, respectively. In con-
trast, the expected Social Security beneﬁts relative to college graduates 
were 0.51, 0.64, and 0.65, respectively. 
The ratio of the expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension 
wealth of income quintiles 1 to 4 relative to the top income quintile 
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ranged from 0.03 to 0.09 and that from DC plans DCTOT from 0.02 to 
0.38. On the other hand, expected Social Security beneﬁts relative to 
the top income quintile were much higher, ranging from 0.36 to 0.84, 
and expected DB plan beneﬁts relative to the top quintile were also 
higher, ranging from 0.07 to 0.62.13 
Overall, the expected retirement income of age group 47–64 
climbed by 40 percent between 1989 and 2001 but advanced by only 8 
percent from 2001 to 2007, for an overall gain of 52 percent (see Table 
7.4). The expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension wealth grew 
strongly during the 1990s, by 33 percent, but by only 3 percent from 
2001 to 2007, for an overall increase of 37 percent. The expected annu-
ity from DC plans showed a huge gain in the ﬁrst period, almost tripling 
in value, and a much smaller increase in the second period, 17 per-
cent, for an overall advance of 244 percent. Expected DB pension ben-
eﬁts remained largely unchanged in both the earlier and later periods. 
Expected Social Security beneﬁts rose sharply in the ﬁrst period, by 48 
percent, and then remained largely unchanged in the second period. As 
a result, the share of nonhome, nonpension wealth in total retirement 
income fell from 41 percent in 1989 to 37 percent in 2007, while the 
share of Social Security beneﬁts stayed fairly constant. However, the 
share of DC pension wealth climbed 10 percentage points, from 8 to 18 
percent, while that of DB pension beneﬁts fell 6 percentage points, from 
19 to 13 percent. Of the $38,000 increase in expected retirement income 
between 1989 and 2007, the increase in nonpension wealth (including 
home equity) made the largest contribution, 45 percent, followed by the 
growth of DC pension wealth, 38 percent (see Table 7.5).14 The growth 
in Social Security wealth accounted for the other 17 percent. 
The ratio of expected retirement income between minorities and 
whites jumped from 0.37 in 1989 to 0.43 in 2007. The convergence was 
due largely to the growth in expected Social Security beneﬁts among 
minorities, which outstripped that among whites. From 1989 to 2007, 
expected Social Security beneﬁts rose by 73 percent among minorities 
and 50 percent among whites. The share of expected Social Security 
beneﬁts in expected retirement income also rose among minorities, 
from 24 percent in 1989 to 27 percent in 2007, whereas it was virtually 
unchanged among whites at about 17 percent. As a result, the ratio of 
expected Social Security beneﬁts between the two groups climbed from 
0.54 in 1989 to 0.71 in 2007. Minorities will obtain a much higher share 
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Table 7.3  Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security 
Beneﬁts, 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Nonhome, Deﬁned Deﬁned 
nonpension Home contribution beneﬁt Social 
wealth equity plans pensions Security Total 
Aged 47–64 41.6 16.1 20.3 14.2 19.1 111.3 
Aged 47–55 40.4 16.9 21.7 14.1 19.5 112.6 
Aged 56–64 43.2 14.9 18.4 14.3 18.7 109.6 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 49.0 17.5 23.3 15.4 20.3 125.5 
African American or Hispanica 11.3 10.3 8.1 9.6 14.5 53.8 
Married couples 57.5 20.4 26.9 17.9 24.7 147.5 
Single males 29.7 10.8 15.4 10.0 11.7 77.5 
Single females 9.5 8.3 7.1 7.2 9.4 41.5 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 3.8 5.4 2.4 1.8 12.9 26.3 
12 years of schoolingb 12.6 10.8 8.5 8.0 16.1 56.0 
13–15 years of schoolingb 21.7 12.2 13.9 12.1 16.4 76.3 
16 or more years of schoolingb 90.3 26.2 39.9 24.4 25.2 206.0 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 5.9 4.8 1.1 2.2 10.2 24.2 
Income quintile 2 7.1 7.8 4.6 6.1 14.3 39.8 
Income quintile 3 10.3 11.5 13.1 13.0 18.9 66.8 
Income quintile 4 15.3 16.8 23.5 19.3 24.1 99.1 
Income quintile 5 174.6 40.4 61.2 31.1 28.6 335.8 
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Aged 47–64 
1989 30.4 10.2 5.9 13.9 12.8 73.2 
2001 40.3 12.0 17.4 14.2 18.9 102.8 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁ t) from 
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied 
housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned 
contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted 
value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
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Table 7.4  Percentage Change in Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected 
Pension and Social Security Beneﬁ ts, 1989–2007 
Nonhome, Deﬁned Deﬁned 
nonpension Home contribution beneﬁt Social 
wealth equity plans pensions Security Total 
Aged 47–64 36.7 58.2 243.5 1.6 49.6 52.0 
Aged 47–55 14.7 47.4 133.1 −0.7 42.1 34.2 
Aged 56–64 73.0 72.4 801.8 4.5 59.3 79.4 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 36.5 54.4 225.4 2.0 44.2 50.2 
African American or Hispanica 47.1 93.9 1,017.1 −2.4 89.9 72.6 
Married couples 44.2 65.3 258.4 0.1 50.2 56.8 
Single males 2.8 16.5 412.1 16.1 52.4 35.0 
Single females −6.6 47.8 102.4 2.9 46.3 26.8 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb −61.2 −12.1 −4.9 −80.0 49.4 −27.3 
12 years of schoolingb −61.1 −4.2 141.3 −35.5 −5.6 −26.9 
13–15 years of schoolingb −30.0 −10.7 57.0 −28.8 2.5 −11.8 
16 or more years of schoolingb −1.9 41.6 131.7 −14.0 41.3 18.4 
Income quintile, ages 47–64 
Income quintile 1 155.4 77.9 41,473.1 64.2 71.9 96.7 
Income quintile 2 −15.7 30.3 317.9 −12.9 26.6 18.0 
Income quintile 3 −22.8 24.7 373.5 −6.2 41.7 27.2 
Income quintile 4 −16.1 70.1 222.6 −4.3 56.6 39.6 
Income quintile 5 54.0 73.1 220.4 13.8 62.7 67.3 
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Aged 47–64 
1989–2001 32.5 18.2 194.6 1.6 47.8 40.4 
2001–2007 3.1 33.8 16.6 0.0 1.2 8.2 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁ t) from 
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied 
housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned 
contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted 
value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Table 7.5  Contribution to the Change in Expected Mean Retirement Income Made by Component, 1989–2007 (%) 
Nonhome, Deﬁned Deﬁned 
nonpension Home contribution beneﬁt Social 
wealth equity plans pensions Security Total 
Aged 47–64 29.3 15.5 37.9 0.6 16.7 100.0 
Aged 47–55 18.0 18.9 43.3 −0.3 20.1 100.0 
Aged 56–64 37.7 12.9 33.8 1.3 14.3 100.0 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 31.3 14.7 38.5 0.7 14.8 100.0 
African American or Hispanica 16.0 22.1 32.7 −1.0 30.2 100.0 
Married couples 33.0 15.1 36.4 0.0 15.5 100.0 
Single males 4.0 7.6 61.5 6.9 20.0 100.0 
Single females −7.6 30.5 40.9 2.3 34.0 100.1 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 60.1 7.5 1.3 74.3 −43.1 100.0 
12 years of schoolingb 96.0 2.3 −24.3 21.3 4.7 100.0 
13–15 years of schoolingb 91.2 14.3 −49.4 47.9 −4.0 100.0 
16 or more years of schoolingb −5.6 24.1 70.9 −12.4 23.0 100.0 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 30.2 17.7 8.9 7.2 36.0 100.0 
Income quintile 2 −21.7 29.8 57.2 −15.0 49.7 100.0 
Income quintile 3 −21.3 16.0 72.4 −6.0 38.8 100.0 
Income quintile 4 −10.4 24.7 57.8 −3.1 31.0 100.0 
Income quintile 5 45.3 12.6 31.1 2.8 8.1 100.0 
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NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁ t) from 
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. The 
contribution made by a component such as pension wealth to the overall change in expected retirement income is deﬁned as the change 
in the mean value of the component divided by the change in the mean value of expected retirement income. Key: Home equity = net 
equity in owner-occupied housing.Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home equity. Deﬁ ned contribution 
plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present 
discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989 and 2007 SCF. 
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of their retirement income from Social Security than whites—27 ver-
sus 16 percent in 2007—and also a somewhat higher proportion from 
pensions (DC plus DB)—33 versus 31 percent—and a correspondingly 
much smaller share from nonpension wealth holdings—40 versus 53 
percent. 
Nonhome, nonpension wealth grew much faster among whites from 
1989 to 2001 but much faster among minorities from 2001 to 2007. 
On net the ratio of the expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension 
wealth between minorities and whites grew slightly, from 0.21 in 1989 
to 0.23 in 2007. The ratio of the expected annuity from home equity 
also increased over these years, as did the ratio in the expected annuity 
from total DC pension wealth. 
Of the overall increase in expected retirement income from 1989 to 
2007, gains in Social Security accounted for 30 percent among minori-
ties in comparison to 15 percent among whites. In contrast, the growth 
of nonhome, nonpension wealth contributed 31 percent of the overall 
advance in expected retirement income for whites but only 16 percent 
for minorities. Increases in DC pension wealth made a larger contribu-
tion for whites than minorities (39 versus 33 percent), while increases 
in home equity were more important for minorities than whites (22 ver-
sus 15 percent). 
In contrast, the expected retirement income of single females grew 
much more slowly than that of married couples from 1989 to 2007, 18 
versus 55 percent. As a result, the ratio in expected retirement income 
between the two groups fell from 0.35 in 1989 to 0.28 in 2007. The 
relative decline was due mainly to a steep drop in the expected annuity 
from nonhome, nonpension wealth, from a ratio of 0.26 in 1989 to 0.17 
in 2007, and in the expected annuity from DC pension wealth from 0.47 
to 0.26. 
All told, the share of nonhome, nonpension wealth in expected 
retirement income as well as the share of expected Social Security ben-
eﬁts remained about the same among married couples from 1989 to 
2007, but the former fell from 31 to 23 percent among single females, 
whereas the latter increased from 20 to 23 percent. Single females in 
2007 will obtain a higher share of their retirement income from Social 
Security than will married couples (23 versus 17 percent), a higher frac-
tion from (DC plus DB) pensions (35 versus 30 percent), but a much 
lower share from nonpension wealth (43 versus 53 percent). 
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Advances in Social Security beneﬁts made a much larger contribu-
tion to gains in expected retirement income for single females, 34 per-
cent, than for married couples, 16 percent, or single males, 20 percent. 
In contrast, DC plan accumulations were the largest source of growth 
in expected retirement income for single males, 62 percent, compared 
to 41 percent for single women and 36 percent for married couples. 
Increases in nonhome, nonpension wealth accounted for one-third of 
the growth in expected retirement income among married couples but 
made virtually no contribution to retirement income growth among sin-
gle men or single women. 
Absolute declines in expected retirement income were recorded for 
each of the three lowest educational groups between 1989 and 2007, 
whereas college graduates are expected to see an 18 percent increase. 
Here, too, there were steep declines in the expected annuity from non-
home, nonpension wealth relative to college graduates from 1989 to 
2007 (the ratio between high school and college graduates plummeted 
from 0.35 to 0.14!), and that from total DC wealth relative to college 
graduates. Less-educated households became more dependent on Social 
Security, whose share in total expected retirement income more than 
doubled from 24 percent in 1989 to 49 percent in 2007 among the least 
educated, increased from 22 to 29 percent among high school gradu-
ates, and from 19 to 22 percent among those with some college (it also 
showed a modest rise among college graduates from 10 to 12 percent). 
Correspondingly, the share of expected annuities from nonhome, 
nonpension wealth declined sharply among the three less-educated 
groups (it also fell among college graduates). However, overall the 
less-educated groups were much more dependent on Social Security 
in 2007 than were college graduates (29 percent for high school gradu-
ates versus 12 percent for college graduates) but the reverse was true 
for nonpension wealth holdings—42 percent for high school graduates 
versus 57 percent for college graduates. 
The bottom income quintile showed a slight increase in expected 
retirement income relative to the top income quintile between 1989 
and 2007 (from a ratio of 0.06 to 0.07), but the middle three income 
quintiles each lost ground (the relative expected retirement income of 
the third income quintile fell from 26 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in 
2007). The expected annuity from nonhome, nonpension wealth of each 
of the four bottom quintiles was very low relative to the top quintile, 
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ranging from a ratio of 0.03 to 0.09 in 2007. Except for the bottom quin-
tile, these ratios all fell between 1989 and 2007. The expected annuity 
from DC plan wealth of each of the four bottom quintiles was also low 
relative to that of the top quintile, ranging from a ratio of 0.02 to 0.38 
in 2007, but in this case there was little change between 1989 and 2007. 
Middle-income households saw an increase in their dependence on 
Social Security as a source of retirement income. The share of total 
expected retirement income in the form of Social Security beneﬁ ts rose 
from 34 percent in 1989 to 36 percent for the second quintile, from 25 
to 28 percent for the middle quintile, and from 22 percent to 24 percent 
for the fourth quintile. Correspondingly, the importance of nonhome, 
nonpension wealth in future retirement income declined for each of 
the three middle quintiles. Interestingly, the share of Social Security in 
expected retirement income fell for the bottom quintile, from 48 to 42 
percent, and the share from nonhome, nonpension wealth rose from 19 
to 24 percent.
 Nonetheless, the lower-income groups were all much more depen-
dent on Social Security than the top quintile. The share of Social Secu-
rity in expected retirement income descended with income quintile, 
from 42 percent for the bottom to 9 percent for the top quintile in 2007. 
In contrast, the share of expected annuity income from nonhome, non-
pension wealth in expected retirement income ran in the range of 15 to 
24 percent for the bottom four income quintiles in 2007, in contrast to 
52 percent for the top quintile. Indeed, the gain in total expected retire-
ment income of the bottom quintile relative to the top quintile (from 
a ratio of 0.06 to 0.07) can be traced largely to the faster growth of 
expected Social Security beneﬁts in the bottom quintile relative to the 
top (a gain of 72 percent from 1989 to 2007 compared to 63 percent). In 
contrast, expected Social Security beneﬁts grew slower for each of the 
middle quintiles than for the top or bottom. 
Social Security was also much more important as a contributor to 
the growth in expected retirement income for the bottom four income 
quintiles (a range of 31 to 50 percent) than the top income quintile (only 
8 percent). Gains in total DC pension wealth accounted for more than 
half the growth in expected retirement income among the middle three 
income quintiles, compared to 9 percent for the bottom and 31 percent 
for the top. Changes in nonhome, nonpension wealth made negative 
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contributions to advances in expected retirement income among the 
middle three income quintiles but accounted for 45 percent of the gain 
for the top income quintile. 
In summary, Social Security was more important as a source 
of expected retirement income among the lower-income groups— 
minorities, single females, the less educated, and the lower income 
quintiles—than among higher-income groups—whites, married cou-
ples, college graduates, and the top income quintile. It has thus served 
as an important equalizing factor in retirement adequacy. Moreover, the 
importance of Social Security beneﬁts in expected retirement income 
grew over time between 1989 and 2007 for the low-income groups 
indicated above. The faster growth of expected Social Security beneﬁts 
among minorities largely explains the decline in the gap in expected 
retirement income between them and whites from 1989 to 2007. Like-
wise, the faster growth of Social Security beneﬁts for the bottom 
income quintile is the principal factor explaining the faster growth in 
their expected retirement income relative to that of the top quintile. 
THE EXPECTED POVERTY RATE AT RETIREMENT
As discussed earlier, another important concern is the percentage of 
households that might be expected to fall below the poverty line after 
retirement. This is an important issue in social policy since such fami-
lies will be at particular risk in that they are unlikely to be able to rely 
on the labor market in order to exit from poverty. 
Trends in projected poverty rates at retirement tend to follow 
trends in mean retirement income (see Table 7.6). In 2007, 10.2 per-
cent of households in age group 47–64 were projected to have retire-
ment income of less than the poverty line for their family size. The 
percentage was smaller for age group 56–64 (8.2 percent) than for age 
group 47–55 (11.6 percent). Only 4.8 percent of white households are 
projected to fall below the poverty standard, compared to 13.9 percent 
of minorities (a 9.1 percentage point difference). Differences are also 
marked by marital status, with only 5.7 percent of married couples com-
pared to 12.8 percent of single males and 19.7 percent of single females 
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Table 7.6  Percentage of Households with Expected Retirement Income Less Than the Poverty Line, Based on 
Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security Beneﬁ ts, 1989–2007 
Change
 1989 2001 2007 1989–2001 2001–2007 1989–2007 
Aged 47–64 14.8 10.2 10.2 −4.6 −0.0 −4.6 
Aged 47–55 13.2 10.7 11.6 −2.5 0.8 −1.6 
Aged 56–64 16.7 9.4 8.2 −7.3 −1.2 −8.5 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 3.2 4.0 4.8 0.8 0.8 1.6 
African American or Hispanica 48.1 21.6 13.9 −26.5 −7.6 −34.1 
Married couples 7.3 3.9 5.7 −3.4 1.8 −1.6 
Single males 11.4 11.9 12.8 0.4 1.0 1.4 
Single females 33.2 24.4 19.7 −8.8 −4.7 −13.4 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 26.7 23.8 28.1 −2.8 4.3 1.4 
12 years of schoolingb 1.6 10.6 9.0 9.1 −1.7 7.4 
13–15 years of schoolingb 0.4 6.8 9.0 6.4 2.1 8.5 
16 or more years of schoolingb 5.4 5.7 6.4 0.3 0.7 1.0 
NOTE: Total retirement income includes expected future gains on all components of net worth. Households are classiﬁed by the age of the 
head of household. Percentage changes between years may reﬂ ect rounding. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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falling below the poverty line. Poverty rates are smaller for the better 
educated, varying between 28.1 percent for the least educated and 6.4 
percent for college graduates. 
Most of the poverty reduction appears to have taken place between 
1989 and 2001. The projected poverty rate at retirement for the whole 
age group 47–64 fell by 4.6 percentage points over these years. From 
2001 to 2007 the projected poverty rate showed no change. 
By and large, groups with the highest projected poverty rate in 
1989 experienced the largest reduction in their projected poverty rate 
at retirement. Percentage point declines were much greater for age 
group 56–64, which had a higher poverty rate in 1989, than age group 
47–55. In fact, the projected poverty rate was 3.5 percentage points 
greater for the older age group in 1989 and 3.4 percentage points lower 
in 2007. Minority households experienced a precipitous decline in their 
projected poverty rate, 34.1 percentage points, while white households 
experienced a slight increase of 1.6 percentage points. The gap between 
the two groups fell sharply, from 44.9 percentage points in 1989 to 
only 9.1 percentage points in 2007. Single females also saw a large 
decline—13.4 percentage points—especially compared to married cou-
ples (a 1.6 percentage point decline) and single males (a 1.4 percentage 
point increase).15 
Table 7.7 shows the expected poverty rate at retirement on the 
basis of current and projected net worth, total DC wealth, expected 
DB pension beneﬁts, and expected Social Security beneﬁts for 2007 
(see Appendix Table D.5 for details on 1989 and 2001). I have added 
in these components sequentially. Of course, the results depend on the 
order in which the components are included, so that these results give 
particular inﬂuence to Social Security, the last component. 
On the basis of current and future gains on nonhome, nonpension 
wealth alone, I project a huge poverty rate at retirement of 75 percent 
for households in age group 47 to 64 in 2007.16 In other words, standard 
nonpension ﬁnancial wealth accumulation is quite insufﬁcient to lift 
the vast majority of families out of poverty. Next, since the treatment 
of housing equity, owner-occupied housing, can be ambiguous (as dis-
cussed above), I ﬁrst include only half the expected annuity on owner-
occupied housing. This lowers the expected poverty rate by more than 
15 percentage points, to 60 percent. Adding in the other half from home 
equity owner-occupied housing lowers it another 15 percentage points, 
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Table 7.7  Percentage of Households with Expected Retirement Income Less Than the Poverty Line, Based on 
Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security Beneﬁ ts, 2007 
Total expected 
retirement 
Nonhome, Nonpension income: 
nonpension wealth plus nonpension 
Nonhome, wealth plus deﬁned Nonpension wealth + pension 
nonpension half of home Nonpension contribution wealth plus wealth + 
wealth equity wealth plans all pensions Social Security 
Aged 47–64 75.1 59.8 45.2 33.2 27.9 10.2 
Aged 47–55 76.6 59.3 45.5 31.7 28.6 11.6 
Aged 56–64 72.9 60.4 44.9 35.3 27.0 8.2 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 70.6 54.0 38.9 25.9 20.5 4.8 
African American or Hispanica 88.4 75.1 60.2 49.7 43.9 13.9 
Married couples 70.9 54.0 37.1 24.9 20.6 5.7 
Single males 72.1 57.8 50.3 44.0 36.8 12.8 
Single females 86.9 74.9 62.4 48.0 41.0 19.7 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 94.2 92.0 80.1 74.6 68.7 28.1 
12 years of schoolingb 86.3 72.6 54.3 39.9 32.8 9.0 
13–15 years of schoolingb 80.7 62.8 50.4 32.5 27.4 9.0 
16 or more years of schoolingb 56.4 37.5 23.9 15.5 11.7 6.4 
Aged 47–64 
1989 67.5 57.0 45.1 40.7 27.5 14.8 
2001 71.7 62.3 50.2 38.9 30.2 10.2 
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NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Home equity: net equity in owner-occupied housing. Non-
home, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home equity. Nonpension wealth plus deﬁned contribution plans: Total 
deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present 
discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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to 45 percent. Thus, standard nonpension ﬁnancial wealth accumulation 
plus investing in a home still leaves the expected poverty rate at a very 
high level. 
Another 12 percentage point decline comes from adding in the 
expected annuity from both the current value and the expected future 
gains on total DC pension wealth, bringing the expected poverty rate 
down to about one-third, and adding in DB pension beneﬁts brings 
the poverty rate down a bit more, to 28 percent. Finally, adding in the 
expected Social Security beneﬁt lowers the expected poverty rate by 18 
percentage points, to 10 percent. 
There is considerable disparity across groups in the importance of 
these various components to reducing expected poverty. In 2007, non-
whites aged 47–64 were projected to have a poverty rate of 14 per-
cent, compared to 5 percent for whites. The poverty rate on the basis 
of standard nonpension wealth (including home equity) is much lower 
for whites, 39 percent, than for nonwhites, 60 percent. Adding in the 
expected annuity from all expected pension beneﬁts lowers the rate for 
whites by 18 percentage points to 21 percent, and that for blacks by 
16 percentage points to 44 percent. Adding in Social Security causes a 
huge reduction in the expected poverty rate for nonwhites, by 30 per-
centage points, to 14 percent, compared to a 16 percentage point drop 
for whites, to 5 percent. 
A similar pattern holds for the comparison between married cou-
ples and single females. The expected poverty rate for the former is 
37 percent on the basis of nonpension wealth alone. Adding in private 
retirement wealth reduces it by 17 percentage points to 21 percent, and 
including Social Security further reduces it by 15 percentage points to 
6 percent. For single females, the predicted poverty rate is 62 percent 
on the basis of nonpension wealth alone. It falls to 41 percent, a 21 per-
centage point reduction, when private pensions are included, and then 
to 20 percent when Social Security is included, another 21 percentage 
point reduction. 
The expected poverty rate for college graduates on the basis of non-
pension wealth NWX is quite low, 24 percent. Adding private pensions 
lowers it by 12 percentage points to 12 percent, and then including Social 
Security lowers it by 5 percentage points to 6 percent. In contrast, the 
poverty rate on the basis of nonpension wealth alone varies from a high 
of 80 percent for the least educated households to 50 percent for those 
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with some college. Adding in private pensions reduces the expected 
poverty rate by 11 to 23 percentage points, and then including Social 
Security lowers it by another 18 to 41 (for the least-educated group) 
percentage points. Indeed, for the least educated group, Social Security 
reduces the projected poverty rate from 69 to 27 percent. 
Over time, the importance of Social Security grows as a weapon to 
reduce poverty among the low-income elderly. Among all households 
aged 47–64, on the basis of nonhome, nonpension wealth alone, the 
expected poverty rate actually increases by 8 percentage points, from 
68 percent in 1989 to 75 percent in 2007. With the addition of home 
equity owner-occupied housing, the expected poverty rate remains at 
45 percent in 1989 and in 2007. Next, with the inclusion of private pen-
sions, the expected poverty rate is slightly higher in 2007, at 28 percent, 
than in 1989, at 27 percent. The main effect comes from Social Secu-
rity. When this is included, the expected poverty rate declines from 15 
percent in 1989 to 10 percent in 2007. 
The effects of Social Security are even more signiﬁcant for minori-
ties. Their expected poverty rate on the basis of private accumulations 
alone (nonhome, nonpension wealth plus private pensions) is 63 per-
cent in 1989. Adding in Social Security reduces it by 15 percentage 
points to just a little less than half, 48 percent. In 2007, their expected 
poverty rate from private accumulations is 44 percent, 19 percentage 
points lower than in 1989, but adding in Social Security results in a 30 
percentage point drop, to 14 percent. 
Similar results hold for single females. On the basis of private accu-
mulations, their expected poverty rate in 1989 is 48 percent; adding 
in Social Security lowers it by 15 percentage points, to 33 percent. In 
2007, the expected poverty rate from private accumulations alone is 
lower, at 41 percent, but including Social Security results in a 21 per-
centage point fall, to 20 percent. 
The results by educational group highlight the importance of DB 
pensions for less-educated workers in the 1980s. In 1989, the predicted 
poverty rate from total net worth for the least educated workers is 57 
percent. Adding expected DB pensions lowers it by 15 percentage 
points, to 42 percent. In 2007, the drop in the expected poverty rate 
from including DB pensions is only 6 percentage points. Among high 
school graduates, the addition of DB pensions to net worth lowers the 
expected poverty rate by 13 percentage points in 1989 but only 7 per-
Wolff.indb 240  11/21/2011 9:19:28 AM   
 
 
 
 
  
240 Wolff 
centage pints in 2007. Even among those with some college, including 
DB pensions reduces the expected poverty rate by 13 percentage points 
in 1989 but by only 5 percentage points in 2007. In fact, in 1989, the 
expected poverty rate is actually lower among high school graduates 
(1.6 percent) and those with some college (0.4 percent) than among col-
lege graduates (5.4 percent), because of the greater importance of DB 
pensions for these two groups than for college graduates. 
The same pattern also holds with regard to the importance of Social 
Security for the less-educated households. The predicted poverty rate 
among the least educated workers in 1989 is 42 percent from private 
accumulations alone but 27 percent when Social Security is included, a 
16 percentage point reduction. In 2007, it was higher, 69 percent from 
private accumulations, and also higher when Social Security is added, 
28 percent, but the effect of adding Social Security is greater for 2007, a 
41 percentage point reduction. For high school graduates, the expected 
poverty rate from private accumulations alone is also higher in 2007 
than in 1989, 27 percent versus 17 percent, but the reduction from add-
ing Social Security is also greater, 24 versus 15 percentage points. A
similar result holds for households with some college. 
REPLACEMENT RATES 
The third dimension of retirement income security is the so-called 
replacement rate. This concept measures expected retirement income as 
a fraction of the income the household receives just on the eve of retire-
ment. As such, it reﬂects the degree to which income during retirement 
replaces prior income and is thus of major concern to the individual 
household. 
There was relatively little change over time in the share of house-
holds with expected retirement income greater than or equal to three-
quarters of projected income at retirement (the “three-quarters replace-
ment rate”), particularly in comparison to changes in projected poverty 
rates (see Table 7.8).17 The reason is that a replacement rate is a relative 
standard, whereas the poverty rate is based on an absolute standard. 
Changes in the replacement rate reﬂect changes in both expected retire-
ment income, which is projected to grow on average by 2.32 percent 
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Table 7.8  Percentage of Households with Expected Retirement Income Greater Than or Equal to 75 Percent 
of Projected Income at Age 64, Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security 
Beneﬁts, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
Change 
1989 
2001 2007 1989–2001 2001–2007 1989–2007 
Aged 47–64 45.4 46.5 49.3 1.2 2.8 3.9 
Aged 47–55 38.8 40.7 43.7 1.9 2.9 4.9 
Aged 56–64 53.0 55.3 57.1 2.3 1.8 4.0 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 49.7 50.5 53.6 0.8 3.1 3.9 
African American or Hispanica 35.2 37.4 41.5 2.3 4.1 6.4 
Married couples 47.3 49.7 49.7 2.4 −0.0 2.4 
Single males 54.0 47.1 57.2 −6.9 10.1 3.2 
Single females 37.6 38.2 44.0 0.5 5.9 6.4 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 42.1 44.3 34.6 2.2 −9.7 −7.5 
12 years of schoolingb 47.8 44.8 42.6 −3.0 −2.2 −5.2 
13–15 years of schoolingb 44.8 43.1 45.9 −1.7 2.8 1.2 
16 or more years of schoolingb 52.7 51.5 61.4 −1.2 9.9 8.7 
Income quintile, ages 47–64 
Income quintile 1 51.8 62.2 57.3 10.4 −5.0 5.4 
Income quintile 2 45.8 45.1 47.0 −0.7 1.9 1.1 
Income quintile 3 56.4 38.4 47.8 −18.0 9.4 −8.7 
Income quintile 4 33.6 41.3 47.1 7.7 5.8 13.5 
Income quintile 5 39.2 45.1 47.3 5.9 2.2 8.1 
NOTE: Total retirement income includes expected future gains on all components of net worth. Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head 
of household. Percentage changes between years may reﬂ ect rounding. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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per year from 1989 to 2007, and preretirement income itself, which is 
projected to grow at 1.70 percent per year. 
In 2007, only 49 percent of all households in age group 47–64 are 
expected to meet the three-quarters replacement rate. The share meeting 
this standard increased slightly from 1989 to 2001 (by 1.2 percentage 
points) and then showed a moderate gain from 2001 to 2007 (2.8 per-
centage points). This time trend differs from that found for projected 
average retirement income, which shows a much greater increase from 
1989 to 2001 than from 2001 to 2007. 
Surprisingly, the percentage of households meeting this replace-
ment rate standard is generally greater for the higher-income groups, 
despite their higher preretirement income. The share projected to meet 
the three-quarters replacement rate in 2007 is greater for the higher-
income older age group 56–64, 57 percent, than the lower-income 
younger age group, 44 percent. However, the younger age group expe-
rienced a somewhat greater increase in the share of households meet-
ing this replacement standard from 1989 to 2007. Despite the higher 
preretirement income of white households, the share meeting the three-
quarters replacement rate is 54 percent in 2007, compared to 42 percent 
for minorities. However, the share of minority households meeting this 
standard rose more than that of white households, 6.4 versus 3.9 per-
centage points between 1989 and 2007. 
In similar fashion, despite the lower preretirement income of single 
females, the share of this group meeting the 75 percent replacement 
rate was lower in 2007, at 44 percent, than that for married couples, 
50 percent, or single men, 57 percent. However, as with minorities, 
single women saw the greatest improvement in retirement income 
adequacy, at least if a 75 percent replacement standard is used, from 
1989 to 2007, while both married couples and single men experienced 
smaller gains (6.4 percentage points versus 2.4 and 3.2 percentage 
points, respectively). 
The share of households meeting the three-quarters replacement 
rate standard was much higher among college graduates in 2007 (61 
percent) than among the other educational groups (35 to 44 percent), 
despite their much higher level of preretirement income. Moreover, 
the share meeting the replacement rate standard climbed much more 
for college graduates than for the other educational groups (indeed, 
changes were negative for the two lowest educated groups), reﬂecting 
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the greater gains in expected retirement income among college gradu-
ates than among the other groups (which were all negative). 
The percentage of households able to meet the 75 percent replace-
ment rate benchmark was much higher among the bottom income 
quintile (57 percent) than among the other income quintiles (about 
47 percent for the top four quintiles). The bottom quintile also saw an 
improvement in the share able to meet the replacement rate standard 
from 1989 to 2007 (5.4 percentage points), as did the fourth quintile 
(13.5 percentage points) and the top quintile (8.1 percentage points), 
whereas the second quintile showed no change and the share of the 
middle quintile meeting the standard fell by 8.7 percentage points. 
As noted above, in 2007, the percentage of all households in age 
group 47–64 with a 75 percent replacement rate was projected to be 
49 percent. However, the percentage of households in this age group 
projected to meet this replacement rate standard is only 6 percent on the 
basis of nonhome, nonpension wealth alone (see Table 7.9 and Appen-
dix Table D.6 for details for 1989 and 2001). The share rises somewhat 
to 10 percent when the annuity from home equity is also included and 
then to 17 percent when total DC pension wealth is also included. The 
addition of DB pension wealth raises this fraction rather sizably to 29 
percent. The addition of Social Security makes an even bigger differ-
ence, raising the share to 49 percent. 
As noted above, the share of households in age group 47–64 meet-
ing the 75 percent replacement standard rose from 45 to 49 percent 
between 1989 and 2007. Deﬁ ned contributions pensions made a larger 
marginal contribution in the later year, increasing the replacement rate 
by 6.8 percentage points compared to 2.2 percentage points in 1989, 
whereas DB pensions made a correspondingly smaller marginal con-
tribution, 11.7 percentage points in 2007 compared to 14.8 percentage 
points in 1989. The marginal contribution of Social Security increased 
between the two years as well—17.6 in 1989 versus 20.8 percentage 
points in 2007. 
There is a sizable gap in the share of households meeting the 
replacement rate standard between whites and minorities, 14.5 percent-
age points in 1989 and 12.1 percentage points in 2007. Most of the 
gap comes from differences in the accumulation of standard nonpen-
sion wealth, and a smaller contribution emanates from the larger total 
DC wealth accumulations of whites. In 2007, the difference in expected 
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Table 7.9  Share of Households with Expected Replacement Income Greater Than or Equal to Three Quarters 
of Projected Income at Age 64, Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security 
Beneﬁts, 2007 (%) 
Nonhome, Nonpension Total expected 
nonpension wealth plus retirement income: 
Nonhome, wealth plus deﬁned Nonpension nonpension wealth 
nonpension half of home Nonpension contribution wealth plus + pension wealth + 
wealth equity wealth plans all pensions Social Security 
Aged 47–64 5.5 7.3 10.0 16.8 28.5 49.3 
Aged 47–55 4.4 6.1 8.1 14.7 26.1 43.7 
Aged 56–64 6.9 8.9 12.5 19.6 31.8 57.1 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 6.1 8.2 11.0 18.9 31.2 53.6 
African American or Hispanica 3.9 5.0 7.8 11.4 23.2 41.5 
Married couples 5.1 6.6 8.7 16.5 28.4 49.7 
Single males 9.9 11.2 14.9 20.8 35.8 57.2 
Single females 4.1 6.9 10.5 15.4 25.1 44.0 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 2.2 2.5 3.1 4.4 7.5 34.6 
12 years of schoolingb 3.2 4.6 7.6 11.7 19.9 42.6 
13–15 years of schoolingb 6.1 8.3 10.2 15.2 27.5 45.9 
16 or more years of schoolingb 8.1 10.3 13.9 25.7 42.7 61.4 
Income quintile, ages 47–64 
Income quintile 1 6.7 10.4 16.8 19.4 25.6 57.3 
Income quintile 2 4.8 6.5 9.3 14.8 25.1 47.0 
Income quintile 3 4.0 5.7 7.6 16.0 29.2 47.8 
Income quintile 4 2.1 2.8 3.2 12.4 29.2 47.1 
Income quintile 5 10.1 11.2 12.9 21.5 33.8 47.3 
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Aged 47–64 
1989 6.8 8.0 10.8 13.0 27.8 45.4 
2001 6.3 8.0 10.5 16.1 26.8 46.5 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. 
Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home 
equity. Nonpension wealth plus deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer 
contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned 
contribution plan. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
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Social Security beneﬁts between whites and minorities also contributes 
to the gap. The gap between married couples and single females is large 
in 1989, 9.7 percentage points. This is mainly due to the higher expected 
Social Security beneﬁts of the former, which increase the percentage 
of households meeting the replacement standard by 21.3 percentage 
points, compared to a 12.0 percentage point increase for single females. 
However, by 2007 the gap in the share meeting the replacement rate 
standard between these two groups narrows to 5.7 percentage points. 
Differences in the share of households meeting the replacement rate 
standard are 5–10 percentage points higher for college graduates than 
for the other education groups in 1989. By 2007, the differences expand 
to a range of 17–27 percentage points. In 1989, the differences are due 
almost entirely to the higher expected Social Security beneﬁts of col-
lege graduates. However, by 2007, the differences are ascribable almost 
exclusively to the much higher value of DC pension wealth among col-
lege graduates. 
In contrast, the share meeting the replacement standard is highest 
for the lowest income quintile, at 57 percent in 2007. It is almost con-
stant among the top four income quintiles, at 47 percent. In 2007, the 
gap between the bottom and top quintiles is quite large, 10.0 percentage 
points. Differences in the share of households meeting the replacement 
rate standard are much smaller on the basis of private accumulations 
(the sum of nonpension wealth and total DC pension wealth), with the 
top income quintile having the highest share meeting this standard. As 
a result, the relatively higher level of expected Social Security beneﬁts 
for lower-income households explains almost all of these gaps. 
Similar patterns exist when we look at different cut-off points for 
replacement rates (Table 7.10). The share of all households aged 47–64 
meeting the indicated replacement rate standard remains virtually 
unchanged from 1989 to 2001 and then increases from 2001 to 2007 
at the 50 and 75 percent replacement rate standards, though it is almost 
unchanged at the 25 and 100 percent replacement standards. The share 
meeting these standards are uniformly higher for age group 56–64 than 
for age group 47–55, for whites than for minorities, and for married 
couples than for single females. The percentage of households meet-
ing the standards were also generally higher for college graduates than 
for the other educational groups (particularly for 2007), and generally 
higher for the bottom income quintile than for higher income quintiles. 
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Table 7.10  Percentage of Households in Age Group 47–64 Meeting Minimum Expected Replacement Rate 
Standards, Based on Expected Income at Retirement, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989  2001  2007 
25 50 75 100 25 50 75 100 25 50 75 100 
Aged 47–64 89.6 69.4 45.4 27.6 92.2 70.1 46.5 30.4 92.2 73.7 49.3 30.9 
Aged 47–55 88.8 64.7 38.8 22.4 91.3 64.5 40.7 25.4 91.1 70.1 43.7 25.9 
Aged 56–64 90.5 74.9 53.0 33.7 93.5 78.7 55.3 38.0 93.8 78.7 57.1 37.8 
Non-Hispanic whitea 96.2 76.6 49.7 30.4 96.9 75.4 50.5 33.6 96.4 78.2 53.6 34.2 
African American or Hispanica 77.7 51.7 35.2 20.9 86.9 59.3 37.4 22.2 93.4 70.1 41.5 23.7 
Married couple 92.7 75.0 47.3 26.9 94.3 75.4 49.7 33.3 93.0 75.3 49.7 30.1 
Single male 92.2 66.3 54.0 40.8 93.0 66.8 47.1 29.7 90.2 72.5 57.2 42.1 
Single female 81.5 58.0 37.6 24.2 86.2 59.5 38.2 23.8 91.4 70.3 44.0 27.0 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 85.1 62.6 42.1 24.5 90.4 64.6 44.3 29.4 90.2 61.4 34.6 21.2 
12 years of schoolingb 94.8 74.9 47.8 30.0 91.3 69.7 44.8 28.9 92.1 70.4 42.6 24.6 
13–15 years of schoolingb 97.0 82.5 44.8 25.5 92.7 67.6 43.1 26.1 93.4 72.5 45.9 28.7 
16 or more years of schoolingb 91.2 74.1 52.7 35.8 93.3 75.0 51.5 35.3 92.2 80.9 61.4 40.5 
Income quintile 1 80.3 63.9 51.8 33.7 90.6 77.6 62.2 47.9 92.7 78.3 57.3 42.2 
Income quintile 2 90.9 76.6 45.8 26.6 91.8 68.0 45.1 29.5 91.2 67.8 47.0 31.7 
Income quintile 3 95.3 80.9 56.4 31.2 91.8 62.9 38.4 24.5 92.1 75.4 47.8 29.9 
Income quintile 4 91.7 59.9 33.6 24.6 93.1 69.3 41.3 24.4 92.0 75.5 47.1 26.8 
Income quintile 5 88.2 64.1 39.2 22.6 93.7 72.6 45.1 25.1 93.2 71.3 47.3 23.6 
NOTE: Total retirement income includes expected future gains on all components of net worth. Households are classiﬁed by the age of 
the head of household. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
In line with the main themes of the book, a marked slowdown in the 
growth of mean expected retirement income was found for age group 
47–64 in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, even before the ﬁnancial 
meltdown of 2008–2009. Whereas mean expected retirement income 
gained 40 percent from 1989 to 2001, it advanced by only 8 percent 
from 2001 to 2007. This result is consistent with our ﬁndings of a pro-
nounced decline in the rate of growth of augmented wealth between the 
1990s and the 2000s (see Chapter 5). Households in this age group also 
saw a large reduction in their expected poverty rate at retirement, from 
15 percent in 1989 to 10 percent in 2001. However, there was no further 
reduction in the expected poverty rate from 2001 to 2007. In contrast, 
the percentage of households meeting the 75 percent replacement stan-
dard rose more in the later period, from 45.4 to 46.5 percent from 1989 
to 2001 and from 46.5 to 49.3 percent from 2001 to 2007. 
With regard to intergroup differences, the ratio of expected retire-
ment income between minorities and whites jumped from 0.37 in 1989 
to 0.43 in 2007. The convergence was due largely to the growth in 
expected Social Security beneﬁts among minorities, which outstripped 
that among whites. These results are consistent with my ﬁnding of a 
convergence in augmented wealth between the two groups over this 
time period (see Chapter 6). 
Minorities also made dramatic inroads in reducing their projected 
poverty rate at retirement. This fell from 48 percent in 1989 to 14 per-
cent in 2007, a 34 percentage point reduction. In contrast, white house-
holds saw their expected poverty rate rise by 1.6 percentage points. Still, 
whites had a much lower expected poverty rate in 2007 than minorities, 
5 versus 14 percent. Moreover, minorities saw slightly greater increases 
in the share of households with a replacement rate of 75 percent or more 
from 1989 to 2007—6.4 versus 3.9 percentage points. However, minor-
ities still had a lower proportion who met this replacement standard in 
2007—42 versus 54 percent. 
In contrast, the expected retirement income of single females grew 
much more slowly than that of married couples from 1989 to 2007, 
by 27 versus 57 percent. As a result, the ratio in expected retirement 
income between the two groups fell from 0.35 in 1989 to 0.28 in 2007. 
Wolff.indb 249  11/21/2011 9:19:34 AM   
 
  
Retirement Prospects 249 
The relative decline was due mainly to a steep drop in the relative hold-
ings of nonhome, nonpension wealth and total DC wealth. 
Less-educated households did not fare well at all. The three lowest 
groups all saw absolute declines in their expected retirement income 
from 1989 to 2007. For those with a high school degree or less, expected 
retirement income plummeted by 27 percent. Indeed, the only group 
showing positive gains was college graduates. The less-educated groups 
were much more dependent on Social Security in 2007 than college 
graduates (29 percent of expected retirement income for high school 
graduates versus 12 percent for college graduates), but the reverse was 
true for nonpension wealth holdings—42 percent for high school gradu-
ates versus 57 percent for college graduates. 
The expected poverty rate at retirement was much higher for the 
least-educated group, 28 percent in 2007, compared to 6–9 percent for 
the more-educated ones. However, those with 12 years of schooling 
and those with some college saw the biggest increase in expected pov-
erty, 7 and 9 percentage points, respectively. Indeed, households with a 
high school degree and those with some college had by far the lowest 
expected poverty rates in 1989, 1.6 and 0.4 percent, respectively. The 
1989 ﬁgures reﬂected the large role played by DB pension wealth in 
their portfolios. 
The share of households meeting a 75 percent replacement rate 
at retirement was much higher for college graduates in 2007, 61 per-
cent, than for the other schooling groups, between 35 and 46 percent. 
The percentage meeting this standard increased for college graduates 
between 1989 and 2007 but declined for the least-educated group and 
high school graduates and essentially remained the same for those with 
some college. 
Expected retirement income also varies directly with income quin-
tile, and the gaps were quite large. The ratio of expected retirement 
income of the top to the bottom quintile was 13.9 in 2007. Advances in 
expected retirement income had a U-shaped pattern, with the strongest 
gains at the bottom quintile and the second strongest at the top quintile. 
The share of households with a 75 percent expected replacement rate 
is actually greatest for the bottom quintile in 2007, at 57 percent, com-
pared to 47–48 percent for the other income quintiles. 
Social Security was much more important as a source of expected 
retirement income among the lower-income groups—minorities, single 
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females, the less educated, and the lower income quintiles—than among 
higher-income groups—whites, married couples, college graduates, 
and the top income quintile. It thus serves as an important equalizing 
factor in retirement adequacy. The share of Social Security in expected 
retirement income descended with income quintile, from 42 percent for 
the bottom to 9 percent for the top in 2007. 
Moreover, the importance of Social Security beneﬁts in expected 
retirement income grew between 1989 and 2007 for the low-income 
groups indicated above. The faster growth of expected Social Secu-
rity beneﬁts among minorities largely explains the decline in the gap 
in expected retirement income between them and whites from 1989 to 
2007. Likewise, the faster growth of Social Security beneﬁts for the 
bottom income quintile was the principal factor explaining the faster 
growth in that group’s expected retirement income relative to that of 
the top quintile. 
In 2007, Social Security caused a huge reduction in expected pov-
erty rate for low-income groups—nonwhites (30 percentage points), 
single females (21 percentage points), less than 12 years of school (41 
percentage points), and high school graduates (24 percentage points). 
Between 1989 and 2007, the drop in the expected poverty rate from 
adding in expected Social Security beneﬁts increased from 15 to 30 
percentage points for minorities; 15 to 21 percentage points for single 
females; 16 to 40 percentage points for the least educated; and from 15 
to 24 percentage points for high school graduates. 
The unraveling of the DB pension system was particularly hurtful 
to those with less than a high school degree, high school graduates, and 
those with 3–5 years of college or less in terms of expected poverty 
rates. In 1989, high school graduates and those with some college had 
the lowest expected poverty rates at retirement. The effect of adding 
expected DB pension beneﬁts on the expected poverty rate fell from 15 
to 6 percentage points for the least educated households from 1989 to 
2007, 13 to 7 percentage points for high school graduates, and from 13 
to 5 percentage points for those with some college. 
Overall, the marginal effect of adding total pension wealth (DB plus 
DC pensions) to nonpension wealth on the expected poverty rate actu-
ally fell a bit from 1989 to 2007 (from a 17.6 to a 17.3 percentage point 
reduction) among all households in age range 47–64. Among most 
demographic groups, there was little change from 1989 to 2007 in the 
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marginal impact of pension wealth on the expected poverty rate. How-
ever, the drop in the marginal impact was particularly severe among 
those with less than a high school education (from a 21 to an 11 percent-
age point reduction), though among single females the marginal impact 
rose between 1989 and 2007 (from a 15 to a 21 percentage point reduc-
tion in the expected poverty rate). 
In conclusion, it has been found, ﬁrst, that Social Security fulﬁlls 
its expected role of a solid, broadly shared retirement beneﬁ t. Second, 
private savings, including home ownership, is the second most impor-
tant retirement savings vehicle. Third, private pensions still leave large 
holes, even after growing sharply from 1989 to 2007. 
Notes 
1. I am ignoring miscellaneous sources of income such as government transfer pay-
ments other than Social Security, alimony payments, and the like. These compo-
nents of household income are quite small and are hard to predict many years into 
the future. 
2. In fact, in principle, the family could convert its net worth into an annuity plan 
from a life insurance company if the plan was actuarially fair and the life insur-
ance company made no proﬁts on the annuity. 
3. The average real rate of return on gross assets for age group 47–64 on the basis 
of their actual portfolio composition was 1.97 percent in 1989, 1.76 percent in 
2001, and 1.79 percent in 2007. The real rate of return on net worth was much 
higher because of the high debt levels of U.S households—7.33 percent in 1989, 
5.32 percent in 2001, and 6.09 percent in 2007 (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of 
household debt). 
4. This projection is based on the assumption that the worker continues to work for 
the same employer (the so-called on-going concern assumption). See Chapter 4 
for more discussion. 
5. DCEMPW is deﬁned in exactly analogous fashion to DCEMP except that in Equa-
tion (4.10), the term EMPAMT is replaced by EMPLAMT, or the dollar amount 
of the employee contribution to the DC plan, which is assumed to remain ﬁxed 
in real terms over time; and in Equation (4.11), the term EMPPER is replaced by 
EMPLPER, which is the employee contribution to the DC plan as a percent of 
earnings, which is assumed to be ﬁxed over time. See Chapter 4 for more details. 
6. I also use an alternative method to project future retirement income. This method, 
referred to as Method A, is a straightforward projection of net worth (NW, includ-
ing DC, DCEMP, and DCEMPW) based on historical changes in the net worth of 
age group 47–64. Using data from the SCF for age group 47–64 over the period 
1989–2007, I calculate an annual growth rate of 2.59 percent for real net worth. 
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7. I use the ofﬁcial U.S. poverty thresholds for this analysis and assume that the fam-
ily’s marital status remains unchanged over time, and that at time of retirement 
there are no children living with the parents. 
8. Though it is possible to project wages and salaries at retirement on the basis of 
the estimated human capital earnings functions (see Appendix B in Chapter 4 for 
details), it is not easy to project other forms of income, such as property income, 
government transfer income other than Social Security beneﬁts, and miscella-
neous income. As a result, I use the historical growth in income as the basis for 
projecting household income at retirement. 
9. Scholz and Seshadri (2009), for example, used two denominators for their replace-
ment rate calculations: the average of lifetime income up to the time of retirement 
and income averaged over the top ﬁve earnings years. They computed a much 
lower average replacement rate on the basis of the latter standard: 0.57 versus 
0.68. My standard is closer to income averaged over the top ﬁve earnings years 
than to average lifetime income. 
10. These results might appear to be inconsistent with an overall gain of 39 percent 
in mean retirement income for the whole age group 47–64. However, the paradox 
is explained by the fact that the share of households with a college degree also 
climbed sharply over the period (from 17 to 37 percent). 
11. The estimated share of total expected retirement income from net worth is higher 
than most other estimates because I include the expected annuitized value from net 
worth in my deﬁnition of retirement income rather than expected future property 
income. As a result, the shares of Social Security and DB pensions in expected 
retirement income are correspondingly lower than in most other estimates. 
12. Further details are provided in Appendix Table D.4. Of the 51.8 percent share of 
nonpension wealth in total retirement income in 2007, 40.6 percent will come 
from the current value of nonpension wealth and 11.3 percent will come from 
future gains on nonpension wealth. Likewise, of the 18.3 percent share of DCTOT
in total retirement income, a little under half of this, 8.7 percent, is projected to 
come from current holdings in DC plans; another 2.5 percentage points from 
DCEMP, or expected future contributions into the plans from the employer; 1.4 
percentage points from DCEMPW, or expected future contributions into the plans 
by the employee; and ﬁnally, 5.7 percentage points from expected future capital 
gains on all three components. 
13. It is also of interest to compare estimates of mean retirement income using the 
standard method discussed in the text with the alternative method (Method A) dis-
cussed in Note 6. The two estimates were almost identical for 1989 and very close 
in the other two years (a 4 percent difference in 2001 and 2007). These results 
suggest that households in this age group engaged in very little net savings (and 
received relatively little in the form of wealth transfers like inheritances) other 
than accumulations in DC plans and receiving returns on existing forms of wealth. 
14. The contribution made by a component such as pension wealth to the overall 
change in expected retirement income is deﬁned as the change in the mean value 
of the component divided by the change in the mean value of expected retirement 
income. This term shows what share of the gain in expected retirement income is 
attributable to increases in the value of that component. 
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15. There is no clear pattern by educational group. 
16. It should be noted that the poverty rates reported in Table 7.7 are household pov-
erty rates, not individual (head count) poverty rates. 
17. A 75 percent replacement rate is the standard most often used in the relevant litera-
ture on the subject. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this issue. Moreover, it should 
be noted that the replacement rate computed here is based on the ratio of expected 
retirement income and projected income during the year before retirement. 
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Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations 
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the unraveling of the traditional DB 
pension system in favor of DC pension coverage. The study in this book 
addresses three key questions. First, have U.S. households in general 
gained from this transformation? Second, if not, which groups gained 
and which groups lost out? Third, has the transformation of the pension 
system lowered or raised overall wealth inequality?
 The main ﬁnding is that DC plans did very well during the 1980s 
and 1990s, when the stock market boomed, and that they more than fully 
compensated for the decline of DB pension plans. The overall value of 
pension wealth rose sharply over these two decades, and overall pen-
sion coverage increased, at least during the 1990s. However, between 
2001 and 2007, when the stock market slackened, there was a marked 
slowdown in the growth of both DC and overall pension wealth, and 
overall pension coverage dipped slightly. Moreover, when the stock 
market tanked from 2007 to 2009, there was a sharp projected drop in 
DC pension wealth. Indeed, from 2001 to 2009, there was virtually no 
change in average DC pension wealth and in average overall pension 
wealth. 
I begin the study using conventional net worth in order to provide 
a backdrop to the analysis of retirement wealth. Over the 2001–2007 
period, median net worth grew by 19 percent, even faster than during 
the 1990s (and 1980s). Wealth inequality was also up very slightly from 
2001 to 2007. The most notable ﬁnding for the 2001–2007 period was 
the sharply rising debt-to-income ratio, which reached its highest level 
in almost 25 years at 119 percent in 2007 for all households. The debt-
equity ratio also climbed, from 14.3 percent in 2001 to 18.1 percent in 
2007. Among the middle three wealth quintiles there was a huge increase 
255 
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in the debt-income ratio, from 100 to 157 percent from 2001 to 2007, 
and an almost doubling of the debt-equity ratio, from 32 to 61 percent. 
I also updated the wealth ﬁgures to July 1, 2009, on the basis of 
changes in housing and stock prices. My projections indicate that while 
mean wealth (in 2007 dollars) declined by 17 percent from 2007 to 
2009, median wealth plunged by 36 percent. The projections also sug-
gest a steep rise in wealth inequality, with the Gini coefﬁcient advanc-
ing from 0.834 to 0.865. 
The racial disparity in wealth holdings was almost exactly the same 
in 2007 as in 1983, with a ratio of average net worth holdings of 0.19 
and a ratio of median wealth of about 0.07 in both years. In contrast, 
Hispanic households made progress relative to white (non-Hispanic) 
households, with the ratio of average net worth holdings rising from 
0.016 in 1983 to 0.026 in 2007 (there was little change in the ratio of 
median wealth). Young households (under the age of 45), after some 
relative gains from 1983 to 1989, saw their relative wealth position 
deteriorate over the years 1989 to 2007. 
In 2007, 56 percent of male workers (currently employed) under the 
age of 65 had some type of DC account, 19 percent had some form of 
DB entitlement, and altogether, 62 percent had some form of pension 
coverage. Corresponding ﬁgures for female workers were only slightly 
lower than those for men. Pension coverage was lower for workers 
under age 47 than those aged 47–64: 53 versus 75 percent. Figures for 
female workers were very similar to those for men. 
From 1989 to 2001, overall coverage rose moderately, by 3.2 per-
centage points for male workers and 3.9 percentage points for females. 
However, trends were very different for DC and DB coverage. Deﬁned 
contribution coverage climbed by 13 percentage points for men and 10 
percentage points for women, while DB coverage plummeted by 12 
and 11 percentage points, respectively. However, from 2001 to 2007, 
male pension coverage fell by 6.4 percentage points, while female pen-
sion coverage increased by 1.7 percentage points. As a result, whereas 
in 1989 and 2001 there was about a 10 percentage point gap in pen-
sion coverage between male and female workers, by 2007 the gap was 
almost completely eliminated. The loss in pension coverage for men 
from 2001 to 2007 was almost all from the decline in DB coverage, 
which, in turn, was likely due to the continuing decline in manufactur-
ing jobs. Gains in coverage for female workers, in contrast, were all 
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in the form of expanded DC plan coverage, which likely reﬂ ected the 
continuing movement of women up the occupational ladder and from 
part-time to full-time work. 
On the household level, there were spectacular gains in the propor-
tion of households covered by DC plans from 1983 to 2001, but the 
coverage rate stabilized from 2001 to 2007. However, the DB coverage 
rate plummeted from 1989 to 2001, and though it remained steady from 
2001 to 2007, the overall pension coverage rate slipped by 1.4 percent-
age points from 2001 to 2007, to 64 percent, after rising by 10 percent-
age points from 1989 to 2001. Due mainly to the stock market boom 
and rising DC coverage, average DC pension wealth increased spec-
tacularly from 1989 to 2001 (by 80 percent). It continued to increase 
from 2001 to 2007 but at a much slower pace (only 14 percent). Projec-
tions to mid-2009 suggest that DC wealth was eviscerated by the stock 
market plunge of 2007–2009. The average value of DC plans tumbled 
by 17 percent from 2007 to the midpoint of 2009. Over the years from 
2001 to 2009, mean pension wealth was virtually unchanged. In all, 
2001–2009 was truly a “lost decade.” The results also illuminate the 
fact that DC pension wealth does well only when the stock market per-
forms spectacularly. 
While there were marked improvements in both mean and median 
net worth from 1983 to 2007, mean private accumulations (the sum of 
net worth and DB pension wealth) grew slower than mean net worth, as 
did median private accumulations in comparison to median net worth. 
This pattern also held for middle-aged and elderly households. 
Mean Social Security wealth grew by 46 percent from 1989 to 2001 
among all households, but there was virtually no change from 2001 
to 2007. As a result, mean and median retirement wealth surged from 
1989 to 2001 (by 59 and 46 percent, respectively, for all households) 
but mean retirement wealth grew very slowly from 2001 to 2007 and 
median retirement wealth fell slightly in absolute terms. Both mean and 
median augmented wealth (the sum of net worth and retirement wealth, 
the most comprehensive measure of retirement resources) advanced 
strongly from 1989 to 2001 (39 and 23 percent gains, respectively). 
However, the growth in both mean and median augmented wealth dis-
sipated from 2001 to 2007. Indeed, median augmented wealth advanced 
by only 2 percent among middle-aged households and the elderly. 
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Clearly, by the decade of the 2000s, the DC pension system was not 
providing the boost to household well-being that it had in the 1990s. 
There was also a marked slowdown in the growth of mean expected 
retirement income for age group 47–64 in the years 2001–2007 in com-
parison to the period 1989–2001, even before the ﬁ nancial meltdown 
of 2007–2009. Whereas mean expected retirement income climbed 
40 percent during the earlier period, it advanced by only 8 percent in 
the later one. This result is consistent with the ﬁnding of a pronounced 
decline in the growth of augmented wealth between the 1990s and the 
2001–2007 period. These households also experienced a substantial 
reduction in their expected poverty rate at retirement, from 15 percent 
in 1989 to 10 percent in 2001, but there was no further decline in 2001– 
2007. The percentage of households with replacement rates of 75 or 
more percent of their projected income at age 64 rose somewhat more 
in the later period than the earlier one (because preretirement income 
slowed). Still, in 2007, less than half of households could meet this 
replacement rate criterion. 
Because of the switchover from lower-inequality DB plans to 
higher-inequality DC plans, pension wealth inequality among pension 
holders rose from 1989 to 2007. The Gini coefﬁcient was up by 0.020 
points among all households, 0.018 points among young households, 
0.039 points among middle-aged ones, and 0.036 among the elderly. 
The addition of DB pension wealth to net worth to obtain private 
accumulations reduces measured wealth inequality. In 2007, the Gini 
coefﬁcient for net worth among all households was 0.834 while that 
for PA was 0.805, for a 0.029 difference. This difference is due to the 
smaller level of inequality in DB pensions than in net worth. How-
ever, the inequality-reducing effect of DB pensions declined from 0.039 
in 1989 to 0.029 in 2007. This change was largely due to the declin-
ing share of DB wealth in total private accumulations. This effect on 
inequality is most notable among middle-aged households, the group 
that was most subject to the transition of the pension system. The dif-
ference in the Gini coefﬁcients of net worth and private accumulations 
dwindled from 0.073 in 1983 to 0.036 in 2007. 
When we next include Social Security wealth in retirement wealth, 
we ﬁnd that the addition of retirement wealth also lowers wealth inequal-
ity. Adding retirement wealth to net worth lowered the Gini coefﬁcient 
for 2007 from 0.834 to 0.684. Most of the equalizing effect came from 
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adding in Social Security wealth. However, the equalizing effect of 
retirement wealth, like that of DB pension wealth, also fell off from 
1989 to 2007. The addition of retirement wealth to net worth reduced 
the overall Gini coefﬁcient in 1989 by 0.169 but by only 0.150 in 2007. 
Among middle-aged households, the difference in the Gini coefﬁcient 
between net worth and augmented wealth fell off from 0.187 in 1983 to 
0.145 in 2007. 
As might be expected, younger households suffered the most dam-
age from the transition from the DB to the DC system in terms of pen-
sion wealth. Among households aged 46 and under, DC pension cov-
erage dropped by 4 percentage points from 2001 to 2007 and overall 
pension coverage dipped by 6 percentage points. Average DC wealth 
declined by 7 percent from 2001 to 2007, and overall pension wealth 
was up by only 4 percent over this period, compared to a 56 percent rise 
in the 1990s. This marked slowdown in pension wealth growth bodes ill 
for the future retirement security of this generation. 
Moreover, among young households, mean net worth and mean pri-
vate accumulations grew very slowly from 2001 to 2007, and median 
net worth and median private accumulations actually declined in abso-
lute terms during both the 1990s and the 2000s. Mean augmented 
wealth was largely unchanged over these years, and median augmented 
wealth fell by 6 percent. 
Young households were particularly vulnerable to the stock market 
crisis in 2007–2009. From 2001 to 2009, their mean net worth plum-
meted by 21 percent, and their median net worth by (an incredible) 
78 percent. Their pension wealth, retirement wealth, and augmented 
wealth were all down over these years. Starting in 2007, young house-
holds, who had already slipped in terms of net worth and augmented 
wealth during the early and mid-2000s before the ﬁ nancial meltdown, 
got hammered by the stock market crash of the late 2000s. 
Middle-aged households also experienced deleterious effects from 
the transformation of the pension system, though many were still pro-
tected under the older DB system. After rising 34 percentage points 
from 1989 to 2001, DC coverage barely moved in the 2000s, and the 
overall pension coverage rate, after advancing by 8 percentage points in 
the 1990s, declined by 2 percentage points in the 2000s. Mean DC pen-
sion wealth, after exploding in the 1990s (by 76 percent), grew much 
more slowly in the 2000s (only 6 percent). 
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The elderly were by and large fully protected from the transition of 
the pension system. In particular, those with DB pensions were shel-
tered because of “grandfather” provisions and pension legacies. Their 
DC accumulations also experienced strong growth during the 1990s. As 
a result, their overall pension coverage rate advanced in both the 1990s 
and the 2000s. However, gains in mean pension wealth also slowed 
down from 79 percent in the 1990s to a still respectable 16 percent in 
the 2000s. 
In 2007, there was a 12 percentage point gap in pension coverage 
between black and (non-Hispanic) white male workers and a huge 30 
percentage point gap between Hispanic and (non-Hispanic) white male 
workers. Racial and ethnic differences in pension coverage were very 
similar for female workers as well. The racial and ethnic gap in pen-
sion coverage increased from 1989 to 2007. On the household level, 
there were also large gaps in pension coverage, pension wealth, retire-
ment wealth, and augmented wealth between minorities and (non-
Hispanic) whites in 2007. However, minorities made strong relative 
gains on whites in terms of Social Security wealth, retirement wealth, 
net worth, and augmented wealth from 1989 to 2007, particularly from 
2001 to 2007. Among age group 47–55, the ratio of mean augmented 
wealth advanced by 10 percentage points from 2001 to 2007 and that of 
median augmented wealth by 16 percentage points. 
The ratio of expected retirement income between minorities and 
whites also climbed, from 0.37 in 1989 to 0.43 in 2007. The conver-
gence was due largely to the growth in expected Social Security ben-
eﬁts among minorities, which outstripped that among whites. It is likely 
that the relative gains in Social Security wealth among minorities are 
due to three factors: 1) some convergence in labor earnings between 
minorities and whites, particularly during the 1990s; 2) more continu-
ous work histories for minority workers over time; and 3) a reduction in 
the life expectancy gap between minorities and whites. 
Minorities also made dramatic inroads in reducing their expected 
poverty rate at retirement, from 48 percent in 1989 to 14 percent in 
2007. Still, whites had a much lower expected poverty rate in 2007 
than minorities, 5 versus 14 percent. Moreover, minorities saw slightly 
greater increases in the share of households with a replacement rate of 
75 percent or more from 1989 to 2007. However, minorities still had a 
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lower proportion who met this replacement standard in 2007—42 ver-
sus 54 percent. 
There was also a substantial gap in retirement wealth and augmented 
wealth between single females and married couples in 2007. However, 
similar to the experience of minorities relative to whites, single females 
generally made modest gains on married couples between 1989 and 
2007 in terms of pension, retirement, and augmented wealth. However, 
despite this, the ratio of expected retirement income between the two 
groups dropped from 0.35 in 1989 to 0.28 in 2007. 
In 2007, only 22 percent of male workers without a high school 
degree had some form of pension coverage, compared to 51 percent 
of those with a high school degree, 62 percent of those with some col-
lege, and 79 percent of college graduates. The gap in pension coverage 
between college graduates and the other educational groups widened 
substantially from 1989 to 2007. The reason is not that pension cover-
age grew strongly among college graduates but rather that it dropped 
among the other educational groups. Here, too, results are similar for 
female workers. 
Households with less educational attainment had substantially less 
retirement wealth and augmented wealth in 2007 than those with more 
education. Moreover, they generally fell further behind college gradu-
ates over the years from 1989 to 2007 in terms of pension wealth, retire-
ment wealth, and augmented wealth. Indeed, retirement wealth and 
augmented wealth splayed out over time, as college graduates pulled 
ahead of the other educational groups. With regard to pension wealth, 
the decline in DB plans was particularly detrimental to the less edu-
cated, since DB coverage had been a bulwark of retirement security 
among blue-collar workers up through the 1980s. 
Less-educated households did not fare well at all with regard to 
expected retirement income. The three lowest educational groups aged 
47–64 all experienced absolute declines in this dimension from 1989 to 
2007, and the only group showing positive gains was college graduates. 
Likewise, the share of households meeting a projected 75 percent or 
better income replacement rate at retirement was much higher for col-
lege graduates in 2007, 61 percent, than for the other schooling groups, 
between 35 and 46 percent. The expected poverty rate at retirement was 
likewise much higher for the least educated group, 28 percent in 2007, 
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compared to the more educated ones. In contrast, households with a 
high school degree and those with some college had by far the low-
est expected poverty rates in 1989, 1.6 and 0.4 percent, respectively, 
because of their high level of DB coverage. 
Pension coverage was also much higher among the top earnings 
quintile than the bottom—94 versus 40 percent for male workers in 
2007 and 86 versus 46 percent among female workers. However, 
among male employees in 1989, overall pension coverage rates were 
over 90 percent among the top four earnings quintiles. This was attrib-
utable to the concentration of DB plans in the middle of the earnings 
distribution. During the 1980s, the DB pension system shored up the 
middle class. However, with the decline of the DB system, a grow-
ing gap in pension coverage emerged between the top earnings quintile 
and the bottom three. Expected retirement income varied directly with 
(household) income quintile, and the gaps were quite large. The ratio 
of expected retirement income of the top to the bottom quintile was 14 
in 2007. However, gains in expected retirement income had a U-shaped 
pattern, with the strongest gains at the bottom quintile and the second 
strongest at the top quintile. 
Social Security was a much more important source of expected 
retirement income among the lower-income groups—minorities, single 
females, the less educated, and the lower income quintiles—than among 
higher-income groups – whites, married couples, college graduates, and 
the top income quintile. It thus serves as an important equalizing factor 
in retirement adequacy. The share of Social Security in expected retire-
ment income was much higher for the lowest income quintile (42 per-
cent) than the top quintile (8 percent). Moreover, in the lowest income 
quintile, Social Security wealth accounted for almost half or more of 
augmented wealth in some years. 
Social Security beneﬁts became more important as a source of 
expected retirement income for the low-income groups indicated above 
between 1989 and 2007. The faster growth of expected Social Secu-
rity beneﬁts among minorities largely explains the decline in the gap 
in expected retirement income between them and whites from 1989 to 
2007. Likewise, the higher growth of Social Security beneﬁts for the 
bottom income quintile was the principal factor accounting for rela-
tively faster growth in their expected retirement income compared to 
that of the top quintile. 
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In 2007, Social Security beneﬁts substantially lowered the expected 
poverty rate among these low-income groups—30 percentage points 
for nonwhites, 21 percentage points for single females, 41 percentage 
points for those with less than 12 years of school, and 24 percentage 
points for high school graduates. Between 1989 and 2007, the reduction 
in the expected poverty rate from adding in expected Social Security 
beneﬁts to other sources of retirement income climbed from 15 to 30 
percentage points for minorities; 15 to 21 percentage points for single 
females; 16 to 40 percentage points for the least educated; and from 15 
to 24 percentage points for high school graduates. 
The unraveling of the DB pension system was particularly hurt-
ful to non–college graduates in terms of expected poverty rates. In 
1989, high school graduates and those with some college had the low-
est expected poverty rates at retirement. The effect of adding expected 
DB pension beneﬁts to nonpension wealth on the expected poverty rate 
declined from 15 to 6 percentage points between 1989 and 2007 for 
the least educated households, from 13 to 7 percentage points for high 
school graduates, and from 13 to 5 percentage points for those with 
some college. 
It is thus found that Social Security fulﬁlls its expected role of a 
solid, broadly shared retirement beneﬁt. In contrast, private pensions 
still leave large holes, even after showing strong improvements from 
1989 to 2001. Indeed, in 2007, many households still had to rely on 
Social Security as the sole source of their retirement income. One-
quarter of all households nearing retirement (aged 47–64) had no pri-
vate pension plans in 2007. In fact, private pension wealth still remained 
below the level of other private savings for households nearing retire-
ment. The impact of private pensions on retirement income adequacy 
is further reduced by the fact that private pension wealth remained very 
unevenly distributed. Whites, the more highly educated, married cou-
ples and single men, and college graduates had substantially larger pen-
sion wealth accumulations than their respective counterparts. 
Most of the groups with less wealth narrowed the gap in retirement 
income adequacy somewhat from 1989 to 2007. Most of these gains 
were due to improvements in Social Security wealth and not private 
pension wealth. Social Security offers almost universal coverage. Also, 
Social Security’s beneﬁts depend solely on one’s earnings record. Thus, 
as the labor market improved throughout the economic expansion of 
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the 1990s, Social Security wealth also saw large gains (though there 
was some retrenchment during the 2000s). Moreover, these gains were 
more equally distributed than income gains or other wealth gains due 
to the fact that Social Security redistributes wealth to lower lifetime 
earners. In other words, as many new job opportunities opened up for 
low-wage workers in the late 1990s, Social Security wealth increased, 
though some of these gains were modestly reversed in the 2000s. 
Still, the data include a sobering note with respect to retirement 
income adequacy. Assuming that a replacement ratio of 75 percent of 
preretirement income is a threshold for retirement income adequacy, 
less than half of all households in age range 47–64 in 2007, 42 percent 
of minority households, 44 percent of single women, and only 35 per-
cent of the least educated households will likely meet this target. 
Young households, in particular, appear to face a daunting future. 
The share of households under the age of 47 with a DC account already 
fell by 4 percentage points from 2001 to 2007, before the ﬁ nancial crisis 
hit, and the share with any pension wealth was down by 6 percentage 
points. Though mean pension wealth was up by 4 percent over these 
years, mean retirement wealth fell by 0.5 percent and median retire-
ment wealth by 4 percent. Mean net worth and mean augmented wealth 
were both up slightly but median net worth tumbled by 10 percent and 
median augmented wealth dropped by 6 percent. 
The “Great Recession” of 2007–2009 hit this group particularly 
hard, with mean net worth plummeting by 23 percent, mean augmented 
wealth by 13 percent, median net worth by another (incredible) 75 per-
cent, and median augmented wealth by another 12 percent. By 2009 
young households, according to my projections, had likely slipped way 
behind where they were in 2001. Though the fortunes of young house-
holds may be reversed to some degree when the stock market rebounds 
(as it basically has partially as of November 2010, when I am writing 
this chapter) and housing prices recover (which may take much longer), 
it may take a decade or more for this group to fully recover the 2001 
levels of their pension wealth, net worth, and augmented wealth. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Against this backdrop, how do we think about the most effective 
policies to recommend? We have already seen that even in 2007, before 
the ﬁnancial meltdown, replacement rates with respect to preretirement 
income just before retirement were low. Assuming that a replacement 
rate of 75 percent is a threshold for retirement income adequacy, slightly 
less than half of all households in age range 47–64, 42 percent of minor-
ity households, 44 percent of single women, and only 35 percent of the 
least educated households will likely meet this target. 
Much work is still left to do for public policy. First and foremost, 
retirement income adequacy cannot depend solely on Social Security, 
despite the fact that it is an important source of retirement income and 
of gains in retirement wealth for vulnerable groups. In fact, in 2007 
Social Security by itself accounted for only 17 percent of projected 
retirement income, on average, among age group 47–64. Nonpension 
wealth picked up another 52 percent on average, though, as we saw in 
Chapters 2 and 4, it is very unequally distributed. 
Pension wealth accounted for the remaining 31 percent on average, 
though it also, as we saw in Chapter 4, is quite unequally distributed, as 
are its increases over time. In fact, in 2007, only 45 percent of house-
holds (and 70 percent of pension holders) in age range 47–64 had pen-
sion wealth worth $100,000 or more (including DB wealth). A $100,000 
balance would generate only about $700 in retirement beneﬁts per year. 
This high degree of inequality in pension wealth is to a large extent a 
consequence of the transformation of the private pension system from 
traditional DB plans to the newer DC plans such as 401(k)s. Thus, pri-
vate pension coverage needs to be broadened, and future improvements 
in retirement income adequacy will likely depend on ensuring more 
widely held private pension wealth with higher account balances. 
In 2007, as we saw in Chapter 4, only 74 percent of households in 
age group 47–64 had any pension coverage (including IRAs and Keogh 
plans). Moreover, of those with pension coverage, many, as I just indi-
cated, had very small pension balances. In fact, the pension coverage 
rate had already slipped a bit between 2001 and 2007. It is quite likely 
that the downturn of 2007–2009 caused even further slippage in the 
pension coverage rate, particularly as ﬁnancially distressed families 
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cashed out their DC plans. As we saw in Chapter 5, it is also likely the 
downturn resulted in a large reduction in average pension balances. 
As the country moves toward universal health coverage, the next 
logical step may be universal pension coverage. For current workers, I 
argue in favor of guaranteed employer pension coverage for all workers 
in the company. For nonworkers below the age of retirement, I advocate 
a mixture of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs) supported, and in some cases, subsi-
dized by the federal government. For nonworkers under retirement age 
without any preexisting DB or DC pension account, one or the other 
retirement account should be mandated by law. 
It is unlikely that the country will be able to return to the “golden 
age” of DB plans. Moreover, it is not clear that the DB system is all that 
desirable. There are many problems associated with the DB system, par-
ticularly for younger workers. First, DB systems have vesting require-
ments. As a result, workers who switch jobs frequently (particularly 
younger ones) often do not work long enough at a company to become 
vested. Second, correspondingly, DB pensions as they are set up now 
are not portable, so that those workers who switch jobs before vesting 
lose the beneﬁts of the time worked at the company. Third, even among 
workers who become vested but leave a company early in their work 
careers, the accrued beneﬁts from the DB system are often very small. 
Indeed, the DB system is designed to encourage long-term employment 
at a company. Fourth, DB plans are expensive and seem to work best 
for high-wage, high-productivity employees. As a result, requiring an 
employer to provide a DB plan may result in substantial dislocations of 
low-wage and low-skilled workers. 
Fifth, DB systems have, historically at least, been subject to many 
funding problems. By the same token, their funding is often heavily 
dependent on movements in the stock market. With the collapse of the 
stock market in 2008 and 2009, many private pension funds and, par-
ticularly, state and local government pension funds, found themselves 
severely underfunded. Though beneﬁts from private pensions are 
largely guaranteed (at least up to a cap) by the Pension Beneﬁ t Guar-
anty Corporation (PBGC), the PBGC itself is (as of March 2011) in 
ﬁnancial trouble, with its reserves severely depleted. 
Though it may be possible through legislation to shore up the DB 
system and to encourage employers to offer such plans (or, at least, to 
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not discontinue existing plans) through a combination of tax incentives 
and tax credits, it seems to be the case that many of the same advantages 
of the DB system can be garnered by a DC system. Moreover, the DC 
system has the advantage of portability and can be extended to low-
income workers without creating an employment disincentive for the 
company (at least to the same degree as a DB plan would). 
With regard to the DC pension system, there appear to be four 
major goals in reforming and improving the present system. The ﬁrst 
is to increase participation rates so that pension coverage is universal. 
The second is to increase the amount contributed into the system. The 
third is to increase the returns on retirement accounts. The fourth is to 
stabilize the returns on these accounts and reduce the risk associated 
with such accounts. 
There have been many proposals to accomplish these four objec-
tives. With regard to the ﬁrst objective, one common proposal is to 
change the default option at work for enrollment in a retirement plan to 
“opt out” rather than to “opt in” to the retirement plan. Automatically 
enrolling employees in a retirement plan unless they opt out is a use-
ful objective. However, one problem with this approach is that a lot of 
low-income workers simply cannot afford a 401(k) or even an IRA. The 
same is true for young workers. Changing the default option is therefore 
likely to have only a modest impact on the take-up rate of these retire-
ment plans for these groups of workers. 
Another proposal is that tax incentives need to be changed. Under 
existing law, high-income employees receive the largest tax subsidy, 
while low-income ones receive the lowest. As a result, replacing the 
current tax deduction for retirement plan contributions with a tax credit 
would still provide everyone with a tax incentive but would shift the 
beneﬁt down the income ladder. This should presumably increase the 
savings of low-income workers and increase their take-up rate for an 
employer-provided retirement plan. 
I would, in fact, make the amount of tax credit dependent on fam-
ily income and would turn the tax credit into a refundable tax credit 
in the case of low-income families. This would mean that the govern-
ment would subsidize low-income workers for part of the savings in a 
retirement account, much like the way an IDA works (see, for example, 
Sherraden 1991). Moreover, a special tax credit might be provided to 
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young families as well in order to boost their take-up rate of retirement 
accounts. 
Another recommendation is to push for comprehensive retirement 
coverage, an emphasis at least early on in the Obama administration. 
Less than half of employees have a retirement plan at work. The so-
called universal IRA advanced by Barack Obama during the presiden-
tial campaign would help make a retirement account available to all 
workers (see Mandell et al. [2009] for a discussion of this proposal). 
Personally, I would make an even stronger proposal: universal, 
guaranteed employer pension coverage (much like one would propose 
for health care). The ﬁrst step is to make participation universal within 
a ﬁrm, so that all workers are covered. Second, it should not be neces-
sary to require employee contributions in order to have funds provided 
(or matched) by the employer. Instead, employer contributions should 
be mandatory. A certain minimum contribution should be required from 
each employer (in much the same way as minimum standards should 
be drawn up for an employer-provided health policy). Employee con-
tributions, in turn, should be voluntary. Third, the provisions should be 
universal within a ﬁrm. The plans should be the same for rank-and-ﬁle 
workers as for top management. 
In addition, nonworkers under the age of retirement would be 
required to have an IRA unless they have a preexisting DB or DC plan 
from earlier employment. In the case of low-income and young house-
holds, the contribution to the IRA should be subsidized by the federal 
government in much the same way as an IDA. This subsidy would take 
the form of a refundable tax credit like the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
Low-income households would receive a tax credit (or actual payment 
from the government) as a percentage of their contribution to the IRA, 
where the credit would vary inversely to household income (starting as 
high as 100 percent for a household with no income). A minimum con-
tribution would also be required—perhaps $1,000 per year in the initial 
year, indexed for inﬂation over time. 
With regard to the second objective, increasing balances in retire-
ment accounts, it is ﬁrst of note that a 2009 New York Times editorial 
reports evidence from Fidelity Investments that from the ﬁrst quarter 
of 2008 through the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 more employees reduced their 
contributions to 401(k) plans than increased them. By the second quar-
ter, employees were still contributing less of their pay than they did in 
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2008. Moreover, some employers cut their 401(k) matching contribu-
tions as well. Indeed, some recent reports indicate that many large com-
panies were suspending their matches entirely for employee retirement 
accounts.1 
With this in mind, I would propose that employers be required to 
contribute a minimum percentage to the retirement accounts of the 
workers in their employ. I favor a minimum of 3 percent of worker pay. 
Moreover, a minimum dollar amount should be stipulated by law, say, 
$1,000 in the initial year and indexed for inﬂation over time. This would 
help insure adequate accumulations in retirement accounts among low-
wage workers. As noted above, a similar minimum pay-in should be 
required for nonworkers into their IRAs. 
Another proposal is that preretirement payouts from retirement 
accounts should be discouraged (I would even say prohibited), except 
in cases of real hardship like disability. This proposal is important in 
light of the Great Recession of 2007–2009, during which many ﬁnan-
cially distressed families “cashed out” a large part or even all of their 
retirement accounts. One method of implementing this proposal would 
be to require that employees roll over a 401(k) or similar retirement 
account into a new account when they change jobs. I would also add 
that loans against retirement accounts like 401(k)s should be severely 
limited, since these also reduce the payout from these plans at the time 
of retirement. 
The third and fourth objectives enumerated above are to increase 
the returns on retirement accounts and to reduce the risk associated with 
such accounts. These objectives are particularly germane in light of the 
2007–2009 years, when DC plans were devastated by the stock mar-
ket crash. In light of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, should we think about 
limiting the stock market exposure of DC plans? Should we mandate a 
guaranteed rate of return on pension assets? 
In order to avoid wide variations in payouts from retirement plans 
at the time of retirement, one possibility would be to develop a savings 
plan in which the federal government shared the risk. This could be 
implemented by providing a guarantee that returns would not fall below 
a certain level. A similar proposal has been advanced by Ghirladucci 
(2007, 2008), which she calls a Guaranteed Retirement Account. In her 
proposal, participation in the program is mandatory except for workers 
participating in an equivalent or better employer DB plan. Contribu-
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tions are set equal to 5 percent of earnings, split equally by employer 
and employee. Participants are guaranteed a minimum 3 percent annual 
rate of return adjusted for inﬂation. The guarantee is provided by the 
federal government.2 
I support such an approach only in part. I think that a ﬁxed rate of 
return should be mandated (and guaranteed) for only a ﬁxed amount (or 
percentage) of pension assets. To achieve this, one possibility is to offer 
federal bonds with ﬁxed yields. Such bonds actually already exist as 
Treasury Inﬂation-Protected Securities, though the yields have histori-
cally been quite low. Another possibility is to have the federal govern-
ment or company make up the difference between the actual yield on a 
retirement account like a 401(k) and some preset minimum. This plan, 
however, would require some further reﬁnement. However, we should 
give individuals the freedom for speculation and risk-taking on the 
remaining part of their pension accounts if they so desire. This would 
allow individuals to invest part of their pension accounts in equities, for 
example, where, at least historically, rates of returns have been higher 
than on bonds and other ﬁ nancial securities. 
Though this book is about the pension system and not Social Secu-
rity, it might be helpful to say a few words about Social Security as 
well. I think that in general the current Social Security system should 
be left largely intact. For example, the periodic discussions over beneﬁt 
cuts for middle-class families as part of Social Security privatization 
seem to be misplaced, since it would hurt middle-class families, for 
whom private pensions have not ﬁlled the supplemental income role 
that they were always intended to play. Indeed, this should give pause to 
those who want to carve up Social Security through privatization, since 
Social Security has proven to be superior to private retirement beneﬁts 
in many ways. It is universal and it has risen faster than other forms 
of retirement savings for those households who need additional retire-
ment beneﬁts the most. It also has a pronounced equalizing effect on the 
distribution of (augmented) wealth. As a result, it would be most desir-
able to protect Social Security as much as possible and ﬁll the holes 
in the retirement savings system outside of Social Security, so that a 
decent standard of living in retirement as a reward for a life of hard 
work becomes a reality for America’s middle class and working poor. 
Though no major overhaul of the Social Security system is needed, 
there may be small ﬁxes required to keep the system ﬁscally in bal-
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ance. I have three recommendations. First, as life expectancy rises, split 
the difference with regard to the normal retirement age. In particular, 
for each 12-month rise in life expectancy, raise the normal retirement 
age for that birth cohort by some ﬁxed fraction (perhaps one-third).3 A 
similar proposal is voiced by Turner (2009) in the case of DB pension 
plans. Second, gradually raise the earnings cap (without a correspond-
ing increase in Social Security beneﬁts at the top). Third, make the 
Social Security tax more progressive (currently it is a regressive tax). 
Last, because large improvements in retirement income adequacy 
resulted primarily from more Social Security wealth as a result of a 
tight labor market in the late 1990s, and because these gains may have 
been largely dissipated by the Great Recession and the high unemploy-
ment rate of this period, public policy should also focus on increasing 
employment and lowering unemployment as a way not only to lift cur-
rent living standards, but also the living standards of future retirees. 
Notes 
1. See, for example, Munnell and Quinby (2010), who report that in 2008 and 2009, 
over 200 employers suspended their 401(k) matches, affecting 5 percent of active 
401(k) participants. 
2. A critique of a guaranteed rate of return plan is provided in Munnell et al. (2009). 
3. One proposal before Congress as of November 2010 is to gradually raise the age 
of full Social Security beneﬁts from the current 67 to 69. 
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Appendix A 
Sources and Methods Used for the 
Survey of Consumer Finances Data 
CHOICE OF WEIGHTS 
In some years, the SCF supplied alternative sets of weights. For the 1983 
SCF, I use the “Full Sample 1983 Composite Weights” because this set of 
weights provides the closest correspondence between the national balance 
sheet totals derived from the sample and those in the Federal Reserve Board 
Flow of Funds. For the same reason, results for the 1989 SCF are based on the 
average of SRC-Design-S1 series (X40131 in the database itself) and the SRC 
design-based weights (X40125). Results for the 2001 and 2007 SCF rely on 
the Designed-Base Weights (X42001)—partially design-based weights that are 
constructed on the basis of original selection probabilities and frame informa-
tion and adjusted for nonresponse and that account for the systematic deviation 
from the CPS estimates of homeownership rates by racial and ethnic groups.
ALIGNMENT WITH THE FLOW OF FUNDS DATA 
The Federal Reserve Board imputes information for missing items in the 
SCF. However, despite this procedure, there still remain discrepancies for sev-
eral assets between the total balance sheet value computed from the survey 
sample and the Flow of Funds data. Because of this, the results presented in 
Table A.1 are based on my adjustments to the original asset and liability values 
in the surveys. This takes the form of the alignment of asset and liability totals 
from the survey data to the corresponding national balance sheet totals. In most 
cases, this entails a proportional adjustment of reported values of balance sheet 
items in the survey data (see Wolff [1987a, 1994, 1996, 1998] for details). The
adjustment factors by asset type and year are as follows: 
No adjustments were made to other asset and debt components, or to the 
2001 or 2007 SCF. 
It should be noted that the alignment has very little effect on the measure-
ment of wealth inequality—both the Gini coefﬁcient and the quantile shares. 
273 
Wolff.indb 274  11/21/2011 9:19:48 AM   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
274 Wolff 
Table A.1  Asset Adjustment Factors by Asset Type and Year 
1983 SCF 1989 SCF 
Checking accounts 1.68 
Savings and time deposits 1.50 
All deposits 1.37 
Financial securities 1.20 
Stocks and mutual funds 1.06 
Trusts 1.66 
Stocks and bonds 
Nonmortgage debt 1.16 
NOTE: Blanks = not applicable. 
However, it is important to make these adjustments when comparing changes 
in mean wealth, both overall and by asset type. 
CHOICE OF PRICE INDEX 
I use the standard price deﬂator, the CPI-U, which the BLS has been com-
puting since 1947, to deﬂate wealth values. The CPI-U has been criticized for 
overstating the rate of inﬂation. As a result, the BLS also provides an alterna-
tive consumer price series called the CPI-U-RS (the RS stands for research 
series). The CPI-U-RS series makes quality adjustments for housing units and 
consumer durables such as automobiles and personal computers and employs 
a geometric mean formula to account for consumer substitution within CPI 
item categories. As a result, the CPI-U-RS deﬂator is not subject to the same 
criticisms as the CPI-U series. Indeed, the CPS data are now normally deﬂated 
to constant dollars by the U.S. Census Bureau using the CPI-U-RS price index. 
While the CPI-U-RS deﬂator incorporates quality and other adjustments,
the adjustments are made only from 1978 to the present. The CPI-U index is
used for years prior to 1978. The CPI-U-RS shows a much slower rate of inﬂa-
tion after 1973 than the CPI-U: 288 versus 238 percent. If we use the CPI-U-RS
deﬂator, then constant dollar median family income would show a 22 percent
growth between 1973 and 2000, in comparison to the 6 percent growth rate on
the basis of the CPI-U deﬂ ator.
While the use of the CPI-U-RS will show a higher growth in real incomes 
(and wealth) since 1978, it is not clear that the degree of bias in the CPI has 
risen in recent years. If similar adjustments were made on the pre-1978 price 
data, it is possible that the inﬂation rate over the 1947–1978 period would be 
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adjusted downward by a similar amount as the post-1978 inﬂation rate. Since 
my aggregate time-series data on wealth began in 1922 and I have made cal-
culations of household wealth trends on the basis of microdata beginning in 
1962, I have elected to use the CPI-U series to convert nominal values to real 
dollars to be consistent with my earlier work on the subject, since the CPI-U 
series is the only consumer price series that runs from 1922 to the present (see, 
for example, Wolff [1987a, 1994, 2002a]). 
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Appendix B 
Estimation of Pension and 
Social Security Wealth 
I generally follow the methodology laid out in the 1983 SCF codebook. 
However, even though estimates of both pension and Social Security wealth 
are provided in the 1983 SCF, I reestimate the values of both to be consis-
tent with later years. The computations of retirement wealth use the following 
steps: 
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION WEALTH 
Deﬁ ned beneﬁt pension wealth consists of two main components.1 
1) The present value of DB pensions from past jobs: The sum of the 
present value of past DB job pensions for head and spouse. 
2) The present value of DB pensions from current jobs: The sum of the 
present value of current job nonthrift beneﬁts for head and spouse. 
Expectations data are used for calculations. 
The procedure is as follows. Pension coverage is ﬁrst ascertained for cur-
rent jobs. There are ﬁve possible categories: 
1) covered and vested, anticipates beneﬁts; 
2) covered but not vested yet, anticipates beneﬁts; 
3) covered but not vested yet, does not anticipate beneﬁts; 
4) not covered but anticipates will be (the age when expected to be cov-
ered is ascertained); and 
5) not covered, never will be. 
For those who are covered by a pension plan or expect coverage, the per-
son is asked how many distinct pension plans he or she is covered by. For each 
plan, the age at which the pension beneﬁts are expected to be given is then 
asked. 
The actual expected annual retirement beneﬁt is then determined by the 
following steps. First, the age at which the respondent will be vested in each 
plan is determined. Second, the age at which the respondent could retire with 
277 
Wolff.indb 278  11/21/2011 9:19:50 AM   
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
278 Wolff 
full beneﬁts is ascertained. Third, the respondent was asked the nature of the 
formula used to determine the retirement beneﬁts. There are six possibilities: 
1) retirement formula based on age, 
2) retirement formula based on years of service, 
3) retirement formula based on meeting both age and years of service 
criteria, 
4) retirement formula based on the sum or age and years of service, 
5) retirement formula based on meeting either age or years of service 
criteria, and 
6) other combinations or formulas. 
Fourth, the age at which the respondent could retire with some beneﬁts 
was asked. The same six choices of the formula used were then given. Fifth, 
the age at which the respondent expected beneﬁts to start was then asked. 
Sixth, the expected retirement beneﬁt was computed depending on the 
type of formula. This consists of three possibilities: 
1) The annual pay in the ﬁnal year of the job was computed. This vari-
able, used in pension beneﬁt calculations, is computed by projecting 
current pay to the year respondents say they will leave the job or 
retire. This projection is based on human capital earnings equations 
detailed below and a real discount rate of 2.0 percent. Wage growth 
is based on the historical change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
mean hourly wages series for nonsupervisory workers for the period 
and of hours worked per week from 1979 to 2007.2 
2) In some cases, the respondent reported expected retirement beneﬁts. 
This variable is the expected dollar retirement beneﬁts in the ﬁrst 
year of eligibility as answered by the respondent. For some observa-
tions the dollar amount was reported directly, but for others it was 
computed by multiplying reported beneﬁts as a percentage times the 
calculated projected ﬁnal wage. The variable is given as an annual 
amount except when a lump sum is expected (in which case the lump 
sum amount is given). 
3) In some cases, the respondent reported expected retirement beneﬁts 
as a percentage of ﬁnal pay. This variable is the expected retirement 
beneﬁts in the ﬁrst year of eligibility as answered by the respondent, 
expressed as a percentage of their projected wages in their ﬁ nal year 
of work. For some observations the percentage was reported directly, 
but for others it was computed by dividing the reported dollar beneﬁt 
by the calculated projected ﬁ nal wage. 
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Seventh, on the basis of the responses above, the present value of pension 
beneﬁts from each current and past plan applicable to both head and spouse 
was then computed. This variable is measured assuming an annual (or lump 
sum) pension beneﬁt as given above, starting in the year of ﬁ rst beneﬁ ts. Ben-
eﬁts for that and each succeeding year are adjusted for the probability of death 
and are discounted back to the survey year. For this, I have used mortality 
rates by age, gender, and race in the computation of the present value of both 
pensions and Social Security wealth.3 These are capped at 109 years. Spousal 
survival beneﬁts are assumed to be opted for 75 percent of the time and are 
randomly assigned when appropriate. Spousal survival beneﬁts are also ad-
justed for death probabilities. Beneﬁts are discounted at a real discount rate of 
2 percent. 
Eighth, pension wealth was also computed for those individuals currently 
receiving pension beneﬁts from past jobs. This was based on the following 
responses: number of years receiving beneﬁts, and amount of pension beneﬁt 
pay received in the year preceding the survey year. For pensions already be-
ing received, the nominal value of the pension is assumed to be ﬁxed, and is 
indexed to the year it started by the actual price changes observed, as measured 
by the CPI. The present value of pension beneﬁts from each job is then mea-
sured, assuming an annual pension beneﬁt from the survey year onward. Ben-
eﬁts for that and each succeeding year (adjusted for probability of survival) are 
discounted back to the survey year. As before, I have used mortality rates by 
age, gender, and race in the computation of the present value of both pensions 
and Social Security wealth. These are capped at 109 years. Spousal survival 
beneﬁts are assumed to be opted for 75 percent of the time and are randomly 
assigned when appropriate. Spouse mortality tables are also used, and beneﬁts 
are discounted at a real discount rate of 2 percent. 
SOCIAL SECURITY WEALTH 
The present value of Social Security beneﬁts is deﬁned as the sum of the 
present value of Social Security beneﬁts for head and spouse. Social Security 
formulae and current receipts are used for calculations. 
Among current Social Security beneﬁt recipients, the steps are as follows. 
First, the respondent was asked which kind of Social Security beneﬁt he or she 
received. (The possibilities are retirement, disability, both retirement and dis-
ability, and other.) Second, the respondent was asked the number of years he 
or she had received Social Security beneﬁts. Third, both head and spouse were 
asked the amount received in the survey year. 
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Among future recipients, the steps are as follows. First, both head and 
spouse were asked to report the age at which they expected to receive So-
cial Security beneﬁts (zero if he or she does not expect beneﬁts). Second, the 
number of years until the start of Social Security beneﬁts was determined. 
Third, the respondent was asked the total number of years he or she had spent 
working on jobs covered by Social Security to the current date. If this was not 
answered, then an estimate of Social Security coverage was used, summing 
over current and three possible past jobs. Fourth, an estimate of future years 
on Social Security jobs was computed from retirement years indicated by head 
and spouse. 
Fifth, data on the number of years on Social Security jobs, wage rates for 
each known job, estimates of retirement dates, and dates of starting beneﬁts 
were used as inputs to Social Security formulae to compute beneﬁts. Sixth, 
estimates of Social Security beneﬁts were provided. A calculated value was 
based on current job wage. All persons were assumed to work continuously un-
til their stated age of full-time retirement, and then part-time until their stated 
age of ﬁnal retirement. All persons were assumed to retire no later than 72, or 
age plus one if currently over 72. Persons not currently working and over 50 
were assumed not to work again. Wages were calculated by projecting current 
wages by the same method used to calculate ﬁnal wages. This projection is 
based on human capital earnings equations detailed in the following section 
and a real discount rate of 2.0 percent. Wage growth is based on the historical 
change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ mean hourly wage series for non-
supervisory workers for the period and of hours worked per week from 1979 
to 2007. Part-time years (if currently working full time) were assigned wages 
equal to one-half the projected full-time wages or the maximum amount for 
full beneﬁt receipt allowed by Social Security, whichever was smaller. 
Seventh, the Social Security AIME used as the basis for calculating the 
Social Security beneﬁt base was computed. The variable is the average cov-
ered Social Security earnings per month (including zero) for all years from 
1951 or age 22–60 (whichever is later). These are indexed by a Social Security 
wage index to the year the respondent is 60. Years after 60 can be substituted at 
nominal value. The ﬁve lowest years are dropped before an average AIME is 
computed. These procedures are mimicked using the SCF data on job earnings 
and future retirement plans to estimate an AIME value. Past and current job 
wages are projected back (and forward) to estimate earnings for each known 
year of work. As before, these projections are based on human capital earn-
ings equations detailed below and a real discount rate of 2.0 percent. Wage 
changes are based on the historical change in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
mean hourly wages series for nonsupervisory workers for the period and of 
hours worked per week from 1979 to 2007. Other years of unknown jobs are 
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ﬁlled in with terms from the closest known job to ﬁll in the total number of 
Social Security covered years. Wages are then capped at the actual or projected 
Social Security maximum and minimum coverage amounts. The AIME was 
then computed using actual or projected Social Security wage indices. The 
variable is currently estimated for all persons projected to have future Social 
Security beneﬁts. 
Eighth, the Social Security Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) on an annual 
basis is the basis of the calculation of Social Security beneﬁts. It is computed 
from the AIME. In 1982 the monthly PIA was computed as 90 percent of the 
ﬁrst $254 of AIME plus 32 percent of the next $1,274 plus 15 percent of the 
amount above that. Calculations here take into account legislatively planned 
changes in this formula. The PIA is currently computed for all nonreceivers 
projected to have future Social Security beneﬁts. 
Ninth, the present value of Social Security beneﬁts is then determined as-
suming an annual beneﬁt as given by the PIA estimate and starting in the year 
of ﬁ rst beneﬁts (or the survey year). Beneﬁts for that and each succeeding year 
(adjusted for probability of receipt) are discounted back to the survey year. As 
before, I have used mortality rates by age, gender, and race in the computation 
of the present value of Social Security wealth; these are capped at 109 years. 
Beneﬁts are discounted at a real discount rate of 2 percent. 
Tenth, spousal beneﬁts are also assumed at 50 percent of the primary ben-
eﬁt if a spouse is present. However, this variable will be zero if no spousal 
beneﬁts are expected (such as when the individual’s own beneﬁts are larger 
than his or her spousal beneﬁts). The age at which spousal beneﬁts begin is 
estimated. Spouse mortality tables are also used for these calculations. The 
age at which widow’s beneﬁts ﬁrst could be drawn is also estimated. It is an 
estimate of the age at which the individual could start to receive Social Secu-
rity widow’s beneﬁts upon the death of the spouse. This variable will be zero 
if widow’s beneﬁts could never be drawn. An adjustment is also made if it ap-
peared that the recipient’s beneﬁts had been reduced because of work. Beneﬁts 
are discounted at a real discount rate of 2 percent. 
HUMAN CAPITAL EARNINGS EQUATIONS 
The regression equations used to compute future and past earnings are as 
follows: 
Human capital earnings functions are estimated by gender, race, and 
schooling level. In particular, the sample is divided into 16 groups by the fol-
lowing characteristics: white and Asian versus African American and Hispanic; 
male and female; and less than 12 years of schooling, 12 years of schooling, 
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282 Wolff 
13–15 years of schooling, and 16 or more years. For each group, an earnings 
equation is estimated as follows: 
ln(Ei)=b0+b1 ln(Hi)+b2 Xi+b3 Xi 2+b4 SEi+Σj bjOCCUPij+b10 MARi+b11 ASI +εi , 
where ln is the natural logarithm; Ei is the current earnings of individual i; Hi is
annual hours worked in the current year; Xi is years of experience at current age
(estimated as age minus years of schooling minus 5); SEi is a dummy variable
indicating whether the person is self-employed or working for someone else;
OCCUP is a set of ﬁve dummy variables indicating occupation of employment:
1) professional and managerial; 2) technical, sales, or administrative support;
3) service; 4) craft; and 5) other blue-collar, with farming the omitted category;
MAR is a dummy variable indicating whether the person is married or not mar-
ried; AS is a dummy variable indicating whether the person is Asian (used only
for regressions on the ﬁrst racial category); and ε is a stochastic error term. Fu-
ture earnings are projected on the basis of the regression coefﬁcients.4 
QUESTIONS ON WORK HISTORY
Following is a sample of questions on work history drawn from the 1989 
SCF codebook that is used to calculate the earnings proﬁle of both head and 
spouse and to calculate the AIME for each: 
1) Including any periods of self-employment, the military, and your 
current job, since you were 18, how many years have you worked 
full-time for all or most of the year? 
2) Not counting your current job, have you ever had a full-time job that 
lasted for three years or more? 
3) I want to know about the longest such job you had. Did you work for 
someone else, were you self-employed, or what? 
4) When did you start working at that job? 
5) When did you stop working at that job? 
6) Since you were 18, have there been years when you only worked 
part-time for all or most of the year? 
7) About how many years in total did you work part time for all or most 
of the year? 
8) Thinking now of the future, when do you expect to stop working full 
time? 
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Appendix B 283 
9) Do you expect to work part time after that? 
10) When do you expect to stop working altogether? 
QUESTIONS ON DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 
1) Does your employer make contributions to this [DC] plan? Does the 
business make contributions to this plan? 
2) What percentage of pay or amount of money per month or year does 
your employer currently contribute? 
Appendix Notes 
1. A third though minor component is also provided: pensions from other nonspeci-
ﬁ ed sources.
 2. These ﬁgures are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) hourly wage se-
ries. The source is Table B-47 of the Economic Report, available at http://www 
.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables09.html. The BLS wage ﬁgures are converted to constant
dollars on the basis of the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-
U). I use the BLS series rather than one of the alternatives to project future wages
because it likely corresponds closest to changes in the Social Security wage base
over time, due to the cap on Social Security earnings that enter the Social Security
beneﬁ t formula. 
3. The source is U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract, various years and table 
numbers. I use the mortality tables as of the survey year (or the one nearest to the 
survey year). 
4. This implicitly assumes that deviations from the regression line in the current year
are a result of a transitory component to current income only. This procedure follows
the conventions of the 1983 SCF codebook. 
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Table B.1  Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Race, 
Education, Age, and Gender, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
By racea 
Aged 46 and under 
Non-Hispanic whites 
All DC accounts 45.3 40.9 60.2 48.4 53.1 52.0 
All DB plans 35.4 23.7 18.1 15.1 14.0 12.8 
DC and/or DB Plans 64.2 51.5 66.1 55.4 56.9 57.7 
(Non-Hispanic) African Americans 
All DC accounts 37.8 33.3 50.8 45.3 47.1 37.9 
All DB plans 33.0 37.2 17.2 15.1 15.3 8.6 
DC and/or DB plans 56.6 53.6 61.2 53.6 50.7 42.7 
Hispanics 
All DC accounts 15.2 13.6 28.4 26.2 29.2 28.6 
All DB plans 22.6 23.5 11.7 12.1 6.9 9.1 
DC and/or DB plans 34.0 33.2 32.7 34.4 32.1 34.1 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whites 
All DC accounts 66.4 56.6 69.1 65.2 71.9 67.9 
All DB plans 45.1 38.8 40.1 27.2 29.6 22.8 
DC and/or DB plans 82.8 71.8 81.4 75.3 79.4 75.3 
(Non-Hispanic) African Americans 
All DC accounts 28.8 20.8 47.7 52.4 43.4 50.3 
All DB plans 45.0 46.5 46.2 21.7 28.3 25.7 
DC and/or DB plans 63.3 52.9 73.9 61.5 59.6 61.1 
Hispanics 
All DC accounts 44.6 36.3 48.1 31.0 42.8 35.1 
All DB plans 34.5 34.1 24.9 21.2 11.1 10.3 
DC and/or DB plans 57.1 57.4 58.5 42.6 49.8 45.3 
By educational attainment 
Aged 46 and under 
No high school diploma (or GED) 
All DC accounts 17.6 21.0 21.4 21.4 14.0 14.2 
All DB plans 20.3 13.7 6.6 1.6 1.2 0.3 
DC and/or DB plans 32.5 32.0 25.8 23.0 15.2 14.5 
Wolff.indb 285  11/21/2011 9:19:54 AM   
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix B 285 
Table B.1  (continued) 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
By educational attainment (cont.) 
Aged 46 and under (cont.) 
High school diploma (or GED) 
All DC accounts 34.7 29.0 48.2 34.6 35.9 34.0 
All DB plans 32.4 23.0 15.3 10.7 12.0 10.2 
DC and/or DB plans 55.7 44.3 55.4 41.4 40.3 40.5 
Some college 
All DC accounts 42.8 37.5 49.7 37.5 51.2 42.9 
All DB plans 33.5 25.1 19.5 11.0 11.6 10.2 
DC and/or DB plans 61.8 48.4 59.1 43.5 54.9 48.3 
College degree 
All DC accounts 53.3 51.9 74.7 63.4 70.3 62.3 
All DB plans 39.1 30.5 20.7 22.1 17.6 15.2 
DC and/or DB plans 71.7 61.9 78.8 72.6 73.9 68.7 
Aged 47–64 
No high school diploma (or GED) 
All DC accounts 41.6 26.6 33.3 18.8 33.9 35.0 
All DB plans 38.2 31.3 37.9 14.1 7.9 7.0 
DC and/or DB plans 68.3 50.7 60.0 33.0 40.1 39.2 
High school diploma (or GED) 
All DC accounts 55.4 44.0 60.6 54.2 55.4 55.7 
All DB plans 38.6 35.1 33.1 19.0 26.6 18.7 
DC and/or DB plans 73.9 61.7 72.6 66.2 67.0 63.0 
Some college 
All DC accounts 63.5 53.3 61.9 67.9 68.5 64.7 
All DB plans 46.5 37.0 31.5 21.4 29.7 18.8 
DC and/or DB plans 83.5 69.2 72.8 71.6 75.6 70.9 
College degree 
All DC accounts 78.0 72.1 78.6 72.4 80.0 74.9 
All DB plans 50.3 47.9 45.5 35.2 30.5 28.8 
DC and/or DB plans 87.6 85.2 90.2 82.9 86.2 84.1 
NOTE: The table includes only current workers aged 64 and under. 
a Asians and other races are excluded from the table because of their small sample size. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Table B.2  Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Industry, 
Occupation, Employment Status, and Age, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
By industry of employmenta 
Aged 46 and under 
Goods-producing industries 
All DC accounts 40.2 37.5 52.0 53.1 38.1 51.9 
All DB plans 28.6 25.4 17.4 11.2 7.8 7.0 
DC and/or DB plans 55.1 53.3 58.9 56.0 41.2 53.8 
Wholesale and retail trade 
All DC accounts 35.4 22.4 45.7 33.3 46.4 27.8 
All DB plans 15.8 12.3 7.6 4.9 6.1 3.9 
DC and/or DB plans 44.5 29.4 47.8 35.9 47.5 30.0 
Nongovernmental services 
All DC accounts 43.9 40.3 62.5 46.2 56.7 50.9 
All DB plans 39.9 25.7 17.1 16.0 11.1 11.4 
DC and/or DB plans 65.6 52.4 67.7 54.9 59.8 56.7 
Public administration 
All DC accounts 41.4 52.0 72.2 53.0 73.8 62.1 
All DB plans 76.5 59.6 51.2 45.7 57.9 52.8 
DC and/or DB plans 96.2 77.0 93.8 73.9 86.1 88.9 
Aged 47–64 
Goods-producing industries 
All DC accounts 58.6 45.7 62.7 54.6 59.8 67.5 
All DB plans 46.2 22.7 37.3 25.0 21.7 7.9 
DC and/or DB plans 79.6 51.3 78.3 62.5 66.9 70.3 
Wholesale and retail trade 
All DC accounts 51.6 45.3 62.5 53.7 66.3 63.9 
All DB plans 14.5 21.7 28.6 13.7 15.9 12.1 
DC and/or DB plans 60.9 60.2 74.0 59.1 69.4 67.0 
Nongovernmental services 
All DC accounts 65.3 53.5 68.4 63.5 72.0 63.5 
All DB plans 49.7 43.7 38.9 27.3 30.2 24.5 
DC and/or DB plans 82.5 72.8 79.8 74.5 80.2 72.5 
Public administration 
All DC accounts 80.7 34.8 82.0 66.4 70.5 73.2 
All DB plans 64.3 67.6 74.6 36.5 55.1 57.4 
DC and/or DB plans 96.9 70.1 100.0 78.4 89.8 88.7 
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Table B.2  (continued) 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
By occupation of employment 
Aged 46 and under 
Professional and managerial 
All DC accounts 56.7 51.7 70.0 56.6 67.7 57.4 
All DB plans 40.6 33.9 18.5 21.3 13.7 15.0 
DC and/or DB plans 75.0 64.8 74.4 66.6 70.1 63.8 
Technical and clerical 
All DC accounts 42.5 37.0 58.7 44.7 53.4 47.4 
All DB plans 23.6 23.6 14.4 11.7 11.0 8.4 
DC and/or DB plans 55.3 49.4 62.7 50.5 56.0 52.1 
Service workers 
All DC accounts 30.9 19.1 35.2 20.7 38.4 21.8 
All DB plans 43.2 13.3 22.5 7.2 26.5 9.4 
DC and/or DB plans 63.8 28.0 48.2 25.5 47.9 27.3 
Craft, operative, and agricultural 
All DC accounts 30.5 24.9 46.3 42.2 35.7 31.5 
All DB plans 31.2 24.7 16.4 8.4 8.7 9.8 
DC and/or DB plans 50.0 41.0 53.6 46.9 38.8 38.2 
Aged 47–64 
Professional and managerial 
All DC accounts 78.2 73.3 77.2 71.3 79.3 67.7 
All DB plans 55.5 39.9 40.6 30.1 31.8 27.4 
DC and/or DB plans 91.8 83.1 87.1 80.3 86.6 77.4 
Technical and clerical 
All DC accounts 57.5 53.5 74.8 63.5 68.5 71.5 
All DB plans 25.2 45.5 32.7 22.4 22.4 20.1 
DC and/or DB plans 71.8 75.9 81.2 71.8 73.6 77.4 
Service workers 
All DC accounts 27.9 19.9 53.3 39.6 56.2 35.8 
All DB plans 48.4 34.0 54.8 20.1 43.4 15.7 
DC and/or DB plans 61.2 44.8 76.1 52.7 73.3 42.9 
Craft, operative, and agricultural 
All DC accounts 51.7 28.5 53.5 40.1 53.5 58.2 
All DB plans 40.1 17.1 36.3 24.6 20.4 7.2 
DC and/or DB plans 72.2 35.6 71.0 55.7 61.5 60.6 
(continued) 
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Table B.2  (continued) 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
By work statusa 
Aged 46 and under 
Part-time, full-year 
All DC accounts 17.4 24.1 27.5 31.4 37.0 32.7 
All DB plans 24.3 8.8 7.5 8.3 2.7 4.1 
DC and/or DB plans 35.2 29.8 31.8 35.5 37.0 35.6 
Full-time, part-year 
All DC accounts 33.0 42.9 49.8 42.9 34.9 57.8 
All DB plans 26.6 41.8 11.8 31.6 10.4 20.6 
DC and/or DB plans 47.9 64.1 53.3 63.5 38.3 67.8 
Part-time, part-year 
All DC accounts 18.7 35.8 19.8 34.5 30.9 33.0 
All DB plans 15.3 10.1 1.2 8.7 17.7 9.5 
DC and/or DB plans 27.1 42.8 20.1 38.7 40.3 38.1 
Full-time, full-year 
All DC accounts 43.1 40.7 58.8 49.9 51.9 50.8 
All DB plans 34.9 30.1 18.6 14.7 13.4 12.8 
DC and/or DB plans 62.5 55.0 65.4 56.7 55.5 56.9 
Self-employed workers 
All DC accounts 31.3 52.1 40.6 46.4 31.3 37.6 
All DB plans 9.9 20.3 6.7 11.5 1.3 12.6 
DC and/or DB plans 34.6 62.0 43.2 50.9 32.4 40.8 
Aged 47–64 
Part-time, full-year 
All DC accounts 58.8 31.1 48.2 48.0 60.2 50.6 
All DB plans 25.4 24.1 37.3 16.8 17.9 17.0 
DC and/or DB plans 70.9 46.7 64.1 57.1 64.1 54.9 
Full-time, part-year 
All DC accounts 70.5 54.2 66.7 64.4 55.8 58.6 
All DB plans 37.1 72.1 42.5 48.5 30.0 32.3 
DC and/or DB plans 81.8 91.0 83.4 87.3 66.8 73.6 
Part-time, part-year 
All DC accounts 46.9 50.7 72.8 65.1 72.2 60.5 
All DB plans 8.8 14.0 49.7 23.3 24.1 18.8 
DC and/or DB plans 46.9 55.7 84.7 72.6 78.7 63.1 
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Table B.2  (continued) 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
By work statusa (cont.) 
Aged 47–64 (cont.) 
Full-time, full-year 
All DC accounts 60.5 54.8 67.8 63.8 68.2 68.8 
All DB plans 46.9 42.2 38.4 24.5 28.0 22.6 
DC and/or DB plans 80.0 72.3 80.4 72.1 76.3 76.9 
Self-employed workers 
All DC accounts 58.8 44.8 63.6 49.8 54.1 48.2 
All DB plans 12.3 20.9 20.5 22.6 11.1 20.3 
DC and/or DB plans 63.7 50.4 71.2 62.1 57.6 52.4 
NOTE: The table includes only current workers aged 64 and under. Industries are 
grouped into four classiﬁcations: 1) agriculture, mining, and manufacturing; 2) whole-
sale and retail trade; 3) communications, information services, ﬁnance, insurance, real 
estate, repair services, transportation, utilities, professional services, and personal ser-
vices; and 4) public administration. 
a Part-time = less than 35 hours per week; part-year = less than 50 weeks per year. Self-
employment may be part-time or full-time. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Tab le B.3  Percentage of Workers with Pension Coverage by Age and 
Earnings Quintile, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Aged 46 and under 
Bottom earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 32.4 34.2 37.4 36.6 26.7 32.7 
All DB plans 29.3 22.8 8.8 11.4 6.3 6.9 
DC and/or DB plans 51.3 46.8 42.7 43.3 29.8 37.9 
Second earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 75.3 71.7 67.9 67.4 58.6 61.4 
All DB plans 47.5 64.6 22.3 23.1 15.6 20.4 
DC and/or DB plans 92.8 87.0 76.0 76.3 64.0 71.5 
Third earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 64.6 98.8 79.5 82.9 71.6 85.6 
All DB plans 57.8 40.3 32.7 31.9 18.4 19.0 
DC and/or DB plans 89.2 99.8 88.2 92.3 75.0 89.4 
Fourth earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 89.8 100.0 88.1 95.7 85.0 81.4 
All DB plans 28.0 11.8 24.3 8.8 27.1 27.2 
DC and/or DB plans 89.8 100.0 89.2 95.7 88.0 83.6 
Top earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 67.7 99.5 91.3 57.7 93.2 85.0 
All DB plans 72.5 96.5 26.4 29.1 19.2 6.0 
DC and/or DB plans 96.4 100.0 91.8 78.2 93.5 85.0 
Aged 47–64 
Bottom earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 52.4 47.7 55.9 53.0 49.2 52.8 
All DB plans 35.7 36.6 31.5 20.2 17.3 16.7 
DC and/or DB plans 72.2 65.5 70.3 62.9 57.4 60.1 
Second earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 73.9 84.9 68.1 78.6 68.2 76.5 
All DB plans 63.3 69.6 41.5 36.3 32.6 31.2 
DC and/or DB plans 92.4 96.4 80.7 89.9 78.6 88.0 
Third earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 89.9 96.4 71.4 78.5 75.1 85.6 
All DB plans 71.2 62.7 55.6 39.4 34.2 32.9 
DC and/or DB plans 98.3 99.9 92.1 87.5 84.6 92.1 
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Tab le B.3  (continued) 
1989 2001 2007 
Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Fourth earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 93.3 99.8 91.6 92.3 84.9 85.7 
All DB plans 55.3 49.2 44.4 40.1 36.4 26.2 
DC and/or DB plans 93.3 99.8 92.5 92.3 90.7 89.1 
Top earnings quintile 
All DC accounts 91.4 100.0 91.2 95.6 96.0 85.4 
All DB plans 52.7 0.0 31.5 48.4 25.1 15.2 
DC and/or DB plans 99.9 100.0 94.9 100.0 96.5 85.4 
NOTE: The table includes only current workers age 64 and under. Self-employed are 
excluded from this table. Earnings quintiles are based on the combined distribution of 
annual earnings for men and women. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Appendix C 
Augmented Wealth Including 
Employer Contributions to 
DC Plans and Net of Taxes 
Table C.1  Augmented Wealth, Net of Federal Income Taxes on 
Receipt and Including Employer Contribution to DC Plans 
(DCEMP), 1983–2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
All households 
Mean values including DCEMP 
Net pension wealth* — 68.3 119.7 132.0 
Net private accumulations* — 367.4 502.1 591.5 
Net retirement wealth* — 171.0 262.0 276.8 
Net augmented wealth* — 470.0 644.4 736.3 
Median values including DCEMP 
Pension wealth — 10.6 34.2 33.7 
Private accumulations — 122.4 138.7 158.6 
Retirement wealth — 124.2 185.6 184.5 
Augmented wealth — 227.1 287.3 312.5 
Aged 46 and under 
Mean values including DCEMP 
Net pension wealth* — 49.7 78.2 74.3 
Net private accumulations* — 211.7 250.1 253.5 
Net retirement wealth* — 134.4 189.5 185.2 
Net augmented wealth* — 296.3 361.4 364.3 
Median values including DCEMP 
Pension wealth — 4.5 18.3 6.3 
Private accumulations — 60.1 62.4 54.3 
Retirement wealth — 100.8 141.5 131.0 
Augmented wealth — 148.5 178.5 167.6 
(continued) 
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Table C.1  (continued) 
1983 1989 2001 2007 
Aged 47–64 
Mean values including DCEMP 
Net pension wealth 75.2 106.6 188.2 204.0 
Net private accumulations 503.1 563.2 775.6 873.4 
Net retirement wealth 233.8 231.8 373.3 389.7 
Net augmented wealth 661.6 688.4 960.7 1,059.1 
Aged 47–64 
Median values including DCEMP 
Pension wealth 39.1 41.2 77.8 84.9 
Private accumulations 202.6 212.1 253.2 287.3 
Retirement wealth 196.1 176.2 275.6 279.2 
Augmented wealth 359.6 364.0 448.1 471.2 
NOTE: Augmented wealth includes employer contributions to deﬁned contribution 
pension plans (DCEMP). Households are classiﬁed into age groups by the age of 
the head of household. Key: Private accumulations = nonpension wealth + pension 
wealth. Retirement wealth = PW + SSW. Augmented wealth = NWX + PW + SSW. — 
= data not available. Augmented wealth* includes employer contributions to deﬁned 
contribution pension plans. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1983, 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Appendix D 
Extended Results on 
Retirement Adequacy 
Table D.1  Average Annual Real Rates of Return Used in 
Annuity Calculations 
Average rates of return (%) 
Period Period 
Asset type available chosen Nominal Real 
Owner-occupied housinga 1968–2007 1968–2007 5.96 1.39 
Business and nonhome real estateb 1953–2007 1960–2007 6.96 2.63 
Liquid assetsc 1965–2007 1965–2007 5.48 0.88 
Financial assetsd 1955–2007 1960–2007 7.54 3.19 
Deﬁned contribution accountse 1986–2007 1986–2007 6.72 3.58 
Mortgage debt 1960–2007 0.00 −4.04 
Nonmortgage debt 1960–2007 0.00 −4.04 
Inﬂation rate (CPI-U average)f 1960–2007 4.21 
1965–2007 4.55 
1968–2007 4.58 
1986–2007 3.03 
NOTE: Real Rate of Return = (1 + Nominal Rate) / (1 + ΔCPI) − 1. 
a Owner-occupied housing: U.S. Census Bureau (2009, Table 943). Updated with data 
from the National Association of Realtors, Washington, DC: Median Sales Price of 
Existing Single-Family Homes for Metropolitan Areas, at www. Realtor.org/research. 
b Business and nonhome real estate: Holding gains (taken from the Flow of Funds table 
R.100) divided by equity in noncorporate business (taken from the Flow of Funds 
Table B.100).
 Liquid assets: The weighted average of the rates of return on checking deposits and 
cash, time and saving deposits, and life insurance reserves. The weights are the pro-
portion of these assets in their combined total (calculated from the Flow of Funds 
Table B.100). The assumptions regarding the rates of return are zero for checking 
deposits, the rate of return on a one-month CD (taken from the table “H.15 Select-
ed Interest Rates,” published by the Federal Reserve and available at http://www 
.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm) for time and saving deposits, and one plus 
the inﬂation rate for life insurance reserves. 
d Financial assets: The weighted average of the rates of return on open market paper, 
Treasury securities, municipal securities, corporate and foreign bonds, corporate equi-
ties, and mutual fund shares. The weights are the proportion of these assets in total 
295 
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Table D.1  (continued) 
ﬁnancial assets held by the household sector (calculated from the Flow of Funds Table 
B.100). The assumption regarding the rate of return on open market paper is that it 
equals the rate of return on one-month ﬁnance paper (taken from the Table H.15 “Se-
lected Interest Rates,” published by the Federal Reserve and available at http://www 
.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm). The data for the rates of return on other 
assets are taken from the Economic Report of the President 2005, Table B.73. The 
assumptions regarding Treasury securities, municipal securities, corporate and for-
eign bonds, and corporate equities are, respectively, the average of Treasury security 
yields, high-grade municipal bond yields, the average of corporate bond yields, and 
annual percent change in the S&P 500 index. Mutual fund shares are assumed to earn 
a rate of return equal to the weighted average of the rates of return on open market 
paper, Treasury securities, municipal securities, corporate and foreign bonds, and cor-
porate equities. The weights are the proportions of these assets in the total ﬁnancial 
assets of mutual funds (calculated from the Flow of Funds Table L.123). 
e Pension (deﬁned contribution) accounts: Net acquisition of ﬁnancial assets (taken 
from the Flow of Funds Table F.119c) divided by total ﬁnancial assets of private 
deﬁned-contribution plans (taken from the Flow of Funds table L.119c). 
f Inﬂation rate: Calculated from the CPI-U, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
SOURCE: Wolff, Zacharias, and Masterson (2009). 
W
olff.indb
297
W
olff.indb  297
11/21/2011
9:20:03
A
M
11/21/2011  9:20:03 A
M
 
 
 
  
 
   
   
 
Table D.2  Composition of Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension 
and Social Security Beneﬁts, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (%) 
Nonhome, Deﬁned 
nonpension Home contribution Deﬁ ned beneﬁt Social 
wealth equity plans pensions Security Total 
1989 
Aged 47–64 41.6 13.9 8.1 19.0 17.5 100.0 
Aged 47–55 42.0 13.7 11.1 16.9 16.3 100.0 
Aged 56–64 40.9 14.2 3.3 22.4 19.2 100.0 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 43.0 13.5 8.6 18.1 16.8 100.0 
African American or Hispanica 24.6 17.1 2.3 31.5 24.4 100.0 
Married couples 42.4 13.1 8.0 19.0 17.5 100.0 
Single males 50.4 16.1 5.2 14.9 13.4 100.0 
Single females 31.1 17.1 10.7 21.5 19.7 100.0 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 26.8 16.9 7.1 25.4 23.9 100.0 
12 years of schoolingb 42.3 14.8 4.6 16.1 22.2 100.0 
13–15 years of schoolingb 35.8 15.8 10.2 19.6 18.5 100.0 
16 or more years of schoolingb 52.9 10.6 9.9 16.3 10.2 100.0 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 18.8 22.0 0.0 10.8 48.4 100.0 
Income quintile 2 24.8 17.7 3.2 20.8 33.5 100.0 
Income quintile 3 25.4 17.6 5.3 26.3 25.4 100.0 
Income quintile 4 25.7 14.0 10.3 28.4 21.7 100.0 
Income quintile 5 56.5 11.6 9.5 13.6 8.7 100.0 
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Table D.2  (continued) 
2001 
Aged 47–64 39.2 11.7 17.0 13.8 18.4 100.0 
Aged 47–55 36.6 11.8 18.6 14.7 18.3 100.0 
Aged 56–64 43.4 11.4 14.4 12.4 18.5 100.0 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 40.9 11.6 17.2 13.0 17.4 100.0 
African American or Hispanica 20.6 12.9 14.6 21.8 30.0 100.0 
Married couples 40.7 11.0 17.2 12.8 18.3 100.0 
Single males 32.5 12.7 18.1 20.6 16.1 100.0 
Single females 35.6 15.6 13.6 13.3 21.9 100.0 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 17.2 15.7 9.2 16.8 41.1 100.0 
12 years of schoolingb 26.6 13.6 14.9 15.8 29.1 100.0 
13–15 years of schoolingb 31.3 14.5 15.6 15.2 23.4 100.0 
16 or more years of schoolingb 45.8 10.2 18.4 12.6 13.0 100.0 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 14.1 15.3 9.3 13.1 48.3 100.0 
Income quintile 2 14.9 16.5 11.1 18.2 39.2 100.0 
Income quintile 3 15.8 13.2 13.0 28.7 29.3 100.0 
Income quintile 4 24.5 14.5 20.5 15.8 24.6 100.0 
Income quintile 5 53.8 9.5 17.9 9.6 9.1 100.0 
2007 
Aged 47–64 37.4 14.4 18.3 12.7 17.2 100.0 
Aged 47–55 35.9 15.0 19.3 12.5 17.3 100.0 
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Aged 56–64 39.5 13.6 16.8 13.0 17.0 100.0 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 39.1 13.9 18.6 12.3 16.1 100.0 
African American or Hispanica 21.0 19.2 15.1 17.8 26.9 100.0 
Married couples 39.0 13.9 18.3 12.1 16.7 100.0 
Single males 38.3 13.9 19.8 12.8 15.1 100.0 
Single females 22.9 19.9 17.1 17.4 22.7 100.0 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 14.3 20.4 9.2 7.0 49.1 100.0 
12 years of schoolingb 22.5 19.3 15.2 14.2 28.7 100.0 
13–15 years of schoolingb 28.4 16.0 18.2 15.9 21.5 100.0 
16 or more years of schoolingb 43.8 12.7 19.4 11.8 12.2 100.0 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 24.4 19.9 4.4 9.0 42.3 100.0 
Income quintile 2 17.7 19.5 11.5 15.3 36.0 100.0 
Income quintile 3 15.4 17.3 19.7 19.4 28.2 100.0 
Income quintile 4 15.4 17.0 23.8 19.5 24.3 100.0 
Income quintile 5 52.0 12.0 18.2 9.3 8.5 100.0 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁ t) from 
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Totals may not sum to 100.0 due to rounding. 
Key: Home equity: net equity in owner-occupied housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home 
equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned 
contribution pension plans + present discounted value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Table D.3  Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security 
Beneﬁts, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Nonhome, Deﬁned Deﬁned 
nonpension Home contribution beneﬁt Social  Total: 
wealth equity plans pensions Security Total Method A 
1989 
Aged 47–64 30.4 10.2 5.9 13.9 12.8 73.2 73.1 
Aged 47–55 35.2 11.5 9.3 14.2 13.7 83.9 80.6 
Aged 56–64 25.0 8.7 2.0 13.7 11.7 61.1 64.4 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 35.9 11.3 7.2 15.1 14.0 83.5 81.4 
African American or Hispanica 7.7 5.3 0.7 9.8 7.6 31.2 34.4 
Married couples 39.9 12.4 7.5 17.9 16.4 94.1 90.9 
Single males 28.9 9.2 3.0 8.6 7.7 57.4 59.7 
Single females 10.2 5.6 3.5 7.0 6.4 32.8 34.2 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 9.7 6.1 2.6 9.2 8.6 36.2 37.0 
12 years of schoolingb 32.4 11.3 3.5 12.3 17.0 76.5 75.8 
13–15 years of schoolingb 31.0 13.7 8.9 17.0 16.0 86.5 81.4 
16 or more years of schoolingb 92.1 18.5 17.2 28.3 17.8 173.9 166.1 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 2.3 2.7 0.0 1.3 6.0 12.3 14.6 
Income quintile 2 8.4 6.0 1.1 7.0 11.3 33.7 33.9 
Income quintile 3 13.4 9.2 2.8 13.8 13.3 52.5 50.9 
Income quintile 4 18.2 9.9 7.3 20.2 15.4 71.0 67.4 
Income quintile 5 113.4 23.3 19.1 27.3 17.5 200.7 190.6 
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2001 
Aged 47–64 40.3 12.0 17.4 14.2 18.9 102.8 99.2 
Aged 47–55 38.4 12.4 19.4 15.4 19.2 104.8 99.1 
Aged 56–64 43.3 11.4 14.3 12.4 18.4 99.9 99.3 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 48.2 13.6 20.2 15.3 20.5 117.8 112.9 
African American or Hispanica 8.6 5.4 6.1 9.1 12.5 41.6 39.9 
Married couples 55.7 15.1 23.5 17.4 25.0 136.7 130.7 
Single males 24.1 9.5 13.4 15.3 12.0 74.3 70.4 
Single females 14.4 6.3 5.5 5.4 8.9 40.4 40.5 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 5.4 4.9 2.9 5.3 12.9 31.3 31.9 
12 years of schoolingb 14.3 7.3 8.0 8.5 15.6 53.7 52.1 
13–15 years of schoolingb 22.0 10.2 11.0 10.7 16.4 70.2 67.3 
16 or more years of schoolingb 92.7 20.7 37.2 25.6 26.3 202.6 191.4 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 3.2 3.5 2.1 3.0 11.0 22.7 23.2 
Income quintile 2 5.7 6.2 4.2 6.9 14.9 37.9 36.9 
Income quintile 3 9.6 8.0 7.9 17.4 17.7 60.5 57.9 
Income quintile 4 23.0 13.6 19.3 14.8 23.1 93.8 88.0 
Income quintile 5 166.9 29.6 55.6 29.8 28.3 310.3 293.0 
2007 
Aged 47–64 41.6 16.1 20.3 14.2 19.1 111.3 106.9 
Aged 47–55 40.4 16.9 21.7 14.1 19.5 112.6 106.5 
Aged 56–64 43.2 14.9 18.4 14.3 18.7 109.6 107.4 
(continued) 
301 
W
olff.indb
302
W
olff.indb  302
11/21/2011
9:20:06
A
M
11/21/2011  9:20:06 A
M
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
   
 
302  
Table D.3  (continued) 
Nonhome, Deﬁned Deﬁned 
nonpension Home contribution beneﬁt Social  Total: 
wealth equity plans pensions Security Total Method A 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 49.0 17.5 23.3 15.4 20.3 125.5 119.9 
African American or Hispanica 11.3 10.3 8.1 9.6 14.5 53.8 52.5 
Married couples 57.5 20.4 26.9 17.9 24.7 147.5 140.8 
Single males 29.7 10.8 15.4 10.0 11.7 77.5 74.6 
Single females 9.5 8.3 7.1 7.2 9.4 41.5 40.5 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 3.8 5.4 2.4 1.8 12.9 26.3 27.0 
12 years of schoolingb 12.6 10.8 8.5 8.0 16.1 56.0 54.2 
13–15 years of schoolingb 21.7 12.2 13.9 12.1 16.4 76.3 73.3 
16 or more years of schoolingb 90.3 26.2 39.9 24.4 25.2 206.0 193.9 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 5.9 4.8 1.1 2.2 10.2 24.2 25.3 
Income quintile 2 7.1 7.8 4.6 6.1 14.3 39.8 39.4 
Income quintile 3 10.3 11.5 13.1 13.0 18.9 66.8 62.5 
Income quintile 4 15.3 16.8 23.5 19.3 24.1 99.1 91.6 
Income quintile 5 174.6 40.4 61.2 31.1 28.6 335.8 317.7 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁ t) from 
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied 
housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁ ned con-
tribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted value 
of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
W
olff.indb
303
W
olff.indb  303
11/21/2011
9:20:07
A
M
11/21/2011  9:20:07 A
M
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
Table D.4  Expected Mean Retirement Income Based on Wealth Holdings, Expected Pension Beneﬁts, and Expected 
Social Security Beneﬁts, by Detailed Component, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (in thousands, 2007$) 
Expected 
Actual Actual Expected Expected 
annuity Expected plus plus annuity annuity Total 
from annuity Expected expected expected Expected Expected from from Total expected 
nonhome, from annuity annual annual annuity annuity future future expected retirement 
nonpension home from deﬁned Soc. Sec. from from gains gains in retirement income: 
wealth equity DC plans beneﬁt beneﬁt DCEMP DCEMPW in NWX DCTOT income Method A 
1989 
Aged 47–64 23.0 8.4 1.6 13.9 12.8 1.2 0.9 9.2 2.2 73.2 73.1 
Aged 47–55 24.0 8.7 1.5 14.2 13.7 2.2 1.8 14.0 3.8 83.9 80.6 
Aged 56–64 21.9 8.0 1.7 13.7 11.7 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.4 61.1 64.4 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 27.2 9.3 1.9 15.1 14.0 1.5 1.1 10.7 2.7 83.5 81.4 
African American or Hispanica 5.8 4.5 0.1 9.8 7.6 0.1 0.2 2.7 0.3 31.2 34.4 
Married couples 30.0 10.1 2.0 17.9 16.4 1.4 1.3 12.2 2.9 94.1 90.9 
Single males 22.3 7.7 1.1 8.6 7.7 0.6 0.2 8.1 1.0 57.4 59.7 
Single females 8.0 4.8 0.8 7.0 6.4 1.0 0.5 3.0 1.2 32.8 34.2 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 7.5 5.3 0.6 9.2 8.6 0.7 0.4 3.1 0.9 36.2 37.0 
12 years of schoolingb 23.9 9.1 1.0 12.3 17.0 0.3 0.9 10.6 1.3 76.5 75.8 
13–15 years of schoolingb 22.5 10.8 1.3 17.0 16.0 2.2 1.6 11.4 3.8 86.5 81.4 
16 or more years of schoolingb 70.8 15.2 5.6 28.3 17.8 3.2 2.1 24.6 6.3 173.9 166.1 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 1.8 2.4 0.0 1.3 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 12.3 14.6 
Income quintile 2 6.4 5.1 0.2 7.0 11.3 0.2 0.3 2.9 0.4 33.7 33.9 
Income quintile 3 10.4 7.6 0.3 13.8 13.3 0.6 0.7 4.6 1.2 52.5 50.9 
Income quintile 4 14.1 8.2 2.0 20.2 15.4 1.4 1.2 5.9 2.6 71.0 67.4 
Income quintile 5 85.2 18.9 5.6 27.3 17.5 3.8 2.5 32.7 7.2 200.7 190.6 
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Table D.4  (continued) 
Expected 
Actual Actual Expected Expected 
annuity Expected plus plus annuity annuity Total 
from annuity Expected expected expected Expected Expected from from Total expected 
nonhome, from annuity annual annual annuity annuity future future expected retirement 
nonpension home from deﬁned Soc. Sec. from from gains gains in retirement income: 
wealth equity DC plans beneﬁt beneﬁt DCEMP DCEMPW in NWX DCTOT income Method A 
2001
 Aged 47–64 31.3 9.4 8.3 14.2 18.9 2.6 0.8 11.7 5.7 102.8 99.2 
Aged 47–55 27.0 8.9 7.4 15.4 19.2 3.2 1.2 14.9 7.7 104.8 99.1 
Aged 56–64 37.8 10.2 9.7 12.4 18.4 1.7 0.3 6.7 2.6 99.9 99.3 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 37.3 10.8 9.9 15.3 20.5 3.0 0.9 13.7 6.5 117.8 112.9 
African American or Hispanica 6.5 3.9 1.9 9.1 12.5 1.3 0.5 3.5 2.3 41.6 39.9 
Married couples 43.2 11.9 11.6 17.4 25.0 3.3 1.1 15.7 7.5 136.7 130.7 
Single males 18.5 7.3 5.3 15.3 12.0 2.7 0.7 7.8 4.8 74.3 70.4 
Single females 11.1 4.9 2.5 5.4 8.9 1.0 0.2 4.6 1.8 40.4 40.5 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 4.3 4.1 1.4 5.3 12.9 0.5 0.2 1.9 0.8 31.3 31.9 
12 years of schoolingb 10.9 5.7 3.6 8.5 15.6 1.2 0.4 5.0 2.8 53.7 52.1 
13–15 years of schoolingb 17.4 7.9 5.0 10.7 16.4 1.7 0.6 6.9 3.7 70.2 67.3 
16 or more years of schoolingb 71.7 16.2 18.0 25.6 26.3 5.6 1.7 25.6 11.9 202.6 191.4 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 2.4 3.0 0.9 3.0 11.0 0.4 0.1 1.3 0.7 22.7 23.2 
Income quintile 2 4.3 4.9 1.8 6.9 14.9 0.8 0.3 2.8 1.4 37.9 36.9 
Income quintile 3 7.5 6.2 3.3 17.4 17.7 1.4 0.5 3.8 2.6 60.5 57.9 
Income quintile 4 18.0 10.3 8.9 14.8 23.1 2.7 1.3 8.3 6.4 93.8 88.0 
Income quintile 5 129.3 23.3 27.5 29.8 28.3 8.2 2.1 44.0 17.8 310.3 293.0 
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2007 
Aged 47–64 32.5 12.6 9.7 14.2 19.1 2.8 1.5 12.5 6.4 111.3 106.9 
Aged 47–55 28.2 12.2 7.9 14.1 19.5 3.3 2.0 16.9 8.6 112.6 106.5 
Aged 56–64 38.2 13.2 12.1 14.3 18.7 2.0 1.0 6.7 3.3 109.6 107.4 
Aged 47–64 0.0 
Non-Hispanic whitea 38.3 13.8 11.3 15.4 20.3 3.1 1.7 14.3 7.2 125.5 119.9 
African American or Hispanica 8.6 7.8 3.2 9.6 14.5 1.3 0.9 5.3 2.7 53.8 52.5 
Married couples 45.0 16.1 12.9 17.9 24.7 3.6 2.1 16.9 8.3 147.5 140.8 
Single males 22.7 8.2 7.0 10.0 11.7 2.1 1.0 9.6 5.2 77.5 74.6 
Single females 7.5 6.7 3.3 7.2 9.4 1.0 0.5 3.7 2.2 41.5 40.5 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 2.8 4.2 1.1 1.8 12.9 0.4 0.2 2.2 0.8 26.3 27.0 
12 years of schoolingb 9.7 8.4 3.9 8.0 16.1 1.1 0.8 5.3 2.8 56.0 54.2 
13–15 years of schoolingb 16.6 9.6 6.7 12.1 16.4 1.7 1.2 7.6 4.4 76.3 73.3 
16 or more years of schoolingb 70.8 20.7 19.2 24.4 25.2 5.6 2.8 24.9 12.4 206.0 193.9 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 4.6 4.0 0.5 2.2 10.2 0.2 0.1 2.1 0.3 24.2 25.3 
Income quintile 2 5.8 6.2 2.5 6.1 14.3 0.5 0.3 2.8 1.2 39.8 39.4 
Income quintile 3 8.1 9.1 5.6 13.0 18.9 1.9 1.1 4.7 4.5 66.8 62.5 
Income quintile 4 11.8 12.8 10.9 19.3 24.1 2.7 2.6 7.5 7.4 99.1 91.6 
Income quintile 5 136.1 31.9 29.9 31.1 28.6 8.7 3.6 46.9 18.9 335.8 317.7 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁt) from the 
current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied hous-
ing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁ ned contribution 
wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted value of future 
employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Table D.5  Percentage of Households with Expected Retirement Income Less Than the Poverty Line, Based on 
Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security Beneﬁts, 1989, 2001, and 2007 
Total 
expected Marginal Marginal 
retirement effect effect 
Nonhome, FWX NWX plus NWX income: of all of all 
nonpension plus half of Nonpension DC plans plus all NWX + PW pensions, pensions, 
wealth home equity wealth (DCTOT) pensions + Soc. Sec. 1989 2007 
1989 
Aged 47–64 67.5 57.0 45.1 40.7 27.5 14.8 −17.6 −17.3 
Aged 47–55 64.9 50.8 40.4 32.1 23.6 13.2 −16.8 −16.9 
Aged 56–64 70.6 64.1 50.7 50.7 32.1 16.7 −18.6 −17.9 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 60.5 47.8 35.1 30.1 15.9 3.2 −19.2 −18.4 
African American or Hispanica 91.1 87.5 77.3 74.0 63.0 48.1 −14.4 −16.3 
Married couples 64.5 49.8 36.8 33.2 19.0 7.3 −17.8 −16.5 
Single males 59.4 56.5 45.9 44.1 23.3 11.4 −22.6 −13.5 
Single females 77.5 73.5 63.7 56.3 48.4 33.2 −15.3 −21.4 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 82.4 75.9 62.9 57.4 42.4 26.7 −20.5 −11.4 
12 years of schoolingb 60.2 47.1 34.9 29.6 16.9 1.6 −18.0 −21.5 
13–15 years of schoolingb 51.9 37.0 22.3 19.8 7.3 0.4 −15.0 −23.1 
16 or more years of schoolingb 42.3 25.8 20.2 18.5 9.7 5.4 −10.4 −12.2 
2001 
Aged 47–64 71.7 62.3 50.2 38.9 30.2 10.2 
Aged 47–55 71.6 62.1 49.0 35.9 29.0 10.7 
Aged 56–64 71.7 62.6 52.0 43.5 32.0 9.4 
Aged 47–64 
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Non-Hispanic whitea 67.1 56.9 43.5 31.5 22.8 4.0 
African American or Hispanica 86.0 78.5 69.7 59.5 49.7 21.6 
Married couples 65.4 55.3 41.3 29.3 21.7 3.9 
Single males 77.6 66.7 53.4 44.0 32.0 11.9 
Single females 82.9 76.3 69.7 58.7 49.9 24.4 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 91.8 87.3 78.7 72.2 59.4 23.8 
12 years of schoolingb 83.2 72.5 63.1 48.6 36.6 10.6 
13–15 years of schoolingb 71.8 63.7 47.8 34.2 25.9 6.8 
16 or more years of schoolingb 52.7 41.0 27.9 18.5 14.2 5.7 
2007 
Aged 47–64 75.1 59.8 45.2 33.2 27.9 10.2 
Aged 47–55 76.6 59.3 45.5 31.7 28.6 11.6 
Aged 56–64 72.9 60.4 44.9 35.3 27.0 8.2 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 70.6 54.0 38.9 25.9 20.5 4.8 
African American or Hispanica 88.4 75.1 60.2 49.7 43.9 13.9 
Married couples 70.9 54.0 37.1 24.9 20.6 5.7 
Single males 72.1 57.8 50.3 44.0 36.8 12.8 
Single females 86.9 74.9 62.4 48.0 41.0 19.7 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 94.2 92.0 80.1 74.6 68.7 28.1 
12 years of schoolingb 86.3 72.6 54.3 39.9 32.8 9.0 
13–15 years of schoolingb 80.7 62.8 50.4 32.5 27.4 9.0 
16 or more years of schoolingb 56.4 37.5 23.9 15.5 11.7 6.4 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Each column equals the expected annuity (or annual beneﬁ t) from 
the current holdings of the indicated asset plus any future expected gains on the asset. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied 
housing. Nonhome, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home equity. Deﬁned contribution plans: Total deﬁned 
contribution wealth = deﬁned contribution wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + present discounted 
value of future employee contributions into employee’s deﬁned contribution plan. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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Table D.6  Share of Households with Expected Replacement Income Greater Than or Equal to Three-Quarters 
of Projected Income at Age 64, Based on Wealth Holdings and Expected Pension and Social Security 
Beneﬁts, 1989, 2001, and 2007 (%) 
Nonhome, Total expected 
nonpension Nonhome, Nonhome, retirement 
Nonhome, wealth plus nonpension nonpension income: 
nonpension half of home Nonpension wealth plus wealth plus NWX + PW + 
wealth equity wealth DC plans all pensions Soc. Sec. 
1989 
Aged 47–64 6.8 8.0 10.8 13.0 27.8 45.4 
Aged 47–55 6.7 7.7 8.8 11.9 23.6 38.8 
Aged 56–64 6.9 8.3 13.1 14.2 32.6 53.0 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 8.3 9.5 13.1 16.0 31.7 49.7 
African American or Hispanica 1.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 16.4 35.2 
Married couples 7.0 8.7 10.8 13.2 26.0 47.3 
Single males 10.9 10.9 22.0 22.0 44.2 54.0 
Single females 4.8 5.2 6.5 9.1 25.6 37.6 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 3.9 4.6 6.9 8.9 23.8 42.1 
12 years of schoolingb 11.0 13.7 16.3 17.0 28.0 47.8 
13–15 years of schoolingb 9.5 11.5 12.8 17.6 30.4 44.8 
16 or more years of schoolingb 8.4 8.6 14.1 17.1 37.8 52.7 
Income quintile, ages 47–64 
Income quintile 1 2.5 6.3 12.4 12.4 22.9 51.8 
Income quintile 2 7.7 7.7 10.1 10.1 23.2 45.8 
Income quintile 3 3.6 5.3 6.1 8.6 32.5 56.4 
Income quintile 4 5.8 6.4 10.7 15.4 28.2 33.6 
Income quintile 5 14.1 14.2 15.1 19.1 32.0 39.2 
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2001 
Aged 47–64 6.3 8.0 10.5 16.1 26.8 46.5 
Aged 47–55 4.9 6.5 8.6 14.0 24.3 40.7 
Aged 56–64 8.4 10.4 13.4 19.3 30.7 55.3 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 7.6 9.7 12.7 19.5 30.9 50.5 
African American or Hispanica 2.0 2.2 3.0 4.9 14.3 37.4 
Married couples 6.9 8.4 10.9 17.6 28.5 49.7 
Single males 4.9 8.2 10.8 18.0 30.9 47.1 
Single females 5.6 6.9 9.4 11.4 19.9 38.2 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 2.3 4.3 7.6 9.6 17.2 44.3 
12 years of schoolingb 5.1 5.9 7.9 12.4 21.7 44.8 
13–15 years of schoolingb 6.1 9.6 10.8 15.4 24.5 43.1 
16 or more years of schoolingb 9.2 10.3 13.7 22.8 37.4 51.5 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 7.5 12.1 17.0 19.2 28.1 62.2 
Income quintile 2 5.1 5.3 7.9 12.0 24.4 45.1 
Income quintile 3 3.1 3.6 4.5 9.6 20.8 38.4 
Income quintile 4 5.0 7.3 9.6 17.6 27.5 41.3 
Income quintile 5 10.9 11.8 13.3 22.3 33.7 45.1 
2007 
Aged 47–64 5.5 7.3 10.0 16.8 28.5 49.3 
Aged 47–55 4.4 6.1 8.1 14.7 26.1 43.7 
Aged 56–64 6.9 8.9 12.5 19.6 31.8 57.1 
Aged 47–64 
Non-Hispanic whitea 6.1 8.2 11.0 18.9 31.2 53.6 
African American or Hispanica 3.9 5.0 7.8 11.4 23.2 41.5 
(continued) 
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Table D.6  (continued) 
Nonhome, Total expected 
nonpension Nonhome, Nonhome, retirement 
Nonhome, wealth plus nonpension nonpension income: 
nonpension half of home Nonpension wealth plus wealth plus NWX + PW + 
wealth equity wealth DC plans all pensions Soc. Sec. 
Single males 9.9 11.2 14.9 20.8 35.8 57.2 
Single females 4.1 6.9 10.5 15.4 25.1 44.0 
Less than 12 years of schoolingb 2.2 2.5 3.1 4.4 7.5 34.6 
12 years of schoolingb 3.2 4.6 7.6 11.7 19.9 42.6 
13–15 years of schoolingb 6.1 8.3 10.2 15.2 27.5 45.9 
16 or more years of schoolingb 8.1 10.3 13.9 25.7 42.7 61.4 
Income quintile, aged 47–64 
Income quintile 1 6.7 10.4 16.8 19.4 25.6 57.3 
Income quintile 2 4.8 6.5 9.3 14.8 25.1 47.0 
Income quintile 3 4.0 5.7 7.6 16.0 29.2 47.8 
Income quintile 4 2.1 2.8 3.2 12.4 29.2 47.1 
Income quintile 5 10.1 11.2 12.9 21.5 33.8 47.3 
NOTE: Households are classiﬁed by the age of the head of household. Key: Home equity = net equity in owner-occupied housing. Non-
home, nonpension wealth = net worth − deﬁ ned contribution − home equity. Total deﬁned contribution wealth = deﬁ ned contribution 
wealth + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans + employer contributions to deﬁned contribution pension plans. 
a Asian and other races are excluded from the table because of small sample sizes. 
b Households are classiﬁed by the schooling level of the head of household. 
SOURCE: Author’s computations from the 1989, 2001, and 2007 SCF. 
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